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The overarching research question posed in this dissertation is related to our 
understanding of the role played by elections during processes of transition from 
authoritarianism and the subsequent consolidation of democratic rule. In this, the 
lessons to be drawn from the Spanish experience after the demise of the Franco 
dictatorship in 1975 will be assessed. Various researchers have pointed to the fact that 
the political elites that forged the transition from authoritarianism, in addition to the 
immediate task of restoring democracy as such, more or less deliberately sought to 
institutionalise a set of societal divisions into manifest political cleavages through free 
and competitive elections in a particular sequential fashion (Linz and Stepan 1995; 
Puhle 2005).  
However, although the notion of an electoral sequence is generally well argued at the 
level of political elites and political parties, it is far less established in terms of the 
behaviour of the individual voters. The overarching assumptions guiding the 
investigation in this dissertation is that there must somehow have been a nexus 
between the elite efforts to guide the process of turning pressing societal divisions 
into manifest cleavages and the structuring of electoral behaviour along these very 
same cleavages.  
In this, particular emphasis will be put on the territorial dimension of Spanish politics. 
It is a long-established fact the Spain has had to struggle with recurring tensions 
between the political Centre on the one hand and the economically advanced Basque 
and Catalan Peripheries on the other. In the wake of the transition, this was a pressing 
problem concerning the legitimacy of the very state. In fact, given the hard 
suppression suffered under the Franco regime, it was an open question whether the 
integrity of the Spanish state could be maintained when the voters after forty years of 
compulsory silence were given a say in politics.  Another pressing issue was that of 
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social reform and economic redistribution, for long left more or less left unattended 
by the Right-wing dictatorship. And, lastly, the impetus for neo-liberal reforms that 
took hold internationally in the 1980s had to be dealt with also in Spain.  
 
Thus, taking as point of departure the notion of an elite guided sequential 
transformation of societal divisions related to the issues of the political regime, the 
territorial structure of the state, the issue of economic redistribution, and, lastly, the 
impetus for neo-liberal reforms, all observed at the elite level, we shall probe into the 
question of how and to what extent this alleged sequence was reflected in terms of the 
structuring of voter behaviour between 1977 and 2000. Thus, the overarching research 
question in this dissertation can be stated as follows:  
 
How and to what extent may electoral participation and party choice in Spain 
between 1977 and 2000 be understood in relation to how the parties and voters 
handled the problems posed by the transition from authoritarianism and democratic 
consolidation, with particular reference to the sequence of translation of the societal 
divisions into manifest cleavages?  
 
The aim of this study is precisely to refine our understanding as to how the successful 
Spanish transition and democratic consolidation was achieved in relation to the 
structuring of the political behaviour of the masses. In this, the analysis of the 
dynamics of electoral behaviour at pairs of consecutive general elections to the lower 
chamber of the Spanish parliament will be used to assess the various aspects of this 
question.   
 
The structure of the dissertation 
 
In chapter 2, the theoretical foundations for what I have coined the electoral nexus in 
transitions from authoritarian rule and democratic consolidation are discussed. 
Derived from general theory on democratisation, party building, elections and 
cleavage formation, a set of overarching assumptions related to the loci of change and 
stability in newly enfranchised polities are presented. These assumptions serve as the 
basis for the elaboration of a conceptual framework for the study of the behaviour of 
the voters in terms of electoral mobilisation, stabilisation and competition. Then the 
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Spanish case of a transition from a long-lasting authoritarian regime in a polity ridden 
by a profound territorial problem is presented. The alleged timing and the sequence of 
the attempts to transform a legacy of societal divisions into manifest cleavages are 
discussed. In this, the territorial dimension of state- and nation building related to the 
Spanish case is catered to.   
 
In chapter 3, “Data and Methodology”, the data and the methodology employed are 
presented and discussed. First, the datasets elaborated are discussed and evaluated. 
Second, the methods for estimating changes between elections in the proportions of 
voters tied to aggregate units are catered to. Third, the LOGIT method for cross-level 
inference is explained and discussed. Fourth, the conceptualisation of ‘Centre’ and 
‘Peripheries’ in relation to the Spanish case is addressed and a so-called radial 
typology for the study of electoral behaviour along the territorial dimension is 
elaborated.  
 
In chapter 4, a general overview over process of party formation, the official results of 
the Parliamentary elections and the resulting party systems during the 1977-2000 
period is presented. Also the position of the relevant parties on the main cleavages of 
the political system is presented. In the light of the overarching theory discussed 
chapter 2, a set of more specific hypotheses are elaborated that, in turn, serve as the 
foundation for the empirical analyses that follow in chapters 5-9.  
 
Chapters 5-9, that are dedicated to the empirical analyses proper, the patterns of 
electoral mobilisation, stabilisation and competition will be assessed and the set of 
hypotheses tested.  
 
First, in chapter 5, we look into the macro level variation between pairs of elections in 
terms of aggregated correlations between proportions of the electorate at pairs of 
consecutive elections. This analysis is based on the more than 8.000 municipalities 
scattered across the Spanish territory. The first objective is to find out to what extent 
the electoral changes observed in the official results for Spain as a whole presented in 
chapter 4 are reflected across the Spanish territory. The second objective is to find out 
whether any changes in the electoral profiles of the municipalities not observed in the 
results for Spain as a whole are detected with particular reference to the sequence of 
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the electoral handling of the political issues. This chapter also gives initial indications 
as to the validity of the hypotheses elaborated in chapter 4.  
 
Second, in chapter 6, we embark upon the analysis of the behaviour of individual 
voters for the seven pairs of elections between 1977 and 2000 for Spain as a whole. In 
this, the proportions of the electorate at the pairs of elections that mobilised, remained 
loyal, transferred their vote to another party or simply demobilised at the second 
elections are assessed. The specific role played by electoral abstention in Spain is 
addressed. The main focus, however, is on identifying trends and changes in the 
electoral profiles of the various components of the party system(s) in relation to their 
positions on the main political cleavages. 
 
Third, in chapter 7, we undertake an analysis as to how electoral mobilisation and 
demobilisation have been structured along the main cleavages, with particular 
emphasis on the territorial dimension of Spanish politics. The aim is to find out how 
the main political cleavages are intersected with reference to political participation. 
 
Fourth, in chapter 8, we analyse the dynamics of electoral stabilisation in relation to 
the territorial dimension with particular reference to the notion of nationalisation of 
party voting in terms of differentiation between the Centre and the Peripheries. Also 
in this chapter the main objective is to find out how the main cleavages are intersected 
with reference to the state-wide parties.    
 
Fifth, in chapter 9, we embark upon the analysis of how and to what extent the 
electoral competition between the parties has been structured along the territorial 
dimension. Also here the main objective is to refine our understanding of how the 
main cleavages are intersected with reference to the state-wide parties. 
 
In chapter 10 the finding are summarised and the overarching conclusions as to the 







Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and Democratic 
Consolidation: The Electoral Nexus 
 
Third wave democracies 
The breakdown of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in Latin America, Southern 
and Eastern Europe paved the way for the so-called Third Wave of democratisation 
(Huntington 1991; Diamond and Gunther 2001; Puhle 2005). This process has 
spawned a considerable amount of comparative research and theorising on both the 
nature of transitions from authoritarian rule and the processes of democratic 
consolidation and persistence. Research on regime transitions has gained new insights 
on the relationship between structure and action, both in terms of the role played by 
key actors and the structure of the previous regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter1986; 
Karl and Schmitter 1991; Berglund and Dellenbrant 1994; Gunther et.al. 1995; Linz 
and Stepan 1996; Berglund and Aarebrot 2001; Diamandouros and Gunther 2001). 
Not surprisingly, the literature produced by this research emphasises the pivotal role 
played by elections in the process of democratisation. After all, free and competitive 
elections are at the heart of liberal democracy. However, the main point underscored 
by this research is that elections not only serve as a crucial test on the 
institutionalisation of one of the core procedures of democracy, they also structure the 
political mobilisation of the citizens, produce political organisations in terms of 
parties, and bestow legitimacy on the resulting rulers. Hence particular emphasis is 
put on the role of so-called founding elections in transitions from authoritarianism 
(O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986).  
 
Likewise, research on the consolidation of democracy tends to underscore the role of 
parties and party systems. Linking the characteristics of party systems to democratic 
legitimacy has a considerable tradition in the political science literature (Tóka 1996). 
Political parties are also at the heart of the modern notion of liberal democracy and 
have been seen to serve a series of important functions in democratic societies 
(Diamond and Gunther 2001). From a behavioural point of view, they are 
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intermediary institutions that are at the same time vote-seeking, office-seeking and 
policy-making institutions (Strøm 1990). From a societal perspective, parties may be 
regarded as transmission belts for social demands, and as delegates or representatives 
of civil society (Morlino 1995: 315). And, even though some of the multiple functions 
once seen to be served by traditional mass parties may have been taken over by other 
social institutions in modern societies, parties are still regarded as the only feasible 
providers of political recruits and governments in consolidated liberal democracies 
(Diamond and Gunther 2001). 
 
Thus, elections, parties, and party systems play crucial roles in the stabilisation and 
consolidation of liberal democracies (Pridham and Lewis 1996; Puhle 2005). The 
specific roles of elections and parties, however, might seem somewhat contradictory 
and perhaps paradoxical. On the one hand, regime consolidation requires a certain 
degree of stability, and yet, on the other hand, no competitive democracy can exist 
without the explicit possibility for change. This puzzle is solved by that in 
consolidated democracies stability and change take place at different loci in the 
political system.  Democratisation, then, is a complex process that operates at many 
levels simultaneously. There is, for example, a crucial distinction in terms of the 
general stability of the system one the one hand, and the changes in the composition 
of the legislature and the executive as a result of changing electoral fortunes on the 
other. When democracy is consolidated as “the only game in town”, a certain degree 
of systemic stability has been achieved and fluctuations in electoral volatility and 
party stability have lesser implications for the fate of the democratic system in terms 
of persistence than in regimes that have not achieved this stability (Diamond 1997; 
Linz and Stepan 1996).  
 
There is a particular aspect of democratic consolidation that deserves particular 
attention by electoral researchers: One thing is to state that a certain combination of 
stability and change at different levels seems indispensable to the very concept of 
liberal democracy, quite another is to assess the nature of the relationship between the 
two. In theory, system stability could coexist with recurrent radical and sweeping 
changes in party system formats from one election to another, but this is hardly 
conceivable in empirical terms. Such a situation would not only be extremely costly in 
terms of time and resources wasted on behalf of the citizenry and of the elected 
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representatives, but it would surely undermine any long-term investments in politics. 
The very meaning of long-term commitments would be at stake. Thus, some sort of 
anchoring of electoral behaviour and structuring of mass politics in relation to social 
context seems paramount to the consolidation of representative democracy.        
 
Consolidation of democracy, then, entails a multifaceted and multileveled process that 
relates to the stabilisation of electoral behaviour and patterns of partisan competition 
that, from a researcher’s point of view, typically involves key indicators of relevant 
electoral behaviour such as the degree of volatility and the occurrence of critical 
elections, i.e. elections that lead to a fundamental restructuring of the party system 
and voter alignments. As the process of democratic consolidation proceeds, volatility 
will tend to decrease and substantial realignments will be fewer and farther between. 
In short, party-voter relationships will have stabilised and the range of effective 
electoral competition will have narrowed down and become restricted to only some 
parts of the electorate (Morlino 1995). This process may entail the establishment of 
either some sort of ‘Downsian’ equilibrium or a “freezing” of electoral competition 
(Downs 1957; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). 
 
In terms of political theory, the salience of this process of stabilisation is rooted in the 
notion of vertical accountability, i.e. that a certain level of anchoring of the vote is 
seen as paramount to the reduction of the possibility for political manipulation of the 
electorate. Research on Europe and Latin America, for example, points to the fact that 
the lack of a substantial anchoring if the vote is an important dimension of the weak 
institutionalisation of party systems in much of Latin America (Mainwaring and 
Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Torcal 2004, 2006). The implicit conclusion that can be 
derived from this line of research is that some sort of stability in terms of 
institutionalisation of part systems and an anchoring of voter alignments appears to be 
an important aspect of a country’s ability to handle socio-economic and ideological 
transformations within a democratic context.   
 
There are basically two explanations put forward to explain the individual voter’s 
anchoring to the political parties and/or the party system: Identification with political 
parties proper and identification based on ideological orientations. In Europe, these 
identifications are generally explained in terms of the theory of social cleavages 
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and/or the theory of the Left-Right continuum as a heuristic cognitive device. 
According to the theory of social cleavages, citizens cast their votes in predictable 
ways because their position in the social structure vis-à-vis the position of others leads 
them to identify certain parties as the best advocates of their interests. More precisely, 
the individual’s location in the social structure in terms of class, religion, region, and 
urban-rural residence provides the underpinnings for political translations of one or 
more ‘us’ versus ‘them’ identities into a system of parties (Sartori 1990; Bartolini and 
Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In relation to the consolidation of democratic 
regimes, the institutionalisation of societal divisions into a set of manifest cleavages 
generates system level stability that in turn fosters long-term commitment and trust 
between the rulers and the ruled. The theory of ideological space, commonly 
embodied in the Left-Right continuum, offers a somewhat different approach to 
explaining electoral stability. In its original form it is derived from the theory of 
Downs in which the logic of inter-party competition is linked to the ideological 
positioning of the voters in a way that makes both the behaviour of the parties and of 
the voters predictable on rationalistic grounds (Downs 1957). This predictability 
enhances the possibility for the narrowing down of the electoral market and thus 
establishing long-term bonds of accountability between the party system and the 
citizenry. Conversely, in a society where only a fraction of the voters are able to 
locate themselves and the parties on the pertinent ideological dimensions, the electoral 
cycles tend to be less predictable and, in some cases, pave the way for short-term 
personalistic voting, populism and electoral manipulation (Mainwaring and Torcal 
2004, 2006).    
 
The theory of ideological positions has also been seen to work in combination with 
the theory of social cleavages. As the cleavages are limited in numbers they may 
themselves work as heuristic cost containing tools for the individual voter. In fact, to 
some scholars the Left-Right continuum itself is an expression of a combination of 
political values and social cleavages (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Inglehart 1977; 
Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Klingemann 1979; Knutsen 1997; Van Deth and 
Geurts 1989, Anduiza and Bosch 2004: 181-190).     
 
In short, the hypothesis is that party systems are more likely to become stable when 
individuals develop attachments to parties based on their location in the social 
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structure or their position in the cognitive ideological space (Mainwaring and Torcal 
2004). This stabilisation, in turn, will make politics more accountable and enhance the 
building of trust in society. The ability to place both oneself as a voter and the 
political parties according to their positions in the cleavage structure and/or the 
ideological space is thus seen as fundamental to the functioning of modern democratic 
systems. In sum, some sort of stable and mutual understanding of one’s respective 
social and ideological orientations between parties and voters is seen as fundamental 
in order to enhance vertical accountability and to enable the political parties to 
perform the function of creation and preservation of trust in representative democracy, 
as stated, for example, by Pizzorno (1990).   
       
This general assessment, however, does not take in to account the variations in terms 
of context under which transitions and democratic consolidation take place, i.e. it does 
not say anything about which cleavages this process of stabilisation entails nor 
anything about the sequence of translating societal divisions into manifest parts of the 
political system. Nor does it say anything specific about the content or, indeed, the 
extension of the ideological space with reference to variations in socio-political 
context. In principle, there is no limit to the array of issues that could serve as 
underpinnings for the institutionalisation of antagonisms in a democratic system, even 
if there seem to be certain limits to the distribution of votes along the resulting 
ideological dimensions in terms of polarisation (Sartori 1976). However, as the new 
democracies did not emerge in a vacuum, comparative research on Latin America, 
Southern and Eastern Europe has revealed that democratisation under the Third Wave 
has posed a series of more or less interrelated challenges that these countries have had 
to face. Apart from the establishment of democratic procedures proper, they have 
often entailed a transition to market economy that may or may not have occurred 
simultaneously with the political transition (Puhle 2005). They may also have entailed 
a profound problem concerning the legitimacy of the very state. Many countries, 
particularly in Eastern Europe, have had to deal with serious state-ness problems that 
have lead to the creation of a series of new independent states. In some cases all of the 
changes have occurred simultaneously: transition to democratic rule, transition to 
market economy, and transition to a new state structure (the break up of the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia are all cases in point). And even countries 
that had completed the transition to market economy long before they embarked on 
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the transition to political democracy, i.e., the Latin American and South European 
cases, have eventually had to relate to the general impetus of the neo-liberalist 
imperative: the ideological drive for the shrinking of the modern state apparatus.  In 
fact, variations in terms of the specific salience and the handling of these challenges 
in each and one of the cases has tended to become the very basis for comparisons 
between the Third Wave democracies. Initial findings and conclusions have been 
revised and refined as the scope of cases has expanded. On the one hand, the inclusion 
of the former communist bloc has lead to a renewed focus on the nature of the non-
democratic regimes from which the new democracies emerged (Linz and Stepan 
1996). On the other hand, research on the less institutionalised democracies has posed 
challenges to the conventional wisdoms derived from research on the well-established 
liberal democracies (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). 
 
This implies that Third Wave democratic transitions have been marked by some 
obviously common denominators imposed by the Zeitgeist on the one hand, and yet 
taken place in different country specific contexts both in terms of the structure of the 
authoritarian regime and the structure of the very state. Together, the common 
tendencies and the country specific variations have had their bearings on the processes 
of democratic consolidation and persistence in each and one of the cases.  
To the extent that the assessments stated above are valid, the main electoral issues in 
processes of transition and consolidation will have tended to vary across countries in 
terms of the specific matrix of challenges that each country has had to face, as well as 
vary over time in terms of the sequence of the electoral handling of these challenges. 
Thus, variations in party system formats will to a substantial degree reflect the 
attempts to cope with legacies of historical, political and social divisions by means of 
free and competitive elections. Indeed, the institutionalisation of political antagonisms 
into a system of mutual understanding and trust in the rules of the game by way of 
such elections is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of democratic consolidation 
(Diamond 1997). In this process, the parties command certain leverage and can to 
some extent structure, and even restructure, the social and attitudinal underpinnings of 
the party system (Enyedi 2005). 
 
This, then, is precisely what the electoral nexus implies: In the process of democratic 
transition and consolidation, the relationship between the handling of social and 
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historical problems faced by the new regimes and the electoral behaviour of the 
enfranchised citizenry will, at least to a certain extent, be reflected in the logic of 
mobilisation, stabilisation and party competition according to the timing of the 
translation of each and one of the pertaining societal divisions into manifest 
cleavages. Moreover, the nature of this relationship will not only tend to vary across 
time, but may also exhibit substantial regional variations according to the relative 
salience of specific societal divisions in different electoral locations. This assessment, 
in turn, may serve as the underpinning for the elaboration of hypotheses for empirical 
research on the electoral dynamics of democratic transition and consolidation in any 
given Third Wave country. A simple, and perhaps trivial, point of departure would be 
to hypothesise that the more complex the matrix of challenges put before the 
electorate, the more complex the electoral competition and the more complex the 
resulting party system. This, however, says nothing about the dimensions of electoral 
competition in terms of direction and intensity. Nor does it say anything specific 
about when and where the narrowing down or restriction of electoral competition will 
take place in a given process of democratisation. In fact, academics have tended to 
refrain from specific a priori theorising on the relationship between historical and 
social divisions on the one hand and the logic of electoral competition and party 
systems on the other, at least in terms of making predictions. And for those few who 
have had the nerve to embark upon such an endeavour, it has proven to be a risky 
business indeed. Juan Linz’ bold prediction regarding the future establishment of a 
Christian Democratic party in Spain based on an extrapolation from the Italian 
experience is a case in point (Linz 1967). The post hoc explanation for the failure of 
Linz’ prediction is that the religious question was more or less deliberately kept out of 
the matrix of issues presented to the electorate at the formative founding elections. In 
other words, one of the most important cleavages of Spain’s past experience with 
mass democracy was simply kept out of electoral politics at the most crucial stages of 
the process of democratisation. Thus, the religious issue has been coined the elusive 
cleavage in Spanish politics (Montero and Calvo 2000). This, however, does not 
imply that the religious division could be laid dead for long. After the founding 
elections the impact of religiosity has steadily increased its presence in terms of party 
choice even without the establishment of a party of an explicit religious denomination 
(Calvo and Montero 2002). This is only one intriguing example of how Third Wave 
 23
transitions may yield insights on the dynamics of the manifestation of cleavages in 
newly enfranchised political systems.  
 
 
Spain: The emblematic case 
 
Of all the cases of the co-called Third Wave transitions, Spain arguably appears as the 
one that has attracted the most academic attention. This is reflected in the fact that the 
bibliography on the Spanish transition was for a long period the most extensive of all 
the cases (Linz and Stepan 1996: 87). Spain is a case of an emblematic non-violent 
transition that took place in an extremely complex socio-political context marked by a 
serious territorial problem, and yet the integrity of the Spanish state was maintained. 
In Spain, the elites that forged the transition towards liberal democracy had to deal 
with deeply rooted regional, cultural, economic and ideological antagonisms that was 
handled through skilful translations into the party system, or rather, as it turned out, 
party systems. Spain is also a case in which the main political party of the transition 
process suffered an unprecedented collapse and simply disappeared. In sum, Spain is 
a case of democratic consolidation in a context of diversity that has lead to a process 
of electoral stabilisation marked by a high degree of variation both in temporal and 
territorial terms. In fact, this variation has not only had bearings on the process of 
democratic consolidation itself, but it has also had a marked impact on electoral 
research in Spain. For example, firm conclusions derived from earlier research on the 
relationship between social cleavages and voter behaviour at the different stages have 
been constantly scrutinised and challenged by newer research. One of the reasons for 
this is definitely to be found in the difficulties in coming to grips with the 
complexities of the Spanish socio-political history.    
 
    
Spain in a macro-historical perspective 
 
As mentioned above, Spain is a country of great regional diversity, both in terms of 
topography, economy and culture. Many Spaniards identify themselves more strongly 
with their own region than with the Spanish state. Indeed, conflicts over the very 
structure of the Spanish state have been a constant theme in Spanish politics since the 
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introduction of absolutism in Europe. In a classic study, Juan Linz portrayed Spain as 
a case of early state building and late peripheral nationalism against the state (Linz 
1973a).   
This means that, apart from the immediate task of remodelling political life according 
to democratic principles, the political class1 that engaged itself in the transition 
towards democracy from the mid 1970s and onwards also had to confront a series of 
long-term problems rooted in a set of polarising antagonisms that had haunted Spain 
since the introduction of nationalism and industrial capitalism in Europe. The state-
building elites that forged the dynastic unifications of the medieval kingdoms on the 
Iberian Peninsula had either lacked the ability, or the will, to introduce a uniform 
territorial or fiscal administration on the Spanish lands. Particular rights known as 
fueros were upheld by the inhabitants of some of the regions way into the 19th 
Century. The relationship between central and local authority has been a constant 
theme in Spanish politics and regionalism, in the sense that some regions claim 
autonomy vis-à-vis the central state apparatus, has manifested itself in a number of 
ways through the history of Spain (Heidar and Berntzen 1995: 269; Newton 1983: 
98). Nationalism, inspired alternatively by the French Revolution2 and German 
romanticism, was introduced on top of the regional question in the 19th Century. An 
uneven process of industrialisation (to a large part confined to the Basque and Catalan 
peripheries) added new socio-economic divisions to this pattern. In all of this, uneven 
development is perhaps the cue. Consequently, one of the most common 
interpretations of modern Spanish political history, repeatedly expressed both by 
scholars and Spanish politicians themselves, entails the notion of the two Spains (Juliá 
2005). This understanding is part of a general modernisation perspective and implies 
that one of the consequences of introducing the industrial and the national revolutions 
onto the relatively backward and territorially fragmented Spanish society was to 
divide the Spanish population into two antagonistic political subcultures. These 
                                                 
1An excellent definition of the political class is offered by Pérez-Díaz: "If the concept of the 
state refers to the whole collection of roles of authority and administrative functions within an 
association that enjoys a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, then the expression political class 
refers to the set of individuals who occupy these roles (the incumbents) plus the set of individuals that 
make it their business to oppose or ally themselves with these incumbents in the more or less remote 
expectation of being able to succeed them in their posts" (Pérez-Díaz 1993: 186-187).  
2Constitutionalism was introduced by the Cádiz Constitution of 1812, and was immediately 
violently challenged by conservatives. 
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subcultures were commonly labelled traditional versus modern Spain.3 In coping with 
the challenges of modernisation, these subcultures would respond with reactionary 
and radical political strategies respectively. Hence, Spanish politics in the 19th 
Century was marked by two civil wars and a series of military coups. In terms of state 
structure, Spain swung between unitarianism and federalism, and even extreme 
confederalism in the form of cantonalism at one point (Newton 1983). After the 
abolition of the First Republic in 1875, some sort of political order was restored by 
the introduction of a two-party system deliberately modelled after the British system. 
In the long run, however, this imported system of alternating conservative and liberal 
governments could only be upheld by way of extensive electoral manipulation and 
fraud, and was eventually toppled by a military coup and subsequent dictatorship in 
1923. In 1930-31 both the dictatorship and the Monarchy were abolished and a 
Second Republic proclaimed. The Second Republic was Spain's first real experience 
with mass politics, and the dynamics of maximised political positions that resulted in 
a new Civil War and the subsequent authoritarian dictatorship epitomised to an 
extreme extent the atmosphere of mutual distrust that could emerge between the 
political subcultures when society was mobilised in competitive elections.4 
 
Consequently, during the Franco regime, intellectuals and politicians in exile 
commonly interpreted the defeat against the Francoist forces as the defeat of modern 
Spain by reactionary Spain, whereas regime supporters nurtured the idea that Franco 
had saved the genuine traditional Spain from the tyranny of radicals (Buck 1998). 
Thus, on the one hand, a peaceful restoration and consolidation of democratic 
institutions would rest heavily on the Spaniards will and ability to overcome this 
polarising logic. On the other hand, the transition to market economy undertaken by 
the regime from 1958 and onwards spawned an unprecedented process of 
industrialisation and urbanisation that made Spain rapidly catch up with the Western 
world north of the Pyrenees. The economic changes wrought upon society had 
profound effects on its composition that, as it turned out, seemed to thaw up the 
pattern of entrenched ideological stances, at least on the part of the common citizen. 
                                                 
3See Newton 1983: 98; and Wiarda 1993: 35-37, for a more elaborate account on this. 
            4 This is a somewhat crude analysis. Some argue that the anarchists constituted a third political 
subculture in the 1930s. As it turned out, however, anarchism had become politically irrelevant by the 
1970s.  
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New social groups emerged that posed a challenge to the existing political alliances.5 
From a classical structural point of view, this gave hope that foundations for the 
polarised political positions of the Civil War could be replaced by a more civic 
political culture.  In sum then, the political elites that were to engage themselves in 
the governance of Spain after Franco would have to address to sets of interrelated 
problems: a) the problems pertaining to the restoration of democracy, and b) find 
ways to institutionalise the profound territorial, socio-economic and ideological 
divisions that had caused so much turbulence in the past.          
 
 
Democratic transition: The paradigmatic case 
 
As it turned out, the Spanish case was to be the first in a series of non-violent 
transitions and soon regarded as the case in point of peaceful and successful 
transitions from authoritarian rule by way of elite negotiations. The Spanish way was 
pointed to as a model for others to follow. To this it should be added that Spain’s was 
the first transition in which problems arising from multilingualism and multi-
nationalism were preponderant. And, given Spain’s problematic prior experience with 
mass democracy, the way in which the memory of the civil war was turned into 
something positive for the transition process in contrast, for example, to the impact of 
the memories of the Second World War in the former Yugoslavia, has further ensured 
Spain a special status within theories of regime transitions. From a comparative 
perspective, then, Spain is a case that is firmly classified within the Western and 
Mediterranean model on the one hand and yet, on the other hand, possesses an 
important property of the East European model in terms of the fundamental territorial 
problem. The Spanish solution to the territorial problem, the creation of the Estado de 
autonomías, enables us to study the electoral institutionalisation of profound societal 
divisions not only in relation to a set of functional cleavages, but also in relation a 
profound territorial division that challenged the legitimacy of the state itself. In fact, 
Spain is a case in which the installation of democratic rule and an urgent restructuring 
                                                 
5See Colomer 1986 for an excellent review on how this shaped the ideological trends in 
Catalonia. 
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of the state were intrinsically connected. The one was not conceivable without the 
other (Balcells 1992, 1996).   
 
However, even though comparative research on Mediterranean Europe has shown that 
there is a fundamental link between a country’s social structure and the structure of 
partisanship that underpins electoral competition, this relationship is neither direct nor 
deterministic – not even merely reflective (Gunther and Montero 2001). This 
underscores the relevance of agency in the process of translation of societal divisions 
into a system of manifest cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1990). 
Consequently, as discussed above, in the process of democratic transition and 
consolidation some latent cleavages may deliberately not be translated into the party 
system.  
 
The actual electoral translation of societal divisions into manifest cleavages in Spain 
followed a sequential pattern (Linz and Stepan 1996). First the regime question was 
handled in terms of state-wide elections for the first democratic legislature. The very 
task of this first legislature was to draw up a proposal for a new constitution that was 
subsequently enacted on the basis of a referendum. Then the territorial divisions were 
institutionalised in terms of devolution of powers to the regions and elections to the 
new regional parliaments. Then the issue of economic change and social welfare, 
more or less postponed during the first two legislatures (Puhle 2005), was 
institutionalised in terms of a landslide victory and subsequent predominance of the 
Socialist party. And, eventually, the question regarding neo-liberal economic reform 
was institutionalised in terms of a steady electoral growth and eventual executive 
take-over by the rejuvenated post-Francoist Right. 6  
 
This “founding elections from above” approach, in contrast to the electoral sequence 
of, say, the transition in the Soviet Union, is held to be conducive to maintaining the 
integrity of the Spanish state. And, even though the boundary between democratic 
transition and consolidation tends to be blurred (Schedler 2001), to many observers 
democracy was consolidated precisely when the regime question had been dealt with 
                                                 
6 This is not to imply that this was the result of a fully rational process, regime transitions seldom are, 
but it fits rather well with the notion of limited rationality in which actors tend to address problems in a 
sequential fashion (Cyert and March 1992). 
 28
and the territorial Centre-Periphery cleavage had been institutionalised. Consequently, 
after the failed military coup attempt in 1981, the electoral collapse of the state-
bearing party of the transitional phase and the landslide victory for the opposition and 
subsequent peaceful takeover of government in 1982, liberal democracy faced no 
serious contenders (Linz, Stepan and Gunther 1995).  
 
The careful timing of the institutionalisation of cleavages was made possible by a 
series of political pacts between the relevant parties. In particular, the quasi-
consociational rules of the game established among the main actors of the transition 
were conducive to the successes of political interaction during the transitional years 
between 1977 and 1982. The most important aspect of this was that party leaders 
would abstain from maximising the interests of their respective electoral clienteles in 
search of an overarching consensus on vital national issues. This tended, however, to 
result in a presidentialisation of party leadership and a subsequent widespread distrust 
among party faction leaders towards the central leadership. Intra-party politics were 
sacrificed to the benefit of inter-party negotiations (Gunther and Hopkin 2002). 
Somewhat paradoxically, the devastating effect of inter-party consensus at the 
expense of intra-party institutionalisation was revealed in relation to the LOAPA7 
process, in which the leaders of the Spanish state-wide parties came together in order 
to try to coordinate the handling of the translation of the Centre-Periphery cleavage 
into the democratic system. As the Socialist Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
(PSOE) abandoned the initial inter-party consensus established with the Centre-Right 
Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), the UCD was left alone in defence of 
moderation in meeting the ever increasing demands for autonomy put forward even 
by regions with no prior history of such demands. Accordingly, the first autonomous 
elections backfired on the government and lead to an irremediable abrasion of the 
image of the UCD on that issue. At the 1982 election it became clear that the party 
interests came to the fore at the expense of the inter-party consensus. This tactical 
shift on part of the PSOE had a strong damaging impact on the UCD and its leader 
Adolfo Suárez (Gunther and Hopkin 2002). 
Without going further into the details at this stage, this account serves to underscore 
the point that the timing and sequence of translating the societal divisions into 
                                                 
7 LOAPA: Ley Orgánica de Armonización de Proceso Autonómica, i.e. The Law for the Harmonisation 
of the Process of  Autonomy. 
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manifest political cleavages have had important implications not only for the 
anchoring of votes in the process of democratic consolidation, but also for the 
institutionalisation of parties as such.             
 
In sum then, Spain is a case of a particular electoral sequence in a newly democratised 
country with a full-fledged market economy and at the same time a serious problem 
concerning the very legitimacy of the state. In this sense, Spain is fully comparable to 
Western Europe in terms of economic affiliation and to many East European countries 
in terms of a profound state-ness problem. In relation to general theory on macro-
sociological modernisation, Spain offers particular set of scores on core variables 
derived from theories on democratisation and the structuring of mass politics that 
makes it particularly interesting from a comparative point of view: Early state-
building and protracted problems of nation-building; a strong centre-periphery 
cleavage; a belated but rapid industrialisation confined to the certain peripheries; a 
dominant religious division and strong anticlericalism; short and violent experiences 
with mass politics; a cruel civil war and long-lasting authoritarian dictatorship; and a 
transition to democracy that has turned out to be a fundamental case for theory 
building within the field of regime transitions. In terms of more specific theory on 
elections, parties, and party systems, Spain offers a case of a plurality of party 
systems within one state not only in temporal terms, but also in territorial terms.  
 
However, although the status as an emblematic case is well argued, an academic 
endeavour involving an extrapolation from the Spanish transition should be 
undertaken with great care (Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995: 77). Based on hindsight, 
post hoc modelling has tended to simplify the process (see Colomer 1996). There are 
still some areas of the relationship between the democratic transition and subsequent 
consolidation that are not fully accounted for. This also holds for some aspects of the 
general electoral dynamics in Spain. Consequently, the common understanding of the 
electoral behaviour right from the first general election in 1977 has been, and still is, 
subject to constant revisions and updates. 





Electoral research on Spain: Party systems and voter alignments 
 
Given the aforementioned sequence of electoral translations of societal divisions into 
manifest cleavages, it comes as no surprise that the majority of the studies of Spanish 
elections since the demise of the Franco dictatorship emphasise the heterogeneity of 
the party system. In fact, many of the prominent scholars writing on Spanish politics 
prefer the notion of party systems instead of the singular system (Vallés 1991, Linz 
and Montero 2001). The logic of electoral behaviour and party competition since the 
demise of the authoritarian regime has lead to a differentiation along two dimensions. 
On the one hand, the impact of peripheral nationalism has given rise to significant 
variations in territorial terms. In a number of autonomous communities the state-wide 
‘Spanish’ parties exist alongside local parties in distinctly regional party systems. On 
the other hand, a series of electoral changes or realignments since 1977 have resulted 
in a number of different party systems also in temporal terms (Heywood 1995, Linz 
and Montero 2001).  
 
As to the structural anchoring of electoral preferences, the initial research on the topic 
showed that, apart from the centre-periphery cleavage, the traditional cleavages of 
industrialised societies were of secondary, if any, importance. Instead, the Left-Right 
schema tended to provide the theoretical underpinning for the study of electoral 
behaviour (Barnes, McDonough and Pina 1986; Caciagli 1986; Gunther, Sani and 
Shabad 1988; Linz and Montero 1986; Gunther 1991; Justel 1992; Gunther and 
Montero 1994). Commonly, it has been understood that the self-placement of the 
Spanish electorate on the Left-Right schema reflects an ideological dimension based 
on two main issues: A socio-economic dimension pertaining to preferences along the 
traditional State versus market divide, and a moral and social dimension pertaining to 
a division between those who favour pluralism and tolerance on the one hand and 
those who support traditional values on the other (Colomer 1996: 172).  
 
The weak or nearly non-existent correspondence between the social structure and the 
party system was reflected in the heterogeneous social composition of the voters 
supporting both the governing parties of the 1970s and the 1980s, the Centre-Right 
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UCD, and the Leftist PSOE (Caciagli 1986; Puhle 1986; Tezanos 1989). At the time, 
of course, this seemed completely in accordance with the findings produced by 
electoral research in the Western democracies in general from the 1970s and onwards. 
The weakening of the ties between social structure and party support had resulted in 
higher levels of partisan volatility at both the aggregate and individual levels (Crewe 
and Denver 1985). In fact, to some observers the major research question had even 
changed from explaining the persistence of contemporary party systems to explaining 
their instability (Dalton 1996: 151). In Spain, as the party system was born in the mid 
1970s, the stability was never there in the first place. And, given the common 
knowledge derived from electoral research on modern televised politics in general, it 
was an open question to students of Spanish politics whether Spain would deviate 
from the general trend and become more stabilised in electoral terms. 
 
However, as shown by Oñate and Ocaña (1999), a profound stabilisation of electoral 
behaviour had taken place in terms of the aggregate proportions of valid votes allotted 
to the various relevant parties between 1977 and 1996. This indicates that Spain had 
undergone a substantial decline in electoral volatility between elections and thus is a 
case that clearly contradicts the general tendency found in Western democracies in 
general. As mentioned above, Spain’s mode of transition had heavy bearings on the 
institutionalisation of the parties. The elites that handled the transition simply had to 
focus on regime change more than on party building. The choice the parties made was 
related to the extent to which they decided to maximise short-term electoral support 
from marginal voters, or consolidate the long-term support of their core constituencies 
(Gunther and Hopkin 2002). Party building, vote maximisation and democratic 
consolidation were in many respects incompatible with one another. The transition 
became the very model of inter-party consensus in terms of concessions and 
compromise. This top based consensus between the leaders of the parties ranging 
from the post-Francoist Alianza Popular on the right to the Communists on the left 
tended to alienate the electoral clienteles of the parties (Gunther and Hopkin 2002). 
All the four major nation-wide parties faced the same dilemmas, and they all 
experienced major crises between 1978 and 1982 (Linz and Montero 2001). The main 
theoretical argument in this is that electorates with feasible alternative choices are 
potentially less stable than electorates more firmly divided into electoral clienteles. 
Consequently, as democracy became consolidated and the parties left the initial inter-
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party consensus, more efforts were put into party building proper and hence the 
electoral stability increased. 
  
Also the notion that social structure was of little significance, apart from the 
aforementioned manifestation of the Centre-Periphery cleavage, has been challenged. 
Torcal and Chhibber, for example, argue that after 1989 social class emerged as a 
manifest influence on electoral preferences regarding the by then two main parties at 
the national level, the PSOE, and the Partido Popular (PP). In particular, they 
concluded that the social composition of PSOE’s electoral support had changed 
significantly. By the use of logistic regression analysis, and controlling for ideology, 
leadership, occupation, gender, and habitat, the finding was that the probability of 
voting the PSOE versus the PP among those belonging to the higher socio-economic 
strata of society had decreased from 0,93 in 1986 to 0,42 in 1992, for the middle strata 
from 0,97 to 0,77 whereas for the lower strata there was virtually no change at all 
(Torcal and Chhibber 1995: 27-28). Furthermore, based on observed regional 
differences in social and economic policy implementation, i.e. that the policies of the 
PSOE government were only carried out successfully in the autonomous regions also 
governed by the PSOE and that the increased social stratification of voter preferences 
had only taken place in those very same regions, it is concluded that policy 
implementation has had an effect on voter preferences. Although these findings need 
to be substantiated by further research before any firm conclusion can be drawn as to 
whether the Spanish electorate has moved towards an increase in class based 
distribution of electoral preferences, they serve to underscore the point that the 
decreased electoral volatility may partly be ascribed to some kind of structural 
anchoring of the vote and that regional variation should be accounted for. In spite of 
the fact that a wide array of electoral studies have been conducted in the two regions 
most marked by the Centre-Periphery cleavage, the Basque Country and Catalonia, on 
the grounds that these regions differ from the rest in terms of the intensity of this 
cleavage, the true implications of this difference seemed for a long time overlooked in 
Spanish electoral research. The consequences of not handling the implications of this 
underlying property in a systematic fashion in electoral analysis were lucidly 
exemplified by Gunther and Montero. By simply leaving the Basque Country and 
Catalonia out of the analysis on the grounds that they represent anomalies in Spain in 
terms of the logic of manifest cleavages and electoral competition, the findings indeed 
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indicate that social class had appeared as a manifest cleavage in Spanish politics right 
from the first general election in 1977 (Gunther and Montero 2001).  
 
All this indicates that that the theory of cleavages and voter alignments should be 
taken seriously into account in that the variations in party system formats across the 
Spanish lands should be taken as point of departure when we try to assess the role of 
electoral mobilisation in the process of democratic consolidation and persistence. It is 
precisely the complexities of regional variations that make the Spanish case a 
particular challenge within this kind of electoral research. However, as it turns out, it 
has been not all that clear how these regional variations should be handled for 
analytical purposes.     
 
The territorial dimension of democratic consolidation: Conceptualisations of ‘centre’ 
and ‘periphery’.   
 
As discussed above, Spain exhibits substantial regional variations according to the 
relative salience of specific cleavages in different electoral locations. At the 
institutional level, the crucial state-ness problem that the new Spanish democracy 
faced was handled by way of undertaking a profound territorial restructuring of the 
very political system labelled the Estado de autonomías. This process has not only 
entailed a profound of decentralisation of political power, the new Constitution has 
also created an asymmetrical system by allowing two different roads to autonomy: 
The § 151 leading to extensive autonomy on the one hand and the § 143, leading to a 
lesser degree of autonomy, on the other. This specific territorial component of 
Spanish politics is seen as paramount to the understanding of the electoral behaviour. 
In short, it is widely held that Spain differs considerably from most other European 
societies as to the extent to which the centre-periphery cleavage is a source of political 
conflict (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1988: 241; Anduiza and Méndez 1997: 265). This 
is reflected by the fact that in the studies employing the theory of social position, i.e. 
the theory of cleavages and voter alignments as outlined in Lipset and Rokkan (1967), 
the cleavage of urban-rural residence is found to have little or no effect on voter 
behaviour and instead will have to be replaced by centre-periphery location (Anduiza 
and Bosch 2004: 168).   
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All this implies that in the analysis of electoral mobilisation, stabilisation and party 
competition the question of when should be followed by the question of where. The 
problem, of course, is that it is not all that clear what where really entails. All relevant 
electoral research in Spain coincides in stating the importance of territorial location on 
voting behaviour, but the exact meaning of this tends to vary to a considerable degree. 
Consequently, no firm academic agreement exists as to which regions should be 
labelled the centre and which should be labelled the periphery (Anduiza and Bosch 
2004: 166). The four § 151 autonomous regions, Andalucía, Catalonia, the Basque 
Country and Galicia, are cases in point. In terms of geographical location on the 
Spanish mainland (leaving the Balearic and Canarian archipelagos aside for a 
moment), they all clearly belong to the periphery in geographical terms. And, in terms 
of political autonomy, of course, they clearly constitute a category of their own. 
However, a closer look at their relative status reveals that their positions vary greatly. 
In terms of economy Catalonia and the Basque Country both occupy a privileged 
position within the Spanish system while both Galicia and Andalucía belong to the 
poorest and less developed regions. In terms of cultural differentiation, Catalonia, the 
Basque Country and Galicia have their own vernacular languages (together with both 
the Balearic Islands and the Valencian Autonomous Community), whereas Andalucía 
does not possess this cultural asset. This seeming confusion leads us to the main issue 
of this section. The fact that there is no academic agreement as to the empirical 
foundation for ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ in Spain is in itself a strong indication of the 
fact that the very territorial distribution of political power is still a highly contested 
issue. Hence the very centre-periphery concept is a disputed one. In particular, the 
existence of both regional parties proper and so-called ‘regional-nationalist’ parties in 
the Spanish party system(s) seems particularly difficult to handle simultaneously 
within a simple centre-periphery framework. A rethinking and elaboration of what 
exactly the problem of state-ness entails in terms of the centre-periphery structure is 
therefore called for. In this, a more elaborate discussion of state and nation building 
seems paramount. This entails going back to the very theoretical roots of ‘centre-
periphery’ as a conceptual framework in order to assess its relevance in the Spanish 




The territorial dimension of politics 
 
The centre-periphery dimension of the modern nation-state is first and foremost 
linked to the works of Stein Rokkan. Rokkan took as point of departure the Parsonian 
AGIL scheme and identified four sub-systems in the analysis of the emergence of the 
modern state: The military system, the judicial system, the economic system, and the 
cultural system. Rokkan’s most important contribution to political analysis, however, 
is the addition of an independent territorial dimension to politics: The centre-
periphery axis linking the institutional architecture of a nation-state to its territorial 
structure, i.e. its given political and geographical characteristics (Rokkan 1987: 347-
380; Rokkan 1999: 108-134; Taylor and Johnston 1979: 111-114). The theoretical 
salience of the centre-periphery nexus is that the existence of a political centre 
logically presupposes a periphery – and vice versa. The two are interdependent. 
Centre, as well as periphery, is a dependent variable in macro-historical terms. 
However, as noted by Bakka, since a preliminary definition of a political centre is that 
it is a node in a discrete network of human interaction were power resources are 
accumulated and projected into the network, a reasonable definition of a periphery 
denotes it as a field were exit and entry is controlled through the exercise of 
authoritative power by a node. In other words, centre and periphery constitute a 
bounded hierarchical political network. Then, of course, the logical interdependence 
between the two presupposes a causal relationship in which the existence of a 
periphery is dependent on the existence of a centre in temporal terms. Analytically, a 
centre-periphery relationship exists only at T+1. At T+0 all that exist are competing 
nodes (Bakka 1998; Bakka 1997: 4).  
 
The combination of the four sub-systems and the territorial axis forms a three-
dimensional grid for political units. The centres and their respective peripheries are 
connected to each other through military-administrative, judicial-legal, economic, and 
cultural channels. These channels constitute four functionally differentiated segments 
along what is commonly labelled the functional axis in the grid. Rokkan then 
constructs a cumulative scheme of political processes of development: from state-
building and nation-building to participation and redistribution. These processes are 
tied to three particular aspects of European history that can be conceptualised a 
sovereignty, intermediate structures, and system-stabilisation. In this perspective, the 
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stabilisation of a system is only possible if it is based on institutionalised political and 
social rights within a sovereign polity, understood as Weber’s Politischer Verband. 
Democratisation, seen as the successive lowering of institutional thresholds leading to 
the eventual take-over of executive power by the opposition, is thus a prerequisite for 
the stability of the modern nation-state (Rokkan 1999: 227-260). 
 
The functionalist element in Rokkan’s analyses in the sense that democracy serves to 
stabilise the complex modern political systems has been duly criticised. Even though 
Rokkan himself in his analyses emphasised strategic action on behalf of social groups, 
the meaning of their actions was introduced from the outside and no analysis of their 
ideology, resources, and choice of strategy was ever conducted. One might conclude 
that even the actors themselves would have to be introduced from outside the model.  
(Berntzen and Selle 1988).   
 
However, in theory, the model does introduce methodological collectivism in the 
sense that it opens for actors that move on the meso level. Thus, the determinism 
introduced by the functionalist elements could supposedly be balanced by the fact that 
it allows for voluntarism in the sense that the strategic choices made by actors are 
seen as an important factor in explaining a specific process of political mobilisation. 
What is needed, then, are more detailed conceptualisations of the strategies pursued 
by collective actors both in the centre and the periphery in the constituting phases of 
state- and nation building. This is precisely the objective of the following section.  
 
 
The national dimension of politics  
There are convincing arguments, both empirical and analytical, for maintaining a 
categorical distinction between the ’nation’ and the ’state’ as units of analysis in the 
modern polities (Nielson 1985; Linz 1993; also Østerud 1978: 101-139; Keating 
2001). The state is seen as a juridical concept that links a governing organisation to a 
social group within a defined territory (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985; Hoffman 1988). 
In contrast, the ‘nation’, both in terms substance and extension, is much harder to 
define. The nation is more than a series of objective characteristics such as geography, 
ethnicity, language, culture and so forth. The nation is also defined by an expressed 
will to act. Indeed, it is "a daily plebiscite, a living soul, a spiritual principle" (Renan 
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1970: 80). This subjective dimension is explicitly or implicitly accepted in academic 
research. The nation, then, is definitely a dynamic entity in the sense that it is not a 
given. The fundamentally different properties of the state and the nation make them 
analytically distinct, and empirically the sociological borders of the nation seldom 
coincide with the juridical borders of the state (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985). In fact, 
states consisting of only one national identity, as the strictest definition of the nation-
state claims, are rather the exception than the rule (see Nielson 1985).  
 
From this follows that, as any collective distinction may serve as the underpinning for 
political mobilisation (Sartori 1990), differing identities may be used for the purpose 
of creating political movements. As a rule, political movements that perceive of 
themselves as representatives of ‘nationalities’ are based on the idea that different 
identities linked to cultures and territories have developed over time. Some kind of 
cultural and geographical identity is thus a prerequisite for the establishment of a 
regional nationalist movement. However, other political and economic factors may 
also have an impact and contribute to the mobilisation on nationalist issues. 
Competing historiographies contribute to the construction of national myths and the 
subjective dimension outlined above implies that one need not be a separatist or claim 
the establishment of a separate nation-state to call oneself a nationalist (Keating 
2001). As will be outlined below, one might mobilise on the principle of the right to 
self-determination and yet refrain from full separation from the existing state. 
 
The relative weight of culture, ethnicity and geography in nationalism is a debated 
issue (see Linz 1985b: 203-253; Kellas 1991: 67). While previous observers tended to 
take ethnic identity for granted, later research found that the identity was chosen, even 
‘invented’, and that transfers from one identity to another was quite possible (Barth 
1967). This also indicates that dual identities are fully feasible (Keating 2001; 
Martínez-Herrera 2002). In Spain this is underscored by the difference between the 
notion of patria (the fatherland) and the patria chica (the little fatherland), in which 
the first relates to the Spanish state and the second to the territory of the region 
(Heywood 1995: 13; Gallagher 1991: 125-126). This yields two kinds of territorial 
identity that at some point may be mobilised against each other, expressed as state 
nationalism and the regional nationalism. The first holds the state as its source of 
legitimacy and is typically sought established by central elites through the 
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standardisation of legal codes, education and so forth. The second builds on an idea of 
an ethnic, cultural and historical community differentiated from that of the state and 
seeks to build the regional nation on it. 
 
Whether the regional elites choose, and succeed, in mobilising on a nationalist basis 
will to a large extent depend on the status of the region vis-à-vis the state during the 
various phases in the process of modernisation. In the struggle over the identity of the 
citizenry, the individual is subject to the pulling forces of different centres of identity 
building. Based on the state and the region, attitudes that compete for the individual’s 
loyalty are created. These attitudes may also coexist in a less conflicting way and the 
individual may retain a multiple identity and feel that he or she belongs both to the 
state and the regional nation. In an ideal type nation-state, of course, the categories of 
regional nationalism and state nationalism coincide and the concept of ‘regional 
nationalism’ is rendered meaningless.  
 
Many of the attempts to analyse the upsurge of regional nationalism from the 1960s 
and onwards saw the various nationalist movements as basically similar whereas the 
explanations put forward in relation to their upsurge were fundamentally dissimilar. 
Some saw the nationalist tendencies as a revival of old ethnicity (Connor 1972; 
Esman 1977), while others saw them as reactions to internal colonialism (Hechter 
1975).  These initial one-dimensional explanations were later revised and the 
empirical variations catered to by more complex typologies (Horowitz 1981; Hechter 
1985). It became clear that not only did a variety of nationalisms exist, but also that 
different nationalisms might mobilise on behalf of the very same ‘nationality’ (see 
Tiryakian and Rogowski eds. 1985). 
 
Nationalists often perceive of the nation as a biological phenomenon (Østerud 1984: 
34) that makes it objectively different from other nations and argue that the nation 
constitutes the natural unit for governance and that the states be organised according 
to the principle of the nation-state or at least that extensive autonomy be secured for 
the region (Keating 1993, 2001).  Thus, an important aspect of the nationalists’ stance 
is that their political, economic and cultural claims against the state are inherently 
related to the thesis of national self-determination. However, a nationalist movement 
may have other claims that enable it to unite nationalism with other ideologies such as 
 39
liberalism, conservatism or socialism. At the same time, both liberalism and 
conservatism – and eventually also socialism – have embraced values that are built on 
the nation and its defence. Nationalism, then, may be regarded as an ideology that 
competes with other ideologies for social support and political power (Alter 1985: 8-
9). In short, regional nationalism is intimately tied to territorial identity and can 
therefore be studied as an integral part of the cleavage structure of the state- and 
nation building processes. 
 
As mentioned above, in Rokkan’s understanding the twin concept of centre and 
periphery caters to the fact that the power is unevenly distributed in the modern states 
also in geographical terms. The basic definition of a centre is that it is privileged area 
within the state territory, whereas a periphery is an area that is dependent on the 
centre and retains minimal resources for the protection of its properties against outside 
influence (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 2-6, Rokkan 1999: 108-121). The concepts of 
distance, difference and dependency are typically employed to characterise the 
predicament of the periphery. The interaction between the central and peripheral areas 
takes place in terms of political, economic, and cultural transactions. In this 
perspective, the elites in the centre try to centralise as much power as possible and 
standardise politics, culture, and economy over the whole territory of the state 
(Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 15). The relationship between the forces that work to 
impose political, economic, and cultural standardisation in the name of the state and 
the forces that strive to maintain the peculiarity of the periphery is one of mutual 
influence. If the central state is relatively weak, regional brokers may arise to meditate 
between the centre and the periphery. This is precisely what happened in most of 
Southern Europe: the central state, albeit omnipresent, was weak and inefficient, and a 
system of regional brokers – called caciques in Spain – was established with 
devastating effects for the legitimacy of the central state as the uneven process of 
economic modernisation took hold (Heywood 1995: 15).  
These dialectics of modernisation, state inefficiency and regional political 
mobilisation has been pointed to as paramount to the understanding of the Spanish 
regional problem, and some see the attitudes of the central elites as the decisive factor 
in the crystallisation of Catalonia and the Basque Country as distinct nationalities 
(González Casanova 1979; Solé Tura 1985: 43)  
 
 40
However, the regional nationalist movements may not only be understood on the basis 
of the internal situation in the region and the relationship with the centre of power that 
they relate to.  
Centre and periphery within the state may also be linked to centre and periphery in 
geopolitics (Rokkan and Urwin 1982, 1983; Rokkan 1987, Rokkan 1999). Being part 
of an empire was a prerequisite for the early modernisation of Catalonia and the 
Basque Country (Brand 1985: 287-288). Spain lost its colonies earlier than the rest of 
the European states and this has been viewed as conducive to the early rise of regional 
nationalism in Catalonia and the Basque Country in comparison to Scotland. The loss 
of the colonies implied, on the one hand, that Catalonia and the Basque Country were 
relegated from belonging to the centre of the empire to becoming two peripheries 
within the Spanish state. On the other hand, the defeat of the empire could serve as an 
inspiration for the regional elites since the colonial struggle for liberation was inspired 
by a nationalist awakening (Mayall 1990: 38-39). Thus, the loss of the colonies had a 
double effect on the geographical peripheries of the Spanish mainland.   
Also, and perhaps paradoxically, the disaster of 1898, in which Spain lost Cuba, the 
Philippines and Puerto Rico to the U.S., is seen as a major impulse for the intellectual 
efforts to build a Spanish identity in the modern sense. But then, of course, these 
efforts would have to compete with the already established efforts to build the Basque 
and Catalan identities (Heywood 1995: 14). Thus, it is fair to say that identity building 
in Spain, both emanating from the centre and from the peripheries, has to a certain 
extent been propelled by a notion of loss and deprivation, often exalting some sort of 
past grandeur (see Colomer 1986 and Juaristi 1997). From the centre this was 
epitomised by the rhetoric of the Franco regime, linking Spanish patriotism to the 
Catholic Kings and the Empire of the past in its crusade against republicanism and 
regional nationalism (Grugel and Rees 1997: 9-11). 
 
As stated above, nationalism has been combined with liberalism, conservatism and 
socialism. 
Nationalism, then, is a rather confusing phenomenon in the sense that it is both 
progressive and reactionary – both radical and conservative. But first and foremost it 
underscores that nationalism is an inherently linked to the process of modernisation 
(Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985). This implies that variations in regional nationalist 
movements may be analysed in terms of the interplay between the industrial and the 
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‘national’ revolutions in the Rokkan perspective. Modernisation understood as a 
series of individual adaptations to social, cultural and physical changes, implies that 
the formation political identities also can be viewed as an integral part of 
modernisation (Tiryakian 1978, 1985). Nationalism, then, is seen equally as an active 
and a reactive core element in the various phases of industrialisation and 
urbanisation.8 As far as the assessments stated above are valid, we may distinguish 
between various forms of nationalisms within the same political system. Thus, there is 
a fundamental distinction between state nationalism, i.e. the nationalism of the central 
elites, and the nationalisms emanating from the peripheries. The three dimensional 
grid established by the territorial axis and the functional axis related to state and 
nation building may serve as the underlying structure for the categorisation of 
nationalist impulses in the political system. Thus, following Tiryakian and Nevitte 
(1985), four main forms of nationalist strategies can be identified. One emanating 
from the centre and the three others pertaining to the responses from the periphery. 
The strategy of the centre is simply called ‘state nationalism’ as an ideal type. The 
three peripheral nationalist strategies, called ‘reactionary’, ‘progressive’ and 
‘competitive’ are also to be understood as ideal types and any nationalist movement 
or party might of course combine at least two of them.   
      
 
a) State nationalism 
State nationalism is characterised by claims put forward on behalf of the state against 
external or internal collectives whose territory and/or culture differ from that of the 
state. These claims may be of a political, economic or cultural nature, or a 
combination of these. Whatever their nature, the realization of the claims is oriented 
to increasing the autonomy and sphere of action of the national centre in relation to 
either other nation-states (or external collectives) or to internal political communities 
(Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985: 71). This form of nationalism is historically not only a 
characteristic of the activities of the established nation-states, but also an instrument 
in the very creation and consolidation of the modern states:      
 
                                                 
8 Gellner (1983, 1987) and Kellas (1991) represent two different views on the relationship between 
modernisation and nationalism. While Gellner sees nationalism as a product of industrialisation, Kellas 
views nationalism as a much older phenomenon. 
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     "The state building process does not have the connotations of an organic growth and it is not seen 
with a biological imagery that would prevail in the discussion of nationalism. The state is not 
associated with the idea of nature, of being born, but rather of being created. The state building 
process goes on for several centuries before the idea of the nation fires the imagination of intellectuals 
and the people. (...) However, there can be little doubt that the identification with the state by the 
subjects, or the loyalty to a common king of people living in the different units composing the modern 
monarchies was accompanied by a proto-national sentiment. Sooner or later, in many of the states, the 
state generated a 'state nation' building process" (Linz 1993:3-4). 
     
From the 19th Century and onwards, ’freedom’ and ‘progress’ have been the 
dominating themes of modernity. These have been employed effectively to legitimise 
claims on behalf of the state. For example, central elites have typically stated that an 
expansion of the central state is needed by claming that peripheral cultures and 
peoples have been incompetent in the exploitation of their natural resources. Thus, the 
state will have to make them effective and productive in the name of freedom. 
Alternatively, ‘progress’ demands that borders around traditional regional markets 
and political institutions be dismantled. This has been the main current of nationalism 
in the process of modernisation and the glue that has bound together the part that 
today constitute the democratic nation-states.        
 
The three other ideal types of nationalism emanate from the periphery in response to 
the strategies of the centre: 
 
 
b) The reactionary response: Withdrawal from modernity 
 
Against the economic, cultural and political claims of an expansive and dynamic 
nation-state, local elites of the peripheral society might choose to strengthen its 
traditional cultural heritage and reject the national project of the state. This kind of 
nationalism will portray the traditional culture, economy and community of the 
periphery as superior to the modernity of the state. Its ideology will tend to emphasise 
mobilisation against the tendencies of modernity to break down old social bonds. It is 
often based on an anti-capitalist core and promotes an economy based on artisan 
traditions and agriculture. This form of response is normally associated with the 19th 
Century reactions against the tendency of capitalism to centralise production and to 
replace the traditional economies. Forcing Tiryakian and Nevitte’s argument 
somewhat, we may state that in the Spanish context this nationalist ideology will 
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typically have produced regional ‘nationalist’ parties of a rightist and conservative 




c) The progressive response: Taking over modernity. 
 
Also this form of peripheral nationalism can be viewed as a reaction against the 
national project of the state. In this, however, the peripheral elites view the national 
project of the state as underdeveloped and as a hindrance for the development of the 
peripheral community and its participation in modernity. The centre is seen as a 
stagnated parasite on the periphery and not as a dynamic modernising agent. The 
‘modernity’ of the centre is the modernity of yesteryear. The solution is self-rule for 
the nation of the periphery in order to develop modern institutions and values in 
accordance with the demands of tomorrow. This form of nationalism combines 
acceptance of the cultural development of the peripheral nation, including a 
renaissance of the language that might have been dominated or replaced by the 
language of the central state, in combination with a strong focus on social reform and 
economic and technological development to serve the very same nation. A central 
value in this strategy is the popular participation in decision-making in terms of 
mobilisation against the perceived ossified hierarchical structures of the central state. 
Thus, again forcing the argument somewhat, we may state that in Spain this ideology 




d) The competitive response: Identification with the modernisation project of the 
state. 
 
This situation is characterised by the fact that the peripheral elites, however culturally, 
economically or territorially differentiated from the central elites, find it advantageous 
                                                 
9 All deductions on the ideological orientations of the Spanish regional ‘nationalist’ parties are based 
on readings of Rovira Virgili 1930; Candel 1965, 1972; Cruells 1965; Pi-Sunyer 1985; Pujol 1976, 
1979; Vilar 1978; Botella 1985; Colomer 1986; Solé Tura 1985, 1988; Heiberg 1989; Liebert 1990; 
Balcells 1996; Juaristi 1997; Acha Ugarte and Pérez-Nievas 1998. 
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for their ‘nation’ to be linked to the modernising project of the state. The original 
peripheral nation (or group or people) is seen as contributing to the creation of a 
greater national community. In a given period of modernisation, when the nation-state 
is seen as immersed in a phase of dynamic growth that produces greater opportunities 
for development than offered within the periphery alone, the regional elites may claim 
that their contribution (or that of their regional nation) both will strengthen, and be 
strengthened by, a joint venture with the central regime and its national institutions.   
Although this, on the face of it, might appear as a kind of cooptation, this form of 
peripheral nationalism is based on the notion that the peripheral groups get access to 
the resources of modernisation through the wider economic and political system of the 
nation-state. Given the unequal relationship in terms of resources and population, this 
is a rational choice by peripheral elites to enhance the sustainability of their nation by 
integrating it into a larger entity (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985: 73).  Thus, again 
forcing the argument, we may state that this ideology in Spain will have produced 
regional ‘nationalist’ parties of a liberal inclination.10  
 
This typology, albeit probably not exhaustive in terms of all varieties of regional 
nationalist movements, will serve as the basis for categorisations of the political 
parties of the various party systems or party subsystems of the Spanish polity from 
1977 to 2000. It underscores that different actors within the same periphery may have 
different views on the limits, objectives and strategies for their ‘national’ community. 
Differences between actors in regard to the perspectives on what and who constitutes 
the nation may reflect variations in historical experiences and varying relations to the 
institutions and elites in the centre. In short, the argument is that a multiplicity of 
nationalisms may be found side-by-side within the same territorially based population 
sharing the common major objective characteristics (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985: 74).    
 
In sum, this account serves to underscore that the state-ness problem identified by 
Linz, is a legacy emanating from Spain’s troubled history of state and nation building. 
                                                 
10 In a typical combination of the ideal types, this category will also include initially conservative and 
radical parties that have come to accept the integration into the economic market of the central state, 
but still mobilise on cultural differences. As such, these parties may be viewed as more suitable actors 
for the creation of a liberal democratic system in that they to a certain extent straddle the territorial and 
functional axes of the party system(s). 
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Indeed, as noted by Linz at the eve of Franco’s demise: “Spain (…) is a state for all 
Spaniards, a nation state for a large part of the Spanish population, and only a state 
but not a nation for important minorities” (Linz 1975b: 423).  The importance of this 





Stating the Problem: The Electoral Nexus in Spain 1977-2000 
 
On the basis of the discussion above, a set of general assumptions regarding the 
dynamics of electoral mobilisation, stabilisation and competition from the first 
democratic elections in 1977 and onwards can be elaborated. As stated in the 
introductory chapter, the focus of analysis in this dissertation are the eight general 
elections to the Spanish parliament held between 1977 and 2000. Thus, we may start 
by rephrasing the overarching research question posed in the introductory chapter and 
ask ourselves the following: 
  
How and to what extent may electoral participation and party choice in Spain 
between 1977 and 2000 be understood in relation to how the parties and voters 
handled the problems posed by the transition from authoritarianism and democratic 
consolidation, with particular reference to the functional axis and the territorial axis?  
 
Now, in order to offer a fruitful answer to this question, a series of parameters will 
have to be catered for. First and foremost, the fact that we have postulated that the 
process of democratic transition and consolidation saw a sequential process of 
translating societal divisions into manifest cleavages of the party system(s), implies 
that the behaviour of the electorate in its totality will have to be studied, i.e. not only 
the behaviour of those who turned out to vote. As will be shown and discussed in the 
following chapters, there is no doubt that changes in electoral turnout has played a 
significant role in this process between 1977 and 2000. Likewise, both the 
stabilisation of the party vote and competition among the parties will be studied in 
relation to the whole electorate and not only in relation to the valid votes cast. Thus, 
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on the basis of the theoretical discussion in this chapter, the following three aspects of 
electoral handling of problems will be particularly accounted for:  
 
 
The mobilisation of the electorate  
 
In the process of transition from authoritarianism and consolidation of a 
representative democracy, the mobilisation of the electorate is fundamental to the 
resulting legitimacy of the system. Now, in the crucial founding elections and the 
subsequent consolidation of a new democracy, there are two aspects of electoral 
mobilisation to consider. One is related to the overall level of electoral participation 
and the other to the changing composition of the electorate, i.e. the mobilisation of 
new voters11 included in the electoral census between the elections. At the very first 
election all registered voters are ‘new’, of course, but the prospect of democratic 
consolidation over time as discussed above is also intimately linked to the political 
socialisation of those who reach voting age between elections. Given the sequential 
handling of problems, i.e. the attempts to translate the societal divisions into manifest 
cleavages, we shall a priori assume substantial variations both in the former 
abstainers’ and the new voters’ propensity to participate at the elections, both in terms 
of overall turnout and in terms of party choice along the functional Left-Right axis 
and the territorial Centre-Periphery axis. The theoretical account above, however, 
says little or nothing as to exactly how these variations in mobilisation will have 
affected the party system(s) in terms of when and for which parties. Thus, the first 
objective of the empirical analysis is to gain insights into to how electoral 
mobilisation and demobilisation affected the electoral results and party system 
formation in the process of democratic transition and consolidation between 1977 and 
2000. This will be done by analysing the behaviour of both the new voters and 
abstainers between pairs of consecutive elections.  
 
The stabilisation of the party vote 
 
In theory, the consolidation of a new democracy entails a stabilisation of electoral 
behaviour as a certain anchoring of the voters’ preferences in relation to the parties is 
                                                 
11 In the following, ’voters’ denotes the citizens registered in the electorate regardless of whether they 
actually turned out on election day or not, i.e. it also includes those who opted for abstention. 
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developed. As discussed above, all the relevant parties went through profound crises 
as the main focus in Spanish party politics shifted from inter-party consensus to the 
building of intra-party cohesion. Thus, we shall a priori expect to see a gradual 
stabilisation of the party electorates in terms of increased loyalty rates between 
elections. Due to the sequential handling of problems, we should expect substantial 
variations in this respect with regard to the parties’ location on the functional Left-
Right axis and the territorial Centre-Periphery axis. Again, however, the theoretical 
account gives little or no indication as to when and for which parties – apart from the 
obvious case of the unprecedented collapse of the very state bearing party of the 
transition, UCD. Thus, the second objective of the empirical analysis is to gain an 
understanding of how electoral stabilisation and destabilisation affected the electoral 
results and the party system formats between 1977 and 2000. This will be done by 
analysing the trends of stabilisation, i.e. the loyalty rates, between pairs of consecutive 





As discussed above, democratic consolidation entails a narrowing down of the scope 
of electoral competition, i.e. that voter mobility will be restricted to certain segments 
of the electorate. This means that voter transitions between parties will have become 
more predictable along the functional axis and the territorial axis over time. Thus we 
should assume that the transfers of votes between parties have varied substantially 
according to the electoral handling of problems in regard to party choice both along 
the Left-Right axis and the Centre-Periphery axis between 1977 and 2000. Again, 
however, the theoretical account gives little or no indication as to when and for which 
parties, i.e. to what extent we should expect specific changes in terms of direction 
along the two axis of the party system(s). Thus, the third objective of the empirical 
analysis is to gain insights into how the electoral competition affected the electoral 
results and party system formation between 1977 and 2000. This will be done be way 
of analysing voter mobility between pairs of consecutive elections.  
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Mobilisation, stabilisation and competition are of course three interrelated aspects of 
elections. The fourth objective of the empirical analysis is therefore to gain an 
understanding of the interplay between these aspects of electoral behaviour.  
 
The general assumptions laid out here will be specified into a more detailed set of 
hypotheses concerning specific pairs of elections and concrete parties on the basis of 
the discussion of parties, elections and party systems during the 1977-2000 period 
presented in chapter 4. 
 
In accord with the above, then, the research questions to be answered in this 
dissertation are related to our understanding of the interplay between electoral 
behaviour and party system formats during the process of democratic transition and 
consolidation both in terms of variations over time and with regard to socio-political 
positions in relation to the functional axis and the territorial axis. Thus, in the analysis 
of the dynamics of electoral behaviour between pairs of the 1977-2000 general 
elections, particular emphasis will be put on the mobilisation of the electorate, the 
stabilisation of the vote and electoral competition in terms of voter mobility between 
parties.  
 
Levels of analysis  
So far the account has dealt with possible variations in change and stability along the 
functional axis and the territorial axis. There is, however, another important 
dimension of electoral analysis that needs to be taken into account. In order to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of the different loci of mobilisation, stabilisation and 
competition, we should bear in mind that changes at the level of the individual voters 
are not necessarily reflected in the electoral results at the aggregate macro level. 
Likewise, meso level changes in terms of territorial restructuring of a particular aspect 
of electoral behaviour may also not be reflected at the macro level. Thus, changes at 
both the micro and meso levels may occur in such a fashion that they are levelled out 
and not captured in the macro level data. In short, to be able to identify all the relevant 
loci of change and stability between the elections along the functional axis and the 
territorial axis, we will have to cater to variations at different levels of analysis. These 
levels range from that of the individual voters (the micro level), the territorial subunits 
of the political system (the meso level), and the system as a whole (the macro level). 
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Therefore, the analysis of electoral mobilisation, stabilisation and competition in this 
dissertation will, to a certain extent, be structured according to the levels of analysis.  
Thus, in chapter 4 that deals with parties and party system formation, the analysis is 
underpinned by the study of aggregate electoral percentages for Spain as a whole. In 
chapter 5, that deals with co-variations between proportions of the electorate at pairs 
of consecutive elections, the analysis is based on electoral data aggregated to the 
municipal level. In chapter 6, the individual level transfers between electoral options 
at pairs of elections are aggregated to Spain as a whole and analysed. And, lastly, in 
chapters 7, 8 and 9 that deal with electoral mobilisation, stabilisation and competition 
in relation to the territorial axis, the analysis is based on meso level district wise 
variations in individual transfers between the relevant electoral options.   
 
The objective of analysing the behaviour of the whole electorate at different levels 
within the same overarching framework has particular bearings on the choice of data 
for analysis. Likewise, the choice of data has bearings on the choice of methods and 
techniques for the estimation of transition matrixes between the pairs of consecutive 
elections. Thus, before embarking upon the specification of the hypotheses and the 
empirical analyses, a fundamental question must be dealt with. What kind of data and 
methods could be employed to assess the variations in electoral mobilisation, 
stabilisation and competition for the electorate as a whole between 1977 and 2000, not 
only in relation to the functional axis, but also in relation to the territorial axis? This, 
then, is the theme of the next chapter that deals with the questions of data and 

















The fundamental problem one has to resolve when embarking upon the task of trying 
to assess the variations in electoral behaviour of the Spanish electorate as outlined in 
the previous chapter is, of course, to find the adequate data and choose the adequate 
methods of analysis. Due to the aforementioned territorial diversity, conducting 
survey research in Spain in order to produce uniform sets of valid data at different 
levels of analysis is an extremely costly and laborious process. Consequently, such 
datasets for the period in question are few and far between. For example, surveys at 
the level of the 52 electoral districts has tended to be conducted by regional research 
institutions in a fashion that is not coordinated at the national level, i.e. that surveys 
exist for some or all of the elections for the electoral districts (provincias), say, of the 
regions of Andalucía, Catalonia, Euskadi, and Galicia, but not of, say, the districts of 
Extremadura, Castilla la Mancha and La Rioja. Apart from the fact that few surveys 
of this kind exist, even fewer of them are panel studies. In short, in order to conduct 
the multilevel analysis required to identify the foci of stabilisation and change as 
described in chapter 2, we would have to rely on a data source very different from the 
survey kind. From previous research on Spain I knew that the administrative reform 
conducted by Javier de Burgos in 1833 had introduced a “French” system of an 
elevated number of small territorial units for the local administration (Buck 1994). In 
fact, there are more than 8.000 municipalities scattered across the Spanish territory. 
So, I wondered, perhaps electoral and demographic data tied to the municipal level 
could be used for the analysis to be conducted? 
Now, on the one hand, relying on aggregate data implies that we will have to wrestle 
with some well-known and serious methodological problems and to confront a 
profound scepticism within the social science community. On the other hand, the 
analysis of data tied to the 8.000 municipalities might reveal some important aspects 
of electoral behaviour not accounted for by the traditional survey approach. Thus, in 
spite of the methodological caveats, the whole idea was simply too tempting to let it 
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go. In addition, given the limited resources at my disposal, it was rather a question of 
to be or not to be: Either I settled for the aggregate data or we would have to give up 
the whole project. Therefore, after some pondering on the distribution of 
municipalities across the electoral districts and the types of data available at this level, 
I decided to rely on electoral data aggregated to the municipal level. Thus, the basic 
units of analysis in this study are the more than 8.000 Spanish municipalities 
(municipios) grouped into the 50 electoral districts (provincias) at the Spanish 
mainland and the Balearic and Canarian archipelagos.12  The numbers of valid units in 
the datasets within each electoral district range from 32 (Las Palmas) to 409 (Burgos), 
with a mean of around 162 units per province.13  The 50 provinces are in turn grouped 
into the 17 Autonomous Communities (Comunidades autónomas, or CAs) with their 
proper regional parliaments and executives. As mentioned in chapter 2, the CAs are 
divided into two groups, the so-called § 143s on the one hand and the § 151s 
(Andalucía, Catalonia, Euskadi, and Galicia) on the other. The thirteen § 143s hold 
the elections to their regional parliaments simultaneously, whereas the other four hold 
their elections individually, albeit the regional elections in Andalucía have tended to 
be held simultaneously with the general elections. 
    
The electoral data were obtained through the Ministry of the Interior and consist of 
the raw provisional counts for each municipality at the 1977, 1979, 1982, 1986, 1989, 
1993, 1996, and 2000 General Elections to the Spanish parliament.14 For each of the 
elections the data files contained the number of registered citizens in the electoral 
census, the number of votes obtained by all the parties and the number of blank and 
rejected votes. The data for the elections between 1977 and 1996 were compiled, 
packed and stored on discs on my request in 1996 and the data for the year 2000 were 
extracted from the cd-rom Elecciones a cortes generales 2000 edited by the 
Ministry.15  
                                                 
12 For reasons that will be discussed in relation to the ECOL method for ecological inference below,  
uni-municipal Spanish enclaves on the African coast, Ceuta and Melilla, have been omitted from the 
analysis precisely because no variance can be computed for them.  
13 See table 3.3 for an overview of the number of municipalities per electoral district. 
14 The consequences having to rely on the provisional counts instead of the definitive official results 
will be dealt with below. 
15 I am indebted to directors Félix Marín Leiva and Gonzalo de Celis for providing me with the data. 
All the standard disclaimers apply.  
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After creating SPSS syntax files in order to read, recode, compute, match, and 
proofread the raw numbers for the parties and electoral abstainers for each and one of 
the more than 8.000 municipalities, I grouped the data into seven data sets, one set for 
each pair of consecutive elections, i.e. that the data for the elections held in 1977 and 
in 1979 are listed into a data set named gen7779 and the data for the elections held in 
1979 and 1982 into a data set named gen7982 and so forth.16  
 
The problem of electoral censuses and changing territorial units 
 
Studying electoral change with data tied to territorial units over time entails two sets 
of interrelated problems: One pertaining to the change in units and the other 
pertaining to the accuracy of electoral censuses. Starting with the territorial changes, 
i.e. splits and mergers of Spanish municipalities between 1977 and 2000, I chose to 
deal with this problem in the simplest manner possible: Given the fact that the grand 
total exceeds 8.000, I simply conducted a pairwise deletion from the data matrix of 
those municipalities that had suffered changes between a given pair of elections. This 
implies, for example, that a municipality that suffered changes in its territorial 
structure, say, between 1982 and 1986 has been deleted from the matrix for the 1982 
and 1986 pair of elections, while it is listed in the 1979-82 matrix in its original form 
and in the 1986-89 matrix as a new entry. The fact is that the number of 
municipalities that suffered territorial changes between the elections as a fraction of 
the total number of Spanish municipalities is very small indeed.  
 
Another parameter that I had to take into account was related to the accuracy of the 
data registered at the municipal level. In comparative electoral research, it is a well-
established fact that the electoral censuses vary in regard to their accuracy and that 
this poses challenges to the estimation of the real size of the electorate at each election 
(Franklin 2004: 86-89). This affects the reliability of both the electoral abstention rate 
and the proportion of registered voters that are new at each election. Starting with the 
problem of electoral abstention, if we divide the official abstention rate into technical 
abstention and real abstention in which the first category denotes electoral abstention 
                                                 
16 The seven data sets and the ECOL program for analysis of ecological data are available at my web 
site: uit.no/statsvitenskap/931/5 
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due to census errors, i.e. that citizens that have passed away still are registered in the 
census at election time, that those who have moved away are entered in the registry on 
more than one location, and other errors, it is generally estimated that the technical 
errors amount to between a tenth of the total abstention rate registered for Spain as a 
whole and up to a third in some areas (López Pintor 1982; Vilas Nogueira 1992; 
Justel 1994: 26-27). This implies, in a hypothetical example, that an official turnout at 
70 percent may indicate a real turnout at 72 – 74 percent for Spain as a whole and 
even up to 79 percent in some areas. The region of Galicia is particularly known for 
census errors (Vilas Nogueira 1992). 
 
Furthermore, it should once more be underscored that the electoral results recorded in 
the data from the Ministry of Interior at the municipal level are based on provisional 
counts and thus differ slightly from the definitive official results. Whether there are 
any systematic district wise differences in this respect is unknown, but it calls for 
some caution regarding a too strict comparison between the official numbers and the 
numbers in my datasets. To this it should be added, of course, that the two tiny 
enclaves on the African coast have been omitted from the datasets.17 In order to assess 
the consequences of the differences between the counts recorded in the datasets and 
the official results, I have listed the relative distributions of the electorate on the main 
categories of electoral behaviour for all the seven general elections in table 3.1 
(below).  
As shown in table, the deviations from the official percentages for all the parties, 
except AP/PP, do not exceed one tenth of a percent point for any of the elections. For 
both AP/PP and electoral abstention, however, we find more substantial deviations 
from the official percentages. For the 1977 election the proportions allotted to AP is 
0.2 percent points lower in the dataset, for the 1993 election it is 0.3 percent points 
higher, for the 1996 election it is 0.3 and 0.2 percent points higher for the 1993-96 
and 1996-2000 data sets, respectively. For electoral abstention, we note that the 1977 
data set reports a 0.3 percent point lower share than the official figures and that both 
data sets containing the 1979 elections report a 0.5 percent point higher share. For the 
rest of the elections, the shares reported in the datasets are either identical or lower, 
ranging from –0.1 to –0.7 percent points, compared to the official proportions based 
                                                 
17 Their combined electorates, however, amount to less than 0.3 percent of the total. 
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on the total number of voters and votes cast. On the whole, then, the deviations caused 
by the deletion from the data matrixes of municipalities that suffered territorial 
changes between pairs of elections, the use of provisional electoral counts and the 
omission of Ceuta and Melilla have not caused serious distortions as to the aggregate 
accuracy of the data, with the possible exception of the results for the AP/PP and the 
estimates of electoral abstention.  The deviations for the latter categories will have to 
be taken into account in assessing the results of the analyses.18 
 
Table 3.1: Elections to the Cortes generales 1977 - 2000 (percent of electorate) 
                               Official proportions vs. proportions in data sets19 
 
          1977    1979    1982    1986    1989    1993    1996    2000 
    
PCE/IU     7,3     7,2     3,2     3,2     6,3     7,3     8,1     3,8     
(1)        7,3     7,2     3,2     3,2     6,3     7,3     8,2       
(2)                7,2     3,2     3,2     6,3     7,3     8,2     3,8 
PSOE      22,8    20,4    37,7    30,6    27,6    29,5    29,0    23,7 
(1)       22,8    20,4    37,7    30,7    27,5    29,6    29,1     
(2)               20,4    37,6    30,7    27,5    29,6    29,0    23,7 
UCD       26,8    23,4     5,3     
(1)       26,8    23,4     5,3 
(2)               23,4     5,3      
CDS                        2,3     6,4     5,5     1,3 
(1)                        2,3     6,4     5,5     1,3 
(2)                        2,3     6,4     5,5     1,3  
AP/PP      6,4     4,1    20,7    18,0    17,9    26,4    29,9    31,0 
(1)        6,2     4,0    20,8    18,1    17,9    26,7    30,2     
(2)                4,0    20,8    18,1    17,9    26,7    30,1    31,0 
PNV        1,3     1,1     1,5     1,1     0,9     0,9     1,0     1,1 
(1)        1,2     1,1     1,5     1,1     0,9     1,0     1,0      
(2)                1,1     1,5     1,1     0,9     0,9     1,0     1,1 
CiU        2,2*    1,8     2,9     3,4     3,5     3,8     3,5     2,9  
(1)        2,2*    1,8     2,8     3,5     3,5     3,8     3,6      
(2)                1,8     2,8     3,5     3,5     3,8     3,6     2,9 
 
 
Abstain   21,2    32,0    20,0    29,5    30,3    23,6    22,6    30,0 
(1)       20,9    32,5    19,8    29,2    30,0    22,9    21,9      
(2)               32,5    19,9    29,2    30,0    22,9    21,9    30,0  
 
*Votes cast for Pacte Democràtic Per Catalonia  (PDPC). 
 
                                                 
18 The official definitive counts for each municipality are by 2005 available on the website of the 
Ministry of the Interior for the 1993 and 1996 elections. Using these, however, would have tampered 
the comparability with the results for the other election for which still only provisional counts are 
available. 
19 Bold types indicate the official distribution of the electorate in percentages. (1) Indicates the 
percentages allotted to the various options at the first election in the pairs of elections in the data set, 
the ‘1977’ in the 1977-1979 pair for example. (2) Indicates the percentages allotted to the various 
options at the second election in the pairs of elections in the data set, the ’1979’ in the 1977-1979 pair 
for example.  
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In order to clarify the problem of estimating the dynamic changes in the composition 
of the electorate between elections, I shall start out by identifying the categories of 
electoral behaviour at two consecutive elections. 
 
A typology of electoral behaviour at two elections 
 
In order to study the dynamic aspects of electoral behaviour at two consecutive 
elections, a series of parameters must be considered. The typology (fig. 3.1 below) is 
adopted and modified from Sani (1986: 5) and is an attempt to categorise the 
dynamics of voter behaviour between elections. The first dichotomy, active vs. 
inactive, marks the distinction between those who turned out to vote at one or both 
elections and those who abstained form participating at both elections. The next 
dichotomy, continuously active vs. discontinuously active, denotes the difference 
between those who turned out at both elections and those who only turned out at one 
of them. Among the continuously active another dichotomy is established between 
those who voted for the same party at both elections, the loyal, and those who 
switched between parties, i.e. those who transferred their vote. Among the 
discontinuously active I have distinguished between those who switched to or from 
abstaining, the mobilised and the demobilised, and those who had entered or left the 
electorate between the elections, the included and the excluded. As mentioned above, 
in general the bulk of the included consists of citizens that had reached voting age 
after the first election and the bulk of the excluded of citizens that had deceased after 
the first election.  
 
Fig. 3.1 A typology of electoral behaviour at two consecutive elections:  
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                            Inactive                                                                          Included 
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 VOTERS     
                                                      Discontinuously active        
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                              Active                                                                               
                                                                                                                    Transferred 
                                                      
                                                        Continuously active       
                                                                                                                    Loyal 
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Estimating the categories of the typology 
 
The included and excluded were calculated on the basis of two data sources: 1) the 
changes in the electoral censuses between elections and 2) the number of recorded 
deaths per province per year between 1977 and 2000. These data were obtained from 
the data bank TEMPUS at the official web site of the Instituto Nacional de 




The Second Election: The excluded 
 
For each of the fifty electoral districts the numbers of deceased per full year between 
the elections were calculated. For the months remaining after election day of the first 
election year and the months preceding election day at the second election year, the 
number for those years were divided by twelve and multiplied with the months that 
remained of the first year and the months passed in the second year, respectively. The 
resulting number, then, was used to calculate the deceased as a proportion of the first 
election electoral census for the whole electoral district. This proportion was then 
used as a coefficient to calculate the excluded at the second election for each of the 
municipalities within the province, i.e. they were added to the electorate of the second 
election as if they were still alive and registered in the census.   
 
The First Election: The included 
 
For each and one of the municipalities the change in the numbers of registered voters 
between the elections was calculated and this number was used to estimate the share 
of the inhabitants at the first election that had reached voting age by the second 
election. In the datasets they appear as if they were registered in the first election 
censuses. 
 
Due to the aforementioned fact that the deviances between the official percentages 
allotted to the parties are almost negligible (the deviances for AP/PP and abstention 
notwithstanding), I decided not to conduct an estimation of possible additional 
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20 www.ine.es/tempus 
changes in the electorates at the municipal level stemming from migrations between 
municipalities between the pairs of elections. Such an estimation would have been 
overtly time consuming and would probably not have added very much to the 
accuracy of the analysis. 
In order to show the relative distributions of the shares of the whole electorate when 
the estimated number of inhabitants that had not reached voting age is included at the 
first election and the estimated number of inhabitants that had been excluded between 
elections is included at the second election, I have listed the estimated percentages for 
the main categories in tables 3.3a and 3.3b (below).  
 
Table 3.2a Percent of electorate at the first elections of the pairs of elections in 
dataset21  
             1977    1979    1982    1986    1989    1993    1996     
    
PCE/IU        6.6     6.8     2.9     3.0     5.8     6.8     7.7     
PSOE         20.6    19.0    34.3    28.8    25.1    27.2    27.2   
UCD          23.9    21.6     4.8 
CDS                           2.1     6.0     5.1     1.2 
AP/PP         5.6     3.8    18.9    16.9    16.6    24.2    28.1 
PNV           1.1     1.0     1.3     1.0     0.8     0.9     0.9  
CiU           2.0     1.6     2.6     3.3     3.1     3.6     3.4 
Other        11.5     9.0     6.0     7.3     7.6     9.6     5.6    
Included      9.9     7.1     9.0     6.4     8.3     5.6     6.6 
Abstain      18.8    30.1    18.1    27.3    27.6    20.9    20.5 
 
Total       100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
 
 
Table 3.2b Percent of electorate in the second elections in the pairs of elections in 
dataset 
 
             1979    1982    1986    1989    1993    1996    2000 
    
PCE/IU        7.1     3.0     3.1     6.1     6.8     8.0     3.7 
PSOE         19.9    36.3    29.5    26.6    27.5    28.2    22.8 
UCD          22.9     5.1 
CDS                   2.2     6.2     5.3     1.2 
AP/PP         4.0    20.0    17.5    17.3    24.8    29.2    29.8 
PNV           1.1     1.4     1.0     0.8     0.9     1.0     1.0 
CiU           1.7     2.7     3.3     3.4     3.5     3.5     2.8 
Other         9.5     6.5     7.4     8.2    10.4     6.1     7.2 
Excluded      1.8     3.6     3.7     3.3     3.6     2.7     3.9 
Abstain      32.0    19.2    28.3    29.0    21.3    21.3    28.8  
 
Total       100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
 
Source: The Spanish Ministry of the Interior and INE. The calculations are my own. 
Notes: 1) For CiU in 1977 votes cast for Pacte Democràtic Per Catalonia  (PDPC). 
2) The “Other” category also includes regional parties apart from PNV and CiU that have obtained parliamentary representation 
at some of the elections. This category also contains blank and rejected votes.  
 
                                                 




As observed in the tables, the proportions of included are far greater than the 
proportions of excluded and reflect the growth of the electorate over the years covered 
in the analysis. The difference between the included and excluded is particularly great 
between 1977 and 1979 due to the fact that the voting age was lowered from 20 to 18 
years in 1979.  
 
So far I have presented the datasets for the analysis. In the next section I shall present 
the statistical methods that I will employ in order to estimate both the aggregate and 
individual level changes between the pairs of elections.  
  
 
Modelling changes in aggregate proportions between elections 
 
 
A general problem faces us as researchers when we try to model the aggregate 
changes in the behaviour of the electorate between elections. The statistical analysis 
of aggregate data for geographical units normally produces a clear pattern, but the 
substantial interpretation of the very same pattern is often equally unclear and 
controversial. For correlation and regression analysis, the choice of one mathematical 
model over the other substantially affects the interpretation of the results. At the heart 
of the matter lie our assumptions about whether linearity or non-linearity is to be 
expected from the data. For a long time, the aggregate analysis of electoral change 
between elections was branded by an unresolved problem. Commonly, the model 
used to describe changes for smaller parties did not fit the data for bigger parties, and 
vice versa. Typically, additive regression models would be seemingly fit to describe 
changes in the proportions of votes obtained by the bigger parties normally found in 
two-party systems whereas multiplicative models would seemingly better fit the data 
for the smaller parties generally found in multiparty systems. This paradox was 
perhaps overlooked or even accepted because although the non-linearity is clearly 
detectable for smaller parties, it is almost invisible for the middle range of the scale 




The basic logic behind this problem is, of course, that the relative distributions of 
votes in a given polity constitute a bounded whole. A party cannot obtain more votes 
than the total number of voters. And, likewise, a party cannot obtain less than zero 
votes. This means that the distribution of votes is not an infinite continuum. This 
implies that in modelling relationship between the numbers of votes obtained by a 
party at two or more elections, techniques based on linear functions are not 
appropriate. However, a series of statistical models exist that take this kind of non-
linearity into account. In particular, models originally elaborated to cater to the 
problems arising from the use of ordinal and nominal scale variables, such as logit 
and probit models, do by default handle the variable studied as a bounded whole. 
Therefore, logit models have been used in cross-level inference research. However, it 
was Søren Risbjerg Thomsen who first showed theoretically why non-linearity also is 
to be expected in the analysis of aggregate proportions as such (Achen and Shively 
1995: 185). The regression of, say, a vote proportion obtained by a given party on its 
vote proportion obtained at a previous election will only be linear after the vote 
proportions have been transformed to the logit scale. The logit model of party change 
fits the data both for smaller and for bigger parties. Now, given the regional diversity 
in terms of party systems in Spain, even the bigger parties will appear as small parties 
in some of the regions. Indeed, when conducting scatterplot analysis for the 
proportions of the electorate obtained by the parties in pairs of elections without 
having transformed the variables to the logit scale, I detected systematic deviations 
from linearity in some of the electoral districts even for the biggest party. These 
deviations disappeared once the proportions were transformed to the logit scale.22    
Thus, for the analysis of aggregate change in the distribution of the electorate between 
elections, i.e. the covariations between the proportions obtained by the parties, 
between the parties and the proportions that opted for electoral abstention, as well as 
with the proportions of included voters between elections, I shall present a series of 
correlation matrixes between these variables after they have been transformed to the 
logit scale. I do so by the use of the ECOL program developed precisely by Risbjerg 
Thomsen and his collegues. The ECOL program automatically transforms the raw 
                                                 
22 The logits are computed as follows:  Logit = Ln[P/(100-P)] i.e. the natural logarithm of the odds 
P/(100-P) for the property.   
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data into logit proportions and computes Pearson’s r correlations between these 
proportions.     
 
This is, however, only part of the analysis that I shall present in this study. In fact, the 
basic objective is to try to assess to what extent the relationships identified at the 




Cross-level inference analysis: The ecological fallacy problem  
 
Any researcher who ventures into the realm of cross-level inferences will, by default, 
have to carry the burden of the ecological fallacy problem. The legacy of the 
ecological fallacy as a methodological obstacle is so overwhelming that it makes any 
attempt to even hint at possible relationships at the individual level from aggregate 
data a true quixotic endeavour. Now, the reference to Cervantes’ famous novel on my 
part is not wholly accidental and I shall not deny that for me personally some of the 
attraction posed by the ecological challenge lies precisely therein. This is, however, 
beside the point. I would rather sum up the current state of cross-level inferences by 
asking the following basic question: Is there a life after Robinson?     
This question stems, of course, from the enormous impact that Robinson’s famous 
article has had on the social science community since the beginning of the 1950s 
(Robinson 1950). Since Robinson’s lucid demonstration of the cross-level fallacy 
problem, social science students graduate with the fundamental understanding that 
one shall not draw conclusions about individual behaviour from aggregate data. This 
understanding tends to be passed on in such a way that it makes us deaf to the fact that 
substantial methodological progress that has been made within the field over the last 
decades. And, although I would never deny that cross-level inference do run against a 
serious logical problem, I still think it is sad to see the vast amount of spatially 
distributed data available deemed untouchable by electoral researchers on purely 
methodological grounds. Thus, given the fact that Spain’s more than 8.000 
municipalities exhibit an enormous wealth of spatially distributed data that is of 
interest to us, we should not fail to make use of it only because it entails a well-known 
methodological obstacle.  
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Several techniques for cross-level inference have been developed since the 
publication of Robinson’s article. The bulk of these have employed variations of 
linear regression models, either in a simple form (Goodman 1959; Crewe and Payne 
1976; Alt and Boix 2001) or in more advanced versions employing bounded 
regression models to ensure that the resulting estimates remain within the logical 
limits (King 1997). Non-linear models have also been employed, but Thomsen’s logit 
technique for the study of Danish elections was the first, and so far the only, to be 
explicitly grounded on a theory of individual level behaviour (Thomsen 1987). 
Thomsen’s logit model has since been used to estimate individual level behaviour in 
several countries of the world, e.g. Australia and New Zealand (Leithner 1997), 
Austria (Hänisch 1998), Britain (Brown, Firth and Payne 1999), Korea (Thomsen and 
Kim 1993; Park 2003), and in the US (Hanmer and Traugott 2004). Hammer and 
Traugott estimated the individual voting behaviour compared to the true voting 
behaviour concerning split ticket voting in Oregon and proved that the results based 
on the logit technique were quite accurate. By and large, the logit technique seems to 
yield results that are generally more valid than any other technique developed so far. 
In addition, it seems to me more theoretically sound to work with a technique that is 
based on an explicit model of individual level behaviour than with techniques that 
lack this characteristic. The theoretical grounding of the model offers a theoretical 
link between the levels of analysis in the light of which the results may be interpreted 
in a more substantial fashion. All this will hopefully be made more easy to grasp 
through a discussion of the ecological inference problem and the proposed logit 
solution to overcome, at least in part, this logical problem. 
 
 
Formal statement of the ecological problem 
 
In this section I shall formalise the ecological inference problem. I will be using a 
revised version of the traditional two-party system as a theoretical point of reference. I 
start with a binary model based on voting the Spanish Workers Socialist Party, PSOE, 
vs. all other options (including abstaining). I find this more suitable for modelling in 
the context of the Spanish multiparty system than the traditional approaches based on 
two-party systems. Now, the reason for choosing one of the parties as denominator in 
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the model instead of, say, electoral abstention, is simply that the group of  ‘abstainers’ 
holds a special function in the ECOL model that I discuss below. 
  
The problem starts with a simple logical combination of two distributions of electoral 
choice, as shown in fig. 3.2 below.  
 
Fig. 3.2  The logical distributions of dichotomous choice at two elections 
                                     
 Psoe 1 not Psoe 1  
Psoe 2 Nipsoe-psoe Nipsoe-not psoe Nipsoe 
not Psoe 2 Ninot psoe-psoe Ninot psoe-not psoe Ninot psoe 
 Nipsoe Ninot psoe  
 
The cell containing Nipsoe-psoe denotes the proportion of voters that opted for the party 
PSOE at both elections. The cell containing Ninot psoe-psoe denotes the proportion of 
voters that did not cast their vote for PSOE at the first election, but opted for PSOE at 
the second election. Likewise, the cell containing Nipsoe-not psoe denotes the proportion 
of voters that voted PSOE at the first election, but defected from the party at the 
second election. And, lastly, the cell containing Ninot psoe-not psoe denotes the proportion 
of voters that did not opt for PSOE at any of the elections.  Given the properties of 
aggregate data, we have no direct knowledge of these proportions. We have only 
knowledge of the distributions on the marginals that are marked in bold types. The 
whole point in ecological inference analysis is, of course, to try and estimate the 
numbers of voters in cells on the basis of the marginal distributions.  The objective, 
then, is to estimate the cell frequencies so that a simple cross tabulation can be 
employed.  
 
Researchers have suggested and elaborated various techniques to that end, ranging 
from a set of intricate cross tabulations to different forms of correlation and regression 
analysis. In general, the bulk of the methods have been seen a mere techniques for 
estimations and have not been based on an explicit theory of electoral behaviour. 
Statistical models, however, are not devoid of theory and the choice of one technique 
over the other has theoretical implications. For example, the traditional and widely 
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used Goodman regression model as an approach to cross-level inference is based on 
manifest variables in which the aggregate election results at the second election are 
regressed on the corresponding results at the first election (Goodman 1953, 1959). 
This implies, in fact, that we are somehow postulating that the behaviour at first 
election is the cause of the voter’s behaviour at the second election. The ECOL 
method, however, model the behaviour at two elections in terms of latent structure 
correlation instead of employing manifest variables. By employing a latent structure 
model we postulate that the voter’s behaviour both at both elections is caused by some 
underlying factors not observed in the data. In addition, it is based on explicit 
assumptions derived from the theory of partisanship, as will be shown below. 
 
The ECOL estimator  
 
The ECOL estimator developed by Thomsen can be classified within the group of 
continuous partisanship models (Achen and Shively 1995: 183-188). The framework 
of the ECOL model is as follows: Suppose that there are just two options, PSOE and 
NOT PSOE, so that party identification may be expressed as a position on a one-
dimensional scale. In each of the municipalities each voter has a (long term) party 
identification that added together produce a certain density of this identification 
within the municipality. This density is assumed to be normal or Gaussian, so that in 
each municipality party identification is distributed as a normal distribution with a 
mean and a variance. The variance is assumed constant over municipalities, while the 
mean varies. Then, the voter’s decision at each time period is modelled as it would be 
in psychometric scaling theory. Each election is treated as if it were an «item» on a 
psychological test. Thus every election has its response curve, a function that gives 
the probability of choosing PSOE as a function of partisanship. In accordance with 
gaussian scaling models, the curve is assumed to be normally distributed and its 
argument linear in partisanship. The election is then modelled as a binary choice 
between PSOE (1) and NOT-PSOE (0). This yields a response curve for the 
relationship of vote to partisanship that in turn is affected by parameters unique to 
each election.23 The individual probabilities are then averaged over the distribution of 
the probabilities within each municipality in order to estimate the vote. Since a 
                                                 
23 Prob (psoetji = 1pji) = Φ(α t + β t pji), where α t and β t are parameters unique to each election. 
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mixture of normal distributions with normally distributed means and common 
variances is itself a normal distribution, the vote proportions can be transformed to a 
scale familiar from probit analysis.24 
On this transformed scale, the constituency vote is linear in mean constituency 
partisanship. Since an equation like this holds for each election, it follows that, under 
these assumptions, the regression of one election on another is not linear in the vote 
proportions, as so much prior work had assumed (Achen and Shively 1995: 184). In 
stead, the regression will be linear only after the vote proportions have been 
transformed to the probit scale. Transformations of that kind have been used in 
ecological regression, since they automatically force the resulting estimates into the 
bounded range. But Thomsen was the first to give the specification a meaningful 
substantive interpretation. Since the probit transformation is nearly linear in the 
middle ranges, the non-linearity will be almost invisible in most two-party systems. 
But in systems with small parties, the model implies substantial non-linearity in 
Goodman style regressions. Thomsen’s achievement is to demonstrate that linear 
ecological models are at best only approximations to the actual functions found in the 
data and to show theoretically why non-linearity is to be expected (Achen and Shively 
1995: 185). However, Thomsen’s model does not escape the well-known 
identification problem in ecological inference.25  
 
The crucial point is that the ECOL method hinges on an assumption of functional 
homogeneity, i.e. that the probability curves and functions for the relationship 
between the partisan model and the estimated transfers between elections must be 
isomorphous in terms of direction. In practice, this means that we should group the 
territorial units into the most functionally homogeneous clusters, that is, units that 
exhibit the most similar dynamics between party identification and the actual 
behaviour at elections in order to minimise the risk of running into such identification 
problems.26     
 
                                                 
24 Φ-1(Psoetj) =  α’t + β’tPj. 
 
25 As pointed out by Achen and Shively, if, say, β is doubled while pj and σ are halved, the probability 
of a vote for the PSOE is unchanged and the statistical fit will be identical. But the substantial 
interpretation is of course radically different in the two cases (se Achen and Shively 1985: 185ff). 
26 The actual grouping of the municipalities into homogeneous regions is dealt with below. 
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The actual estimation method of the ECOL is in fact very simple. Since the primary 
interest is estimating voter transition rates, the partisanship model is used as a means 
to that end. Under the ECOL model, the distribution of the probability of voting the 
PSOE is normal within each district at each time period. The underlying partisanship 
model creates a correlation between these two normal distributions within each 
district. The observed vote is just a dichotomisation of each of these normal 
distributions. The pivotal observation is that pairs of dichotomised, correlated normal 
distributions have long been studied in statistical theory under the topic of tetrachoric 
correlations and it is on the basis of this theory that the estimator is created. The 
actual estimation is done in four steps (Thomsen 1987: 55-64): 
 
The two-option vote proportions (in this case PSOE vs. NOT PSOE) at each election 
are transformed to the logit scale.27 Using the logit transformed vote proportions, the 
Pearson’s r is computed between the votes at the two elections. Then Yule’s Q is 
computed as an approximation to the tetrachoric correlation in order to transform the 
Pearson’s r into the corresponding correlation between the individual-level 
dichotomous vote variables. Then the transition rates is estimated:  
The proportion of voters that cast their vote for PSOE at both elections is written as 
the ratio of those who voted PSOE twice to the fraction that voted PSOE at the first 
election. Likewise, the proportion of those who did not vote PSOE at the first election 
but opted for PSOE at the second election is written as the ratio of those who voted 




The ECOL estimator for larger tables 
In principle the Ecol method is based on a simple relation between a two-vote option, 
i.e. the 2 x 2 table presented in fig. 3.2 and its corresponding logit correlation. Now, 
the two-vote option is at best only an approximation of the real life situation 
experienced by the voters, and in multiparty systems it is not even an 
                                                 
27 Even though logits and probits are radically different in theoretical terms, in practice they are so 
similar that the choice of one over the other is presumably unimportant. Besides, the logits are much 
easier to calculate. 
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approximation.28 This problem is overcome in the Ecol estimates by choosing a 
«reference» option at each election, and then construct all possible 2 x 2 tables 
involving the reference option. The weakness of this approach is that the final 
estimate depends on which reference option we choose. The general experience, 
however, is that we get the most plausible results when we choose electoral abstention 
as the reference option. The main point here is that we choose a reference group that 
is supposedly the most heterogeneous in terms of party preferences and/or social 
characteristics. The problems pertaining to the Spanish electoral censuses mentioned 
above in terms of estimating the true proportion of the electorate that has opted for 
abstention at the elections, i.e. that a part of the official abstention rates are due to 
technical errors, adds credibility to the assumption that the group labelled ‘abstainers’ 
in my datasets are the most heterogeneous of all the categories. I have therefore 
chosen the electoral option of abstention as the reference category for the cross-level 




Spanish municipalities and functional homogeneity 
 
The notion of ‘functional homogeneity’ mentioned above implies that in order to 
make inferences with the aid of the logit technique, we must somehow group the 
Spanish municipalities into functionally homogeneous categories. Now, there are of 
course two ways of establishing categories of functionally homogeneous units of 
analysis. We could either apply some sort of cluster- or discriminant analysis in order 
to identify these categories on purely statistical grounds. Or we can rely upon 
geographical, institutional and political factors. I have chosen the latter approach for 
two main reasons. One important aspect of the Spanish elections is related to the 
aforementioned variations in terms of options presented to the voters, i.e. the plurality 
of party systems. By choosing the electoral districts as categories, we control for 
differences in this regard. However, there is an additional, perhaps even more 
important, reason for choosing the electoral districts as our functional categories, 
namely the well-documented district wise variations in the effects of the electoral law 
on the logic of electoral competition. The small average district size (6.7) and the 
                                                 
28 Even in two-party systems abstaining remains a real option for the voter. 
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application of the d’Hondt formula have created substantial distortions regarding the 
proportionality of electoral representation in Spain, as shown in numerous studies 
(Gunther 1989; Oñate and Ocaña 1999). The average district size is verging upon the 
minimum required (6) to avoid that the electoral system acquires irremediable 
majoritarian effects (Montero 1998: 39). However, thirty of the electoral districts are 
even smaller than the threshold of six. The result is that in half of the Spanish 
electoral districts the MP’s are shared between only the two biggest parties, which has 
lead some observers to label the Spanish system as a district wise two-party system 
(Baras and Botella 1996: 104). And, according to Sartori, the Spanish electoral system 
should be rated as a strong system in terms of its impact on voter behaviour (Sartori 
1994: 37). The acknowledgement of the effects of the electoral law has since the very 
first elections in 1977 been a constant issue in the election campaigns in terms of calls 
on behalf of the major parties for the voto útil, i.e. that a vote for the smaller parties in 
the smaller electoral districts would be a wasted vote in terms of representation. The 
variation in terms of levels of disproportionality across the electoral districts is thus a 
well-known fact that is widely referred to and debated in the very electoral 
campaigns. The immediate effects of this on the voters’ perceptions and behaviour are 
well documented (Gunther 1989), even though the effects do not follow the district 
size in a purely uniform fashion. Together with the differences between districts in 
terms of party system formats, this implies that we should assume systematic 
variations in the logic of partisanship for electoral choice between the districts. In 
other words, that the effects of party identities on electoral behaviour, that constitute a 
pivotal element in the theoretical foundation for the ECOL model, tend to vary 
systematically between the districts. 
 
Table 3.3 (below) presents the 50 electoral districts that will be treated as 
‘homogenous’ regions and serve as the regional units for the estimation of the inferred 
transition matrixes between the pairs of elections. In the table I have also included the 
number of seats pertaining to the districts, the number of registered voters (in 




Table 3.3 The 50 electoral districts, seats, voters registered, and no. of 
municipalities29 
                      1977   1979   1982   1986   1989   1993   1996   2000   
Districts:               Seats:        Voters registered in census (in thousands):                                          Municipalities: 
 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería          5     240    278    276    314    325    349    375    394       103           
Cádiz            9     560    644    651    723    749    799    847    861        44 
Córdoba          7     451    513    514    554    562    583    604    609        75 
Granada          7     457    525    533    583    595    613    652    671       168 
Huelva           5     256    282    288    314    320    341    355    367        79 
Jaén             6     403    465    449    487    482    496    508    516        96 
Málaga          10     570    652    688    753    783    874    921    984       100 
Sevilla         13     842    979   1002   1101   1142   1234   1314   1383       105 
ARAGON                                                              
Huesca           3     153    168    169    176    169    173    177    175       202 
Teruel           3     112    122    121    126    120    120    119    115       236 
        7     547    609    617    657    657    686    709    712       291 Zaragoza 
ASTURIAS         9     783    869    854    910    896    920    958    934        78 
BALEARES     644        67          7     408    452    467    528    549    572    606
CANARIAS                                                            
Las Palmas       7     365    421    452    504    563    597    648    710        34 
Tenerife         7     398    475    434    495    526    587    628    643        53 
CANTABRIA        5     327    376    378    405    405    420    442    455       102 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                       
Albacete         4     211    239    240    265    259    273    284    290        86 
Ciudad Real      5     311    361    342    371    368    373    384    390       100 
Cuenca           3     151    168    163    171    169    167    169    165       238 
Guadalajara      3      95    108    108    115    116    120    128    136       287 
Toledo           5     310    345    347    370    373    387    407    422       204 
CAST.-LEON                                                          
Avila            3     131    146    139    146    144    144    145    141       248 
Burgos           4     239    270    274    286    285    292    301    296       371 
León             5     364    410    397    429    419    429    436    428       211 
Palencia         3     125    142    141    150    149    151    153    150       191 
Salamanca        4     241    277    277    289    289    299    307    298       362 
Segovia          3      99    111    112    117    120    122    124    124       208 
Soria            3      74     82     79     82     80     79     80     77       183 
Valladolid       5     295    334    343    383    380    401    416    419       225 
Zamora           3     165    180    180    189    180    180    182    176       248 
CATALONIA                                                         
Barcelona       31    3005   3467   3332   3576   3618   3752   3905   3968       310 
Girona           5     304    337    339    368    386    406    430    451       221 
Lleida           4     242    268    268    284    283    291    301    304       230 
Tarragona        6     332    372    372    408    411    433    464    483       183 
C.VALENCIANA                                                      
Alicante        11     677    763    788    870    902    963   1028   1092       141 
Castellón        5     283    309    314    338    342    357    373    384       135 
Valencia        16    1288   1460   1462   1590   1605   1682   1782
EXTREMADURA                                                         
   1846       264 
Badajoz          6     413    462    460    498    493    502    516    525       163 
    333       219 Cáceres          5     279    312    306    331    325    329    340
GALICIA                                                             
A Coruña         9     731    821    804    873    880    920    979    938        94 
Lugo             4     302    329    320    339    334    326    338    313        67 
Ourense          4     315    347    330    347    342    329    328    293        92 
Pontevedra       8     549    617    620    686    682    719    770    749        61 
MADRID          34    2744   3178   3275   3558   3714   3977   4200   4210       179 
MURCIA           9     551    635    656    729    754    809    860    901        45 
NAVARRA          5     319    364    376    399    409    425    444    453       272 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava            4     153    174    183    199    209    222    234    242        51 
Guipúzcoa        6     438    507    501    536    537    560    572    574        88 
Vizcaya          9     750    866    854    913    923    948    971    965       111 
LA RIOJA         4     167    186    190    204    207    214    222    225       174 
 
Mean           6.7     471    536    536    581    591    619    649    659       162 
Sum            350   23525  26777  26785  29039  29530  30945  32436  32934      8095    
 
                                                 
29 The municipalities listed are from 1996-2000. Although the changes between the pairs of elections 
have been small, some of the districts have seen a gradual reduction in the number of municipalities 




In addition to the two lines of arguments referred to above, the fact that the electoral 
districts coincide with the administrative units provincia on which the new structure 
of Autonomous Communities de facto was built (all the CAs were based on either one, 
two or several of the already long existing provinces), emphasises the importance of 
the electoral districts also from an institutional perspective.   
 
In summary, the ECOL model for cross-level inferences implies that the territorial 
units be grouped into functionally homogeneous categories and in the Spanish case a 
series of relevant arguments tend to point to the very electoral district, the provincia, 
as the categorical break variable to use in the analysis. Thus, the cross-level inference 
estimates that I shall present in this study are all based on the electoral districts as the 
break variable in computing the estimates. This also includes the estimates presented 
for Spain as a whole.  
   
In the next section I shall address the question of conceptualising the territorial 
dimension of Spanish politics, i.e. the centre-periphery problem as discussed in 
chapter 2.  
 
 
Measuring the Centre-Periphery dimension for electoral analysis 
 
 
As stated in chapter 2, the Estado de autonomías was established in order to handle 
the state-ness problem by way of a profound decentralisation of political power that 
was conducted in an asymmetric fashion. It was observed that Spain differed 
considerably from most other European societies in the extent to which the centre-
periphery cleavage was a source of political conflict (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1988: 
241). On the other hand, no general academic agreement seemed to exist as to exactly 
how this centre-periphery dimension should be conceptualised in terms of 
operationalisation for electoral research. 
  
According to the Rokkanian centre-periphery theory, the Centre occupies a privileged 
position in the state- and nation building processes in terms of military-administrative, 
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legal, economic and cultural resources while the predicament of the Periphery is 
marked by distance, difference and dependency. In terms of the structuring of mass 
politics, the salience of human agency in the relations between centre and peripheries 
was stressed. This implies that in order to have an effect on voter behaviour, elites 
both in the centre and in the peripheries must somehow possess a perception of this 
structure and hence try to mobilise the citizenry accordingly. Thus, the voters in the 
peripheries would be subject to different pulling forces in terms of political identity, 
one emanating from the centre and the others emanating from peripheral elites. This 
means that ‘periphery’ as a political concept cannot merely be established on purely 
geographical grounds – one cannot simply put a ruler on the map of a country and 
draw concentric circles around the capital city in order to determine the different 
levels of peripheral status. Geography and distance are only important to the extent 
that they have hindered or thwarted administrative, legal, economic and cultural 
communication across the state territory at the crucial stages of nation building. To 
the extent that this argument is valid, it means that even though the centre-periphery 
axis is derived from a territorial interpretation of the state we cannot merely rely on 
simple geographical coordinates as a yardstick.  
 
In addition to this there is another factor to be considered. Since the both the 
correlation matrixes and the inferred voter transition matrixes are based on the fifty 
electoral districts as homogeneous regions, we should ensure that each of the 
categories of the centre-periphery typology is broad enough to cover a substantial 
number of these very same districts. Otherwise, no or very little a priori variation 
within the categories can be expected at each point in time and hence the validity of 
the typology would be difficult to assess through empirical analysis. Thus, the 
electoral districts must be aggregated into fairly broad centre-periphery categories 
conceptualised on the basis of a number of variables that take into account both the 
territorial dimension of the four channels of communication identified by Rokkan and 
at the same time cater to the pivotal element of human agency.   
 
Classical versus radial categorisation 
In order to cover a number of territorial entities with proper names and histories, we 
must somehow undertake an abstraction of the centre-periphery concept and at the 
same time try to retain as much as possible of its properties, i.e. extend the conceptual 
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denotation so that it covers all the 50 districts and at the same time retain as much as 
possible of its connotation. In the method of classical conceptualisation exposed by 
Sartori, this is a formidable task since we cannot have it both ways. Extending the 
concept in order to cover different units and at the same time retaining the core of the 
concept implies that we have to move up the ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970). 
Sartori’s argument is that we would have to define the core concept by fewer 
attributes and cater to the differences by a series of second order concepts (see 
Berntzen, Buck and Marsteintredet 2006). In the case that one or more of the units in 
a category do not share a given property with the rest of the units in that category, we 
will have to omit that attribute from the definition of the concept, i.e. undertake a 
limitation in terms of conceptual connotation. In practice, however, this would imply 
omitting a substantial number of variables definitely associated with the Rokkanian 
centre-periphery concept and thwart any attempt to establish any meaningful 
categorisation of centre and peripheries in Spain, i.e. that the resulting typology would 
so abstract that it would be unrecognisable in relation to the channels of 
communication exposed by the theory.  
However, researchers have undertaken a revision of Sartori’s method for 
conceptualisation and have proposed a different approach based on a radial 
understanding of concepts and categories (Collier and Mahon 1993; Collier and 
Levitsky 1997; Collier and Adcock 1999). In the radial understanding, no unit of 
analysis is defined as belonging to the category on all of the variables, but rather on a 
combination of variables. This implies that a category is defined by “family 
resemblance”, i.e. that the units belong to the same family of cases even though they 
are not equal on all the variables. In this conceptualisation, the abstract core of the 
concept is not directly attainable. Rather the units are defined as belonging to a 
category on variables that measure different second order aspects of the core concept.    
 
 
A Broad Centre-Periphery Typology Based on Five Dichotomies  
 
According to the theory, the predicament of a periphery is marked by distance, 
difference and dependency in relation to administrative, economical and cultural 
channels of communication. In order to cater to the problem of aggregation, i.e. to 
ensure that the categories were broad enough to contain more than a few electoral 
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districts, I decided measure the centre-periphery relationships at the level of the 
autonomous regions (CAs). I started out with altogether 19 variables covering 
territorial distance from Madrid, relative economic status, administration (e.g. degree 
of autonomy), status of regional language, strength of regional parties and so forth. 
These initial variables were at different levels of measurement and therefore difficult 
to handle within the same methodological framework. I therefore decided to 
undertake a dichotomisation of the variables and coded the units with the score 
‘periphery’ as 1 and the others as 0. I soon found out that in terms of their effect on 
the dependent variable, i.e. centre-periphery status of the districts, 14 of the initial 
variables could be omitted from the matrix without altering the relative distribution of 
the regions in terms of centre-periphery status. I therefore decided to retain only the 
variables that most directly related to the centre-periphery concept according to the 
combined theories of Rokkan (1999), and Tyriakian and Nevitte (1985). Thus, the 
resulting matrix is defined by the five dichotomised variables described below. 
  
First dichotomy: Distance 
It might seem strange that the variable distance should be dichotomised into only two 
categories. After all, territorial distance could easily be measured in kilometres and is 
a naturally continuous variable. However, the most common conceptualisation of 
distance undertaken by the various statistical institutions in Spain entail some sort 
measuring the relative costs of transporting people and goods out of the provinces and 
into the Spanish marked. Typically, the average freight cost of transporting a ton of 
goods per capita to the neighbouring autonomous region is calculated. This commonly 
yields a continuous variable on which all the provinces are plotted. A closer 
inspection of these measures, however, reveal that out of the 50 provinces there are 
only three outliers with a very high relative level of transportation costs – namely the 
provinces located on the Balearic and Canarian archipelagos. The fact that these are 
separated from the rest of the regions by sea explains why they appear as deviant 
cases. This means that the distribution on the initial continuous variable is strongly 
affected by this straightforward geographical dichotomy of landward versus seaward 
communication.30 I have therefore chosen a parsimonious operationalisation of 
                                                 
30 This is a recurrent theme in the Canarian and Balearic political and economical discourses, often 
conceptualised in the notion of insularidad, i.e. that they face particular problems as island regions 
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distance in which these two regions have been allotted the value 1 and all the others 
the value 0. This variable is labelled Distance in the matrix.  
 
 
Second dichotomy: Economy  
The uneven process of industrialisation mentioned earlier has created great regional 
differences across the Spanish territory in terms of economic development and levels 
of income per capita. As shown in numerous reviews,31 the relative income level of 
the wealthiest region nearly doubles the income level of the poorest region. In fact, 
the notion of ‘poor’ Spain versus ‘rich’ Spain is a common reference in the debate on 
regional economy and redistribution of funds among the regions. On the basis of the 
relative income distributions per capita listed for the years 1980 and 2000 in Herrero 
et.al 2004 (Spain = 100), I have computed the mean for all of the regions and 
thereafter coded the three regions below one standard deviation from the grand mean 
as 1 and all the others as 0. This variable is labelled Economy in the matrix.  
 
Third dichotomy: Language 
In terms of cultural difference in relation to the centre, a fundamental distinction can 
be drawn between the regions that have two official languages, i.e. that the local 
language has obtained official status in the administration alongside Castillian 
Spanish, and the other regions. Thus I have coded the regions with two official 
languages as 1 and the other regions as 0. This variable is labelled Language in the 
matrix. 
 
Fourth dichotomy: Strength of principal regional party 
As discussed in the theory of peripheral response to modernisation, the role of human 
agency in the centre-periphery relationship should be stressed. In terms of electoral 
mobilisation in the interest of the peripheral region, particular emphasis should be put 
on whether the regional elites have opted for and succeeded in establishing their own 
political parties in competition with the parties emanating from the centre. As regional 
tickets abound in the elections to the Spanish parliament, the mere existence of a 
                                                                                                                                            
separated from the Spanish mainland. This has also been acknowledged by the central state in terms of 
specific measures of economic compensation. 
31 See de Carranza 1982; Herrero, Solér and Villar 2004; and Morata 1997: 124.  
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registered regional party is not a valid yardstick in this respect. Therefore, I have 
chosen the threshold of obtaining parliamentary representation32 as the basic criterion 
and have coded the regions accordingly, i.e. that regions that have had one of their 
parties obtain a seat at one or more of the general elections as 1 and all the others as 0. 
This variable is labelled Party1 in the matrix  
 
Fifth dichotomy: Strength of second regional party 
As stated in the discussion on the peripheral responses to the claims for cultural and 
economic standardisation emanating from the centre, these responses could take 
different ideal type forms described as reactionary, radical and liberal. That is, a 
differentiation along the Left-Right axis. From some of the regions both parties of 
Leftist and Rightist leanings have been able to obtain representation in the Spanish 
parliament. Thus I have coded the regions the have obtained seats for both Leftist and 
Rightist regional parties as 1 and those who have not as 0. This variable is labelled 
Party2 in the matrix.   
 
On the basis of the variables described above, the following matrix is set up: 
 
Table 3.4 The initial centre-periphery matrix    
                                    
                 Distance   Economy   Language   Party1   Party2     Sum        
 
ANDALUCIA          0        1        0        1       0        2  
ARAGON             0        0        0        1       1        2                  
ASTURIAS           0        0        0        0       0        0 
BALEARES           1        0        1        0       0        2 
CANARIAS           1        0        0        1       0        2 
CANTABRIA          0        0        0        0       0        0 
CAST.-MANCHA       0        0        0        0       0        0 
CAST.-LEON         0        0        0        0       0        0   
CATALONIA          0        0        1        1       1        3 
C.VALENCIANA       0        0        1        1       0        2 
EXTREMADURA        0        1        0        0       0        1 
GALICIA            0        1        1        1       0        3 
MADRID             0        0        0        0       0        0 
MURCIA             0        0        0        0       0        0 
NAVARRA            0        0        0        0       0        0 
BASQUE COUNTRY     0        0        1        1       1        3       
LA RIOJA           0        0        0        0       0        0  
 
Sum                2        3        5        7       3                   
 
 
                                                 
32 For the threshold of parliamentary representation, see Rokkan 1999.  
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In a strict radial conceptualisation, all the units in a category share an equal number of 
the attributes that define the category. As shown in the table, eight regions have a 
score at 0, one a score at 1, five regions a score at 2 and three regions a score at 3. 
Thus, if we label the category ‘0’ as the Centre, category ‘1’ as the First Periphery, ‘2’ 
the Second Periphery and ‘3’ the Third Periphery, there are four categories in the 
initial conceptualisation of the centre-periphery dimension. However, as the category 
‘1’ only contains the two electoral districts of Extremadura, very little variance can a 
priori be expected within this category. It therefore seems logically sound that these 
two provinces be placed in one of the two adjacent categories, i.e. either the Centre or 
the First Periphery. Now, reconsidering the initial variables employed to create the 
dichotomies, we note that they differ in terms of measurement level.  All the variables 
apart from economy are based on some sort of either/or logic. Distance as landward 
vs. seaward communication, local language as official vs. not official, party1 and 
party2 as passed vs. not passed the threshold of representation. Economy, however, is 
based on the relative measure of deviation from the Spanish grand mean and is at best 
only a proxy for an either/or categorisation. In a stringent conceptualisation of a 
category, it is my firm belief that it is more logically sound to categorise the units 
according to an either/or measurement than according to a more/less measurement. I 
have therefore chosen to place the provinces of Extremadura in the Centre category. 
 
On the basis of the argument exposed above, I have created a threefold categorisation 
as follows: The Centre (values 0 and 1) consisting of Madrid, Asturias, Cantabria, 
Castilla la Mancha, Castilla-León, Extremadura, Murcia, Navarra and Rioja that 
embrace altogether 22 electoral districts. Then the First Periphery (value 2) consisting 
of Andalucía, Aragón, Baleares, Canarias and Comunidad Valenciana with altogether 
17 electoral districts. And lastly, the Second Periphery (value 3) consisting of 
Catalonia, Euskadi and Galicia with altogether 11 electoral districts. 
 
In relation to the radial conceptualisation of the typology, an additional factor should 
be noted. Given the fact that the categories are based “family resemblance” as 
outlined above, one of the virtues of radial conceptualisations is that the units in the 
typology not only exhibit differences between categories, i.e. that they are different in 
degree in relation to the Centre-Periphery concept, but that they are also different in 
kind given the fact that their placement in a category is based on scores on different 
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variables. Thus, not only their degree of peripheriality but also their different kinds of 
peripheriality will be taken into account in the analysis. This implies, for example, 
that systematic differences between districts belonging to different regions within the 
same centre-periphery category can be attributed to the fact they are different in kind 
even though they are equal in degree.   
 
Cases: Electoral districts over time 
Since we are studying the dynamic relationship between electoral options over time in 
all the fifty districts, we shall in the following distinguish between the notion of case 
on the one hand and district on the other. ‘District’ simply denotes the physical 
territory of each and one of the electoral districts, each and one with their proper name 
and history. A case, however, is a relationship between two electoral options at any 
pair of elections in a district, whether the voters exhibit the same behaviour at both 
elections or have changed behaviour. Since we are dealing with 50 electoral districts 
at seven pairs of elections, the maximum number of cases in the analysis of a 
relationship is 50 x 7 = 350. Thus, divided into the three categories of the radial 
conceptualisation of the Centre-Periphery typology, this yields the following initial 
distribution of cases: 
 
 
Table 3.5 The distribution of cases along the Centre-Periphery axis   
 1977-79 1979-82 1982-86 1986-89 1989-93 1993-96 1996-00 Sum 
Centre      22      22      22      22      22      22      22     154 
1. Periphery      17      17      17      17      17      17      17     119 
2. Periphery      11      11      11      11      11      11      11       77 
Sum      50      50      50      50      50      50      50     350 
 
In the actual analysis there are a some deviations from this initial distribution due to 
the fact that not all of the parties have run in all the districts at each point in time and 
that some of the parties did not run at all points in time. This will of course be dealt 
with for the parties in question in due course. 
 
Thus, in this chapter I have discussed the data and the methodology that will serve as 
the underpinnings for the empirical analysis. The next chapter deals with the elections 
and parties that shaped the political landscape for the period to be studied in the 
analysis. The aim of the next chapter is to give a general description of the elections, 
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parties and party systems between 1977 and 2000 in light of the discussion in chapter 
2. This will then serve as the basis for the formulation of a set of specified hypotheses 


































Parties, General Elections and Party Systems 1977-2000 
 
 
In this chapter the formation of the political parties, the official aggregate results of 
the 1977-2000 general elections and the institutionalisation of the parties and party 
systems will be discussed. This will serve as a necessary background for the 
formalisation and specification of the overarching assumptions outlined in chapter 2 
into a set of hypotheses. These, in turn, will be put to empirical tests and structure the 
analysis of electoral behaviour along the functional and territorial axis of the political 
system in chapters 5-9.  
 
 
The formation of political parties 
When dealing with the formation of the parties, party systems and the subsequent 
crystallisation of voter alignments during the twin processes of democratic transition 
and consolidation, two aspects of Spanish politics from the mid 1970s and onwards 
should be noted: First, the fact that Spain started her transition to liberal democracy in 
the mid 1970s implied that the Spanish ‘founding elections’ took place under the full 
impact of modern televised political campaigning. Second, the very longevity of the 
Franco regime implied that the parties that eventually emerged before the first general 
elections in 1977 emanated from two fundamentally different socio-political logics. 
One group of parties emanated from the pre-authoritarian heritage, i.e. parties that had 
been part of the democratic system of the Second Republic (1931-1936), the other 
group consisted of newly founded parties with no prior history. The nature of the 
authoritarian regime, i.e. Right-Authoritarian and Centralist, implied that the first 
category was overwhelmingly comprised of Leftist and Regionalist parties, whereas 
the second category was dominated by parties of the Right. These two features had 
profound bearings on the political activity at the advent of the first elections and the 
institutionalisation of the parties. One the one hand, there is no doubt that in terms of 
political organisation the Right was worse prepared than the Left for democratic 
elections. On the other hand, the Rightist elites emanating from the old regime were in 
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control of the state apparatus and had access to the state-wide mass media to an extent 
that could be exploited for electoral purposes (Gunther and Hopkin 2002). 
 
Of the salient parties of the Second Republic, some of the Leftist parties had survived 
either underground, in exile, or both. However, also some of the Regionalist parties, 
among them the oldest party in Spain, the Basque Nationalist Party, had also 
survived. Thus, the following relevant parties with prior history took part in the 
establishment of the new political democracy: Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party 
(PSOE), Spanish Communist Party (PCE), Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia 
(PSUC), Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC) 
and Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). Only the Catalan UDC and the Basque PNV 
could be labelled 'Centre-Right', the others were either Centre-Left or Leftist.33  
However, one should bear in mind that on the eve of the first election only the PNV 
sought explicitly to emphasise its continuity with the politics of the Republic, whereas 
both the PCE and the PSOE tried to relief themselves of their Stalinist working class 
legacy and portray themselves as catch-all parties (Linz and Montero 2001: 9).  
 
The political organisation of the Spanish Right represented a crucial question. The 
formation of a social and electoral block that was conservative and democratic at the 
same time had always been highly problematic in Spain (Caciagli 1984: 95). The 
Right had to improvise new parties, or, as it were, it had to carry out a profound 
conversion to turn large sections of the authoritarian system into suitable components 
for democracy (Amodia 1983: 4). As it turned out, the transition process itself 
produced three relevant parties of the Right and Centre-Right, Adolfo Suárez' Union 
of the Democratic Centre (UCD), Manuel Fraga's Popular Alliance (AP), and the 
Catalanist Democratic Convergence of Catalunya.34 
 
Compared to the political climate of the Second Republic, political moderation was 
                                                 
33 Partido Socialista Obrero Español, Partido Comunista de España, Partido Socialista Unificat de 
Catalunya, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Unió Democràtic de Catalunya, Partido Nacional 
Vasco (JEA). 
34 Unión de Centro Democrático, Alianza Popular, and Convergència Democràtica de 
Catalunya (CDC). Founded in 1974 by Jordi Pujol and Miquel Roca, the CDC became the dominant 
partner in the Catalanist coalition formed with the UDC in 1978. This coalition, the Convergència i 
Unió, (CiU), governed Catalonia between 1980 and 2003. 
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assumed to prevail in the mid 1970s. Albeit little was known of the political 
preferences of the Spanish electorate after forty years of compulsory silence, it was 
thought that the aforementioned socio-economic development had brought the 
majority of the voters to dread drastic and radical changes. Both within the Left and 
the Right, the dominant elites acknowledged that the Spanish voters of the 1970s 
would be substantially different from the highly mobilised masses of the Republic. 
Thus, even though the UCD eventually would emerge as the most Centrist of the 
parties at the time of the first elections, it was actually Manuel Fraga, former minister 
in the authoritarian regime, who first realised that Francoists could secure a political 
future for themselves by moving towards a Centrist position (Fraga 1975). However, 
after the collapse of the Navarro government, in which he had played a significant 
part, Fraga gave up the Centre in favour of the so-called "natural right" position.35 
Accordingly, when the AP was founded in 1976 it was widely considered a Rightist 
party staunchly defending the interests of the old regime.  
 
Boosted by a courageous reform programme, endorsed by popular referendum in 
1976, the incumbent Premier of the old regime, Suárez, set out to conquer the Centre 
position in the spring of 1977. In order to do this he needed an organisation around 
him that also included individuals with a less Francoist past. This is how UCD was 
born, an organisation set up by those in power with the purpose of preserving that 
power (Amodia 1983: 7). From the outset, the new party relied heavily on the 
apparatus of the old regime. They way in which the reforms were undertaken, i.e. 
from above and within the basic laws of the authoritarian regime, enhanced the 
possibility for the UCD to profit from them. The state controlled mass media and 
public opinion polls, and the network of governing institutions at the province and 
municipal level (that were not democratised until 1979) were all employed to 
facilitate the success of the UCD.  
 
Even though the UCD was completely dependent upon the very popularity and 
success of Adolfo Suárez, it soon became clear that he and his ministers alone could 
not build a party that was strong enough to win the elections. In fact, during the first 
                                                 
35This notion stems from the idea, popular among conservatives, that the Spanish electorate has 
an imminent rightist inclination. 
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six months of 1977 a plethora of embryonic parties had emerged orbiting around the 
centre of the political spectrum. Therefore, Suárez had his close collaborate Calvo 
Sotelo negotiate with all these tiny splinter groups in order to make them run under 
the UCD umbrella. With the possible exception of the Centro Democrático, each and 
one of these groups had no hopes of electoral success on their own due to the 
characteristics of the new electoral law (Gunther and Hopkin 2002). As part of the 
UCD machine their leaders could secure for themselves an access to political power, 
while they gave the UCD a much-needed Centrist profile. The UCD was founded, 
then, as a rather opportunistic coalition set up only weeks before the election in 1977. 
At the right, Suárez’ loose alliance of Liberals, Christian Democrats, Social 
Democrats and Conservatives, had to compete with the AP of course. However, AP’s 
founder, Manuel Fraga, soon "discovered" that in his own party he was surrounded by 
people much to the Right of himself (Vilar 1986: 49). Thus, the AP had to struggle 
with the impression that it was the party of the old Francoist hard-liners. 
 
On the Left, the PSOE was boosted by substantial financial support from French and 
German Socialists whereas the PCE was tarnished by conflicts with its Catalan 
partner PSUC. These features added to the impression that the PSOE was the only 
solid alternative of the Left. 
 
Table 4.1: National Election Results 1977-2000 (percent of valid votes cast): 
                1977    1979    1982    1986    1989    1993    1996    2000 
 
Turnout         78,8    68,0    80,0    70,5    69,7    76,4    77,4    70,0      
 
PCE/IU           9,3    10,8     4,0     4,6     9,1     9,6    10,5     5,5 
PSOE            29,3    30,4    48,1    44,1    39,6    38,8    37,6    34,1 
UCD/CDS         34,4    34,8     9,6     9,2     7,9     1,8      -       - 
AP/PP            8,2     6,1    26,4    26,0    25,8    34,8    38,8    44,5 
 
Regional*        6,9     8,8     7,7     9,6    10,9    10,4     9,9    11,1 
Other           11,9     9,1     4,2     6,5     6,7     4,6     3,2     4,8 
 
* Only regional parties that obtained parliamentary representation are included. 
 
Source: The Spanish Ministry of the Interior. The calculations are my own. 
 
 
As shown in table 4.1, the UCD won the elections both in 1977 and in 1979. Thus, the 
incumbent leader of the old regime also became the first Premier under democratic 
rule. The 1977 result in particular was remarkable if we take into account that the 
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party was set up such a short time before the elections. It was also seen as a personal 
triumph of Suárez over Fraga on the Right. The second largest party was the PSOE, 
three times the size of the Communists. Thus, the moderates on both the Left and the 
Right had polled nearly two-thirds of the votes. This result was, for all practical 
purposes, repeated in 1979, the first election under the new Constitution (enacted on 
the basis of popular referendum in 1978). In 1982, however, we note that a substantial 
realignment took place. Between 1979 and 1982, the UCD had split in two when 
Suárez left both the government and the party to form the Centro Democrático y 
Social, CDS. These two parties, UCD and CDS, together polled less than 10 percent, 
while the AP quadrupled its share to more than 26 percent. On the Left, the PCE was 
halved to 4 percent while the PSOE polled more that 48 percent and gained absolute 
majority in the Parliament. The subsequent peaceful inauguration of a Socialist 
government, apparently accepted by all relevant sectors of society, was to many 
observers the definite token of democratic consolidation. Also by the token of 
electoral support for the forces that explicitly stressed their ideological links with the 
old regime, the transition seemed successful. The extreme right polled 2.1 percent in 
1979, its highest percentage in any national election after the abolition of the 
Francoist regime. Since then, the electoral demise of the extreme Right has been 
steady, albeit slower, also in local elections. 
 
As outlined in chapter 2, the sequence of electoral handling of problems implied that 
the main electoral issues at the first election in 1977 were centred round the very 
regime transition process itself. Indeed, the first election took place before a new 
democratic constitution was enacted. In fact, the elaboration of a new constitution was 
the very task to be undertaken by the resulting legislature. Consequently, the Left-
Right divide was not so much perceived of in traditional socio-economic terms as in 
the stance on regime change, i.e. radical rupture, reform, status quo or even brutal 
reaction.  
 
The 1982 debacle was followed by a long period of Socialist predominance that lasted 
until 1996. However, the support for the AP and its successor Partido Popular (PP) 
on the Right made a leap from just above 25 percent of the votes cast in 1989 to 
nearly 35 percent in 1993. In 1996 the AP/PP won by a slight margin and formed the 
first government of the Right after the collapse of the UCD. In 2000, however, AP/PP 
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won more votes alone than the combined votes cast for PSOE and the Izquierda 
Unida (IU – an alliance dominated by the PCE, established in 1986) and gained 
absolute majority in Parliament. Thus, for the first time after Franco’s demise, the 
Spanish Right could govern without the support of any other party group in 
Parliament. 
 
Apart from the electoral fate of the parties and the changes in government formations, 
one particular aspect of the 1977-2000 elections should be noted. A quick glance at 
the table reveals that the level of electoral turnout suffered drastic changes between 
some of the elections. The first election in 1977 saw a near 79 percent turnout, which 
then dropped to 68 percent in 1979. The realignment election in 1982 saw a sharp rise 
in turnout again to 80 percent before it dropped to around 70 percent both in 1986 and 
1989. As the AP/PP gained momentum in 1993 and 1996, the turnout rose above 75 
percent again before it eventually dropped to 70 percent again in 2000. Thus, there 
can be no doubt that the changes in electoral turnout played a significant part in 
deciding the results of the elections in terms of the shares of the vote obtained by the 
various parties along the functional Left-Right axis. Consequently, on the basis of this 
observation, particular attention shall be paid to the role played by electoral abstention 
in the formation of the party systems.  
 
 
Party building under democratic transition: The case of UCD 
The electoral debacle in 1982 and the subsequent collapse of the UCD have received 
particular academic attention both within the research on political parties per se and 
on processes of democratisation (Hunnæus 1985; Gunther 1993; Hopkin 1999a; 
Gunther and Hopkin 2002). During the aforementioned sequential translation of 
societal divisions into manifest cleavages, a fundamental lack of institutionalisation at 
the central elite level proved fatal to the survival the party. The peculiar logic of the 
pacted transition to democracy implied that the political parties would have to 
perform a series of more or less incompatible functions simultaneously. The 
establishment of democratic rules of the game required strong inter-party consensus 
that was difficult to combine with intra-party cohesion, and the search for marginal 
votes in order to win the elections ran to a certain extent contrary to the building of 
electoral core constituencies.    
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As mentioned above, the task that the first UCD government faced after the electoral 
victory in 1977 was to preside over a constituent process that would hopefully lead to 
a widespread support for the democratic regime. In the light of Spain’s troubled 
constitutional experiences in the past, on the whole the constituent process supervised 
by the UCD must be considered a great success. Although Suárez and his colleagues 
did not succeed in integrating and obtaining the full support from the Basque 
Nationalists, the 1978 constitution had a broader socio-political basis than any 
previous constitution in Spanish history (Gunther and Hopkin 2002).  However, the 
strong emphasis on inter party consensus proved to be costly for the governing party 
and would eventually lead to its total collapse in 1982. The electoral and institutional 
fate of the UCD is quite instructive in order to understand the interplay between the 
ideological Left-Right cleavage and the territorial Centre-Periphery cleavage in the 
process of creating the new political system. As pointed out by José Amodia, the 
UCD emerged on a concurrence of two forms of legitimacy. One pertained to the idea 
of continuity, the other to the idea of change. The first represented a bridging of the 
gap between the dictatorship and the liberal democracy that was to succeed it. This 
institutional continuity enabled broad sectors of the ruling class under Franco to 
survive politically. 
"They crossed the bridge (some rather startling conversions to democracy taking place along the way), 
they organized themselves, and they continued to exercise power in the new democratic system, just as 
they had done under the previous authoritarian system with, of course, all the formal adjustments that 
such a radical transformation required". (Amodia 1983: 1). 
 
On the other hand, the UCD has to be understood on the basis of the legitimacy 
offered by change in itself. Political reform was initiated and guided by the coming 
leaders of the party. In this perspective, the UCD emerged as an attempt to profit from 
the reform process. It was a clever and well-timed way of exploiting the exceptional 
circumstances created by Franco's demise. The legitimacy that democratic change 
afforded them and the possibility of continuing to exercise power acted as catalysts to 
bring together a wide range of frondes, budding parties, and public figures, all of them 
Right of Centre in the ideological spectrum - the exceptions being very few. In fact, of 
the three pillars of Francoism - financial/industrial power, the church and the armed 
forces - only the latter can be said not to have been directly involved in the UCD 
venture (Amodia 1983: 1-5). 
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The industrialisation, urbanisation and general increase in the popular welfare, and the 
clever management by Adolfo Suárez and the UCD, had to a substantial extent 
overcome the problems posed by conflicting interests embodied in the profound 
socio-economic inequalities that had exploded under the Second Republic and led to 
violent political confrontations and the fully fledged civil war. However, as it turned 
out, Suárez and the UCD were less fortunate when they tried to cope with the value 
based divisions, epitomised in relation to the issues of divorce and abortion, and the 
territorial divisions, i.e. the pending questions pertaining to the territorial structure of 
the Spanish state and the challenge posed by the political aspirations of the Basque 
and Catalan peripheries. Even before the death of Franco, the idea that without some 
kind of autonomy for these regions democracy would be impossible, and vice versa, 
was quite widespread (Balcells 1993: 62). This was due to the thesis of the two Spains 
and the peculiar dialectic of democracy and dictatorship on the one hand, and of 
centralism and autonomy on the other:    
 
 "… Spanish politics have swung between two diametrically opposed traditions: the liberal democratic, 
pluralist tradition, best exemplified in the social and political development of Aragón and especially 
Catalonia, and the unitary, centralist tradition, most recently epitomised in the Franco regime. In 
modern times, when the democratic tradition has come to the fore, it has always been accompanied by 
the pressure for some form of regional autonomy; indeed, some form of devolution has been seen as an 
essential ingredient of that democracy." (Newton 1983: 98). 
 
 
In the general euphoria, the so-called encanto, of the first years of democratic rule, the 
territorial question was handled in a rather chaotic way. Virtually everybody seemed 
to think that autonomy would consolidate the democracy and solve the economic 
problems in the regions. This autonomanía made even provinces with no known 
history of autonomous institutions crave for their own regional parliament. The 
government chose to deal with the "historical" claims of the regions with national 
minorities, i.e. the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia, on the one hand and all 
the others on the other in a rather peculiar way.  The Constitution of 1978 differed 
between two roads to autonomy, the § 151 (originally designed for the regions of the 
cultural minorities) and the § 143 (a lesser version for the rest). However, the "non-
national" regions could also achieve autonomy by the § 151, provided that an absolute 
majority was obtained in the referendums in every one of their provinces. This 
immediately sparked a fierce debate over the status of the two kinds of autonomy, to 
whom they should be granted and how they should be implemented. And, after a 
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series of turbulent debates, Andalucía was granted autonomy by the § 151 even 
though the required majority was not obtained in the Almería province.  
 
The autonomy process also faced a serious problem in the dialectic between the 
extreme regional nationalists and the military forces. The ETA violence and the 
territorial differentiation were perceived by sectors within the military apparatus as 
decisive steps towards the total disintegration of the Spanish state, whose integrity 
was its very raison d'etre (Boyd and Boyden 1985). In this chaotic situation the UCD 
and the PSOE came together in order to establish a pact that would "harmonise" the 
autonomy process. This ended in a legislative act called Ley Orgánica de 
Armonización del Proceso Autonómico (LOAPA). In general, the leaders of the 
nationalist parties in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia were extremely 
sceptical to the very idea of the LOAPA process, which they despicably dismissed as 
"coffee for everybody".36 The main point, however, is that the problems which the 
party faced in regard to the handling of the value based issues were compounded by 
how party handled the question of regional autonomy. Straddling these two issue 
dimensions is seen as perhaps the main reason why the UCD, as a coalition of the 
Centre and the Right, collapsed. The party was clearly not able to handle the situation 
and at the first autonomous elections in 1980, each and one of the regional results 
backfired on the party (Vilar 1986: 112). 
 
Thus, from a transition-theoretical perspective, Suárez and the UCD proved 
themselves very instrumental in the process of bridging the gap between the 
incumbents and the opposition in order to establish modes of political action that led 
to a peaceful and guided restoration of parliamentary democracy in Spain. On the 
other hand, the UCD was less successful in reforming the territorial administration of 
the Spanish state. The transfer of powers from the central to regional governments is 
still, at the beginning of the 21st century, a controversial question that awaits a 
solution. Because of this, the governing Centre-Right party between 1996 and 2004, 
Partido Popular, was only able to reach uneasy agreements with the Centre-Right 
                                                 
36i.e. that all the regions were treated equally regardless of history and thus slowing down the 
transfer of powers to their own regions. See interviews with regional party leaders Xabier Arzalluz, 
Xosé M. Beiras, Angel Colom and Jordi Pujol in El País 28.3 1992, 10.5 1992, 3.10 1993 and 10.10 
1993.  
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Basque and Catalan parties.37 In fact, the PNV and the CiU preferred to keep the 
PSOE in power until the situation became unbearable in the mid 1990s.38 This reflects 
a persistent lack of trust between the Spanish Centre-Right on the one hand and the 
Basque and the Catalan Centre-Right on the other.  
 
In sum, the collapse of the UCD in 1982 paved the way for the socialist PSOE and for 
the AP/PP as the main opposing parties at the national level. And there is no doubt 
that the PP under the leadership of José M. Aznar went to lengths in order to occupy 
the Centre-Right position finally left completely vacant by the demise of the CDS in 
1993.  
 
Parties and seats in parliament 1977-2000 
 
Apart from the parties described above, a number of other regional parties have 
obtained parliamentary representation at one or more of the elections. Table 4.2 
(below) presents an overview of the regional representation according to the 
categories of the Centre-Periphery typology presented in chapter 3. As shown in the 
table, the state-wide parties have obtained between 315 to 326 of the 350 seats in 
Parliament, i.e. between 90 and 93 percent of the total. The number of seats obtained 
by the First Periphery parties has ranged from none to seven (2 percent of the total) 
and the number obtained by the Second Periphery parties from 20 to 32, i.e. between 
6 to 9 percent of the Spanish total. In relation to the 125 parliamentary seats from the 
First Periphery, the regional parties have obtained between none and 6 percent. Of the 
90 seats from the Second Periphery, the regional parties have obtained between 22 
and 36 percent. This implies, of course, that the state-wide parties have faced a far 
stronger competition from the regional parties in the Second Periphery than in the 
First Periphery. In terms of the functional axis, three regions have managed to gain 
representation for both the regionalist Left and Right: Basque Country and Catalonia 
                                                 
37Over the years, the AP has run under a series of labels in alliance with others before eventually 
establishing itself as the Popular Party (PP - Partido Popular) in 1989.   
38 Approaching the 1990s a third phenomenon strongly affecting Spanish politics in general and the 
governing party, the PSOE, in particular, should be noted. This is the phenomenon of the escándalo 
político, the syndrome of political scandals, i.e. corruption and illegal funding of counter-terrorism 
against the ETA involving high ranking PSOE officials, that tarnished the González government in the 
1990s. The effect of these scandals was most heavily felt in the capital, Madrid, where the traditional 
PSOE hegemony among the employees in the bureaucracy was completely eradicated, but it also 
tarnished the PNV and the CiU as PSOE’s supporters in Parliament (Heras 1997: 510).  
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of the Second Periphery and Aragón of the First Periphery.39 This means that the 
state-wide parties have faced serious competition both on the Left and the Right in 
these regions. In the Basque Country, the PSOE managed to merge with the Basque 
Left Party (EE) before the 1993 elections. It should also be noted that the IU alliance 
have tended to stress a federalist structure in that its various regional branches 
command certain autonomy vis-à-vis the central party apparatus. However, the 
tensions between the central apparatus and the Catalan branch culminated with the 
excision of the IC-V in 2000.  
 
Table 4.2 Parties and seats in parliament 1977-2000 
State-wide parties:    1977  1979  1982  1986  1989  1993  1996  2000   
PCE/IU                   19    23     4     7    17    18    21     8 
PSOE                    118   121   202   184   175   159   141   125 
UCD                     166   168    11   
CDS                                   2    19    14 
AP/PP                    16    10   107   105   107   141   156   183 
Other*                    7     1 
Sum                     326   323   326   315   313   318   318   316 
 
1. Periphery parties: 
PSA/PA (Andalucía)              5                 2                 1 
CUPC/AIC/CC (Canaries)          1           1     1     4     4     4 
CAIC/PAR (Aragón)         1     1           1     1     1 
CHA    (Aragón)                                                     1 
UV                         (Valencian C.)                       1 2 1 1
Sum                       1     7     0     3     6     6     5     6  
 
2. Periphery parties: 
CiU**  (Catalonia)       13     8    12    18    18    17    16    15 
ERC*** (Catalonia)        1     1     1                 1     1     1 
IC-V   (Catalonia)                                                  1 
EE     (Basque Country)   1     1     1     2     2 
PNV    (Basque Country)   8     7     8     6     5     5     5     7 
HB     (Basque Country)         3     2     5     4     2     2              
EA     (Basque Country)                           2     1     1     1 
BNG    (Galicia)                            1                 2     3 
Sum                      23    20    24    32    31    26    27    28  
 
Total                   350   350   350   350   350   350   350   350     
 
*Includes the Leftist PSP-US that obtained 6 seats in 1977. 
**PDPC and UDC-IDCC in 1977.***ECFED in 1977 and ERFN in 1979. 
 
In order to clarify the combined location of the parties on both the Left-Right axis and 
the Centre-Periphery axis, the parties in table 4.2 are grouped into six broad 
                                                 
39 The Andalusian party ran under a socialist denomination in 1979 (PSA) and later reappeared as the 
Centre-Right PA. 
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categories of party blocs produced by the intersection of the two cleavages in table 4.3 
(below).  
 
Table 4.3 Party Blocs according to Left-Right and Centre-Periphery location 
 














CAIC/PAR (Aragón)  
CUPC/AIC/CC (Canarias)










PNV (Basque Country) 
EA   (Basque Country) 
 
 
As shown in the table, there are nine relevant parties of a Leftist orientation – two 
state-wide parties, two emanating from the First Periphery and five from the Second 
Periphery. To this it should be added that the Leftist PSP-US, established by Tierno 
Galvan in 1977 and merged with PSOE in 1979, also belonged to the state-wide 
category. At the Right we find altogether ten parties – three belonging to the state- 
wide category, four from the First Periphery and three from the Second Periphery. As 
mentioned above, it should be noted that PSA and PA is basically the same party 
organisation that shifted its stance on the Left-Right axis in the mid 1980s and thus 
appears as two parties in the typology.  
 
    
From the general assumptions to specific hypotheses  
On the basis of the discussion in this chapter, the set of assumptions derived from the 
theoretical discussion in chapter 2 can be reformulated into more specific hypotheses 
as to the behaviour of the electorate between the pairs of elections with regards to 
both turnout and party choice along the functional axis and the territorial axis. I shall 
start out by specifying a set of hypotheses regarding electoral mobilisation and 
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demobilisation, i.e. the behaviour of the new voters included in the electorate between 
elections and the behaviour of the electoral abstainers.  
 
Electoral mobilisation 
The first overarching assumption dealt with the mobilisation of the electorate between 
elections. In the typology of electoral behaviour at two consecutive elections outlined 
in chapter 3, we first made a distinction between those who remained inactive at both 
elections and those who turned out to vote at one of the elections, i.e. the 
discontinuously active. At the first election in a pair of elections, there are two 
categories of inactive voters. One category consists of those are inactive by default in 
that they only reached voting age at the second election: the new voters. The other 
category consists of abstainers proper, i.e. those who have the right to vote but opt not 
to turn out.  
 
 
The mobilisation of new voters 1977-2000 
Making a priori assumptions as to the behaviour of the new voters included in the 
electorate between elections is a somewhat risky business due to the fact that we have 
no aggregate turnout rate for this category to base our assumptions on. However, in 
line with general findings from electoral research, we shall expect that in general the 
largest share of the new voters will have opted for abstention between 1977 and 2000. 
This assumption is rather trivial and the behaviour of the new voters in the Spanish 
context is far more interesting in relation to the sequential translation of the societal 
divisions into manifest cleavages. As noted by Franklin, members of the new cohorts 
of the electorate are commonly the most responsive to changes in the characteristics 
of elections, i.e. campaigning, degree of competitiveness and prospects for change in 
government (Franklin 2004: 210).  As discussed in relation to the aggregate electoral 
results, the 1977-2000 period saw two waves of electoral mobilisation that coincided 
with substantial realignments of the electorate along the functional axis. The first led 
to the landslide victory for the Socialists in 1982 and the second to a 9 percent 
increase in the proportion of valid votes cast for the rejuvenated AP/PP at the highly 
competitive election in 1993. Thus, we shall hypothesise that the results of these two 
elections were in part produced by a substantial mobilisation also among the new 
voters. These two expectations are summed up in the following hypothesis: 
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H1: In general, the largest proportions of the new voters have opted for abstention 
between 1977 and 2000. The realignment elections in 1982 and 1993, however, saw a 
sharp increase in turnout among the new voters. 
 
The next hypothesis deals with the mobilisation of new voters in relation to the 
territorial axis. According to the Centre-Periphery theory and the so-called 
nationalisation of the party vote, we should a priori expect that the mobilisation of 
the new voters has been much less pronounced in the Peripheries than in the core 
areas, i.e. the Centre (Rokkan 1970; Taylor and Johnston 1979; Caramani 2004). 
Thus, the mobilisation of new voters in relation to the territorial axis can be summed 
up in the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Substantially lower proportions of new voters have turned out in the Peripheries 
than in the Centre between 1977 and 2000. The greatest differences in turnout will be 
found between the Second Periphery and the Centre.  
 
 
Electoral abstention 1977-2000  
Based on the discussion in chapter 2, we shall expect that the mobilisation and 
demobilisation of the electorate would have varied systematically in relation to the 
sequence of translating the societal divisions into manifest cleavages between 1977 
and 2000. As for the new voters, we shall expect that in general the largest share of 
first election abstainers opted for abstention again at the second elections. However, 
as the aggregate turnout depicted in table 4.1 clearly indicates, a mobilisation far 
outnumbering the influx of new voters must have taken place between 1979 and 1982 
and, to a lesser extent, between 1989 and 1993. Therefore, at the two realignment 
elections in 1982 and 1993, we shall expect that a significant part of these 
realignments along the functional axis were produced by a substantial mobilisation 
among former abstainers. These two aspects of electoral behaviour are summed up in 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: In general, the largest proportion of those who abstained at the first election 
opted for abstention again at the second election between 1977 and 2000. The 
realignment elections in 1982 and 1993, however, saw a sharp increase in turnout 
among former abstainers. 
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In relation to the territorial axis, we shall expect this pattern to be skewed in Centre-
Periphery terms. As peripheries are denoted by distance, difference and dependence, 
we shall expect substantially lower levels of mobilisation among former abstainers in 
the Peripheries than in the Centre. Now, one thing is the long established fact that in 
Spain the aggregate turnout has been higher in the Centre than in the Peripheries 
(Justel 1997). Quite another is to find out exactly how this aggregate pattern is related 
to the dynamics of individual level mobilisation and demobilisation between the 
elections. In principle, the lower aggregate turnout in the Peripheries could easily 
conceal a dynamic of large proportions of voters transferring to and from abstention. 
However, in accord with the theory on centre-periphery structures and the electoral 
mobilisation of the peripheries (Taylor and Johnston 1979), we shall a priori expect 
that a larger proportion of first election abstainers have opted for abstention again at 
the second election in the Peripheries than in the Centre. And, due to the assumption 
of the voters in the Second Peripheries being more exposed to different pulling forces 
of identity than in the First Periphery, we shall expect the greatest differences will be 
found between the Centre and the Second Periphery. These two expectations are 
summed up in the following hypothesis:  
 
H4: Larger proportions of abstainers at the first election have opted for abstention 
again at the second election in the Peripheries than in the Centre between 1977 and 
2000. The greatest differences will be found between the Second Periphery and the 
Centre.   
 
 
Electoral stabilisation 1977-2000 
The general assumption outlined in chapter 2 stated that the stabilisation of the 
electorate would have varied systematically in relation to the sequential translation of 
societal division into manifest cleavages between 1977 and 2000. As noted, 
transitions from authoritarianism and the consolidation of democracy typically entail a 
narrowing down of the electoral market and a stabilisation of voter behaviour. Thus, 
we shall expect a general increase in voter loyalty from the first pair of elections to 
the last pair, i.e. that the average loyalty rate between elections will have increased 
from 1977 to 2000. This general expectation, however, tells nothing about exactly 
how this relates to the position of the parties on the functional axis and the territorial 
axis. What we do know is that all the relevant parties underwent internal crises in the 
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process of moving from democratic transition to consolidation, i.e. in sorting out the 
puzzle of inter-party consensus versus intra-party cohesion (Gunther and Hopkin 
2002). The UCD, not able to handle this, collapsed completely. However, after the 
1982 debacle, PSOE emerged as triumphant and was able to stay in government till 
1996. We shall therefore expect that PSOE was the first of the state-wide parties to 
see an increase in loyalty rates between elections from 1982 and onwards. Somewhat 
in the shadow of PSOE, AP/PP emerged as “sub-triumphant” in 1982 (del Castillo 
1994) and thereafter slowly but steadily seemed to have consolidated its electoral 
stance until it eventually was able to challenge the position held by PSOE from 1993 
and onwards. Thus, we shall expect that AP/PP was the second state-wide party to see 
an increase in loyalty rates between elections. The PCE/IU struggled to regain its 
strength after the debacle in 1982 and was only able to do so after the formation of the 
IU alliance. In 1989, however, its share of the votes reached the level of 1979 again. 
Thus, we shall expect that the PCE/IU was the third state-wide party that saw an 
increase in loyalty rates. Judging from the aggregate electoral results, the CDS never 
managed to assert itself as an electoral force during the period it existed. 
Consequently, we shall expect that this party never experienced a substantial level of 
voter loyalty between any pair of elections. These expectations are summed up in the 
following hypothesis: 
      
H5: After the 1982 debacle, PSOE was the first state-wide party that managed to 
consolidate its electoral constituency in terms of increased loyalty rates between 
elections, followed by AP/PP and PCE/IU, while the CDS never managed to 
consolidate in this respect. 
 
As to the relationship between the territorial axis and electoral stabilisation we have 
two aspects of this to consider. The first is related to the stabilisation of the party vote 
for the state-wide parties. Following the general connotations of the Centre-Periphery 
concept, i.e. distance, difference and dependency, and the theory of nationalisation of 
party voting (Rose and Urwin 1975; Taylor and Johnston 1979; Caramani 2004), we 
should a priori expect that the behaviour of voters in the Centre would have followed 
the national trends to a greater extent than the voters in the Peripheries. Thus, due to 
the assumed impact of the Centre-Periphery cleavage in Spain, we shall expect that 
the increased voter loyalty commanded by the state-wide parties was far less 
pronounced in the Peripheries than in the Centre:  
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H6: The loyalty rates commanded by the state-wide parties were substantially lower 
in the Peripheries than in the Centre between 1977 and 2000. The greatest difference 
in loyalty rates will be found between the Centre and the Second Periphery.  
 
The second aspect deals with the stabilisation of the electoral constituencies of the 
regional parties. As described above, the territorial challenge posed by the aspirations 
of the ‘historical’ peripheries, Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, was the second 
in the sequence to be handled. Consequently, between 1980 and 1981 the three 
Second Periphery regions held their first elections to the new regional parliaments.40 
The establishment of these parliaments marked the fulfilment of the first claim put 
forward by the regionalist elites. However, due to the interplay between the territorial 
and functional axes as captured in the radial centre-periphery typology, the electoral 
fate of their regionalist parties showed a marked difference between the two 
economically advanced regions, Basque Country and Catalonia, on the one hand and 
the economically backward Galicia on the other. In the Basque Country and 
Catalonia, the elections were won by the regional ‘nationalist’ Right, PNV and CiU, 
respectively. In the Basque Country, the HB was quickly able to establish itself on the 
Left, whereas the ERC of Catalonia trailed well behind the CiU. In Galicia, however, 
the Leftist BNG became the biggest regionalist party – albeit trailing the dominant 
state-wide parties by a great margin. In fact, it was actually the AP/PP under the 
regional leadership of the former Francoist minister Manuel Fraga that was able to 
assert itself as the dominant electoral and political force in Galicia between 1981 and 
2000. Only slowly was the BNG able to catch up and become the second biggest party 
in the regional elections, and had to wait until the mid 1990s before it was able to 
assert itself also at the general elections.  
Therefore, we shall expect that the successes of the Basque and Catalan Right spilled 
over into the general elections and that they saw an increased voter loyalty already 
from the beginning of the 1980s and onwards. We shall expect that the third 
regionalist force to achieve an increase in voter loyalty was the Basque Left, while 
both the Catalan and Galician Left lagged behind in this respect.   
Due to the assumption that the impact of the Centre-Periphery cleavage will have 
been much weaker in the First Periphery, we shall expect a rather erratic pattern for 
                                                 
40 The fourth § 151 region, Andalucía, held its first regional election in 1982 and the § 143 regions in 
1983. 
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the regional parties from these areas. These expectations are summed up in the 
following hypothesis:  
 
H7: The Basque and Catalan Right saw a substantial increase in voter loyalty 
between the general elections after 1980. The Basque Left quickly followed suit, while 
the Catalan and Galician Left lagged behind. For the regional parties of the First 




Electoral competition 1977-2000 
A corollary of the narrowing down of the electoral market is that the scope of 
electoral competition is also narrowed down, i.e. that voter mobility will become 
restricted to certain segments of the electorate. In the general phrasing of the 
assumptions derived from theory it was stated that the transfers of votes between 
parties have varied systematically according to the translation of societal divisions 
into manifest cleavages from 1977 and onwards in regard to party choice both along 
the functional axis and along the territorial axis. Now, since we are studying the 
behaviour of the whole electorate at pairs of consecutive elections, we have to take 
into account the party choice of both the new voters and the first and second election 
abstainers in addition to the direct transfers between the political parties proper.  
Taking as point of departure the aforementioned assumption that the new electoral 
cohorts are the most responsive to the characteristics of the elections, we should 
expect the new voters have cast their votes according to the sequence of cleavage 
translation. Thus, we shall expect that the largest share of the new voters that turned 
out will have opted for UCD at the first pair of elections. From 1982 and onwards 
PSOE will surely have asserted itself as the main capturer of new voters compared to 
the other parties. With the recuperation of the PCE/IU, more new voters will have 
opted also for this party. And, lastly, with the neo-liberalist impetus also the AP/PP 
will have made inroads into this group of voters. This means that the mobilisation of 
new voters in relation to party choice will have followed a certain pattern: PSOE will 
have polled its largest shares of the new voters between 1979 and 1982, PCE/IU 
between 1986 and 1989, and AP/PP between 1989 and 1993. These expectations are 
summed up in the following hypothesis:  
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H8: The new voters’ party choice will have followed the sequential translation of 
cleavages in that the UCD polled a large share between 1977 and 1979, the PSOE 
polled large shares from 1982 and onwards, the PCE/IU increased its share in the 
latter half of the 1980s and AP/PP became the preferred party for the new voters in 
the 1990s.  
 
   
As to the transfers of votes between the parties, we shall start out with the rather 
trivial assumption that the parties that had not managed to stabilise its electorates saw 
a larger share of their former voters transfer to the parties that had managed the shift 
from democratic transition to consolidation than vice versa. i.e. that the PCE/IU saw a 
larger share of their former voters transfer to PSOE and AP/PP between 1977 and 
1982 than the other way round. Given the salience of the Left-Right ideological 
cleavage, we should of course expect that the bulk of these transfers would benefit 
PSOE rather than AP/PP. With the creation of the IU alliance in 1986, however, we 
shall expect that the PCE/IU will have obtained net gains from the other parties. And, 
likewise, we shall expect that the main beneficiary from the collapse of the UCD will 
have been AP/PP. And, given its location between the Centre and the Right on the 
functional axis, this will also have been the case for the former CDS voters. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is stated:          
 
H9: The parties that lagged behind in party building after the transitional phase 
(PCE/IU, UCD and CDS) saw large proportions of their former voters transfer to 
PSOE and AP/PP between 1982 and 2000. With the formation of the IU alliance in 
1986, the PCE/IU obtained net gains from the other parties. 
 
 
As to electoral mobilisation for, and competition between, the state-wide parties in 
relation to the territorial axis, there are various aspects to consider. Apart from the 
obvious fact that the state-wide parties have had to compete with a range of regional 
parties in the Peripheries and that therefore the logic of party competition in the 
Peripheries differed from that of the Centre, we shall also expect that the logic of 
exposure to different pulling forces of identity has had bearings on the competition 
between the state-wide parties in the Peripheries. Again, taking as point of departure 
the notion that the peripheries are marked by distance, difference and dependency, we 
shall expect that the trend in voter transfers between the state-wide parties will have 
differed markedly between the Peripheries and the Centre: 
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H10: The trends in voter mobilisation and transfers between the state-wide parties 
have differed markedly between the Centre and the Peripheries. The greatest 





In accord with the above, then, in the analysis of the dynamics of electoral behaviour 
between the 1977-2000 general elections, particular emphasis will be put on the 
mobilisation of the electorate, the stabilisation of the vote and electoral competition in 
terms of mobility between parties.  In this, the hypotheses H1 to H10 shall be put to 
empirical tests. 
 
What may be labelled the dependent variable in the following analyses is twofold: 
First, it measures variations in the level of volatility in terms of correlations between 
the proportions of the electorate that opted for the same category of electoral 
behaviour at pairs of consecutive elections. These variations will be assessed by way 
of comparisons between the relevant electoral categories, i.e. parties, electoral 
abstainers and so forth, over time. Second, it measures variations in the individual 
level mobility of voters in terms of estimated proportions of voters that remained 
loyal or transferred their vote between two consecutive elections. This will be 
assessed by way of comparisons both over time and across electoral districts.    
 
But first, an analysis of the aggregate logit correlations that serve as the very 
underpinnings for the individual inferences will be presented. These correlations will 
serve as an indicator as to what extent the general electoral trends identified in the 
previous chapters are reflected across the Spanish territory. Given the fact that the 
8.0000 municipalities exhibit an enormous variation in the size of the electorates, 
from less than 20 voters to around two million registered voters, it is an open question 
whether and how the national trends are reflected across the municipalities. This will 
be helpful in order to help us assess the impact of the sequential translation of societal 
divisions into manifest cleavages along both the Left-Right and Centre-Periphery 




Mobilisation, Stabilisation and Competition: 




In this chapter we shall map the patterns of aggregate electoral mobilisation, 
stabilisation and competition on the basis of the data tied to the municipal level. We 
shall measure the relationship between aggregate proportions of the electorate at pairs 
of elections according to the typology of electoral behaviour outlined in the previous 
chapters. Particular emphasis is put on aggregate stability and change along the two 
main cleavages of the party system(s): The functional axis and the territorial axis. The 
aim of the analysis is to refine our understanding of the electoral profiles of the 
municipalities before we embark upon the individual level analysis. Thus, this 
analysis has three basic objectives: 1) It will serve as the initial indicator as to what 
extent the expectations regarding the electoral behaviour outlined in the set of 
hypotheses are reflected across the Spanish territory, i.e. whether the electoral swings 
shown in chapter 4 coincided with any form of territorial realignments of the 
electorate. Likewise, 2) it will detect any electoral swings across the municipalities 
not detected in the overall results for Spain as a whole, i.e. territorial shifts in electoral 
behaviour that did not alter the overall relative sizes of the parties from one election to 
the next. And 3) it will serve to detect any particular aggregate relationships between 
the state-wide parties and the regional parties that will be followed up in the district 
wise analyses in chapters 7-9.    
 
The first question to be answered is, of course, whether any systematic patterns of 
positive and/or negative correlations between the aggregate proportions of the 
electorate at the municipal level can be detected at all. The second question is to what 
extent we can detect any systematic changes over time in relation to the postulated 
sequential translation of societal divisions into manifest cleavages. In assessing this, 
we should bear in mind that when we are talking of the aggregate profiles of electoral 
turnout and party support, the bottom line is that we are assessing the electoral 
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profiles of the municipalities per se. When, for example, the support for two parties 
co-vary in a positive fashion, i.e. that strong support for the one goes hand in hand 
with strong support for the other, we should not imply the existence any direct 
behavioural connection between the two parties. 
 
The bulk of the analysis is based on tables presenting logit correlations between one 
option at the first election and all the other relevant options at the second election. The 
correlations are calculated between the aggregate proportions obtained by the various 
electoral options across all the municipalities in which the specific options were 
presented to the voters. This implies that the number of municipalities (N) for which 
the correlations are calculated will vary between the parties. The analysis is limited to 
the political parties that won a minimum of one seat in parliament at specific elections 
between 1977 and 2000. This means that some of the smaller regional parties will 
appear as specific entries only for some of the pairs of elections.  
First, however, we shall turn to the questions of aggregate electoral abstention and 
party stabilisation. Table 5.1 (below) presents the logit correlations between the same 
categories of the electorate the pairs of consecutive elections.  
 
Table 5.1 Aggregate stability between elections 1977-2000: logit correlations 
                                                            
                      77-79  79-82  82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00 
 
Abstain                 .81    .69    .75    .84    .81    .69    .84 
 
PCE/IU                  .90    .90    .86    .90    .92    .95    .91   
PSOE                    .82    .84    .86    .92    .94    .93    .90 
UCD                     .86    .73     
CDS                                   .70    .86    .77 
AP/PP                   .66    .66    .87    .96    .93    .96    .96 
 
CiU*                    .82    .82    .96    .98    .98    .98    .98 
ERC**                   .49    .77                         .95    .97 
EE                      .74    .69    .91    .95 
PNV                     .47    .93    .95    .96    .98    .99    .98 
HB                             .86    .96    .96    .98    .98 
EA                                                  .97    .97    .96 
BNG                                                        .83    .85 
 
PA                                                  .69    .74    .68 
AIC/CC                                       .91    .24    .83    .79 
CAIC/PAR                .37                  .57    .54                  
UV                                           .91    .95    .97    .89 
 
 
*Votes cast for PDPC in 1977. **Votes cast for ECFED in 1977 and ERFN in 1979. 
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Strong positive correlations indicate a high degree of stability between the two 
elections, whereas weaker correlations indicate that a certain degree of restructuring 




According to the overarching assumption derived from the theoretical discussion we 
should expect that the mobilisation of the electorate would have varied according to 
the sequential translation of cleavages. As noted in chapter 4, the elections were 
clearly differentiated as to their level of overall percent wise turnout. Thus, the 
elections in 1977, 1982 and 1993 were mobilising elections in that the turnout was 
substantially higher compared to the other elections. On the other hand, the elections 
in 1979, 1986 and 2000 were demobilising elections. The elections in 1989 and 1996 
were market by stability in terms of overall turnout. Hence, as stated in the H3 
hypothesis, we should expect that the largest share of those who abstained at the first 
elections opted for abstention again at the second elections, but that the realignment 
elections in 1982 and 1993 saw a sharp increase in turnout among the former 
abstainers. However, from table 5.1 we note that in terms of logit correlations 
between the proportions of abstainers at the pairs of elections across the 8.000 
municipalities, a slightly different logic appears. The two pairs of elections that show 
the lowest logit correlations (.69) are the ones between 1979-82 and 1993-96. The 
first is in line with the expectations, but the second implies that also the 1996 election 
saw a territorial realignment of the electorate – only that between 1993 and 1996 it 
took place as a change in the distribution of turnout across the municipalities in such a 
fashion that it did not produce great changes in the overall turnout. This indicates that 
PP must have mobilised a great share of former abstainers in many of the smaller 
municipalities. Thus, both the PSOE victory in 1982 and the PP victory in 1996 
coincided with a change in the territorial distribution of electoral mobilisation and 
demobilisation. This is highly illuminating in relation to the postulated sequential 
translation of cleavages. This particular aspect of electoral behaviour in Spain has not 
been treated in previous research.   
 
We find the highest aggregate correlations between the elections in 1986 and 1989 
and again between 1996 and 2000. This is in accordance with the general impression 
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expressed by electoral observers: From the mid 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s 
the predominant position of the PSOE and the weakness of the Spanish Right seemed 
a natural fact (Montero 1989). Hence the impetus for a substantial electoral 
mobilisation to the benefit of the AP/PP never materialised. In 2000 something 
similar happened, only that this time the table was turned: The strongly wished for 
mobilisation of the Spanish Left turned out to be just that, wishful thinking, on behalf 
of the PSOE and the IU. The election in 1986 falls in a different category. The 
correlation between electoral abstention in 1982 and 1986 falls in between the pattern 
discussed above. In 1986 there was no substantial shift between Left and Right, but 
the party system of the Left underwent some changes in relation to the referendum on 
the NATO membership. The PCE formed an alliance with other leftist groups 
opposing the shift in the political stance of the PSOE regarding the maintenance of the 
NATO affiliation. This alliance, then, served as the platform for launching the 
Izquierda Unida (IU).   
 
In sum, the pattern of mobilisation and demobilisation in terms of overall variations in 
the electoral turnout has to a certain extent been reflected in the patterns of change 
and stability across the municipalities. In addition, we have detected that the AP/PP 
takeover of executive power also coincided with a territorial realignment of the 
electorate. As to the expectations stated in H3 hypothsesis, the aggregate correlations 
were in line with the assumptions for all the pairs of elections except for the 1993-96 
pair. As noted, the low aggregate correlation between these two elections is 
particularly important since it was not detected in the percent wise turnout for Spain 
as a whole.   
      
Electoral stabilisation 
As to the electoral stabilisation of the political parties, the expectations related to the 
H5 and the H7 hypotheses are pertinent here. The first stated that, after the 1982 
debacle, PSOE was the first of the state wide parties that managed to consolidate its 
electoral constituency in terms of increasing loyalty rates between elections after the 
transitional phase, followed by the AP/PP and the PCE/IU, while CDS never managed 
to consolidate in this respect. The second stated that the Basque and Catalan Right 
saw a substantial increase in voter loyalty between the general elections after 1980, 
followed by the Basque Left. It further stated that the Catalan and Galician Left 
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lagged behind and that no clear trend could be identified for the regional parties of the 
First Periphery.  
 
Considering the five relevant state-wide parties first, we note that there has been a 
general tendency towards increased stabilisation over time. From having only the PCE 
hitting the .90 mark for the whole period between 1977 and 1986, we note that only 
the CDS exhibits correlations below the .90 mark for the subsequent period.  All the 
three remaining state-wide parties, the IU, the PSOE, and the PP, exhibited a 
substantial stabilisation of their respective aggregate proportions of the electorate 
across the municipalities. For the PCE/IU we note that the 1982 debacle was not 
reflected at the aggregate municipal level, i.e. that the territorial distribution of the 
PCE/IU vote suffered very little changes in spite of the fact that its share of the valid 
votes cast fell from nearly eleven percent in 1979 to four percent in 1982. With the 
shift from PCE to IU between 1982 and 1986, however, we note that the correlation 
dropped, i.e. that the territorial distribution of its aggregate proportions of the 
electorate shifted somewhat with the creation of the IU.   
Another trend is perhaps even more pronounced, namely that the Right, or more 
precisely the AP/PP, experienced a spectacular increase in aggregate stability over the 
years. From logit correlations at a mere .66 between 1977 and 1982, its stability rose 
to well over .90 from 1986-89 and onwards. And for the last pair of elections, 1996-
2000, it was able to maintain a correlation at .96 while the correlations both for the IU 
and the PSOE decreased to .91 and .90, respectively. This is, again, in accord with the 
notion that the decline in electoral turnout between 1996 and 2000 affected the Left 
and the Right in quite different ways (Barreiro 2001). While the Left was punished, it 
seems that the Right was hardly affected at all at the aggregate level. 
 
Thus, for the state-wide parties, the aggregate pattern is in line with the general 
expectations regarding the overall stabilisation of the vote after the founding 
elections. As to specific expectations derived from the H5 hypothesis, however, the 
pattern is less clear. After the 1982 debacle, PCE/IU, PSOE and AP/PP all exhibited 
the same levels of aggregate stability and only CDS trailed well behind in accord with 
the hypothesis. Thus, at the aggregate level, the hypothesis as such is only partially 
supported.    
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Turning to the regional parties, we note that a trend of stabilisation in accord with the 
expectations has taken place for the Basque and Catalan parties. PNV was the first 
Basque party to hit the .90 mark already in 1982, while both HB and EE followed suit 
in 1986. We also note that the other Rightist Basque party, EA, showed very high 
aggregate correlations already between 1989 and 1993. Thus, from varying levels of 
stability at the first pairs of elections, EE, PNV, HB, and EA alike all stabilised well 
above the .90 mark. 
In Catalonia the CiU and the ERC experienced an increase in aggregate stability from 
.82 and .49 to an impressive .98 and .97 respectively. For CiU’s part, it saw a 
substantial change from the 1977-1982 elections to the 1982-1986 pair of elections 
and onwards. Since the ERC dropped out of Parliament in 1986 we do not have any 
records from the 1982-1993 pairs. 
 
For the rest of the regional parties, the fortunes in terms of aggregate stabilisation 
leave a more mixed picture. In this, it should be underscored that several of the 
regional parties had undergone some profound changes over time both in terms of 
ideological orientations (PSA/PA) and of organisation. The two possible exceptions to 
this, the Valencian UV and the Galician BNG, were both able to achieve some level 
of stabilisation from 1986 and 1993 and onwards. Thus, on the whole, the 
expectations derived from the H7 hypothesis are met at the aggregate level. 
 
We conclude that 1) the swings in electoral turnout between elections identified in 
chapter 4 were to a large extent reflected by the logit correlations. The only exception 
compared to the overall percent wise turnout coincided with the AP/PP victory in 
1996 and thus shows that the last step in the crystallisation of the Left-Right cleavage, 
i.e. passing the threshold of executive power, was reflected in a substantial change in 
the territorial pattern of mobilisation and demobilisation. We may further conclude 
that 2) the relevant state-wide parties in general experienced an increased aggregated 
stability across the municipalities. The fortunes of the Left and Right, however, 
differed somewhat. The spectacular increase from .66 at the two first pairs of 
elections to .96 at the two last pairs for AP/PP implied that the state-wide Right had 
asserted itself as the most stable electoral option at the aggregate level. The 1982-
1986 pair of elections marked a turning point in this respect in that the AP/PP for the 
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first time was able to achieve an aggregate stability that equalled the two parties on 
the Left.  
For the regional parties, we conclude that 3) the parties of the Second Periphery, 
Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia, together with the Valencian UV of the First 
Periphery, also experienced an aggregate stabilisation of their electorates. The 
fortunes of the rest of the regional parties were far more mixed in this respect. 
 
 
The mobilisation of new voters 
According to the H1 hypothesis, the largest proportions of new voters would have 
opted for abstention between 1977 and 2000. The realignment elections in 1982 and 
1993, however, would have seen a sharp increase in the proportions of new voters that 
turned out. From table 5.2 (below), we note that correlations between the aggregate 
proportions of new voters and electoral abstention only exhibit two substantial 
relationships, namely a positive correlation 1993 and a stronger negative one in 1996. 
Thus, only the 1993 election reflects an aggregate pattern in accord with the 
expectations and no substantial change is detected for the 1982 election. On the other 
hand, the correlations for 1989-93 and 1993-96 serve once again to underscore the 
point that the elections leading up to the AP/PP take over coincided with a shift in the 
territorial pattern of aggregate electoral behaviour.    
According to the H8 hypothesis, the new voters’ party choice should have followed a 
sequential pattern related to the translation of societal divisions into manifest 
cleavages. Accordingly, the UCD would have polled a large share of new voters 
between 1977 and 1979, the PSOE large shares from 1982 and onwards, the PCE/IU 
would have increased its share in the latter half of the 1980s, and AP/PP would have 
asserted itself as the dominant party among the new voters in the 1990s.  
On the state-wide Right, we note that the support for the UCD related positively with 
the proportion of new voters at both the pairs of elections it ran. On the contrary, 
Suárez’ new party, the CDS, showed the opposite trend. In this respect, then, the 
aggregate electoral profiles of the UCD and the CDS differed markedly. For the 
AP/PP we detect an unclear and shifting trend, from no relationship at all through a 




Table 5.2  New voters included at the 2nd election - logit correlations 
    
                      77-79  79-82  82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00 
 
Abstain                -.04    .04   -.09   -.01    .19   -.30    .03  
 
PCE/IU                 -.21    .00    .19    .31    .44    .29    .33   
PSOE                    .04    .17    .31    .21    .13    .15    .23 
UCD                     .38    .26     
CDS                           -.21   -.02   -.06   -.14 
AP/PP                  -.04    .06    .00   -.20   -.20   -.26    .12 
UN                      .15      
 
CiU                     .18   -.12   -.19   -.24   -.27   -.11    .18 
ERC                     .20   -.16                 -.15   -.25   -.65 
IC                                                               -.16 
EE                      .69    .07    .31    .55 
PNV                    -.03    .15    .31    .50    .62    .59    .43 
HB                      .15    .18    .29    .43    .29    .19 
EA                                           .47    .41    .18   -.11 
BNG                                                 .46    .33    .31 
 
PSA/PA                 -.26                  .43                  .23 
CUPC/AIC/CC             .29          -.70   -.44    .30    .06    .01 
CAIC/PAR/CHA            .17          -.04   -.02    .39           .67      
UV                                   -.05   -.13    .14   -.11   -.09 
Other                  -.41    .02   -.14   -.21   -.37    .01   -.17 
 
 
On the Left, we note a significant shift in the trend for the PCE/IU. From a negative 
relationship at the 1977-79 pair of elections to a steady and fairly strong positive 
relationship from 1982 and onwards.  The trend for the PSOE is similar, apart from 
the fact that it never exhibited a negative relationship and never obtained positive 
correlations of the strength shown by the PCE/IU. Thus, at the election in 2000 for the 
first time all the state-wide parties had come to correlate positively with the influx of 
new voters. The patterns detected are in accord with the expectations with one 
exception: AP/PP’s expected dominant position among the newly enfranchised voters 
as we approach the millennium is not reflected at the aggregate level.  
 
Moving to the regional parties, the H2 hypothesis stated that a substantially lower 
proportion of new voters would have turned out to vote in Peripheries than in the 
Centre. Hence we should expect that the support for all the parties in the peripheries 
should correlate negatively with the influx of new voters, including the regional 
parties proper. The aggregate correlations, however, show a very mixed pattern 
indeed. In Catalonia, we note that the support for both CiU and ECR varied positively 
with the enfranchisement of the young in 1979, but that this relationship turned the 
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other way round in the 1980s and the 1990s. And, at the last election in 2000, the two 
parties differed markedly in their electoral profile in this respect. While the CiU 
changed from the negative relationship of the two preceding decades to a positive one, 
the ERC experienced a negative correlation at an impressive -.65. Also the party that 
broke off from the IU, the Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds (IC), noted a negative 
correlation. Thus, for the Catalan parties, we see that for the major part of the period 
studied, their support tended to co-vary negatively with the influx of newly 
enfranchised voters.  
A quick glance at the correlations for the Basque parties reveals that their trends show 
quite the opposite tendency compared to Catalonia. With the exception of the PNV in 
1979 and the EA in 2000 (the last time it ran as an independent party), they all exhibit 
positive correlations, and at times very strong ones. Thus, as a general rule, the 
Basque parties have been able to mobilise in the areas with larger proportions of 
young inhabitants reaching voting age between the elections. This also holds for the 
Galician BNG, whereas the fortunes of the other regional parties in this respect are 
rather mixed. We note that the Andalusian party PSA/PA suffered a change in 
electoral profile from a negative to positive relationship following precisely its 
removal of the label ‘socialist’ from its name in the 1980s.  
On the whole, then, the expectations regarding the regional parties are not reflected at 
the aggregate level. The striking differences between the Catalan parties on the one 
hand and the Basque and Galician parties on the other clearly defy the general 
assumption underlying the hypothesis.  
 
 
The mobilisation of first election abstainers 
 
The H4 hypothesis stated that larger proportions of abstainers at the first elections 
would have opted for abstention again at the second election in the Peripheries than in 
the Centre. Hence we should expect that the support for the state-wide parties will 
have correlated negatively with first election abstention and that the regional parties 
will have correlated positively.  
The general trend to be found in table 5.3 (below) is in accord with the expectations in 
that the state-wide parties of both Left and Right have tended to draw less support in 
municipalities with higher levels of abstention at the first election, the only exception 
being the UCD in 1982.  
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Table 5.3 1st election abstention - logit correlations    
 
                      77-79  79-82  82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00 
 
PCE/IU                 -.44   -.38   -.48   -.40   -.29   -.14   -.27   
PSOE                   -.54   -.47   -.36   -.39   -.40   -.39   -.57 
UCD                    -.19    .08      
CDS                           -.10   -.32   -.17   -.22 
AP/PP                  -.06   -.19   -.15   -.20   -.29   -.42   -.34 
 
CiU                    -.05    .17    .02   -.32   -.39   -.36   -.43 
ERC                     .27    .23                 -.41    .58    .43 
IC                                                                .06 
EE                      .23    .39    .19    .42     
PNV                     .45    .54    .28    .20    .06    .35    .24 
HB                      .48    .29    .40    .40    .13    .52     
EA                                           .43    .15    .55    .48 
BNG                                                -.38   -.26   -.20 
 
PSA/PA                 -.18                  .08                  .30 
CC/AIC/CC                             .36    .22   -.36   -.42   -.45 
CAIC/PAR/CHA           -.08          -.15   -.04    .06           .22 
UV                                    .04   -.19   -.08   -.04   -.01 
Other                  -.07   -.06    .04    .17    .28   -.03   -.02     
 
For the regional parties, however, the expectation is only met for the Basque parties. 
All the Basque parties correlated positively with first election abstention all through 
the period while the rest of the regional parties show a mixed pattern. The situation in 
the Basque Country should come as no surprise. Taking the extreme polarisation of 
Basque politics into consideration, it is not far fetched to evoke the notion of social 
gravity in trying to explain why this is the case (Llera 1994, 1998). This aspect of the 
elections in the Basque Country will be dealt with in a more detailed fashion in the 
individual level analyses. 
 
The conclusion, then is that two trends are detected: 1) The state-wide parties have 
fared better in municipalities with a higher degree of electoral mobilisation at the first 
elections, and 2) the Basque parties have tended to draw support from municipalities 
with a lower degree of electoral mobilisation at the first elections. Thus, at the 
aggregate level, the expectations are reflected at the aggregate level the state-wide 
parties and for the Basque periphery, but not in relation to the Centre-Periphery axis 





The expectations regarding electoral competition are related to hypothesis H9, 
stateing that the state-wide parties that lagged behind in party building after the 
transitional phase (PCE/IU, UCD and CDS) should have seen large proportions of 
their former voters transfer to PSOE and AP/PP, but that after the formation of the IU 
alliance in 1986 the PCE/IU to would have made net gains from the other parties. 
Hence we should expect fairly strong correlations between first election support for 
PCE/IU, UCD and CDS and the second election support for PSOE and AP/PP in the 
1980s, but that these aggregate relationships were gradually weakened as we approach 
the millennium.    
  
 
The first election PCE/IU vote   
From table 5.4 we note that there was a fundamental difference between the two 
PCE/IU electoral debacles in 1982 and 2000 as to how they were related to electoral 
abstention. For the 1979-82 pair, the first election PCE vote showed the strongest 
negative correlation with electoral abstention at the subsequent election recorded for 
the whole period studied, whereas there was virtually no correlation at all between the 
1996 IU vote and electoral abstention in 2000. This aggregate change is in line with 
the notion of an increased propensity for first election IU voters to opt for abstention 
at the second election identified in electoral research (Barreiro 2001).   
In terms of the hypothesised relationships between PCE/IU the other state-wide 
parties, we note that the correlations with the support for PSOE at the second 
elections dropped from .67 in 1982 to below the .40 mark from 1986 and onwards. On 
the other hand, the trends in the relationships with the other state-wide parties may 
seem to contradict the hypothesis in that the first election support for the PCE/IU has 
come to correlate positively with the second election support for the state-wide Right. 
Thus, the near aggregate incompatibility between the PCE and the UCD does not hold 
for its relationship with the state-wide Right in general. The conclusion is rather that 
over time all the other state-wide parties have come to correlate positively with the 
first election IU vote, even though the correlations found for the mid 1980s and 
onwards are substantially weaker than the ones recorded for its relationship with the 
PSOE at the first pairs of elections.  
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Table 5.4  1st election PCE/IU votes: logit correlations   
 
                      77-79  79-82  82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00 
 
Abstain                -.31   -.50   -.37   -.27   -.20   -.17   -.07 
 
PSOE                    .50    .67    .47    .38    .36    .19    .39 
UCD                    -.47   -.68 
CDS                            .01    .10    .16    .34   
AP/PP                  -.12   -.08   -.16   -.03    .19    .15    .15 
 
CiU                    -.32   -.67   -.62   -.50   -.67   -.76   -.85 
ERC                    -.29   -.48                 -.18   -.46   -.52 
IC                                                                .79 
EE                     -.71    .27    .27   -.09 
PNV                     .08    .12    .14   -.26   -.45   -.37   -.39 
HB                      .08   -.06   -.20   -.40   -.53   -.49 
EA                                          -.51   -.61   -.51   -.41 
BNG                                                 .41    .52    .52 
 
PSA/PA                  .35                 -.05                 -.04 
CUPC/AIC/CC             .37                 -.54   -.39   -.39   -.54 
CAIC/PAR/CHA           -.04          -.06   -.05    .23           .61 
UV                                    .22    .13    .15    .12    .15 
Other                   .16    .06    .05   -.06   -.21    .33    .36 
 
 
                       
As to the regional parties we note that both the Catalan Left and Right in general 
exhibit strong negative correlations with the first election PCE/IU vote, whereas the 
IC that broke away from the IU before the 2000 election naturally show a strong 
positive correlation with the support for IU at the 1996 election. For the Basque 
parties the trends a more mixed, but according to the general picture, the support for 
the Basque parties has increasingly tended to come in municipalities with relatively 
weaker first election PCE/IU support. In this respect, then, it seems that the Centre-
Periphery cleavage had asserted its influence over the Left-Right cleavage at the 
aggregate level in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In Galicia, however, the BNG 
drew far more support in municipalities that supported the PCE/IU at the previous 
election than in municipalities with a weak IU support. For all the other regional 
parties, the trends are fairly mixed without any clear patterns. 
This implies that, even though it has come to correlate positively with all the other 
state-wide parties, the correlations between the first election PCE/IU vote and the 
second elections PSOE vote dropped substantially with the establishment of the IU. 







The first election PSOE vote 
Firstly, we note from table 5.5 (below) a clear negative relationship between the first 
election support for the PSOE and the tendency to abstain at the second elections. 
This means that even though survey research indicate that electoral abstention has 
become systematically skewed to the Left of the political spectrum (Barreiro 2001), 
this trend is not strongly reflected at the aggregate level for the PSOE. The 
correlations between first election PSOE vote and the support for the PCE/IU show a 
revealing pattern: Although all correlations are positive, the trend is clearly 
weakening - from an impressive .68 in 1986 to a mere .14 in 2000. The logic of the 
aggregate Leftist vote in the municipalities has definitely been changing over the 
years, from a relationship of going hand in hand towards virtually no relationship at 
all. 
Turning to the parties of the state-wide Right, we note the negative relationship 
between first election support for the PSOE and second election support for the other 
dominant party of the transition, UCD, a weakly positive relationship with the CDS 
support and the unclear and shifting trend of nearly no relationship with the AP/PP. 
This means that even though the AP/PP by and large replaced the UCD as the party of 
the state-wide Right, the aggregate trends in the territorial distribution of the vote do 
not reflect any clear-cut Left-Right division across the municipalities. This is 
illuminating as the AP/PP is usually considered more rightist than the UCD. In short, 
the clear aggregate division between the state-wide Left and Right that existed during 
the transitional years simply waned after UCD’s demise.  
Turning to the regional parties of the Second Periphery regions, we note a substantial 
and increasing negative relationship between the support for the PSOE and the 
support for the Catalan Right (CiU). The relationship with the more Leftist ERC show 
a similar, but weaker, pattern. By and large, however, we may conclude that at the 
aggregate level, the first election support for the PSOE and the second election 
support for the Catalan parties have become nearly incompatible with each other. In 
Catalonia the municipalities tend not to change their support from the state-wide Left 
to the regional parties from one election to the other, quite the contrary. The only 
relevant regional party in Catalonia that has received more support in municipalities 
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with strong first election PSOE support is the Iniciativa per Catalunya (IC) which, as 
mentioned above, split from the IU alliance prior to the 2000 election.     
 
Table 5.5  1st election PSOE votes - logit correlations  
 
                      77-79  79-82  82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00 
 
Abstain                -.48   -.53   -.45   -.39   -.43   -.37   -.37 
 
PCE/IU                  .66    .55    .68    .50    .28    .35    .14     
UCD                    -.23   -.38 
CDS                            .07    .22    .12    .08 
AP/PP                  -.11    .08   -.01    .04    .15    .10    .01 
 
CiU                    -.36   -.61   -.86   -.83   -.79   -.84   -.75 
ERC                    -.33   -.45                 -.43   -.42   -.14 
IC                                                                .35 
EE                     -.32   -.05   -.18   -.12 
PNV                    -.33   -.46   -.51   -.43   -.46   -.50   -.46 
HB                     -.19   -.37   -.52   -.60   -.59   -.60 
EA                                          -.60   -.57   -.60   -.54 
BNG                                                 .08   -.01   -.09 
 
PSA/PA                  .19                  .00                 -.15       
CUPC/AIC/CC             .51           .44    .22    .05    .06    .17 
CAIC/PAR/CHA           -.04          -.19   -.27   -.24          -.62 
UV                                   -.09   -.07   -.20   -.24   -.23 
 
Other                   .11   -.04    .03   -.15   -.21    .07   -.24 
                       
 
For the Basque parties, we note that the first election support for the PSOE has co-
varied negatively with all the parties of both the Basque Left and Right, although the 
negative correlation with the EE was insignificant for the 1979-1982 pair of elections. 
Particularly after the merger between the EE and the PSOE, the logic of aggregate 
party competition in the Basque country has been one of incompatibility between first 
election support for the PSOE and second election support for the Basque parties. 
The situation in the third of the second periphery regions, Galicia, is quite different as 
there is no aggregate correlation between the first election support for the PSOE and 
the second election support for the BNG at all. 
Moving to the parties of the First Periphery, the tendency of a weakly positive 
correlation with the second election support for the Andalusian Socialist Party 
changed to a weak, but negative, correlation after the PSA had conducted its 
metamorphosis into the PA. Again, this indicates that the aggregate electoral profile 
of the PA is different from that of the PSA. For the other regional parties, we note the 
positive correlations with the Canarian parties and the negative correlations both with 
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the Aragonese and the Valencian parties. The strong negative correlation with the new 
Leftist Chunta Aragonesista (CHA) in 2000 is particularly noteworthy as the support 
for this party showed a strong positive correlation with the first election support for 
the IU.  
 
 
The first election AP/PP vote 
For the AP/PP, the sole relevant party of the state-wide Right as we approach the 
millennium, we note from table 5.6 (below) increasingly negative correlations 
between the first election support for the party and the tendency to abstain from 
turning out at the second election. Also in this respect, the state-wide parties of both 
Left and Right tended to become more similar in their aggregate electoral profiles. 
This is also reflected by the fact that the support for the AP/PP at the first elections 
have gone from varying negatively with the support for both the PCE/IU and the 
PSOE at the second elections to a situation of no relationship or a weak positive 
correlation. 
 
Table 5.6 1st election AP/PP votes - logit correlations   
 
                      77-79  79-82  82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00 
 
Abstain                -.06   -.11   -.24   -.31   -.43   -.28   -.51 
 
PCE/IU                 -.22   -.17    .07    .08    .03    .13    .25                
PSOE                   -.12   -.19    .02    .10    .01   -.01    .12 
UCD                     .41    .09 
CDS                            .42    .58    .50    .56 
 
CiU                     .19    .36    .33    .33    .12    .03   -.36 
ERC                     .35    .33                 -.49   -.81   -.87 
IC                                                                .31 
EE                      .08    .07   -.44   -.45 
PNV                     .11    .24   -.64   -.65   -.69   -.66   -.63 
HB                     -.19    .16   -.67   -.69   -.65   -.71 
EA                                          -.61   -.62   -.61   -.56 
BNG                                                       -.36   -.40 
 
PSA/PA                  .14                 -.10                 -.05  
CUPC/AIC/CC            -.13          -.30   -.57   -.43   -.25   -.35 
CAIC/PAR/CHA            .12           .25    .00   -.26          -.05 
UV                                    .11   -.15   -.36   -.35   -.31 
Other                  -.05    .06    .23    .00    .41    .27    .35 
 
The shift in aggregate electoral profile is further emphasised by the fact that with the 
exception of the Catalan IC in 2000, the AP/PP support at the first elections has 
changed towards negative correlations with the support for all relevant parties at the 
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second elections both in Catalonia, the Basque Country and in Galicia. Thus, the 
state-wide Right has over the years tended to become near anathema to the regional 
parties at the aggregate level with the sole exception of the new Catalan offspring 
from the PCE/IU. This is yet another token sustaining the impression that the Centre-
Periphery cleavage is strengthened over the years, at least at the aggregate level.      
 
 
The first election UCD vote 
The big issue concerning the first election support for the UCD is, of course, centred 
around the following question: Where did the UCD voters go when the party 
collapsed in 1982? First, from table 5.7 (below), we see that there was no aggregate 
relationship between the first election support for the UCD and second election 
abstention. Further, the first election support for the UCD correlated negatively with 
the second election support for the state-wide Left and positively with the second 
election support for the state-wide Right.  
 
Table 5.7 1st election UCD votes - logit correlations     
 
                       77-79  79-82  82-86   
 
Abstain                -.08   -.08    .03 
 
PCE/IU                 -.45   -.26   -.51         
PSOE                   -.14   -.08   -.21 
CDS                            .33    .25 
AP/PP                   .23    .63    .54 
 
CiU                     .04    .44    .38 
ERC                     .12    .30 
EE                     -.14   -.41   -.13 
PNV                    -.59   -.72   -.13 
HB                     -.58   -.63   -.25 
 
PSA/PA                 -.24 
CUPC/AIC/CC             .11          -.04 
CAIC/PAR/CHA           -.06           .03 
UV                                   -.47 




However, we note that the negative relationship with the second election support for 
PCE and PSOE was weaker in 1982 than both before and after. On the other hand, the 
positive relationship with the second election support for the AP/PP was clearly much 
stronger in 1982 and 1986 than at the first pair of elections. We also note that the 
correlations between first election UCD support and second election CDS support 
 114
were much weaker than the ones found for AP/PP. Thus, the expectation derived from 
the H9 hypothesis predicting higher levels of transfers from UCD to AP/PP than to 
the CDS, is reflected at the aggregate level.                 
                       
In the Second Periphery, we note that the relationship between first election support 
for UCD and second election support for the regional parties differed markedly 
between Catalonia and the Basque Country. Whereas both the Catalan Right and Left 
tended to poll more votes in municipalities that had supported the UCD at the 
previous elections, the situation in the Basque Country was quite the opposite.  The 
strong negative correlation between first election UCD support and the second 
election support for the Basque Right in 1979 and 1982 are all the more striking when 
we take into account that at those pairs of elections the PNV correlated positively with 
the first election AP/PP vote. 
The correlations with the regional parties of the first periphery leave a rather mixed 
pattern, with the sole exception of the votes cast for the Valencian UV in 1986.    
 
 
The first election CDS vote 
Compared to the UCD, the first election support for the CDS shows a stronger 
negative relationship with second election abstention. In terms of state-wide Left-
Right, the CDS exhibit the expected positive correlations with the AP/PP and a 
somewhat surprising relationship with the PCE/IU of fairly marked positive 
correlations from 1986 and onwards. The trend vis-à-vis the PSOE show a tendency 
moving from a weak negative correlation to virtually no relationship at all. 
 
Moving to the regional parties we note that the CDS vote exhibits strong negative 
correlations with all the Catalan and Basque parties from 1986 and onwards, 
regardless of Left-Right orientation. The situation in Galicia, however, is quite the 
opposite. The BNG tends to draw substantially more support in areas that voted the 
CDS at the previous election than in areas with little or no support for the CDS. The 
picture regarding the rest of the regional parties is more mixed, albeit the tendencies 





Table 5.8  1st election CDS votes - logit correlations     
 
                       82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96   
Abstain                -.09   -.20   -.24   -.17 
 
PCE/IU                  .05    .34    .21    .36    
PSOE                   -.16    .07    .03   -.02 
AP/PP                   .33    .59    .61    .62 
 
CiU                     .00   -.62   -.57   -.58 
ERC                                  -.63   -.63  
EE                     -.34   -.22 
PNV                    -.66   -.33   -.54   -.56 
HB                     -.51   -.65   -.61   -.62 
EA                            -.59   -.62   -.59 
BNG                                   .40    .42 
 
PSA/PA                        -.02     
CUPC/AIC/CC            -.01   -.60    .12   -.06 
CAIC/PAR/CHA           -.11    .06   -.09 
UV                     -.06   -.19   -.46   -.31 
Other                   .16    .06    .32    .23 
 
                       
Thus, in terms of cleavages, the CDS exhibits a mixed pattern. A strong positive co-
variation with its fellow traveller on the state-wide Right, the AP/PP, a positive co-
variation with the most Leftist of the state-wide parties, the PCE/IU, and no 
correlation with the more moderate party of the Left, the PSOE. In terms of the 
Centre-Periphery cleavage, the CDS support is clearly negatively related to support 
for the Catalan and Basque parties, whereas in Galicia the municipalities that support 
the CDS also tend to support the BNG. In sum, the electoral profile of the CDS 
follows the pattern of AP/PP with one notable exception: They differ markedly as to 





In this chapter we have detected some systematic patterns and trends regarding the 
electoral profiles of the state-wide political parties in terms of the variations in 
aggregate support for each and one of them over time as well as the co-variations 
between the proportions of the electorate opting for the various categories of 
behaviour at the pairs of elections: 
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1) In terms of changes in electoral turnout between elections, the aggregate 
analysis produced a pattern that is generally in accord with the swings 
described in chapter 4. However, the logit analysis has detected that the last 
executive takeover in 1996 also coincided with substantial shifts in the 
territorial distribution of electoral mobilisation. This shift between 1993 and 
1996 calls for particular attention since it was not reflected in the overall 
turnout and has not been treated in previous research.    
2) All the surviving parties, with the predicted exception of the CDS, 
experienced an increase in the level of aggregate stability after the 1982 
debacle and onwards. This trend was particularly pronounced in the case of 
the AP/PP. The state-wide Left experienced a downturn in stability towards 
the end of the period, while the stability of the AP/PP was unchanged. Thus, in 
general terms, the hypothesis elaborated in chapter 4 on electoral stabilisation 
after the first founding elections of the transitional period was reflected at the 
aggregate municipal level, i.e. that the main parties consolidated their electoral 
clienteles in territorial terms. However, in relation to the party specific 
expectations derived from the H5 hypothesis, the predicted patterns were not 
reflected at the aggregate level in terms of the timing of the stabilisation of the 
PSOE, PCE/IU and the AP/PP vote.   
3) The state-wide parties, regardless of Left or Right orientation, related 
negatively to electoral abstention, i.e. the lower the first election turnout the 
lower the second election support for the state-wide parties. The only 
exception being the UCD that showed no relationship with abstention, neither 
at the first nor the second elections.   We also noted that the substantial drop in 
support for the PCE/IU from 1996 to 2000 coincided with a substantial drop in 
its negative correlations with second election abstention.  
4) The relationship between first election abstention and support for the regional 
parties showed very mixed patterns. The salience of the Centre-Periphery 
cleavage was clearly reflected in the Basque Country. First election abstention 
related positively to second election support for all the Basque parties at all of 
the pairs of elections studied. The Catalan parties showed mixed and erratic 
patterns, while the support for the Galician BNG related negatively to first 
election abstention. This implies that there were substantial differences in the 
logics of electoral abstention within the Second Periphery. Thus, the 
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assumptions regarding the Centre-Periphery cleavage was only in part 
reflected at the aggregate level.   
5) In terms of aggregate electoral competition, the patterns showed that the 
Centre-Periphery cleavage had become strengthened at the expense of the 
Left-Right cleavage as we approach the millennium. On the one hand, the 
negative relationship between support for the state-wide Left and Right of the 
1970s and the first half of the 1980s waned and even tended to turn into a 
positive relationship. On the other hand, the we noted a steadily increasing 
negative relationship between first election support for the state-wide parties 
and second election support for the regional parties regardless of Left-Right 
orientation, the exceptions being very few. 
 
Now, the question is to what extent do these aggregate patterns relate to the 
estimated overall behaviour of individual voters?  This, then, is precisely the 


























In this chapter, we shall analyse the overall estimated behaviour of individual voters 
for the seven pairs of elections between 1977 and 2000 for Spain as a whole. The bulk 
of the analyses are based on transition matrixes calculated by way of the ECOL 
method for cross-level inference as discussed in chapter 3.41 The majority of the 
analyses are based on conditional percentages in terms of the estimated proportions of 
the electorate at the first elections that remained loyal, transferred their vote to another 
party or simply demobilised at the second elections. These proportions, then, are the 
indicators that we shall first use to assess the trends in individual level voter loyalty 
for the parties. For these loyalty rates also a matrix based on survey recall data is 
presented. We shall then proceed by presenting the estimated proportions of voters 
that transferred their vote from one option at the first election to the other options at 
the second election. This analysis will include both transfers between parties and to 
and from electoral abstention. In addition, the behaviour of the new voters included in 
the census between the elections will be assessed. Again, the main focus will be on 
identifying trends and changes in the electoral profiles of the various components of 
the party system(s) in relation to the functional Left-Right axis and the territorial 
Centre-Periphery axis.  In addition to this, the analysis will be concluded with the 
presentation of estimated net flows between the state-wide options, i.e. PCE/IU, 
PSOE, AP/PP, UCD, CDS and abstention.  
In all of this, three overarching observations from the aggregate level analysis will be 
followed up in particular and the pertaining hypotheses elaborated in chapter 4 will be 
put to empirical test:  
 
1) To what extent did the increase in aggregate stability observed for all the 
parties (with the obvious exception of the CDS) reflect an increase in 
individual voter loyalty? 
                                                 
41 See appendix II for a complete presentation of the matrixes. 
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2) To what extent did the patterns in the aggregate relationships between the 
political parties and electoral abstention detected in the previous chapter 
reflect systematic variations in this respect at the level of individual voters? 
 
3)  How, and to what extent, did the observed strengthening of the Centre-
Periphery cleavage at the expense of the Left-Right cleavage in terms of 
aggregate electoral profiles reflect an underlying tendency at the individual 




Stabilisation: Loyalty rates 
 
We shall start out with the loyalty rates related to hypotheses H3, H5 and H7. The 
first hypothesis stated that the largest proportions of former abstainers have opted for 
abstention again at the second elections, apart from the two realignment elections in 
1982 and 1993. The second hypothesis stated that PSOE was the first state-wide party 
that managed to consolidate its electoral constituency in terms of increased loyalty 
rates between elections, followed by the AP/PP and PCE/IU, while the CDS never 
managed to consolidate in this respect. The third hypothesis stated that the Basque 
and Catalan Right saw a substantial increase in voter loyalty from 1980 and onwards. 
The Basque Left quickly followed suit, while the Catalan and Galician Left lagged 
behind. No clear trend would be identified for the regional parties of the First 
Periphery. 
 
Now, moving from patterns of aggregate stability to the calculation of loyalty rates, 
for some of the parties and abstention we have data from two methodological 
approaches at our disposal. For the 1977-79 pair of elections, survey recall data only 
exist for three of the state-wide parties. For the elections in 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 
1996 and 2000 the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) conducted a series of 
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post electoral studies in which the respondents were asked to report their electoral 
behaviour both at the actual election and the previous one.42  
                   
Table 6.1: Loyalty rates between elections 1977-2000: Ecol percentages. 
                      77-79  79-82  82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00 
Abstain                61.8   33.3   57.7   59.4   50.1   64.3   69.1 
 
PCE/IU                 49.3   22.2   35.5   65.4   70.0   76.7   33.8   
PSOE                   56.0   73.8   58.5   70.7   80.8   83.2   67.8 
UCD                    58.5   14.9  
CDS                                  25.9   33.3    7.9     
AP/PP                  18.5   56.1   56.0   74.1   84.3   90.5   81.9 
 
CiU*                   46.1   57.1   78.3   81.8   81.1   86.3   74.5 
ERC**                  13.2   23.9                        61.2   59.7 
EE                     28.2   39.4   52.4   49.5 
PNV                    54.6   72.0   62.3   63.9   86.7   89.4   69.7 
HB                            59.5   62.3   71.0   80.1   78.3 
EA                                                 68.1   74.4   47.4 
 
AIC/CC                                      40.3   51.8   79.9   74.8             
CAIC/PAR               17.7                 44.1   41.1                 
UV                                          45.5   49.7   61.6   42.2 
BNG                                                       80.9   70.1 
Other                  13.6   11.1   18.2   25.2   20.6   16.7   26.6 
 
Votes cast for PDPC in 1977. ** Votes cast for ECFED in 1977 and ERFN in 1979. 
 
Table 6.2 Loyalty rates between elections 1977-2000: Survey percentages. 
                      77-79  79-82* 82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00    
Abstain                       34.7   36.7   48.9   48.4   61.2   55.3 
 
PCE/IU                 75.7   43.7   53.8   81.1   68.4   73.0   45.6 
PSOE                   76.3   89.8   73.2   70.4   69.2   72.4   57.4 
UCD                    71.2   19.9             
CDS                                  60.8   65.9   24.8       
AP/PP                         91.7   81.4   80.0   90.3   72.4   78.2      
 
PNV                           91.4   62.4   87.5   74.4   75.6   53.8 
CiU                           69.5   84.8   90.4   77.6   80.8   60.4 
 
 
* The un-weighted average of two CIS recall surveys. 
 
This implies that we can calculate the proportions of the respondents that reportedly 
opted for the same behaviour at two consecutive elections based on their own 
recollection. There are many well-known flaws to this method, but as no valid panel 
                                                 
42 CIS studies no. 1327, 1542, 1543, 1842, 2061, 2210, 2382 and 2384. The 2382 and 2384 are labelled 
‘panel study’, but since the first was conducted in February 2000 and the second in March-April 2000, 
the data for the 1996 election are still based on the recall method. 
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studies exist for the 1977-2000 elections, the reported proportions will be presented as 
rough estimates that together with the ECOL results will be helpful in order to 
identify the trends in voter loyalty.  
Given the respective strengths and weaknesses of the two methods, we shall not 
expect that the ECOL matrix and the survey matrix will show identical percent wise 
distributions, but rather that they will tend to converge in terms of the trends depicted 







Starting with the electoral abstainers, we note that the ECOL results and the survey 
recall results diverge in some aspects and converge in other. They diverge in terms of 
the estimated percentages for the 1982-86 and 1986-89 pairs in particular, and to 
some extent for the 1996-2000 pair. At these pairs of elections the ECOL method 
yield estimates that indicate that a larger proportion of those who abstained at the first 
elections did so again at the second elections. The methods converge both in terms of 
tendencies over time and for the 1979-82, 1989-93 and 1993-96 pairs of elections also 
in terms of percentages. We may conclude, then, that the 1982 election saw a 
sweeping mobilisation amongst voters that had not turned out in 1979. According to 
the recall data, this tendency was repeated for the 1982-86 pair of elections while the 
ECOL estimates indicate that this was not the case. Now, given the nearly 11 percent 
drop in electoral turnout, a mobilisation of the abstainers in 1986 that nearly equalled 
the mobilisation in 1982 depicted by the recall data does not seem very likely. This 
also holds for the 2000 election, which saw an overall drop in turnout of more than 
seven percent. Given the methodological shortcomings of the two methods, however, 
we have no exact yardstick by which we could decide which of the estimates that are 
the most accurate. Thus, the trend signalled by the ECOL method is clearly in accord 
with the hypothesis in that both 1993 and 1982 saw large numbers of former 
abstainers turning out to vote. In terms of percentages, this is corroborated by the 
survey results. The survey results, however, deviate from the expected overall trend in 
relation to the election in 1986 and, to some extent, in 1989. However, given the well-
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known flaws to this method in estimating the true levels of electoral abstention, these 
results are simply not very plausible. Hence, we shall conclude that the H3 hypothesis 
is strengthened.  
In addition to this, we note that the territorial shift in the territorial distribution of the 
proportions of abstainers between 1993 and 1996 detected in the aggregate analysis is 
not reflected the tables above. This once again underscores that the ‘territorial’ 
realignment of electoral abstention between these two elections took place in such a 





We note that also in terms of party loyalty the two methods tend to diverge in terms of 
the size of the estimated proportions, but converge in terms of the trends depicted. In 
relation to the parties of the state-wide Left, we note that the trends are quite similar 
for the two methods regarding the PCE/IU. Both indicate that the party experienced 
its lowest loyalty rates between 1979 and 1982 and again between 1996 and 2000. 
They both indicate that the party struggled to maintain its grip on the voters also 
between 1982 and 1986. Thus, both yield results that reflect that the party went 
through a process of ideological reorientation and reorganisation between 1982 and 
1986. For the period following the 1982-86 debacle, we see that the ECOL estimates 
show a trend of steadily increasing loyalty that ended abruptly at the last election in 
2000. The trend depicted by the recall data shows a substantial increase in loyalty 
rates from the 1986-89 pair and onwards, albeit with more ups and downs. Thus, the 
overall tendency is quite clear: the PCE/IU went trough a period of great difficulties 
in retaining its voters from one election to the next in the first half of the 1980s. 
During the latter half of the 1980s and the decade of the 1990s the party experienced a 
period of electoral consolidation. This trend came to abrupt end in 2000 with the 
aforementioned sharp drop in voter loyalty.  
 
For the other party of the state-wide Left, the PSOE, we note that the two methods 
tend to converge in terms of trends (with one exception) and to diverge somewhat in 
the size of the estimated proportions. We observe that when the loyalty rates are low, 
the ECOL estimates tend to be much lower than the survey estimates. When loyalty 
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rates are high, however, the ECOL estimates tend to be somewhat higher than the 
survey estimates. As mentioned above, there is one exception to the convergence 
between the two methods as to how they depict the trend for the PSOE. While the 
ECOL estimates show a 10 percent increase in loyalty from the mid 1980s to the mid 
1990s, the survey estimates oscillate around a loyalty rate at 70 percent for the whole 
of this period.       
We may conclude, then, that the state-wide Left parties were able to consolidate their 
respective electorates from the mid 1980s and onwards, but that both parties, and the 
PCE/IU in particular, suffered a sharp drop in the loyalty rate at the turn of the 
millennium. In the analysis of voter transitions we shall see to what extent other 
parties benefited from this decline in loyalty or whether the PCE/IU and PSOE voters 
mainly opted for abstention, as stated by some observers (Barreiro 2001).43    
 
For the state-wide Right we observe that both methods capture the dramatic decline in 
loyalty for the UCD from the 1977-79 pair of elections to the debacle that took place 
between 1979 and 1982. For the CDS both methods depict a similar trend: Increased 
voter loyalty from 1982-86 to 1986-89 and then a sharp decline in 1989-93. Once 
again, however, we note the divergence in terms of the size of the proportions in that 
the ECOL estimates are substantially lower than the surveys percentages and that at 
the 1982-86 pair of elections the recall loyalty rate is even higher for CDS than for 
PCE/IU.    
It is in relation to AP/PP that we observe the greatest discrepancies between the 
ECOL estimates and the recall estimates.44 Notably, whereas the ECOL estimates 
show a trend of steadily increased voter loyalty between 1977 and 1996, the surveys 
yield a trend of ups and downs. In fact, the lowest loyalty rate to be found in the 
survey estimates, the one for 1993-96 at 72,4 percent, coincides with the highest 
loyalty rate in the ECOL estimates with 90,5 percent. Now, given the fact that the 
AP/PP increased its share of the votes cast and that the turnout remained virtually 
unchanged between 1993 and 1996, the almost 20 percent decline in loyalty observed 
in the recall data frankly does not seem very plausible.  
                                                 
43 A particular aspect of the election in 2000 should be noted: PSOE and PCE/IU had established an 
electoral pact that, according to Sánchez-Sierra, tended to demobilise relatively more former PCE/IU 
voters than former PSOE voters (Sánchez-Sierra 2005: 17).   
44 It should be noted that the survey data of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s tended to 
systematically under-estimate the support for the AP/PP, indicating that only the most loyal AP/PP 
voters were captured in those surveys.  
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The overall conclusion regarding the voter loyalty for the state-wide parties is that the 
1980s and the 1990s saw a process of stabilisation and consolidation for the two 
parties on the Left, the PCE/IU and the PSOE, and for the dominant party on the 
Right, the AP/PP.  At the election in 2000, however, only the AP/PP can be said to 
have maintained its grip on the voters. In particular, the PCE/IU took heavy tolls in 
this respect. Based on a comparison with the aggregate trends depicted in the previous 
chapter, we may conclude that, on the whole, the increased aggregate stability for the 
state-wide parties was indeed produced by increased party loyalty at the individual 
level. 
As to the status of the H5 hypothesis, we note that according to the ECOL estimates, 
PSOE was the first state-wide party to reach a certain level of stability, followed by 
the AP/PP and then PCE/IU. According to the recall estimates, however, the AP/PP 
had retained a high level of stability all along. Both methods indicate that CDS 
obtained the lowest loyalty rates of all the state wide parties after 1982 with one 
exception for the 1982-86 recall data. On the whole, then, the hypothesis is sustained 
for the parties of the state-wide Left, while its status in relation to AP/PP is less clear.    
 
Turning to the Centre-Periphery axis, the H7 hypothesis stated that the Basque and 
Catalan Right would have seen a substantial increase in voter loyalty after 1982. The 
Basque Left would quickly have followed suit, while the Catalan and Galician Left 
would have lagged behind. For the regional parties of the First Periphery, no clear 
trend would be identified. In the table, we observe the familiar pattern of divergence 
and convergence between the ECOL estimates and the recall estimates for the Catalan 
CiU.  They depict similar trends in that the party saw a steady increase in voter 
loyalty up till 1986-89, followed by a downturn and again an upturn. They diverge, 
however, in terms of the estimated percentages and in that according to the recall data 
the CiU held the strongest grip in its voters between 1986 and 1989 whereas 
according to the ECOL results the CiU experienced its highest loyalty rate between 
1993 and 1996. We conclude that the party in the 1980s and the 1990s was able to 
command more voter loyalty than in the 1970s and thus the hypothesis is sustained. 
This also holds for the other Catalan party, the ECR, which according to the only 
estimates available (the ECOL estimates) maintained a much firmer grip on its voters 
at the two last pairs of elections than between the first two pairs.  
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On the whole, the trends for the Basque parties are rather mixed. Starting with the 
PNV, we observe that the estimates obtained by the recall method tend to fluctuate far 
more than the ones obtained by the ECOL method. Both methods depict a trend in 
which the voter loyalty fell from the 1979-82 pair of elections before it increased 
again at a later stage. However, compared to the consistently strong aggregate 
correlations observed in chapter 5, the patterns detected for at individual level are far 
more erratic. The conclusion is that the pattern of voter loyalty for the PNV does not 
reflect the expected overall trend in the same degree as for the other parties analysed 
above. To what extent this can be explained by the relationship between the support 
for the PNV and the levels of electoral abstention will be dealt with below.  
As to the voter loyalty for the rest of the Basque parties, for which we have to rely 
solely on the ECOL estimates, we see that they in general follow the trend of 
increased loyalty through the 1980s and 1990s. However, the estimated voter loyalty 
dropped sharply between 1996 and 2000. To this it should be noted that the electoral 
situation in the Basque Country was rather peculiar in 2000 given the fact that the 
Basque radical nationalist party Herri Batasuna (HB), widely regarded as the political 
wing of the ETA, was outlawed prior to the election. This particular aspect of the 
elections in the Basque Country will be followed up in the district wise analysis.        
For the rest of the regional parties, the trends are rather mixed. Although they by and 
large seem to have reached higher levels of stability in the 1990s than in the previous 
decade, the trends identified are too erratic to sustain the hypothesis.       
     
Electoral mobilisation 
 In this section the mobilisation of the voters will be assessed in terms of the estimated 
behaviour of new voters and first election abstainers at the second elections. Particular 
emphasis will be put on the transfers along the Left-Right axis and the Centre-
Periphery axis. In the last section of the chapter the estimated net flows between the 
state-wide options will be presented and analysed. We start out with the conditional 







Table 6.3  New voters included at 2nd election. Ecol percentages. 
                      77-79  79-82  82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00 
To: 
Abstain                36.6   18.3   33.4   37.8   23.6   30.3   45.8 
 
PCE/IU                  6.6    2.3    3.0    8.9    6.3    8.4    2.3   
PSOE                   19.9   41.7   30.2   20.1   22.5   27.7   18.8 
UCD                    17.3    2.3  
CDS                            1.8    8.2    6.7    1.2 
AP/PP                   5.0   19.9   11.8    9.9   25.5   20.9   18.8 
 
CiU                     0.8    1.0    2.8    3.0    5.3    1.6    1.5 
ERC                     0.2    0.2                  0.5    0.1    0.2 
IC                                                                0.3 
EE                      0.4    0.4    0.4    0.5 
PNV                     0.6    1.4    0.4    1.1    1.2    1.3    1.8 
HB                      0.4    0.6    0.4    0.4    0.4    0.2 
EA                                           0.8    0.5    0.3    0.4 
 
PA                      2.3                  1.1    0.4    0.9    1.0 
CUPC/AIC/CC             0.2           0.2    0.4    1.9    1.2    1.0 
CAIC/PAR/CHA            0.2           0.1    0.2    0.5           0.1 
UV                                    0.2    0.7    0.3    0.2    0.1 
BNG                                                 0.7    0.7    1.3 
Other                   7.3    9.2    7.5    7.1    8.3    4.5    5.7 
                    
The first of the pertaining hypotheses, H1, stated that, in general, the largest 
proportion of new voters would have opted for abstention between 1977 and 2000. 
The realignment elections in 1982 and 1993, however, would have seen a sharp 
increase in the proportion of new voters that turned out to vote. 
The table 6.3 (above) shows the estimated transfers from the group of voters that was 
enfranchised between the elections. First and foremost, we note that with two 
exceptions their preferred option during the whole period was that of electoral 
abstention. The exceptions are the elections in 1982 and 1993. In 1982 an estimated 
42 percent of the new voters cast their vote for the PSOE, nearly twenty percent cast 
their vote for the AP/PP and abstention came in only as the third most preferred 
option. Also the election in 1993 saw a substantial decline in the proportion of new 
voters that opted for abstention. AP/PP was the most preferred option, while the 
proportion that opted for PSOE nearly equalled the proportion that opted for 
abstention. Thus, the H1 hypothesis is sustained by the data. 
According to the H8 hypothesis, the new voters party choice would have followed the 
sequential translation of cleavages in that the UCD would have polled a large share of 
new voters between 1977 and 1979, the PSOE large shares from 1982 and onwards, 
the PCE/IU would have increased its share in the latter half of the 1980s and AP/PP 
would have become the dominant party among the new voters in the 1990s. From the 
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table we observe that UCD did poll a substantial share of new voters in 1979. PSOE 
was clearly the party with the strongest hold on the new voters in the 1970s and 
1980s, but its position amongst the young was far more contested by the AP/PP in the 
1990s and in 2000. In this respect, then, we see a change in the electoral profiles of 
the two main state-wide parties to the benefit of the Right. However, AP/PP cannot be 
said to have achieved the predicted dominant position among this group after the 1993 
election. Thus, the hypothesis is sustained in relation to UCD and PSOE, but not in 
relation to AP/PP. On the Left we note that the PCE/IU saw an increased ability to 
mobilise the new voters from 1986-89 and onwards in accord with the hypothesis, but 
that the party was not able to uphold its grip on the young at the 2000 election.  
 
In assessing the proportions obtained by the regional parties we must bear in mind 
that these parties only compete in their home regions while the proportions estimated 
here are based on the total number of voters in Spain. Straightforward comparisons 
between the estimated proportions for these parties at a given pair of elections are 
therefore not tenable. Thus the proper test of the H2 hypothesis stating that a 
substantially lower proportion of new voters would have turned out to vote in the 
Peripheries than in the Centre will have to await the district wise analysis. What can 
be assessed, however, are the trends over time for each and one of the parties and, of 
course, the relative proportions compared with the other regional parties within each 
region.  
 
Starting with the Catalan parties, we note that the CiU showed an increased ability to 
mobilise the new voters up through the 1970s and 1980s. This trend reached its peak 
in 1993 with an estimated 5.3 percent of the Spanish total. At the last two pairs of 
elections CiU’s mobilising ability dropped considerably again. The trend for the other 
Catalan party, the ERC, show a similar pattern by reaching its peak with an estimated 
0.5 percent in 1993. For the Basque parties, the picture is far more mixed and no 
general trend can be identified. The Galician BNG polled an estimated 1.7 percent in 
2000, up from 0.7 percent at the two previous pairs of elections. The Andalusian 
PSA/PA polled an estimated 2.3 percent of the new voters in 1979, but has never been 







In the previous chapter we noted some significant differences in the aggregate 
relations between electoral abstention and the state-wide parties on the one hand and 
the Basque parties on the other. On the basis of table 6.4 (below), we may assess the 
estimated capability of the parties in terms of mobilising voters that had opted for 
abstention at the previous election. In assessing the relative successes and failures in 
this, however, we must once again bear in mind the fundamental difference between 
the state-wide parties on the one hand and the regional parties on the other in that the 
number of abstainers that can be mobilised has been far greater for the state-wide 
parties than for the regional parties, i.e. that the percentages are not directly 
comparable. 
According to the H8 hypothesis, the parties’ ability to mobilise first election 
abstainers would have followed the sequential translation of societal divisions into 
manifest cleavages in that the UCD would have polled a large share of former 
abstainers in 1979, the PSOE large shares from 1982 and onwards, the PCE/IU would 
have increased its share in the latter half of the 1980s and AP/PP would have become 
the dominant party among the former abstainers in the 1990s. 
Starting with the state-wide Left we note that the PCE/IU was able to double its share 
of the first election abstainers from less than two percent in 1982 and 1986 to four 
percent or more at all the elections leading up to the debacle in 2000, in which it 
dropped back to less than two percent. For the PSOE we note a spectacular increase in 
mobilising ability from less than 10 percent in 1979 to more than 25 percent in 1982. 
During the 1980s and the 1990s, however, the flow of mobilised voters into the PSOE 
clearly ebbed and reached a bottom mark in 2000 with less than five percent. The 
trend exhibited by the AP/PP on the state-wide Right is very different from the one of 
the PSOE. After the peak in 1982 at nearly 17 percent, it was able to reach a second 
peak in 1993 with 16.7 percent and was able to assert itself as the dominant party 
from then on. Thus, overall, the pattern here clearly sustains the hypothesis. It also 
underscores the point that in the latter half of the 1990s a change occurred between 
the state-wide Left and Right in that the Right maintained its ability to mobilise 
 129
former abstainers while the Left clearly lost its previous grip on this group, as noted 
by Barreiro (2001). 
 
 
Table 6.4  Abstainers at 1st election.  Ecol conditional percentages. 
 
                      77-79  79-82  82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00 
To: 
PCE/IU                  2.8    1.7    1.6    4.7    4.0    4.0    1.7   
PSOE                    9.3   25.8   14.0   10.2   11.9    8.8    4.9 
UCD                    11.8    4.1   
CDS                            2.5    4.3    4.5    1.6 
AP/PP                   2.9   16.6    9.7    7.8   16.7   12.6   11.6 
 
 
CiU                     0.9    3.0    1.9    1.1    0.9    0.6    0.3 
ERC                     0.6    0.5                  0.4    0.2    0.2 
IC                                                                0.5 
EE                      0.2    0.4    0.2    0.2 
PNV                     1.1    1.3    0.5    0.3    0.2    0.3    0.5 
HB                      1.2    0.6    0.5    0.3    0.1    0.2 
EA                                           0.4    0.1    0.1    0.2 
 
PSA/PA                  0.8                  0.7    0.4    0.6    0.7 
CUPC/AIC/CC             0.1           0.2    0.2    0.3    0.2    0.2 
CAIC/PAR/CHA            0.1           0.2    0.2    0.6           0.2 
UV                                    0.2    0.3    0.1    0.1    0.1 
BNG                                                 0.3    0.3    0.5 
Other                   3.5    4.5    4.6    4.5    6.8    3.4    3.8 
 
 
                                                
 
For the regional parties we see that the CiU, after having reached the familiar peak in 
the mobilising election of 1982 with an estimated 3 percent, slowly lost its grip on the 
first election abstainers. This also holds for the ERC. Turning to the Basque parties, 
we observe that the parties running in 1979 and 1982, the PNV and the HB, were able 
to mobilise the first election abstainers at a rate that equalled their total share of the 
electorate. This is an impressive showing not equalled by any other party at any time. 
From the 1982-86 and onwards, however, these parties ability to mobilise former 
abstainers decreased to the general level for all the other parties. The peculiar 
relationship between electoral abstention and the vote for the Basque parties observed 
in the aggregate analysis in chapter 5 is therefore only partially reflected at the level 
of individual voter mobility.45 No particular pattern can be observed for the rest of the 
regional parties.  
 
45 See Appendix IV, tables A IV.9 to A IV.12 as to how the Basque parties have related to abstention. 
The transfers from HB to abstention after the party was banned were extremely high.   
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Electoral competition: Transfers from the parties 
 
The expectations regarding transfers between the parties are related to the hypothesis 
H9. As stated in the hypothesis, the state-wide parties that lagged behind in party 
building after the transitional phase, i.e. PCE/IU, UCD and CDS, should have seen 
large proportions of their former voters transfer to PSOE and AP/PP, but that after the 
formation of the IU alliance in 1986 the would have made net gains from the other 
parties.                  





Transfers from PCE/IU 
 
As shown in table 6.5 (below), the transfers from the PCE/IU reveal a very interesting 
pattern indeed as to the relationship with its state-wide fellow on the Left, the PSOE, 
and to electoral abstention. Whereas an estimated more than half of the 1979 PCE/IU 
voters shifted to the PSOE at the latter’s land-slide victory in 1982 and less than 10 
percent opted for abstention, the pattern at the 2000 election was quite the opposite. 
While three out of ten 1996 PCE/IU voters opted for abstention in 2000, only a mere 
16 percent shifted their vote to the PSOE. Thus, the hypothesis is supported and the 
results once again underscore the observed progressive demobilisation of the Leftist 
voters (Barreiro 2001). 
The 1.2 percent transfer to the IC in Catalonia is quite as expected given the relative 
size of the Catalan electorate. The estimated 7 percent transfer to the AP/PP in 2000 
might seem somewhat exaggerated to some observers but is in fact conservative 
compared to the 10 percent transfer rate observed in a recall survey (Sánchez-Sierra 
2005: 17).46 Anyway, the long terms trends in the relationship between the PCE/IU 
and the PSOE follow the aggregate pattern depicted in chapter 5, from relatively high 
transfers in the 1977-1986 period to low transfers during the 1986-1996 period and 
again a rise in the proportion of voters transferred in 2000. 
                                                 
46 This difference may be attributed to the fact that the transfers to abstention are notoriously under-
estimated in surveys. 
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Table 6.5  1st election PCE/IU voters. ECOL conditional percentages  
 
                      77-79  79-82  82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00 
To: 
Abstain                14.8    7.6   23.4   16.8    9.6    9.5   30.4 
 
PSOE                   22.6   55.0   23.6    7.3    7.6    5.9   16.5 
UCD                     2.5    0.4 
CDS                            1.0    5.3    2.4    0.9 
AP/PP                   1.3    6.5    3.6    2.4    4.8    3.4    7.0 
 
CiU                     0.3    0.4    0.4    0.2    0.1    0.0    0.0 
ERC                     0.2    0.1                  0.1    0.0    0.0 
IC                                                                1.2 
EE                      0.2    0.1    0.1    0.1 
PNV                     0.1    0.1    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0 
HB                      0.1    0.1    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0 
EA                                           0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0 
 
PSA/PA                  1.0                  0.2    0.0    0.1    0.3 
CUPC/AIC/CC             0.2           0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0 
CAIC/PAR/CHA            0.0           0.1    0.1    0.2    0.0    0.5 
UV                                    0.2    0.2    0.1    0.0    0.1 
BNG                                                 0.1    0.3    0.6 
Other                   5.7    4.4    4.8    2.8    4.6    2.1    6.1 
 
 
The pattern of the relationship with the AP/PP cannot be said to directly reflect any 
pattern at the aggregate level as the correlation were fairly weak either way. In terms 
of the regional parties the transfers from the PCE/IU in general tend to be low, and if 
anything, decreasing over the years for the Basque parties, whereas we note an 




Transfers from PSOE 
 
As shown in table 6.6 (below), the transfers from the PSOE to electoral abstention do 
not follow a pattern as closely linked to the demobilisation of the Left thesis as it did 
for the PCE/IU, but a ten percent point increase from 1993-96 to the 1996-2000 pair is 
still impressive, and, given the bigger size of the PSOE, contributed substantially to 
the increase in abstention in 2000. 
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The estimated transfers from PSOE to the other party of the state-wide Left, the 
PCE/IU follow a pattern that could be deduced from the aggregate analysis: From a 
fairly high level of transfers between 1977 and 1979 and then a sharp decrease from 
then on. A comparison with the estimated transfers to the AP/PP on the state-wide 
right is quite revealing as to the logic of party competition. Both in 1982 and in 2000 
a substantially larger proportion of first election PSOE voters opted for the AP/PP 
than the PCE/IU. Again, the estimated 7.3 percent transfer to the AP/PP is somewhat 
conservative in relation to the nearly 10 percent observed in a recall survey (Sánchez-
Sierra 2005: 17). Once again we may conclude that the Left-Right cleavage has 
decreased in importance over time, at least as far as voter transitions from the Left to 
the Right are concerned.  
 
Table 6.6  1st election PSOE voters. Ecol conditional percentages.     
 
                77-79  79-82  82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00 
To: 
 
Abstain                18.2    8.9   19.0   13.6    5.4    6.4   16.0 
 
PCE/IU                  8.8    2.6    3.3    4.3    1.7    3.0    1.4  
UCD                     5.2    0.9 
CDS                            0.9    6.3    2.8    0.3 
AP/PP                   1.4    6.7    4.2    2.7    3.8    3.6    7.3 
 
CiU                     0.3    0.3    0.1    0.1    0.0    0.0    0.1 
ERC                     0.1    0.1                  0.0    0.0    0.0 
IC                                                                0.3 
EE                      0.3    0.2    0.1    0.1     
PNV                     0.1    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0 
HB                      0.2    0.1    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0     
EA                                           0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0 
 
PSA/PA                  1.0                  0.3    0.1    0.1    0.5 
CUPC/AIC/CC             0.4           0.3    0.1    0.1    0.1    0.3 
CAIC/PAR/CHA            0.1           0.1    0.1    0.2           0.0 
UV                                    0.1    0.3    0.1    0.0    0.1 
BNG                                                 0.1    0.2    0.4 




Moving to the regional parties, we note that the estimated transfers to the Catalan CiU 
and the ERC were fairly low across the whole period studied and that, if anything, the 
transfers tended to decrease over time. The only Catalan party that received a more 
substantial part of the former PSOE votes in 2000 was the new IC. For the Basque 
parties, the tendency observed for Catalonia is repeated in a strengthened fashion. For 
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the last three pairs of elections, no transfers from the PSOE to any Basque party are 
recorded at all. Whether this is due to the fact that the proportions were too small to 
appear at this level of aggregation or whether no transfers can be detected in any of 
the electoral districts in the Basque Country at all will have to await the district wise 
analysis. The estimated transfers to the Galician BNG are noteworthy given the fact 
that there was no aggregate correlation between the first election PSOE vote and the 
second election BNG vote. This implies that the BNG have polled votes both from the 
PSOE and the PCE/IU. 
Turning to Andalusia, we note a fairly impressive transfer to the PSA/PA in 1979 and 
far smaller transfers once the party reappeared as the PA in the 1990s. Bearing in 
mind that Andalusia is one of PSOE’s strongholds, the estimated one percent transfer 
between 1977 and 1979 was fairly substantial in terms of votes. For the Aragonese 
leftist CHA we observe that there were no transfers in 2000.      
        
 
Transfers from AP/PP 
 
As shown in table 6.7 (below), the transfers from the AP/PP to electoral abstention 
follow the predicted pattern of relatively high proportions in the 1970s and 1980s 
followed by a sharp decrease in the 1990s. And, even though the general turnout fell 
considerably from 1996 to 2000, the AP/PP lost a substantially smaller share of its 
1996 voters to abstention than the PCE/IU and the PSOE. The transfers from AP/PP 
to its fellow travellers of the state-wide Right reflects the increasingly dominant 
position of the party. In the table for AP/PP the ultra-rightist National Union (UN) is 
included,47 and we note that an estimated six percent switched from AP in 1977 to this 
party in 1979, well below the nearly thirty percent that transferred to UCD. In terms 
of the transfers from the AP/PP to the two parties of the state-wide Left, we note an 
overall substantial decrease in the proportions across the period. It seems that while 
the tendency of vote transfers from the Left to the Right increased, the transfers the 
other way round tended to decrease. This implies that when we conclude that the 
importance of the socio-economic Left-Right cleavage has decreased in terms of voter 
transitions, we should bear in mind that the relationship between the state-wide Left 
and Right had become asymmetrical in this respect. Further, a few comments on the 
                                                 
47 The UN has been omitted from preceding tables since the transfers to this party from all the other 
options treated so far were negligent. 
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relationship between the AP/PP and its fellow travellers on the state-wide Right in the 
1970s and 1980s are called for. In the 1980s the transfers to both the UCD and the 
CDS were smaller than the joint transfers to the state-wide Left, indicating that the 
voters would rather “jump over” the UCD and the CDS when moving along the Left-
Right axis.     
 
Table 6.7  1st election AP/PP voters. Ecol percentages.  
 
                      77-79  79-82  82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00 
To: 
Abstain                30.1   10.8   17.8   11.2    5.1    4.5    9.1 
 
PCE/IU                  1.8    0.7    1.0    1.2    0.6    0.5    0.3                
PSOE                    5.6   15.7    7.5    4.4    3.0    1.7    2.3 
UCD                    27.6    2.4 
CDS                            4.9    5.9    2.3    0.4 
UN                      6.2 
 
CiU                     0.8    1.7    1.6    0.5    0.1    0.2    0.0 
ERC                     0.4    0.4                  0.0    0.0    0.0 
IC                                                                0.1 
EE                      0.1    0.0    0.1    0.1 
PNV                     0.5    0.1    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0 
HB                      0.2    0.1    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0  
EA                                           0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0 
 
PSA/PA                  1.3                  0.3    0.0    0.1    0.2 
CUPC/AIC/CC             0.1           0.2    0.1    0.1    0.1    0.1 
CAIC/PAR/CHA            0.2           0.5    0.1    0.2           0.1 
UV                                    0.4    0.5    0.1    0.0    0.0 
BNG                                                 0.2    0.0    0.3 




Turning to the regional parties, we once again observe the familiar pattern regarding 
transfers to both the Catalan and the Basque parties. In both cases the estimated 
transfers decreased considerably over time, indeed in 2000 the only transfer recorded 
is the 0.1 percent to the newly created IC. This is also the case for the transfers to the 
Basque parties. Thus, the near aggregate incompatibility between the first election 
AP/PP vote and the second election vote for Catalan and Basque parties is clearly 
reflected in underlying individual level properties. Interestingly, even though the 
proportions are fairly low (with the possible exception of the Galician BNG), the 
pattern of incompatibility in terms of transfers from the state-wide Right to the 
regional parties does not hold for all of the regions. It is rather a question of the 
particular situation in the two dominant regions on the Centre-Periphery axis, the 
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Basque Country and Catalonia. This question will therefore be explored in more detail 
in the district wise analysis. 
 
                   
 
 
Transfers from UCD 
                   
Again, the fundamental question regarding the transfers from the state bearing party 
of the democratic transition after its unprecedented collapse is, of course, where did 
its voters go?   
 
Table 6.8  1  election UCD votes. Ecol percentages.     st
 
                      77-79  79-82  82-86   
To: 
Abstain                23.8   16.4   29.8 
 
PCE/IU                  1.0    0.7    0.5         
PSOE                    5.7   18.4   17.0 
CDS                            3.0    8.0 
AP/PP                   3.4   35.2   30.7 
UN                      1.2 
 
CiU                     0.5    2.4    1.6 
ERC                     0.2    0.3 
EE                      0.1    0.1    0.0 
PNV                     0.1    0.1    0.1 
HB                      0.0    0.0    0.0 
 
PSA                     0.6            
CUPC                    0.1           0.1 
CAIC                    0.1           0.9 
UV                                    0.1 
Other                   2.8    4.2    5.6 
 
         
First, in table 6.8 we note that a fairly large proportion of former UCD voters opted 
for abstention both in 1979, 1982 and in 1986. Then we observe that in 1979 a larger 
share of its 1977 voters opted for the state-wide Left in terms of PCE/IU and PSOE 
than the AP/PP. This pattern, however, was completely turned around both in 1982 
and in 1986. In 1982 between three and four out of ten previous UCD voters opted for 
the AP/PP and less than two out of ten opted for the Left. The new party created by 
the former UCD leader, the CDS, was only able to capture mere 3 percent of the 
former UCD voters, whereas the CiU in Catalonia captured an impressive 2.4 percent 
of the Spanish total. The Basque parties were hardly able to capture any former UCD 
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voter at all.48 This pattern of transfers was for all practical purposes repeated in 1986, 
with one notable exception: The share transferred to CDS increased to 8 percent. We 
also note the substantial share that transferred to the Canarian party (AIC) in 1986. 
Thus, we may conclude that the AP/PP was the greatest beneficiary from the collapse 
of the UCD, followed by the PSOE and the CiU. These particular aspects of the UCD 
collapse will be followed up in a more detailed fashion in the district wise analysis.               
           
 
           
        
Transfers from CDS                     
 
Also in relation to the CDS we are dealing with the question of what happened to the 
voters of a party that disappeared, albeit to a much lesser degree than in the case of 
the UCD as the CDS never collapsed the way the former party did. 
 
Table 6.9  1st election CDS votes. Ecol conditional percentages.     
 
                       82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96   
To: 
Abstain                31.1   26.9   21.2   39.7 
 
PCE/IU                  1.8    7.9    5.0    7.2    
PSOE                   10.6    9.9   12.4    8.8 
AP/PP                  17.0    9.6   26.8   29.6 
 
CiU                     1.0    0.1    0.1    0.1 
ERC                                   0.1    0.1 
EE                      0.2    0.2 
PNV                     0.1    0.0    0.0    0.0 
HB                      0.1    0.0    0.0    0.0 
EA                             0.0    0.0    0.0 
 
PSA/PA                         0.7    0.2    0.3 
CUPC/AIC/CC             0.4    0.1    3.3    0.2 
CAIC/PAR/CHA            0.3    0.2    0.5 
UV                      0.3    0.2    0.1    0.1 
BNG                                   0.5    0.6 
Other                   6.8    8.2   17.7    7.8 
 
From table 6.9 we observe that, with one exception, the largest shares of first election 
CDS voters transferred to abstention. The second most preferred option, also with one 
exception, was that of transfer to the AP/PP. This said, the perhaps most interesting 
pattern to be noted is that the trend in the transfers from the CDS clearly exhibits an 
                                                 
48 To this it should be noted, as we shall see in the district wise analysis, the UCD did not run in all of 
the electoral districts in the Basque Country in 1979. 
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increase in the transfers to the state-wide parties in general, also to the Left, rather 
than to the Catalan and Basque Right. The transfers to the PCE/IU compared to that of 
the CiU and the PNV at the last three pairs of elections are quite revealing in this 
respect. At the same time we note that the transfers to the Canarian parties and to the 
Galician BNG were of a far more substantial nature than to the Catalan and Basque 
parties. 
 
Electoral competition: Net flows 
The question to be answered in this section is to what extent the conditional transfers 
observed above are reflected in the net flows between the options. The percentages 
presented in table 6.10 (below) are calculated of the basis of the whole electorate at 
the pairs of elections, i.e. that the relative distributions are directly comparable 
regardless of the size of the various parties.  
  
Table 6.10  Ecol net flow percentages. 
 
                      77-79  79-82  82-86  86-89  89-93  93-96  96-00 
 
PCE/IU vs. Abstain     -0.5    0.0   +0.3   +0.8   +0.6   +0.2   -2.0   
PSOE   vs. Abstain     -2.0   +6.1   -4.0   -1.1   +1.9   +0.1   -3.3 
UCD    vs. Abstain     -3.5   -2.3   
CDS    vs. Abstain            +0.8   +0.1   -0.4   -0.6 
AP/PP  vs. Abstain     -1.7   +5.0   +1.8   +2.1   +3.8   +1.5   -0.2 
    
PCE/IU vs. PSOE        +0.3   -3.2   +0.4   +1.0    0.0   +0.4   -0.9 
PCE/IU vs. UCD         +0.1   +0.1   
PCE/IU vs. CDS                        0.0   +0.4   +0.2 
PCE/IU vs. AP/PP       +0.1    0.0   +0.2   +0.2   -0.2   -0.1   -0.4 
 
PSOE  vs. UCD          +0.3   +3.8                
PSOE  vs. CDS                        -1.9   -0.2   +0.6 
PSOE  vs. AP/PP        +0.3   -0.7   +1.4    0.0   -0.5   -0.6   -1.4 
           
AP/PP vs. UCD          -0.7   +7.6                
AP/PP vs. CDS                        -1.7   +0.2   +1.3 
 
As shown in the table, all the state-wide parties suffered a net loss to abstention 
between 1977 and 1979 in accord with the overall drop in turnout. In 1982, the PSOE 
and the AP/PP mobilised far more former abstainers then they lost to this group, the 
CDS made a net gain, while the transfers to and from PCE/IU levelled out. The 
collapse of the UCD is clearly reflected in a substantial net loss to abstention in spite 
of the overall mobilisation of the electorate. As to the trends for the parties over time, 
we note that AP/PP experienced net gains form abstention for all the pairs of elections 
between 1982 and 1996. Thus, the electoral consolidation of the party was to a great 
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extent linked to its ability to mobilise first election abstainers and retain a large share 
of those mobilised at the subsequent elections. Also for PCE/IU we note a similar 
trend. As the IU consolidated its electoral stance from 1986 and onwards, it 
experienced a positive exchange rate with abstention. This trend, however, came to an 
abrupt halt with the electoral debacle in 2000. As to the trend for PSOE, we note that 
after the victory in 1982 the party suffered net losses to abstention all the way during 
its hegemonic period in the 1980s. At the highly contested elections in 1993 and 1996, 
PSOE once again mobilised a larger share of former abstainers than it lost, 
particularly in 1993. The 2000 debacle, however, inflicted heavy tolls on the party in 
this respect. These trends, then, underscore the pivotal role played by electoral 
abstention in relation to the changes in the state-wide party system formats. 
     
 
We observe that in terms of net flows between the parties, the relationship between 
PCE/IU and it fellow traveller on the Left, PSOE, was one of give and take over the 
years. There is no doubt that the 1982 debacle was produced by a substantial net loss 
to the PSOE, while the second one in 2000 was first and foremost produced by the net 
loss to abstention already noted. The pattern of PCE/IU’s relationship with the other 
parties was more mixed with relatively small net flows as the general rule. There 
were, however, two exceptions to this: In 1989 it saw a net gain at 0.5 percent form 
CDS and in 2000 it saw a net loss at 0.4 percent to AP/PP. On the whole, then, the 
electoral fortunes of PCE/IU depended most heavily on the swings to and from 
abstention and to and from PSOE.  
 
   
For PSOE we note in relation to UCD the party experienced net gains both between 
1977-1979 and, of course, between 1979-1982. Between 1982 and 1986, however, 
PSOE suffered a quite substantial net loss to UCD’s successor CDS. As to the 
relationship with AP/PP we note that the trend swung between net gains and losses 
during the 1970s and 1980s to steady and increasing net losses in the 1990s, 
culminating with 1.4 percent of the total electorate in 2000.   
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Whereas AP/PP saw a net loss to UCD in 1979, again there is no doubt that AP/PP 
was the main beneficiary of UCD’s demise in 1982. We note that the swing from 
UCD to AP/PP produced a net gain for the latter that doubled the one experienced by 
the PSOE. At the election in 1986, however, AP/PP suffered a net loss to CDS – yet 
another token of the rather slow stabilisation of the vote at the state-wide Right. 






Conclusions   
 
On the basis of the analysis so far, we may draw the following conclusions as to the 
questions posed in the introduction and to the status of the pertaining hypotheses: 
 
1) As to the assumptions pertaining to the increase in aggregate stability 
observed in chapter 5 and how this related to the individual level loyalty, we 
noted that the aggregate stabilisation of the electorate indeed reflected an 
overall increase in voter loyalty. However, the status of the hypothesis in 
relation to the sequence of party stabilisation is less clear. The prediction was 
that, after the 1982 debacle, PSOE was the first of the state-wide parties to see 
an increase in loyalty rates between elections. This was supported by the 
ECOL data, whereas the survey data indicated that also AP/PP quickly 
stabilised its electorate.  Both methods, however, showed clearly that PCE/IU 
lagged behind in this respect. The results for CDS were more mixed. The 
recall method exhibited higher loyalty rates for the party than the ECOL 
estimates. They converged, however, in terms of the party’s demise in 1993. 
On the whole, then, the hypothesis is clearly supported with regard to PSOE 
and PCE/IU, but its status is less clear with regard to the two surviving parties 
of the Right. 
 
2) As to the role played by electoral abstention in the process of democratic 
transition and consolidation, we saw that the changes in electoral results and in 
the party system format were to a substantial extent caused by differences 
between the parties in relation to transfers to and from abstention. At the 1977-
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79 pair of elections, which saw a substantial drop in turnout without any 
change in the state-wide party system, all the relevant parties lost former 
voters to abstention in a rather uniform fashion. At the mobilising election in 
1982, the electoral gains for the winner PSOE and the “sub triumphant” 
AP/PP were to a large extent produced by the mobilisation of former 
abstainers, whereas PCE/IU did not benefit from the increased turnout and 
UCD suffered a substantial net loss. Thus, the change in the party system was 
intimately linked to the structure of mobilisation and demobilisation. Further, 
the reorientation of the PCE that culminated in the formation of the IU alliance 
was followed by period of net gains from abstention. This trend, however, 
came to an abrupt end in 2000. After its landslide victory, PSOE suffered net 
losses to abstention between 1982 and 1989. However, in facing the challenge 
from the rejuvenated AP/PP in 1993, PSOE was once again able to obtain net 
gains from abstention. This trend ended in 2000 when the party suffered a net 
loss almost comparable to the one in 1986. On the Right, apart from the 
election in 1986, CDS was never able to assert itself in relation to abstention 
and suffered net losses both in 1989 and 1993. The AP/PP, however, managed 
to obtain substantial net gains from abstention all the way from 1982 to 1996. 
Further, even though the turnout fell by more than seven percent from 1996 to 
2000, its net losses were far smaller than the ones experienced by the state-
wide Left. Thus, there is no doubt that the consolidation and growth of the 
AP/PP leading up to its eventual executive take over was to a great extent 
caused by the structuring of electoral mobilisation and demobilisation. The 
conclusion, then, is that the assumption regarding the pivotal role played by 
electoral abstention in the transition and consolidation of the Spanish 
democracy is sustained by the individual level data. 
 
3)  As to the mobilisation of new voters, the hypothesis was sustained in that the 
largest shares of the new voters opted for abstention at all the elections apart 
from the ones in 1982 and 1993. A larger share of new voters opted for both 
AP/PP and PSOE in 1982 and for AP/PP in 1993. In addition, the share 
obtained by PSOE in 1993 nearly equalled the share that opted for abstention. 
Thus, the hypothesis is sustained in that both realignment elections saw a 




4)  With regard to the hypotheses on electoral competition, we saw that patterns 
were in accord with the expectation in that the parties that lagged behind in 
party building after the transitional phase (PCE/IU, UCD and CDS) saw large 
shares of their former voters transfer to PSOE and AP/PP. After the formation 
of the IU alliance in 1986, the transfers from PCE/IU to the other parties 
decreased substantially and it was able to obtain net gains from both AP/PP 
and PSOE in the latter half of the 1980s. AP/PP was the main beneficiary of 
both UCD’s collapse and the demise of the CDS. On the whole, then, the 
hypothesis was sustained by the data. 
  
5) For the question of how and to what extent the strengthening of the Centre-
Periphery cleavage dimension observed in the aggregate analysis reflected an 
underlying tendency at the individual level, we observed that the transfers 
form the state-wide parties to the Catalan and Basque parties tended to 
decrease over the years. This tendency was particularly pronounced for the 
transfers form the state-wide Right to the Catalan and Basque Right. The 
transfers from the state-wide parties outside Catalonia and the Basque Country 
did not decrease in the same fashion. Thus, we shall expect that the relevance 
of the Centre-Periphery cleavage in relation to the functional Left-Right 
cleavage will differ markedly between the Second and First peripheries. This 
will be followed up in the district wise analysis. 
 
 
The conclusion, then, is that the bulk of the expectations related to the hypotheses 
were met and thus supports the general argument. However, a few revisions will have 
to be undertaken. This will be done in the light of the following district wise analysis. 
The main point is that the findings in from the district wise analysis will help us in 
achieving a more refined understanding of the patterns detected. In particular, the 
analysis of district wise deviations from the national trends will be analysed. In this, 
also the remaining hypotheses regarding the Centre-Periphery dimension elaborated 










               





In the process of democratic transition and consolidation the turnout at the first 
critical elections is paramount to the legitimacy of the resulting legislature. Even more 
so in the Spanish case where, as noted earlier, elections were held before a  
democratic constitution was in place and where the highest priority task of the very 
first legislature was precisely the elaboration of a new constitutional framework. 
Given Spain’s historical territorial problem and the sequence by which the legacy of 
political issues were put to the test of elections, the integration of the Peripheries in 
terms of electoral turnout was of outmost importance. A strongly biased turnout 
pattern with a substantially lower turnout in the Peripheries would pose a serious 
challenge to the new democracy. We know from the general distribution of turnout 
rates that there was a difference between the Centre and at least some of the 
Peripheries in this respect, but that these differences were not large enough to severely 
tarnish the image of a wide spread support for the new democracy in territorial terms 
(Justel 1995). In this chapter we shall look into a somewhat different aspect of 
electoral mobilisation, namely the relationships between the new enfranchised voters 
and electoral abstainers at the first elections and the various parties’ ability to 
mobilise these voters at the second election. Likewise, we shall look into the first 
election party voter’s propensity to opt for electoral abstention at the second elections. 
Particular emphasis will be put on whether we can detect any systematic Centre-




Thus, we shall try to assess the effect of the territorial cleavage on the patterns of 
electoral mobilisation and demobilisation. In accord with the typology outlined in 
chapter 3, the 50 electoral districts on the Spanish mainland and the two archipelagos 
are grouped into three categories: The Centre, the First Periphery, and the Second 
Periphery. The purpose of the analysis is twofold. First and foremost, the aim is to 
find out how and to what extent the behaviour of the Spanish electorate has been 
structured in Centre-Periphery terms in accord with the hypotheses elaborated in 
chapter 4. A secondary purpose is to find out if, and how, the territorial and the 
functional cleavages are related in this respect.   
According to hypotheses H2, H4 and H10, we shall expect that the voters have 
showed a higher propensity to mobilise in the Centre than in the Peripheries, i.e. that 
larger proportions of new voters and first election abstainers will have opted for 
abstention at the second elections in the Peripheries than in the Centre. The greatest 
discrepancies will be found between the Second Periphery and the Centre. This 
expected pattern is straightforward and in line with a strict application of the Centre-
Periphery concept. For the new voters’ and former abstainers’ party choice, however, 
we shall also to take into account the state-wide parties’ position on the functional 
axis in relation to the translation of the societal divisions into manifest cleavages. To 
the extent that the state-wide Left and Right show systematic differences in their 
ability to mobilise in the Peripheries compared to the Centre, the functional and 
territorial cleavages can be said to co-vary in a certain fashion. With reference to the 
discussion in chapter 4 and the notion that the state-wide Right was left alone in the 
defence of the harmonisation of the autonomy process, it is an open question whether 
the impact of the Centre-Periphery cleavage will be as pronounced for the state-wide 
Left as for the Right.   
 
The indicators that we shall employ consist of identifying district wise deviations 
from the overall trends for all the 50 electoral districts. For each and one of the 
districts, the ECOL method was employed to estimate the individual level transition 
matrixes at the seven pairs of elections. Then the conditional percentages for the 
categories the electorate outlined in the typology presented in chapter 3 were 
calculated, and the means and standard deviations computed. On the basis of this, a 
series of tables showing the descriptive statistics and counts of cases more than one 
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standard deviation above and below the means are presented. In the analysis, the 
relative distributions of deviant cases in relation to the total number of cases in the 
Centre, First Periphery and Second Periphery will be used to assess if, and to what 
extent, we can detect any systematic differences between the categories along the 
territorial cleavage. References to particular districts and outliers are based on  
inspections and standard box-plot analyses of the ECOL distributions.49   
                         
New voters 
The question to be answered in this section is whether we can detect any meaningful 
centre-periphery patterns as to the behaviour of the voters that were enfranchised 
between the pairs of elections, both in terms of turnout as such and in terms of party 
choice. According to hypothesis H2, we shall expect that a substantially lower 
proportion of new voters will have turned out to vote in the Peripheries than in the 
Centre and that the greatest differences will be found between the Second Periphery 
and the Centre. This implies that we expect that the Peripheries will be over 
represented among deviant cases showing high levels of new voters opting for 
abstention.  Likewise, we expect to find relatively more deviant cases showing low 
levels of abstention in the Centre. The corollary of this logic is that in terms of new 
voters opting for the state-wide parties, as stated in hypothesis H10, we expect a 
larger proportion of deviant “positive” cases in the Centre than in the Peripheries. As 
noted earlier, this second assumption might seem trivial given the competition that the 
state-wide parties face in some of the Peripheries, but once again it should be 
underscored that there is no necessary causal relationship in this and that the actual 
patterns can only be established by empirical evidence.  
 
 
New voters opting for abstention   
 
As shown in table 7.1 (below), the mean scores for the 50 electoral districts follow the 
estimated trends in the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole presented in 
chapter 6. At each pair of elections, the district wise mean is around 2 to 4 percent 
points lower than the national percentage, indicating that the new voters have been 
more readily mobilised in the smaller districts than in the larger ones. At the election 
in 2000, however, this discrepancy rose to an astonishing 27.7 percent points (45.8 vs. 
                                                 
49 All matrixes for the electoral districts are listed in Appendix III. 
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18.1) indicating a very high level of demobilisation in the larger districts combined 
with a high level of mobilisation in the smaller districts. We may therefore conclude 
that to the extent that the new voters contributed to the overall fall in turnout, this 
contribution was definitely skewed towards the larger districts, i.e. the strongholds of 
the state-wide Left. In terms of standard deviations, we see that the variation around 
the mean was at its lowest at the highly contested 1993 election and reached its peak 
when the Left suffered its aforementioned calamity in 2000.  
 
Table 7.1 New voters opting for abstention: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00         
 
Mean            34.5    16.2    31.5    34.0    21.9    26.9    18.1                          
Std.dev.         9.9     8.5     9.2     8.7     7.8     9.1    10.0   
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             4       1       0       2       0       1       3      10                 
1. Periphery       2       2       2       4       2       4       3      17 
2. Periphery       6       3       4       4       5       5       0      27 
 
Sum               12       6       6      10       7      10       6      57 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             4       2       7       3       3       2       1      22                 
1. Periphery       0       0       1       1       1       4       2       9 
2. Periphery       1       0       0       0       2       0       5       8 
 
Sum                5       2       8       5       6       6       8      39 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 




Identifying the cases more than one standard deviation above the means, we observe 
that for the whole period studied, there are 10 out of the total of 154 centre cases.50 
The figures for the First and Second Peripheries are 17 out of 119 and 27 out of 77, 
respectively. This implies that 6 percent of the centre cases, 14 percent of the first 
periphery cases and 35 percent of the second periphery cases exhibit high levels of 
new voters opting for abstention. This pattern, then, is clearly in accord with the 
hypothesis in that there is a clear Centre-Periphery bias in the new voter’s propensity 
to mobilise.  
Looking at the cases more than one standard deviation below the means, we see that 
there are 22 cases from the Centre, 9 cases from the First Periphery and 8 cases from 
                                                 
50 Cut off points above for new voters opting for abstention: 44.4, 24.4, 40.7, 42.7, 29.7, 36.0 and 28.1. 
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the Second Periphery.51 These figures amount to 14, 12 and 10 percent of their 
respective totals. Although the differences for the distribution of cases below are quite 
small, the combined pattern produced by both indicators show that there has been a 
marked centre-periphery bias in the new voters’ propensity to mobilise between 1977 
and 2000 and thus supports the hypothesis.   
 
New voters opting for PCE/IU 
Comparing the district level means for the PCE/IU listed in table 7.2 (below) to the 
overall estimated share at the national level discussed in chapter 6, we note an 
interesting pattern. Whereas the district means are lower than the overall results at the 
national level until 1986, the situation was the other way round thereafter. This 
indicates that the PCE/IU polled a greater share of the new voters in the larger district 
until the mid 1980s and from then on polled a greater share in the smaller districts. 
This is yet another token indicating that the party’s electoral profile suffered a change 
with the creation of the IU. We also note that, on the basis of the standard deviations, 
any increase in the party’s overall share among the new voters has been accompanied 
by a substantial increase in the variation between the districts, indicating that the 
party’s mobilising ability has been unevenly distributed.  
  
Table 7.2 New voters opting for PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean             5.6     2.1     2.7     9.6     8.0     9.4     2.6                          
Std.dev.         3.4     1.3     1.9     6.7     4.2     5.9     1.8 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             1       1       1       3       5       4       6      21  
1. Periphery       3       4       4       4       1       3       1      20 
2. Periphery       1       1       0       0       1       0       0       3 
 
Sum                5       6       5       7       7       7       7      44 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             3       0       0       0       1       0       0       4 
1. Periphery       1       0       0       2       3       3       2      11 
2. Periphery       2       4       3       4       5       4       4      26 
 
Sum                6       4       3       6       8       7       6      41 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      48      50      50      50      50      50     348     
 
                                                 
51 Cut off points below for new voters opting for abstention: 24.6, 8.0, 22.3, 25.3, 14.1, 17.8 and 8.1. 
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As noted earlier, we should expect lower proportions of the new voters opting for the 
PCE/IU in the Peripheries than in the Centre. In terms of cases one standard deviation 
above the means, we note that there are 21 cases from the Centre, 20 cases from the 
First Periphery and three cases from the Second Periphery.52 This means that 14 
percent of the Centre cases, 17 percent of the First Periphery cases and only 4 percent 
of the Second Periphery cases are in this group. The strong show in the First 
Periphery is due to PCE/IU’s ability to capture new voters in the Andalusian districts. 
The rather spectacular increase in cases above the means from the Centre from 1986-
89 and onwards is basically due to a change in PCE/IU’s share of the new voters in 
the central region of Castilla-León, and underscores the familiar pattern of a change in 
the electoral profile with the creation of the IU. So far, in terms of deviant cases above 
the means, the straightforward centre-periphery logic does not apply to the PCE/IU 
since the pattern of the First periphery do not fall in between the Centre and the 
Second Periphery.          
Looking at the deviations below the means, we observe that there are four Centre 
cases, 11 First Periphery cases and 26 Second Periphery cases.53 These figures 
amount to 3, 9 and 34 percent of their respective totals. On the basis of the combined 
pattern revealed by the two indicators, then, we conclude that the general hypothesis 
is strengthened and that there is an overall Centre-Periphery bias in the new voters’ 







New voters opting for PSOE 
From table 7.3 (below) we note that the means for the 50 districts follow the estimated 
national percentages observed in chapter 6 closely, with one exception. For the 1993-
96 pairs of elections the district mean is substantially lower than the percentage 
observed at the national level of aggregation (27.7 vs. 22.7). Together with the 
increase in the standard deviation, this indicates that the PSOE strengthened its grip 
on the new voters in the larger districts and lost out in the smaller districts in 1996. 
                                                 
52 Cut off points above for new voters opting for PCE/IU: 9.0, 3.4, 4.6, 16.3, 12.2, 15.3 and 4.4. 
53 Cut off points below for new voters opting for PCE/IU: 2.2, 0.8, 0.8, 2.9, 3.8, 3.5 and 0.8.  
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This pattern is fully in accord with the aforementioned notion of a ‘territorial’ 





Table 7.3 New voters opting for PSOE: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean            20.0    40.7    28.0    20.1    21.6    22.7    18.1                         
Std.dev.         7.9    10.0     9.7     7.4    11.0    12.2    10.0 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             3       3       4       3       1       1       3      18  
1. Periphery       5       3       3       4       6       3       3      27 
2. Periphery       1       1       0       0       0       1       0       3 
 
Sum                9       7       7       7       6       4       6      48 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             3       1       1       0       2       1       1       9 
1. Periphery       3       3       1       2       5       0       2      16 
2. Periphery       5       4       6       4       2       6       5      28 
 
Sum               11       8       8       6       9       7       8      53 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      50      50      50      50      50      50     350     
 
 
In terms of deviant cases, we observe that there are 18 cases above the means from 
the Centre, 27 cases from the First Periphery and three cases from the Second 
Periphery.54 These amount to 12, 23 and 4 percent of their respective totals. Thus, the 
pattern of positive cases refuting the hypothesis detected for PCE/IU also holds for 
PSOE. As to cases below the means, we find nine from the Centre, 16 from the First 
Periphery and 28 from the Second Periphery, i.e. 6, 13 and 36 percent of their 
respective totals.55 The Second Periphery is thus grossly over represented. However, 
on the basis of the combined patterns of the two indicators, we will have to conclude 
that the hypothesis is refuted for PSOE since overall distribution is not in accord with 
the strict application of the Centre-Periphery concept. 
 
 
                                                 
54 Cut off points above for new voters opting for PSOE: 27.9, 50.7, 37.7, 27.5, 32.6, 34.8, and 28.1. 
55 Cut off points below for new voters opting for PSOE: 12.1, 30.7, 18.3, 12.7, 10.6, 10.5, and 8.1. 
 149
New voters opting for AP/PP 
   
From table 7.4 (below) we observe that AP/PP the mean scores for the 50 electoral 
districts are consistently higher than the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole 
presented in chapter 6. This pattern clearly underscores that AP/PP showed a greater 
ability to mobilise the new voters in the smaller districts. Furthermore, the difference 
reached its peak in 1996 with nearly 7 percent points in accord with the 
aforementioned notion of a territorial realignment at this election. We also note the 
sharp increase in the variation between the districts as AP/PP strengthened its 
electoral stance and were able to challenge PSOE’s hegemonic position from 1989-93 
and onwards.  
 
Table 7.4 New voters opting for AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean             6.3    24.0    15.6    13.7    27.6    27.7    23.2                          
Std.dev.         5.0     9.7     8.9     6.9    12.9    12.5    12.2     
N                 47      50      50      50      50      50      50      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             2       4       2       6       6       5       5      30  
1. Periphery       0       1       1       2       2       2       0       8 
2. Periphery       2       1       0       2       0       0       0       5 
 
Sum                4       6       3      10       8       7       5      43 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             0       1       1       0       0       1       0       3 
1. Periphery       0       1       1       4       3       5       4      18 
2. Periphery       1       6       6       5       7       5       6      36 
 
Sum                1       8       8       9      10      11      10      57 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         47      50      50      50      50      50      50     347     
 
The table reveals that of the cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 
30 are from the Centre, eight from the First Periphery and five from the Second 
Periphery.56 This amounts to 19, 7 and 7 percent of their respective totals. From the 
district wise percentages listed in appendix III, we note that all the Second Periphery 
cases are from Galicia and reflect the strong position of AP/PP in that region. As for 
the cases more than one standard deviation below the means, there are three from the 
Centre, 18 from the first Periphery and 36 from the Second Periphery, i.e. 2, 15 and 
                                                 
56 Cut off points above for new voters opting for AP/PP: 11.3, 33.7, 24.5, 20.6, 40.5, 40.2 and 35.4. 
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47 percent of their respective totals.57 Thus, the combined pattern on the two 
indicators show that there is a marked Centre-Periphery bias in AP/PP’s ability to 
mobilise the new voters in accord with the hypothesis.  
 
 
New voters opting for UCD   
 
From table 7.5 (below) we note that for UCD the means for the 50 electoral districts 
are higher than the percentages for Spain as a whole presented in chapter 6. This 
indicates that also the UCD polled a greater share of the new voters in the smaller 
districts than in the larger ones. The party’s stance in the smaller districts is sustained 
by the box-plot analysis of the distributions in appendix III, showing that there are 
two positive outliers, both belonging to the small Centre districts north of Madrid, 




Table 7.5 New voters opting for UCD: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82    
 
Mean            20.4     3.1                                                                  
Std.dev.        10.6     2.5 
------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                           Sum 
 
Centre             5       5      10  
1. Periphery       2       2       4 
2. Periphery       0       2       2 
 
Sum                7      11      18    
------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                           Sum 
 
Centre             1       0       1        
1. Periphery       1       3       4 
2. Periphery       3       1       2 
 
Sum                5       8       8   
------------------------------------ 
N (Total)         47      50      97         
 
In terms of deviant cases, there are 10 cases more than one standard deviation above 
the means from to the Centre, four from the First Periphery and two from the Second 
Periphery.58 These amount to 23, 12 and 11 percent of their respective totals, showing 
                                                 
57 Cut off points below for new voters opting for AP/PP: 1.3, 14.3, 6.7, 6.8, 14.7, 15.2 and 11.0. 
58 Cut off points above for new voters opting for UCD: 31.0 and 5.6 
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that the distribution is biased in Centre-Periphery terms. This is also underscored by 
the fact that of the cases more than one standard deviation below the means, one is 
from the Centre, four from the First Periphery and four from the Second Periphery, 
which amounts to 2, 11 and 21 percent of their respective totals.59 Thus, in terms of 
deviations from the national trend, the combined directions of both indicators show 




New voters opting for CDS 
 
From table 7.6 (below) we note that the means for the 50 districts are slightly higher 
than the estimated overall percentages presented in chapter 6, indicating that also 
CDS has tended to mobilise more new voters in the smaller districts than in the larger 
ones.   
 
Table 7.6 New voters opting for CDS: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93    
 
Mean             2.7     9.8     7.5     1.8                                                  
Std.dev.         2.6     7.4     5.0     1.8 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                           Sum 
 
Centre             0       7       4       2      13      
1. Periphery       0       1       1       0       2     
2. Periphery       1       0       0       0       1     
 
Sum                1       8       5       2      16     
------------------------------------------------------ 
BELOW:                                            Sum 
 
Centre             0       0       0       0       0   
1. Periphery       0       1       3       0       4   
2. Periphery       0       1       3       0       4   
 
Sum                0       2       6       0       8   
------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      50      50      50     200       
                                                 
59 Cut off points below for new voters opting for UCD: 9.8 and 0.6. 
60  In the analysis of transfers to the UCD and CDS a warning is called for. Since the total number of 
cases is substantially lower than for all the other options, the reader should bear in mind that in terms of 
percentages each single case has much greater weight for these parties. Thus, measuring the relative 
frequencies in terms of percentages is not the best option. For the sake of simplicity, however, I have 






An inspection of the table reveals that of the cases more than one standard deviation 
above the means, there are 13 from the Centre, two from the First Periphery and one 
from the Second Periphery. They amount to 15, 3 and 2 percent of their respective 
totals and show a biased pattern in accord with the centre-periphery concept. This is 
corroborated by the cases more than one standard deviation below the means. In this 
group there is no Centre case, four First Periphery cases and four Second Periphery 
cases, i.e. 0, 6 and 9 percent of their respective totals. Thus, the conclusion is that the 
overall trend also for CDS reveals a Centre-Periphery pattern in relation to the 
mobilisation of new voters in accord with the hypothesis. 
 
 
So far, we have detected that there is a marked Centre-Periphery bias in the new 
voter’s propensity to mobilise in accord with the hypothesis. In terms of party choice, 
the hypothesis holds for all the parties with the sole exception of PSOE. Before we 
embark upon the task of drawing overall conclusions as to the patterns of mobilisation 
and demobilisation, we shall undertake an analysis the behaviour of those who 
abstained at one or both of the elections. 





According to hypotheses H4, larger proportions of first election abstainers will have 
opted for abstention again at the second elections in the Peripheries than in the Centre, 
and the greatest differences in this respect will be found between the Second 
Periphery and the Centre. Thus, we should a priori expect to find a greater number of 
deviant cases showing a large percentage of first election abstainers opting for 
abstention again at the second election in the Peripheries than in the Centre. Likewise, 
we should expect to find more deviations from the average in terms of smaller 
percentages opting for abstention at two consecutive elections in the Centre than in 
the Peripheries. As for hypothesis H10 regarding the parties’ ability to mobilise those 
who abstained at the first elections, we expect to find more deviant cases showing low 
transfers from abstention to the state-wide parties from the Peripheries than the 
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Centre. Likewise, we expect to find a larger proportion of deviant cases from the 
Peripheries showing high levels of transfers from the state-wide parties to abstention 
than from the Centre. As mentioned in relation to the new voters, in one respect the 
assumptions about the dynamic relationship between first election abstainers and the 
state-wide parties might seem trivial. As the state-wide parties compete with regional 
parties of substantial strength in some of the Peripheries we would assume that there 
would be relatively fewer former abstainers to be captured by the state-wide parties. 
But again, there is no automatic or necessary causal relationship in this. Electoral 
behaviour is not deterministic and elections never foretold. In the last resort it is a 
question that will have to be answered through empirical investigation.   
 
 
First election abstainers remaining demobilised 
 
Compared to the estimated overall percentages discussed in chapter 6, we note the 
means for the 50 electoral districts shown in table 7.7 (below) follow the national 
trend closely. In terms of variation between the districts, however, we note that it 
dropped substantially as the parties were able to consolidate their constituencies from 
1986-89 and onwards, but that it increased again when the state-wide Left suffered its 
debacle in 2000.  
     
Table 7.7 Electoral abstainers opting for abstention: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
 
Mean            61.2    35.0    56.1    57.6    49.3    61.7    65.7                          
Std.dev.        10.4     9.5    11.5     7.8     7.1     7.3    10.1  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             1       1       2       2       1       2       2      11  
1. Periphery       2       1       3       6       3       4       5      24 
2. Periphery       4       4       5       3       3       4       0      23 
 
Sum                7       6      10      11       7      10       7      58 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             4       4       4       7       7       7       3      36 
1. Periphery       0       1       4       2       2       1       2      12 
2. Periphery       0       1       0       0       0       0       1       2 
 
Sum                4       6       8       9       9       8       6      50 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 




As shown in the table, there are altogether 58 cases more than one standard deviation 
above the district means. Of these, 11 are from the Centre, 24 from the First Periphery 
and 23 from the second Periphery.61 In terms of relative distributions, these amount to 
7, 20 and 30 percent of their respective totals. This distribution is clearly biased in 
Centre-Periphery terms. This finding is corroborated by the distribution of cases more 
than one standard deviation below the means. Out of 50 cases, there are 36 from the 
Centre, 12 from the First Periphery and only two from the Second Periphery, i.e. 23, 
12 and 2 percent of their respective totals.62 In terms of deviations from the district 
means, then, the dynamic aspects of electoral abstention are clearly biased according 
to the Centre-Periphery logic and thus sustain the hypothesis. 
  
From an inspection of the district wise distribution listed in appendix III, it is worth 
noting that although the four Galician districts exhibit the highest levels of first 
elections abstainers opting for abstention at the second elections for both the 1977-79 
and the 1979-82 pairs, this tendency waned quickly from then on. This implies that 
even though Galicia continued to show an ‘endemic’ problem of high levels of 
electoral abstention as detected in numerous studies (Vilas Nogueira 1992; Justel 
1995), from a more dynamic perspective Galicia became more integrated into the 
political system in that it did not produce consistent outliers in terms of voters 
remaining permanently demobilised at consecutive elections during the last two 
decades studied.   
 
 
First election abstainers opting for PCE/IU   
 
As shown in table 7.8 (below), the means for the 50 electoral districts are slightly 
lower than the overall estimated percentages observed in chapter 6, indicating a 
slightly lower ability to mobilise former abstainers in the smaller districts.  
Of the 44 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 25 are from the 
Centre, 15 from the First Periphery and four from the Second Periphery.63 This yields 
the following relative distributions: 16 percent of the Centre cases, 13 percent of the 
                                                 
61 Cut off points above for abstainers opting for abstention: 71.6, 44.5, 67.6, 65.4, 56.4, 69.0, and 75.8. 
62 Cut off points below abstainers opting for abstention: 50.8, 25.5, 44.6, 49.8 42.2, 54.4, and 55.6. 
63 Cut off points above for abstainers opting for PCE/IU: 3.9, 2.1, 2.3, 5.9, 5.2, 5.8 and 2.6.  
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First Periphery cases and 5 percent of the Second Periphery cases. This pattern is in 
accord with the hypothesis. In terms of deviations more than one standard deviation 
below the means, there are altogether 44 cases of which seven are from the Centre, 
four from the First Periphery and 33 from the second Periphery, i.e. 5 percent, 3 




Table 7.8 Electoral abstainers opting for PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
 
Mean             2.5     1.5     1.4     3.5     3.5     4.0     1.7                          
Std.dev.         1.4      .6      .9     2.4     1.7     1.8      .9 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             2       3       3       3       3       3       8      25  
1. Periphery       1       1       4       3       3       2       1      15 
2. Periphery       1       2       0       1       0       0       0       4 
 
Sum                4       5       7       7       6       5       9      44 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             2       2       0       0       1       1       1       7 
1. Periphery       1       0       0       0       1       1       1       4 
2. Periphery       6       6       5       4       4       4       4      33 
 
Sum                9       8       5       4       6       6       6      44 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      48      50      50      50      50      50     348 
 
 
                                                
Thus, although the relative distribution of cases below is not in line with the strict 
application of the Centre-Periphery concept, the combined distributions on the two 
indicators show a Centre-Periphery bias. We conclude, then, that the hypothesis is 
sustained in that the Centre-Periphery logic applies to PCE/IU’s ability to mobilise 









First election PCE/IU voters opting for abstention   
 
From table 7.9 (below) we note that the district means are consistently higher than the 
estimated transfers for Spain as a whole discussed in chapter 6. This shows clearly 
that larger proportions of former PCE/IU voters have tended to demobilise in the 
smaller districts than in the larger ones. 
There are 54 cases more than one standard deviation above the means.65 Of these, 10 
are from the Centre, 18 from the First Periphery and 26 from the Second Periphery, 
i.e. 6, 15 and 34 percent of their respective totals. In this respect, then, the strict 
Centre-Periphery logic applies. More than one standard deviation below the means we 
find 49 cases, 17 from the Centre, 27 from the First Periphery and five from the 
Second Periphery.66 These amount to 11, 23 and 6 percent of their respective totals. 
 
Table 7.9 PCE/IU transfers to abstention: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean            20.7    10.0    27.0    24.9    13.1    12.5    34.9     
Std.dev.        11.5     6.9    10.7    11.4     7.0     6.0    11.6  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             2       0       3       1       2       0       2      10  
1. Periphery       1       4       2       2       2       5       2      18 
2. Periphery       3       3       4       6       3       4       3      26 
 
Sum                6       7       9       9       7       9       7      54 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             2       1       3       3       2       4       2      17 
1. Periphery       4       1       5       4       6       5       2      27 
2. Periphery       1       1       0       0       0       0       3       5 
 
Sum                7       3       8       7       8       9       7 49       
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      50      48      50      50      50      50     348 
 
 
Thus, although there is a Centre-Periphery bias on the first indicator, we note that the 
strict Centre-Periphery concept does not apply to the combined pattern for PCE/IU 
and the hypothesis is refuted for this relationship.  
                                                 
65 Cut off points above for PCE/IU transfers to abstention: 32.2, 16.9, 37.7, 36.3, 20.1, 18.5 and 46.5.  






First election abstainers opting for PSOE   
 
As shown in table 7.10 (below) the district means for PSOE follow the estimated 
proportions for Spain as a whole discussed in chapter 6 closely. We also note the drop 
in variation around the mean as the electorates became consolidated after the 
realignment election in 1982.  
We find 51 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 22 from the 
Centre, 24 from the First Periphery and five from the second Periphery.67 This yields 
the following relative distribution: 14 percent of the Centre cases, 24 percent of the 
First Periphery cases and 6 percent of the Second Periphery cases. 
 
Table 7.10 Abstainers opting for PSOE: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean             8.8    23.9    13.6    11.4    11.3     9.0     5.4                          
Std.dev.         6.2    10.6     8.7     6.5     4.4     5.0     3.4 
     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             2       2       3       4       2       2       5      22  
1. Periphery       2       7       6       1       2       2       1      24 
2. Periphery       0       0       0       2       3       3       0       5 
 
Sum                4       9       9       7       7       4       9      51 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             1       2       2       3       1       1       2      12 
1. Periphery       0       0       0       2       6       3       5      16 
2. Periphery       6       7       9       5       3       4       0      34 
 
Sum                7       9      11      10      10       8       7      62 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      50      50      50      50      50      50     350 
 
 
At the other end of the scale we find 62 cases of low transfers rates from abstention, 
12 from the Centre, 16 from the First Periphery and 34 from the second Periphery, i.e. 
8, 13 and 44 percent of their respective totals.68 This implies that, although the second 
indicator does yield a pattern in accord with the strict application of the Centre-
                                                 
67 Cut off points above for abstainers opting for PSOE: 15.0, 34.5, 22.3, 17.9, 15.7, 14.0 and 8.8. 
68 Cut off points below for abstainers opting for PSOE: 2.6, 13.3, 4.9, 4.9, 6.9, 4.0 and 2.0. 
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Periphery concept, the combined pattern of the two indicators is not in accord with the 
expected pattern and the hypothesis is refuted in relation to PSOE’s ability to mobilise 
former abstainers.  
 
 
First election PSOE voters opting for abstention   
 
From table 7.11 (below) we note that the means for the 50 electoral districts are 
somewhat lower than the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole studied in 
chapter 6. This indicates that also PSOE has tended to see a relatively larger 
proportion of former voters demobilise in the larger districts than in the smaller ones. 
We observe that there are 50 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 
13 from the Centre, 17 from the First Periphery and 20 from the Second Periphery.69 
These figures amount to 8, 14 and 26 percent of their respective totals and show a 
centre-periphery bias in accord with the hypothesis. Likewise, of the 47 cases more 
than one standard deviation below the means, we observe that there are 27 from the 
Centre, 12 from the first Periphery and eight from the second Periphery, i.e. 18, 10 
and 10 percent of their respective totals.70 
 
Table 7.11 PSOE transfers to abstention: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean            15.7     6.9    16.4    12.7     5.1     6.3    13.5                          




ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             1       2       2       3       3       1       1      13  
1. Periphery       2       3       4       4       2       1       2      17 
2. Periphery       4       0       2       1       3       3       7      20 
 
Sum                7       5       7       8       8       5      10      50 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             3       3       4       8       2       1       6      27 
1. Periphery       2       1       0       3       2       1       3      12 
2. Periphery       2       2       2       0       2       0       0       8 
 
Sum                7       5       6      11       6       2       9      47 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      50      50      50      50      50      50     350 
                                                 
69 Cut points above for PSOE transfers to abstention: 21.8, 10.7, 22.5, 16.6, 7.6, 10.3 and 20.1.   




Thus, although the pattern on the second indicator is not quite in line with the Centre-
Periphery concept, the combined pattern on the two indicators is clearly skewed in 
accord with the hypothesis. One interesting observation is that the Centre district  
Madrid appears as cases of high defection rates at six out of the seven pairs of 
elections.71 We may conclude, then, that Madrid constitutes a notable exception in the 





First election abstainers opting for AP/PP  
 
 
As shown in table 7.12 (below), the means for the 50 electoral districts are 
consistently higher than the estimated overall percentages discussed in chapter 6. 
Thus, we conclude that larger proportions of former abstainers have been mobilised 




Table 7.12 Abstainers opting for AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean             3.6    16.7    11.4     9.8    17.8    14.7    14.7                          
Std.dev.         2.2     6.2     6.2     5.8     5.7     6.4     7.6 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             4       7       9       6       6       6       4      42  
1. Periphery       1       3       1       0       3       1       0       9 
2. Periphery       0       0       1       0       1       2       1       5 
 
Sum                5      10      11       6      10       9       5      56 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             0       0       3       1       1       2       1       8 
1. Periphery       2       3       2       2       3       2       3      17 
2. Periphery       0       6       6       5       6       7       3      33 
 
Sum                2       9       9       8      10      11       7      58 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      47      50      50      50      50      50     347 
 
                                                 




                                                
 
In the table there are altogether 56 deviant cases above the means, of which 42 are 
from the Centre, nine from the First Periphery and five from the Second Periphery.72 
The relative distributions are 27, 8 and 6 percent, respectively. At the lower end we 
find 58 cases, eight from the Centre, 17 from the First Periphery and 33 from the 
second Periphery.73 This yields the following relative distribution: 5, 14 and 45 
percent respectively. Thus the distributions on both indicators are clearly skewed in 
accord with the Centre-Periphery concept and the hypothesis is sustained.  
 
 
First election AP/PP voters opting for abstention    
 
 
As shown in table 7.13 (below) the means for the 50 districts are consistently 
somewhat higher than the estimated overall percentages shown in chapter 6. Thus, the 
AP/PP has tended to see larger proportions of its voters demobilise in the smaller 
districts that in the larger ones.  
 
 
Table 7.13 AP/PP transfers to abstention: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean            33.3    13.3    18.7    13.4     6.5     6.2    10.8                         
Std.dev.         9.6     5.9     5.3     6.7     4.0     3.4     5.4 
N                 48      47      50      50      50      50      50      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             0       0       0       0       0       4       2       6  
1. Periphery       4       3       6       3       2       3       5      26 
2. Periphery       4       1       2       5       3       3       3      22 
 
Sum                8       4       8       8       5      10      10      54 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             7       3       6       4       1       4       3      28 
1. Periphery       1       0       3       3       3       1       2      13 
2. Periphery       0       1       2       0       1       1       3       8 
 
Sum                8       4      11       7       5       6       8      49 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         48      47      50      50      50      50      50     345 
 
 
72 Cut off points above for abstainers opting for AP/PP: 5.8, 22.9, 17.6, 15.6, 23.5, 21.1 and 22.3. 
73 Cut off points below for abstainers opting for AP/PP: 1.4, 10.5, 5.2, 4.0, 12.1, 8.3 and 7.1. 
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In the table, we observe that there are 54 cases more than one standard deviation 
above the means, six from the Centre, 26 from the First Periphery and 22 from the 
Second Periphery.74 These figures amount to 4, 22 and 30 percent of their respective 
totals and the distribution is clearly biased in Centre-Periphery terms. At the other end 
of the scale, there are 49 cases more than one standard deviation below the means, 28 
from the Centre 13 from the First Periphery and eight from the Second Periphery, i.e. 
18, 11 and 11 percent of their respective totals. 75 Although this last distribution is not 
skewed in accord with the strict Centre-Periphery logic, the combined distribution on 
the two indicators clearly underscore that the strictest version of the Centre-Periphery 




                                                
First election abstainers opting for UCD  
 
From table 7.14 (below) we note that the means for the electoral districts are lower 
than the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole presented in chapter 6. Thus, the 
UCD have tended to mobilise larger proportions of former abstainers in the smaller 
districts than in the bigger ones.  
 
Table 7.14 Abstainers opting for UCD: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82    
 
Mean            13.7     5.8                                                                  
Std.dev.         6.4     3.4 
N                 50      47     
------------------------------------- 
 
ABOVE:                           Sum 
 
Centre             7       7      14  
1. Periphery       2       0       2 
2. Periphery       0       3       3 
 
Sum                9      10      19    
------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                           Sum 
 
Centre             1       1       2        
1. Periphery       2       6       8 
2. Periphery       4       3       7 
 
Sum                7      10      17   
------------------------------------ 
N (Total)         47      50      97         
 
74 Cut off points above for AP/PP-abstention: 42.9, 19.2, 24.0, 20.1, 10.5, 9.6 and 16.2. 




In the table, we find 19 deviant cases above the means, 14 from the Centre, two from 
the First Periphery and three from the Second Periphery.76 These amount to 32, 6 and 
16 percent of their respective totals. This distribution is not in accord with the strictest 
application of the Centre-Periphery concept and begs an answer to the question of to 
what extent the former UCD voters in the First Periphery opted for the regional 
parties after the collapse of the party. This will be catered to in the analysis of the 
behaviour of the first election UCD voters in chapter 9.   
Below the means we find 17 cases, two from the Centre, eight from the First 
Periphery and seven from the Second Periphery.77 This gives the following relative 
distribution: 5 percent of the Centre cases, 24 percent of the First Periphery cases and 
37 percent of the second Periphery cases. Thus, even though the distribution on the 
first indicator was not skewed in accord with the hypothesis, the combined 
distributions on the two indicators show an overall Centre-Periphery bias and thus 
sustain the hypothesis. The box-plot analysis of the distribution listed in appendix III 
showed that there was only one outlier, namely Segovia in 1979 where UCD captured 
around 35 percent of the former abstainers. This should come as no surprise given the 
fact that the party leader, Adolfo Suárez, had been designated Civil Governor of 
Segovia under the Franco regime and, as mentioned in chapter 2, the networks of 
local government was fully exploited in order to facilitate the success of the UCD.   
 
 
First election UCD voters opting for abstention 
 
From table 7.15 (below) we note that the means for the electoral districts follow the 
estimated overall percentages presented in chapter 6 closely for the first two pairs of 
elections. At the 1982-86 pair, however, the district mean was nearly 22 percent 
points lower than the overall percentage (8 vs. 29.8) and the standard deviation more 
than doubled, indicating that the UCD lost heavily to abstention in the larger districts 
in 1986. 
Out of the 39 cases identified above the means, 14 are from the Centre, 12 from the 
First Periphery and 13 from the Second Periphery, i.e. 21, 24 and 45 percent of their 
                                                 
76 Cut off points above for abstainers opting for UCD: 20.1 and 9.2.  
77 Cut off point below for abstainers opting for UCD: 7.3 and 2.4. 
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respective totals. 78 This distribution is clearly biased in accord with the strict 
application of the Centre-Periphery concept. On the indicator below, however, we 
observe that the distribution runs contrary the assumptions of the strict application of 
the concept. Out of 11 cases, four are from the Centre, six from the First Periphery 
and only one from the Second Periphery, i.e. 6, 12 and 3 percent of their respective 
totals.79 Thus, the combined distribution on the two indicators show that, in spite of 
the fact that the indicator above is skewed in Centre-Periphery terms, the hypothesis is 
refuted for the former UCD voters’ propensity to opt for abstention.  
 
 
Table 7.15 UCD transfers to abstention: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86    
 
Mean            23.0    17.0     8.0                                                          
Std.dev.         6.0     6.7    15.6 
--------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                   Sum 
 
Centre             1       0      13      14         
1. Periphery       1       4       7      12       
2. Periphery       3       3       7      13       
 
Sum                5       7      27      39       
--------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                   Sum 
 
Centre             0       4       0       4     
1. Periphery       5       1       0       6     
2. Periphery       0       1       0       1     
 
Sum                5       6       0      11     
----------------------------------------- 






First election abstainers opting for CDS  
 
 
As shown in table 7.16 (below), the means for the districts are consistently somewhat 
higher than the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole presented in chapter 6, 
                                                 
78 Cut off points above for UCD transfers to abstention: 29.0, 23.7 and 23.6. 
79 Cut off points below for UCD transfers to abstention: 17.0, 10.3 and –7.6. 
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indicating that also the CDS has tended to mobilise larger proportions of former 
abstainers in the smaller districts than in the larger. 
In the table, there are 23 deviant cases above the means.80 Of these 20 are from the 
Centre, three from the First Periphery and none from the Second Periphery, i.e. 23, 4 
and 0 percent of their respective totals. Likewise, we find 15 deviant cases below the 
means,81 of which none are to the Centre, two from the First Periphery and 13 from 
the Second Periphery. These amount to 0, 3 and 30 percent of their respective totals. 
This implies that the pattern of the dynamic relationship between first election 
abstainers and CDS is markedly biased in Centre-Periphery terms and that the 
hypothesis is supported in relation to the CDS.  
 
Table 7.16 Abstainers opting for CDS: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93    
 
Mean             2.9     4.7     5.0     2.0                                                  
Std.dev.         2.3     3.4     2.3     1.3 
----------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                           Sum 
 
Centre             2       6       6       6      20      
1. Periphery       1       1       1       0       3     
2. Periphery       0       0       0       0       0     
 
Sum                3       7       7       6      23     
------------------------------------------------------ 
BELOW:                                            Sum 
 
Centre             0       0       0       0       0   
1. Periphery       0       0       2       0       2   
2. Periphery       0       3       5       5      13   
 
Sum                0       3       7       5      15   
------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      50      50      50     200       
 
 
From the box-plot analysis of the distributions listed in appendix III, we note that 
there are seven positive outliers, of which six are either from the party leader Adolfo 
Suárez’ birth place Ávila or from the province where he served as Civil Governor, 
Segovia. This once again underscores the importance of the party leader in the UCD 
and ventures as discussed in chapters 2 and 4. 
 
 
                                                 
80 Cut off points above for abstainers opting for CDS: 5.2, 8.1, 7.3 and 3.3. 
81 Cut off points below for abstainers opting for CDS: 0.6, 1.3, 2.7 and 0.7. 
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First election CDS voters opting for abstention  
 
 
From table 7.17 (below) we observe the familiar pattern of slightly higher means for 
the districts than the estimated overall percentages presented in chapter 6. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the estimated transfers to abstention across the district were as lowest 
between 1989 and 1993, precisely when the party’s overall share of the votes cast fell 
from 7.9 to 1.8 percent. This indicates that the bulk of the party’s defectors had opted 
for other parties in 1993. This question, then, will be dealt with in chapter 9.  
 
As observed in the table, out of 33 cases more than one standard deviation above the 
means, five are from the Centre, 11 from the First periphery and 17 from the Second 
Periphery.82 This amount to the following relative distribution: 6 percent of the Centre 
cases, 16 percent of the First Periphery cases and 39 percent of the Second Periphery 
cases. This distribution is clearly in accord with the strictest application of the Centre-
Periphery concept and supports the hypothesis. 
 
 
Table 7.17 CDS transfers to abstention: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96    
 
  
Mean            34.3    30.2    23.0    41.0                                                 
Std.dev.         8.7     8.8     6.6    11.1  
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                           Sum 
 
Centre             2       2       0       1       5      
1. Periphery       2       5       4       0      11     
2. Periphery       5       2       4       6      17     
 
Sum                9       9       8       7      33     
------------------------------------------------------ 
BELOW:                                            Sum 
 
Centre             5       5       5       3      18   
1. Periphery       1       2       2       1       6   
2. Periphery       0       0       0       1       1   
 
Sum                6       7       7       4      25   
------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      50      50      50     200       
 
                                                 
82 Cut off points above for CDS transfers to abstention: 43.0, 39.0, 29.6 and 52.1. 
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Likewise, as 18 of the altogether 24 cases below the means are from the Centre, six 
from the First Periphery and only one from the Second Periphery (20, 9 and 2 percent 
respectively), the combined pattern on both indicators are in line with the strict 
application of the Centre-Periphery concept and supports the hypothesis in relation to 






As to the new voters, the pattern of relative distributions of deviant cases shown in 
table 7.18 (below) reveals that there is a marked overall Centre-Periphery bias in the 
new voters propensity to opt for abstention. While the Centre exhibits a negative 
percent wise balance of deviant cases (-8), both the First Periphery (+2) and the 
Second Periphery (+25) exhibit positive balances. The H2 hypothesis is thus 
sustained. In terms of the new voter’s party choice, the Centre-Periphery bias is 
particularly marked for the state-wide Right. For the state-wide Left, however, a slight 
modification of the initial hypothesis is called for. Although there is a marked 
difference in the relative distributions of deviant cases between the Centre and the 
Second Periphery both for PSOE and PCE/IU, they also show positive balances in the 
First Periphery – and for PSOE the greatest difference is actually found between the 
First and the Second Periphery. Thus, the impact of the territorial cleavage is not 
evenly distributed along the functional axis of the party system. This is, of course, 
fully in accord with the notion that the state-wide Left and the state-wide Right differ 
in their views on the territorial structure of the Spanish state. The combined patterns 
for abstention and all the state-wide parties are summarised in table 7.18 (below). 
 
Table 7.18 New voters: Relative distributions of deviant cases84 
 
New voters Abstention    PCE/IU      PSOE      AP/PP      UCD      CDS 
Centre              -8             11               6             17             21             15 
1. Periphery               2               8             10             -8               0              -3 
2. Periphery             25            -30            -32            -40            -10              -7 
   
Out of six relationships, only the one recorded for PSOE is not in accord with the 
expected pattern. On the basis of the combined relative distribution of deviant cases, 
                                                 
83 Cut off points below for CDS transfers to abstention: 25.6, 21.4, 16.4 and 29.9. 
84 The percent wise distributions below subtracted from the percent wise distributions above. 
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then, we conclude that there is a marked overall bias in the behaviour of the new 
voters along the territorial axis, but that there is a certain co-variation between the 
Centre-Periphery axis and the Left-Right axis in terms of party choice. This difference 
between the Left and the Right is clearly captured in table 7.19 (below).  
 
Table 7.19 New voters: Mean relative distributions of deviant cases85 
 
New voters To all 
parties 
To the   
Left 
To the      
Right 
Centre         14.0              8.5        17.7  
1. Periphery           1.4              9.0          -3.7     
2. Periphery        -23.8           -31.0       -19.0     
 
In the table, the mean realtive distributions of deviant cases are listed for all the state-
wide parties, the party bloc on the Left (PCE/IU + PSOE) and the party bloc on the 
Right (AP/PP + UCD + CDS). The pattern detected for all parties together reveals a 
clear Centre-Periphery pattern in accord with the theory. This also holds for the party 
bloc on the Right. The pattern for the party bloc on the Left, however, is clearly not in 
accord with the expectations due to its strong showing in the First Periphery. 
 
Also the analysis of the behaviour of the first election abstainers during the transition 
to and consolidation of the new democracy in Spain shows an overall Centre-
Periphery bias in their behaviour. The distributions in tables 7.20 (below), show 
clearly that the Second Periphery has produced a substantially higher number of cases 
of large proportions of voters remaining demobilised at consecutive elections than 
cases of high levels of mobilisation. The First Periphery show the same tendency, but 










                                                 
85 The distributions for the parties added together and divided by the number of parties in each 
category. 
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Abstention    PCE/IU      PSOE      AP/PP      UCD      CDS 
Centre            -16             11               6             22             27             23 
1. Periphery             10             10               7              -6           -18               1 





PCE/IU PSOE      AP/PP      UCD      CDS 
Centre                 -5               -10               -14                 15               -14 
1. Periphery                 -8                  4                 11                 12                  7 
2. Periphery                28                16                 19                 42                37 
 
 
As shown in tables 7.20, out of altogether 11 relationships, eight are in accord with 
the expectations. In terms of shares of first election abstainers mobilised at the second 
elections, the state-wide parties have been far more successful in capturing the former 
abstainers in the Centre districts than in the First and Second Peripheries. The H4 
hypothesis is therefore supported in general terms. As already noted, however, we 
have detected that the effect of the territorial cleavage differs between the state-wide 
Left and the state-wide Right. For the Left there has hardly been any difference 
between the Centre and the First Periphery in terms mobilisation of first election 
abstainers. For the state-wide Right, the relative distributions are strongly biased 
along the territorial axis. The patterns of demobilisation are more mixed. For both 
PSOE on the Left and AP/PP and CDS on the Right the patterns are in accord with the 
strict application of the Centre-Periphery concept. For both PCE/IU and UCD, 
however, the patterns of demobilisation run contrary to the hypothesis. 
As captured in tables 7.21 (below), the mean patterns for all the parties and the parties 
of the Right are clearly in accord with the expectations, while the pattern detected for 
the Left indicates a stronger ability to both mobilise and retain the voters also in the 











 All parties      Left      Right 
Centre          17.8            8.5          24.0 
1. Periphery           -1.2              8.5           -7.7   




 All parties      Left     Right 
Centre          -5.6             -7.5             -4.3    
1. Periphery           5.2             -2.0           10.0    




Thus, the conclusion is that we have detected an overall Centre-Periphery bias in the 
patterns of mobilisation and demobilisation for the state-wide parties between the 
seven pairs of elections from 1977 to 2000. At the same time, we have detected that 
the effect of the Centre-Periphery cleavage is unevenly distributed along the 
functional Left-Right axis. After UCD’s collapse, for the state-wide Right the ability 
both to mobilise former abstainers and to retain former voters has definitely been 
skewed towards the Centre, while the state-wide Left has been far more successful in 
this respect also in the First-Periphery. All the state-wide parties, however, have 
struggled in the Second Periphery.  
 
In the next chapter, we shall probe into the Centre-periphery patterns of the 


















                        
 
Introduction          
 
As noted in chapter 4, according to the general connotations of the Centre-Periphery 
concept, i.e. distance, difference and dependency, and the dynamics of nationalisation 
of party voting (Rose and Urwin 1975; Taylor and Johnston 1979; Caramani 2004), 
we should a priori expect that the behaviour of voters in the Centre would have 
followed the national trends to a greater extent than the voters in the Peripheries. 
Thus, the H6 stated that the loyalty rates commanded by the state-wide parties would 
be substantially lower in the Peripheries than in the Centre and that the greatest 
difference would be found between the Centre and the Second Periphery. 
This implies that we should expect a greater number of deviant cases exhibiting large 
proportions of first election party voters remaining loyal at the second election the 




Loyal to PCE/IU  
 
As shown in table 8.1 (below) the means of the loyalty rates for the 50 electoral 
districts are substantially lower than the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole 
presented in chapter 6. This is a clear indication that PCE/IU commanded far higher 
loyalty rates in the larger districts than in the smaller ones. This systematic pattern is 
corroborated by the standard deviations that are, as we shall see, by far the greatest 
detected for all of the state-wide parties.  
There are altogether 60 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, of 
which 21 are from the Centre, 39 from the First Periphery and none from the Second 
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Periphery.86 These figures amount to 14, 34 and 0 percent of their respective totals. 
This means that the tendency of a stronger showing of PCE/IU in the First Periphery 
than in the Centre detected in the previous chapter is clearly underscored here. 
 
 
Table 8.1 Loyal to PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00           
 
 
Mean            40.5    19.3    24.1    47.5    58.3    68.6    28.7                     
Std.dev.        20.0    12.1    18.5    22.6    20.3    17.5    12.6 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             4       3       3       2       4       2       3      21  
1. Periphery       6       5       7       5       6       5       5      39 
2. Periphery       0       0       0       0       0       0       0       0 
 
Sum               10       8      10       7      10       7       8      60 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             3       3       0       2       1       1       2      12 
1. Periphery       2       1       0       1       2       2       1       9 
2. Periphery       4       4       4       6       5       6       7      36 
 
Sum                9       7       4       9       8       9      10      57 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      48      48      50      50      50      50     346 
 
 
On the other hand, there are 57 cases more than one standard deviation below the 
means, 12 Centre cases, 9 First Periphery cases and 36 Second Periphery cases.87 This 
yields the following relative distribution: 8, 8 and 47 percent of the respective totals. 
Thus, seen in combination, the two indicators reveal a pattern of overall Centre-
Periphery bias, but the combined relative distributions are not in accord with the strict 
application of the concept. The hypothesis is therefore refuted in relation to the 






    
                                                 
86 Cut off points above for loyal PCE/IU voters: 60.5, 31.4, 42.6, 70.1, 78.6, 86.1 and 41.3. 
87 Cut off points below for loyal PCE/IU voters: 20.5, 7.5, 5.6, 24.9, 38.0, 51,1 and 16.1. 
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Loyal to PSOE  
 
The means for the electoral districts shown in table 8.2 (below) follow the estimated 
percentages for Spain as a whole closely and thus indicate that district size had had 
little or no impact on PSOE’s ability to retain its voters. We also note that the 
standard deviation reached its peak at the highly contested 1993 election. 
 
 
Table 8.2 Loyal to PSOE: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean            59.0    74.3    59.4    70.1    79.0    82.5    67.1   
Std.dev.        10.9     7.8     8.3     7.7    12.1     7.9     9.0        
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             5       2       2       3       0       2       4      16  
1. Periphery       3       1       2       4       3       1       5      19 
2. Periphery       0       3       3       1       0       0       0       7 
 
Sum                8       6       7       8       3       3       9      42 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             0       1       2       2       0       1       2       8 
1. Periphery       1       2       4       2       0       1       2      12 
2. Periphery       6       3       1       4       4       3       5      26 
 
Sum                7       6       7       8       4       4       9      47 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      50      50      50      50      50      50     350 
 
 
We note that there are altogether 16 cases from the Centre, 19 form the First 
Periphery and seven from the Second Periphery more than one standard deviation 
above the district means. These numbers amount to 10 percent of the Centre cases, 16 
percent of the First Periphery cases and 9 percent of the Second Periphery cases.88 
Thus, the pattern is not in accord with the hypothesis.  
More than one standard deviation below the means we find eight cases from the 
Centre, 12 from the First Periphery and 26 from the Second Periphery, i.e. 8 percent 
of the Centre cases, 10 percent of the First Periphery cases and 34 percent of the 
Second Periphery cases.89 This implies that, although the pattern of deviant cases 
below the means is in accord with the Centre-Periphery logic, the combined 
                                                 
88 Cut off points above for voters loyal to PSOE: 69.9, 82.1, 67.7, 77.8, 91.1, 90.4 and 76.1.  
89 Cut off point below for voters loyal to PSOE: 48.1, 66.5, 51.1, 62.4, 66.9, 74.6 and 58.1. 
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distribution on the two indicators is not in accord with the hypothesis and it is 
therefore refuted in relation to PSOE.  
                              
 
Loyal to AP/PP 
 
From table 8.3 (below) we observe that the district means are slightly lower than the 
estimated percentages for Spain as a whole reported in chapter 6. Although the 
differences are not great, the pattern indicates that the AP/PP was somewhat more 
successful in retaining its voters in the larger districts than in the smaller ones. 
 
 
Table 8.3 Loyal to AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
 
Mean            16.8    50.3    53.7    70.8   81.6    87.4    78.3                          
Std.dev.         9.7    10.6     9.8    10.2     8.3     6.1     7.3      
N                 46      47      50      50      50      50      50      
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             3       2       4       4       4       5       2      24  
1. Periphery       2       2       1       1       3       4       6      19 
2. Periphery       2       2       1       0       0       2       0       7 
 
Sum                7       6       6       5       7      11       8      50 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             2       1       1       1       0       1       2       8 
1. Periphery       3       5       6       5       4       3       5      31 
2. Periphery       0       1       2       2       3       3       0      11 
 
Sum                5       7       9       8       7       7       8      50 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         46      47      50      50      50      50      50     343 
 
 
                                                
As listed in the table, there are 50 cases more than one standard deviation above the 
means.90 Of these, 24 belong to the Centre, 19 to the First Periphery and seven to the 
Second Periphery, i.e. 17, 16 and 10 percent of their respective totals. We note that 
even though there is an overall Centre-Periphery bias, the difference between the 
Centre and First Periphery is very small. The pattern of relatively many deviant cases 
in the First Periphery is underscored by the distribution of cases below the means. Out 
 
90 Cut off points above for AP/PP: 26.5, 60.9, 63.5, 81.0, 89.0, 93.5 and 85.6. 
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of 50 cases, eight belong to the Centre, 31 to the First Periphery and 11 to the Second 
Periphery, i.e. 5, 26 and 16 percent of their respective totals.91 
Thus, on the basis of the two indicators, a strict application of the Centre-Periphery 




Loyal to UCD 
 
The means for the electoral districts are somewhat higher than the estimated overall 
percentages reported in chapter 6, indicating the UCD was slightly more successful in 
retaining its voters in the smaller districts than in the larger ones. 
 
 
Table 8.4 Loyal to UCD: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82    
 
 
Mean           60.0    17.8                                                                   
Std.dev.        8.8     7.1     
N                49      47
------------------------------------- 
 
ABOVE:                           Sum 
 
Centre             1       2       3  
1. Periphery       4       5       9 
2. Periphery       0       2       2 
 
Sum                5       9      14    
------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                           Sum 
 
Centre             1       4       5        
1. Periphery       1       2       3 
2. Periphery       4       2       6 
 
Sum                6       8      14   
------------------------------------ 
N (Total)         49      47      96         
 
Out of 14 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, three belong to 
the Centre, nine to the First Periphery and two to the Second Periphery, i.e. 7, 26 and 
11 percent of their respective totals. By token of the indicator above, the strict 
application of the Centre-Periphery concept does not apply.92 In terms of the indicator 
                                                 
91 Cut off points below for AP/PP: 7.1, 39.7, 43.9, 60.6, 77.8, 81.3 and 71.0. 
92 Cut off points above for voters loyal to UCD: 68.8 and 24.9.  
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below, we note that out of the 14 cases, five belong to the Centre, three to the First 
Periphery and 6 to the second periphery. 93 This amounts to 11, 9 and 33 percent of 
their respective totals.  Once again we observe that the strict application of the 
concept does not apply. Even in the Centre the relative distribution on the two 
indicators is negative. This should come as no surprise given the party’s collapse in 
1982. What is surprising, however, is the positive balance recorded for the First 





Loyal to CDS 
 
From table 8.5 (below) we observe that the district means are somewhat lower than 
the estimated overall percentages presented in chapter 6, indicating that also the CDS 
was more successful in retaining its voters in the larger districts than in the smaller 
ones.  
 
Table 8.5 Loyal to CDS: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               82-86   86-89   89-93    
  
Mean            23.8    27.8     7.1                                                         
Std.dev.        13.3    11.9     4.9 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                   Sum 
 
Centre             3       4       6      13         
1. Periphery       2       2       0       4       
2. Periphery       0       0       0       0       
 
Sum                5       6       6      17       
--------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                   Sum 
 
Centre             0       1       0       1     
1. Periphery       3       2       2       7     
2. Periphery       2       5       2       9     
 
Sum                5       8       4      17     
----------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      50      50     150       
 
                                                 
93 Cut off points below for voters loyal to UCD: 51.2 amd 10.7. 
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The box-plot analysis of the distributions listed in appendix III, revealed the 
birthplace of the party leader, Avila, appeared as an positive outlier both in 1986, 
1989 and 1993. Given the fact that the distributions are based on conditional 
percentages, they also reflect that Avila was the stronghold of the party for as long as 
it existed.  
As seen in the table, there are 17 cases more than one standard deviation above the 
means, 13 from the Centre, four from the First Periphery and none from the Second 
Periphery.94 These amount to 20, 8 and 0 percent of their respective totals and this 
distribution is clearly biased in accord with the strict application of the Centre-
Periphery concept. Moving to the other indicator, out of altogether 17 cases, one 
belong to the Centre, seven to the First Periphery and nine to the Second Periphery, 
i.e. 2, 14 and 27 percent of their respective totals.95 This, then implies that in terms of 
both indicators the strict application of the Centre-Periphery logic applies and the 





As shown in table 8.6 below, it is only the Centre-Periphery distribution of deviant 
cases for the CDS that follow the strict pattern predicted by the hypothesis. Although 
there is a general Centre-Periphery bias in terms of differences between the Second 
Periphery versus either the Centre or the First Periphery also for the other parties, the 
initial expectations regarding the pattern of electoral stabilisation are not met for all 
the parties and the general assumption will have to be modified.  
 
 
Table 8.6 Loyalty rates: Relative distributions of deviant cases 
 
     PCE/IU       PSOE       AP/PP        UCD       CDS 
Centre                   6                   5                 12                 -4                 18
1. Periphery                 26                   6               -10                 17                 -6 
2. Periphery               -47               -25                 -6               -22               -27 
 
 
                                                 
94 Cut off points above for voters loyal to CDS: 37.1, 39.1 and 12.0. 
95 Cut off points below for voters loyal to CDS: 10.5, 15.9 and 2.2. 
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While all the parties seen together exhibit a strongly negative balance of deviant cases 
indicating a generalised lower ability to retain the voters in the Second Periphery, they 
differ substantially as to their ability to retain former voters in the First Periphery.  
Whereas both parties of the state-wide Left, PCE/IU and PSOE, together with the 
UCD, showed the strongest ability to retain their voters in the First Periphery, both the 
CDS and the AP/PP showed their strongest ability in the Centre. Thus, after the 
collapse of the UCD, the loyalty patterns for the state-wide parties show a clear 
differentiation along the functional Left-Right axis. The PCE/IU exhibits a positive 
balance both in the First Periphery (+26) and in the Centre (+6) in combination with a 
strong negative balance in the Second Periphery (-47). This pattern also holds for the 
PSOE, although the differences are smaller than for the PCE/IU. On the other hand, 
both the AP/PP and the CDS exhibit negative balances both in the First and Second 
Peripheries, albeit AP/PP’s strong showing in Galicia palliates the effect of the centre-
periphery cleavage for this party to a substantial degree.  
 
Thus far we have only studied the patterns for single parties. However, as shown in 
table 8.7 (below), the average relative distributions of cases for all the parties and the 
two party blocs reveal somewhat different patterns. Although the difference between 
the Centre and the First Periphery for all the parties lumped together is not very 
substantial, the pattern is nonetheless in accord with the hypothesis. This also holds 
for the party bloc on the Right, whereas the party bloc on the Left clearly deviate form 
the expected pattern.  
 
 
Table 8.7 Party blocs: Mean relative distributions of deviant cases 
 
Loyalty  All parties      Left      Right 
Centre            7.4            5.5            8.7 
1. Periphery            6.6            16.0           0.3   
2. Periphery         -25.4          -36.0         -18.3   
 
 
The overall conclusion, then, is that although the bias is not as pronounced as the one 
found in relation to mobilisation and demobilisation, the centre-Periphery logic also 
 178
holds for electoral stabilisation, with, again, a notable exception for the parties of the 
Left.      
 
Thus, so far, we have seen that in Spain the hypotheses derived from the theory of 
Centre and Peripheries in the process of democratic transition and consolidation have, 
in general terms, been strengthened in relation to electoral mobilisation and 
demobilisation, and also in relation to electoral stabilisation – both with the notable 
exception of the state-wide Left. This particular aspect will be followed up in the 
analysis of the Centre-Periphery patterns related to party choice. This will be dealt 
with in the next chapter where we shall embark upon the analysis of voter transition 




















































Centre-Periphery Patterns of Electoral Competition 




The first question to be dealt with in this chapter is quite straightforward: How and to 
what extent has the electoral competition between the parties been structured along 
the Centre-Periphery axis? According to the the H10 hypothesis, the trends in voter 
transitions between the state-wide parties will have differed markedly between the 
Centre and the Peripheries and that the greatest discrepancy would be found between 
the Centre and the Second Periphery. This implies that high transfer rates from one 
party to another party in the Centre should coincide with low transfer rates in the 
Second Periphery, and low transfer rates in the Centre coincide with high transfer 
rates in the Second Periphery. The pattern for the First Periphery should fall in 
between either way. This, however, gives no direct hints as to how these differences 
will relate to the functional Left-Right cleavage. Based on the observation from 
chapter 5, that the Centre-Periphery cleavage seemingly had asserted itself over the 
functional Left-Right cleavage, we shall probe into the question of exactly how this is 
related to the position of the parties on the functional axis. In this, we could either 
envisage that the territorial cleavage be so strongly pronounced in the Peripheries that 
it overrides the Left-Right cleavage completely and hence expect a larger number of 
deviant cases of high transfer rates between the state-wide parties in the Peripheries 
than in the Centre. If this is the case, we have in fact detected that the two cleavages 
are intersected in an orthogonal fashion. Alternatively, and again based on the notion 
that the Left came to understand that democracy and decentralisation were mutually 
interdependent, we could envisage that the Left-Right cleavage be even more 
pronounced in the Peripheries than in the Centre, i.e. that the two cleavages to a 
certain extent overlap. Hence relatively fewer voters in the Peripheries will have 
transferred across the Left-Right axis than in the Centre. If this latter is the case, we 
are in fact implying that the Centre-Periphery cleavage and the Left-Right cleavage 
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have co-varied in an oblique fashion.  Then, of course, the following question arises: 
To what extent have the former UCD and CDS voters rather opted for PCE/IU and 
PSOE than the AP/PP in the Peripheries compared to the Centre?  
 
Thus, apart from assessing the status of the H10 hypothesis as such, we have two 
aspects to consider as to the intersection of the two cleavages. The first is related to 
whether we will observe a general pattern of more deviant cases of large proportions 
of voters shifting between the state-wide parties along the Left-Right axis in the 
Peripheries than in the Centre, or the other way round. The second is related to 
whether any ‘barriers’ in terms of transfers in the Peripheries are to be found within 
the party blocs, i.e. between the PCE/IU and PSOE on the one hand and between 
UCD, CDS and AP/PP on the other - or whether any such barriers are found between 
the party blocs, i.e. between the parties on the Left and some or all of the parties of 
the Right, and vice versa.  
 
In addition to the aspects cited above, the analyses of the means for the electoral 
districts compared to the overall percentages analysed in chapter 6 will serve as an 
indicator as to whether and to what extent the pattern of transfers have undergone any 
‘territorial’ shifts in relation to district size. With reference to the findings presented 
in the previous chapters, particular focus will be placed on transfers to and from the 








Transfers from PCE/IU to PSOE 
 
 
As shown in table 9.1 (below), the means for the transfers from PCE/IU to PSOE are 
slightly lower than the overall estimated percentages presented in chapter 6 for the 
1977-79, 1979-82 and the 1996-2000 pairs of elections, while they are higher for the 
pairs between 1982 and 1996. Thus, once again we conclude that PCE/IU underwent 
a territorial shift in its voter’s behaviour after the creation of the IU. This trend, 
however, came to an end at the calamity election in 2000.  
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Table 9.1 PCE/IU transfers to PSOE: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean            20.5    48.2    24.5     9.9     9.5     6.9    12.2          
Std.dev.        10.4    11.2     9.7     5.8     7.3     8.3    10.5  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             1       5       6       7       2       2       2      25  
1. Periphery       2       0       2       2       1       1       0       8 
2. Periphery       3       4       2       4       6       4       4      27 
 
Sum                6       9      10      13       9       7       6      60 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             1       2       3       3       2       0       1      12 
1. Periphery       7       3       3       6       5       0       2      26 
2. Periphery       3       3       4       0       0       0       0       9 
 
Sum               11       8      10       9       7       0       3      47 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      50      48      50      50      50      50     348 
 
 
There are altogether 60 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 25 
from the Centre, eight from the First Periphery and 27 from the Second Periphery96. 
This amounts to 16, 7 and 35 percent of their respective totals. As seen before in 
relation to PCE/IU, the lowest percentage is found in the First Periphery and implies 
that the H10 hypothesis is not sustained by the data. Turning to the to cases more than 
one standard deviation below the means, we find 12 Centre cases, 26 from the First 
Periphery and nine from the Second Periphery97. These amount to 8, 22 and 12 
percent of their respective totals. The pattern of a greater difference between the First 
Periphery and the Centre than between the Centre and the Second Periphery is 
therefore accentuated. In terms of voter transfers from PCE/IU to PSOE, then, the 
H10 refuted in that the two indicators combined clearly show that the greatest 
difference in former PCE/IU voter’s transfers to PSOE is found between the First and 
the Second Periphery.  
This pattern of high levels of transfers from PCE/IU to PSOE in the Second Periphery 
was corroborated by the box-plot analysis. All of the altogether six positive outliers 
and extreme cases identified were from the Second Periphery regions of the Basque 
Country and Catalonia. And, although Guipúzcoa also appeared once as the only 
                                                 
96 Cut off points above for PSOE: 30.9, 59.4, 34.2, 15.7, 16.8, 15.2 and 22.7. 
97 Cut off points below for PSOE: 10.1, 37.0, 14.8, 4.1, 2.2, -1.4 and 1.7 
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negative outlier identified (1979-82), it appeared again as a positive outlier both in 
1993-96 and 1996-2000. Thus, by all tokens larger proportions of former PCE/IU 
voters have transferred to the PSOE in the Second Periphery than in both the Centre 




Transfers from PCE/IU to AP/PP 
 
As observed in table 9.2 (below), the means for the electoral districts are consistently 
higher than the estimated percentages for Spain as a whole presented in chapter 6. 
This indicates that the PCE/IU have seen larger proportions of former voters defect to 
AP/PP in the smaller districts than in the larger ones across all the pairs of elections 
and that no shift in relation to district size occurred. 
 
 
Table 9.2 PCE/IU transfers to AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean             3.2    10.9     6.5     4.6     7.2     5.5     9.1     
Std.dev.         2.8     6.6     4.5     3.8     6.4     4.6     6.9     
     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             2       4       7       4       3       3       3      26  
1. Periphery       1       3       1       1       3       2       3      14 
2. Periphery       1       1       1       1       0       1       2       7 
 
Sum                4       8       9       6       6       6       8      47 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             0       2       2       1       0       2       3      10 
1. Periphery       0       1       0       1       1       1       1       5 
2. Periphery       1       3       1       1       0       0       1       9 
 
Sum                1       6       3       3       1       3       5      24 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         47      50      48      50      50      50      50     345 
 
 
There are altogether 47 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 26 
from the Centre, 14 from the First Periphery and seven from the Second Periphery.98 
This yields a 17, 12 and 9 percent relative distribution in accord with the hypothesis, 
even though the differences are not overwhelming. 
                                                 
98 Cut off points above for PCE/IU transfers to AP/PP: 6.0, 17.5, 11.0, 8.4, 13.6, 10.1 and 16.0. 
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In terms if cases more than one standard deviation below the means, there are 10 
cases from the Centre and five and nine cases form the First and Second Peripheries, 
respectively.99 Although the relative distribution below shows once again a greater 
difference between the First and Second Periphery than between the Second Periphery 
and the Centre (Centre 6 percent, First Periphery 4 percent and 12 percent from the 
Second Periphery), the combined pattern on the two indicators is in accord with the 
H10 hypothesis. In addition, we note that in contrast to the transfers to PSOE, lower 
proportions of former PCE/IU voters have switched to the AP/PP in the Second 
Periphery than both in the First Periphery and the Centre. This, then, supports the 
notion that the two cleavages are intersected in an oblique fashion. 
The logic of difference in kind between Galicia on the one hand and Basque Country 
and Catalonia on the other as exposed in the radial Centre-Periphery typology was 
underscored by the box-plot analysis. Of altogether 13 positive outliers and extreme 
cases detected, the two from the Second Periphery were from AP/PP’s stronghold 
Galicia. Thus, this is a clear indication of the aforementioned difference between 
Galicia and the two other the Second Periphery regions in relation to transfers from 
PCE/IU to AP/PP versus the PSOE.  
 
 
Transfers from PCE/IU to UCD 
 
The means for the fifty electoral districts are consistently higher than the estimated 
overall percentages presented in chapter 6 and indicate that there was no shift in the 
former PCE/IU voter’s stronger propensity to opt for the UCD in the smaller districts 
than in the larger ones. 
Out of 16 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 11 are from the 
Centre, one from the First Periphery and four from the Second Periphery, i.e. 25, 3 
and 21 percent of their respective totals.100 Likewise, of the five case more than one 
standard deviation below the means, two are from the Centre, three from the First 
Periphery and none from the Second Periphery, i.e. 5, 8 and 0 percent of their 
respective totals.101 
                                                 
99 Cut off points below for PCE/IU transfers to AP/PP: 0.4, 4.3, 2.0, 0.8, 0.8, 0.9 and 2.2. 
100 Cut off points above for PCE/IU transfers to UCD: 9.2 and 2.3. 
101 Cut off points below for PCE/IU transfers to UCD: 1.0 and –0.1. 
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Thus we conclude that the combined relative pattern on the two indicators runs 
contrary to the H10 hypothesis and that it is refuted in relation to the transfers form 
PCE/IU to UCD.102  
 
 
Table 9.3 PCE/IU transfers to UCD: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82    
 
Mean             5.1     1.1      
Std.dev.         4.1     1.2 
------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                           Sum 
 
Centre             7       4      11  
1. Periphery       0       1       1 
2. Periphery       2       2       4 
 
Sum                9       7      16    
------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                           Sum 
 
Centre             2       0       2        
1. Periphery       3       0       3 
2. Periphery       0       0       0 
 
Sum                5       0       5   
------------------------------------ 
N (Total)         47      50      97         
 
 
However, compared to the transfers to the AP/PP, we note that the relative balances of 
deviant cases are strongly positive in the Second Periphery and negative in the First 
Periphery. This indicates that for the former PCE/IU voters in the Second Periphery 
the intersection of the two cleavages is placed to the right of the UCD. This pattern 
was reflected in the box-plot analysis that detected seven positive outliers and extreme 




Transfers from PCE/IU to CDS 
 
As shown in table 9.4 (below), the means for the electoral districts are consistently 
higher than the overall estimated percentages presented in chapter 6. Thus, the finding 
is that there was no shift in the general pattern of larger proportions of former PCE/IU 
                                                 
102 To this it should be noted that the UCD did not run in the three Basque districts in 1982.   
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voters defecting to the state-wide Right parties in the smaller districts than in the 
larger ones.   
 
There are 26 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 21 from the 
Centre, one from the First Periphery and four in the Second Periphery.103 These 
amount to 24, 2 and 9 percent of their respective totals, and once again underscores 
the position of the First Periphery in relation to transfers from PCE/IU. This is even 
more accentuated by the cases more than one standard deviation below the mean.104 
Out of 24 cases, three are from the Centre, 20 from the First Periphery and one from 
the Second Periphery, i.e. 3, 30 and 2 percent of their totals. Thus, the combined 
pattern produced by the two indicators runs contrary to the expected pattern and the 
H10 hypothesis is refuted in relation to the transfers from PCE/IU to CDS.  
 
Table 9.4 PCE/IU transfers to CDS: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93    
 
Mean             2.0     6.2     3.7     1.5     
Std.dev.         1.6     3.9     2.1     1.5 
N                 50      48      50      50 
----------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                           Sum 
 
Centre             6       6       7       2      21      
1. Periphery       0       1       0       0       1     
2. Periphery       1       1       1       1       4     
 
Sum                6       8       8       3      26     
------------------------------------------------------ 
BELOW:                                            Sum 
 
Centre             1       0       2       0       3   
1. Periphery       3       7      10       0      20   
2. Periphery       1       0       0       5       1   
 
Sum                4       7      12       5      24   
------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      48      50      50     198       
 
 
The intersection of the cleavages: Transfers from PCE/IU 
 
The analysis of the behaviour of the first election PCE/IU voters has revealed that the 
expectations derived from the H10 hypothesis were only met in relation to AP/PP and 
that even for this party the differences along the Centre-Periphery axis were rather 
                                                 
103 Cut off points above for PCE/IU transfers to CDS: 3.6, 10.1, 5.8 and 3.0. 
104 Cut off points below for PCE/IU transfers to CDS: 0.2, 2.3, 1.6 and 0.0. 
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small. As shown in table 9.7 (below), for all the other parties, it is the First Periphery 
that stands out as the deviant territory. 
 
Table 9.5 Relative distributions of deviant cases 
PCE/IU      PSOE      AP/PP      UCD      CDS 
Centre               8             11             20             21 
1. Periphery            -15               8              -6            -28 
2. Periphery             23              -3             21               7 
 
 
As to the intersection of the two cleavages, we again observe a substantial difference 
between the Second and the First Periphery. In the Second Periphery, the former 
PCE/IU have far more readily transferred to all the other state-wide parties except for 
the AP/PP. The situation in the First Periphery is exactly the opposite. Thus, the 
narrowing down of the electoral produced by the collapse of the UCD and the demise 
of the CDS implies that in the surviving party system the overall logic of co-variation 
between the Left-Right axis and the Centre-Periphery axis have become more clear-
cut in relation to the behaviour of former PCE/IU voters. As already noted, this should 
come as no surprise to observers of Spanish politics in that there is no doubt that the 
AP/PP has been widely regarded as the most ‘centralist’ of the state-wide parties.  
 
 
                                                
Transfers from PSOE to PCE/IU 
 
As shown in table 9.6 (below), the means for the electoral districts are consistently 
lower than the overall estimated pattern presented in chapter 6, indicating that there 
was no shift in the pattern of larger proportions of former PSOE voters defecting to 
the PCE/IU in the larger districts than in the smaller ones. Thus, the change related to 
district size in terms of transfers between the two parties is only true for the pattern of 
transfers from PCE/IU to the PSOE. 
There are altogether 38 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 19 
from the Centre, five from the First Periphery and 14 from the Second Periphery.105 
These numbers amount to 12, 4 and 18 percent of their respective totals. This pattern 
runs contrary to the hypothesis. Moving to the cases more than one standard deviation 
below the mean, we observe that there are altogether 16 cases, one from the Centre, 
 
105 Cut points above PSOE transfers to PCE/IU: 9.0, 2.9, 3.9, 5.6, 2.7, 4.6 and 2.5. 
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five from the First Periphery and 10 from the Second Periphery.106 This implies that 
13 percent of the Second Periphery and 4 percent of the First Periphery cases are 
represented in this group. Thus, although the distribution on the indicator below is in 
accord with the expected pattern, the combined relative distribution on the two 
indicators violate the hypothesis.  
                           
Table 9.6 PSOE transfers to PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean             5.8     1.7     2.6     3.6     1.3     2.1     1.2                          
Std.dev.         3.2     1.2     1.3     2.0     1.4     2.5     1.3 
N                 50      48      50      50      50      50      50     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             3       4       3       5       1       2       1      19  
1. Periphery       2       1       2       0       0       0       0       5 
2. Periphery       3       1       0       0       3       4       3      14 
 
Sum                8       6       5       5       4       6       4      38 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             1       0       0       0       0       0       0       1 
1. Periphery       2       1       1       1       0       0       0       5 
2. Periphery       2       2       6       0       0       0       0      10  
 
Sum                5       3       7       1       0       0       0      16 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      48      50      50      50      50      50     348 
 
 
This was corroborated by the box-plot analysis that revealed that of altogether 22 
positive outliers and extreme cases, 11 were from the Centre, 10 from the Second 
Periphery and only one from the First Periphery. From the Centre, Madrid appeared 
as an outlier at all the pairs of elections except for 1982-86 and all the outliers and 





Transfers from PSOE to AP/PP 
 
As shown in table 9.7 (below), the means for the districts are consistently somewhat 
higher than the overall estimated percentages presented in chapter 6, indicating no 
                                                 
106 Cut points below PSOE voter opting for PCE/IU: 5.3, 0.5, 1.3, 1.6, -0.1, -0.4, -0.1. 
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shift in the pattern of higher defection rates to the AP/PP in the smaller districts than 
in the larger ones.  
Of altogether 52 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 26 are from 
the Centre, 16 from the first Periphery and 10 from the Second Periphery.107 In terms 
of relative proportions, this amounts to 17 percent of the Centre cases, 13 percent of 
the First Periphery and 14 percent of the Second Periphery cases. This pattern runs 
contrary to the H10 hypothesis. An inspection of the district wise distributions in 
Appendix III reveals that all the Second Periphery cases are found in Galicia and thus 
again reflect the dominant position of AP/PP in that region.  
Moving to the cases more than one standard deviation below the means, we observe 
out of altogether 48 cases, six are from the Centre, 26 from the First Periphery and 16 
from the Second Periphery.108  These figures amount to 4, 22 and 22 percent of the 
respective totals. Although this distribution is closer to the expected pattern, the joint 
distribution on the two indicators implies that the hypothesis is refuted also in relation 
to defections from the PSOE to the AP/PP.  
 
 
Table 9.7 PSOE transfers to AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean             2.5     8.2     5.8     4.0     4.6     5.0    10.1                          
Std.dev.         2.0     4.3     3.5     3.0     3.6     3.9     6.6  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             3       5       0       4       4       6       4      26  
1. Periphery       0       1       7       2       4       1       1      16 
2. Periphery       2       3       0       2       0       2       1      10 
 
Sum                5       9       7       8       8       9      10      52 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             1       0       1       1       1       1       1       6 
1. Periphery       1       5       3       4       4       4       5      26 
2. Periphery       1       3       4       2       2       2       2      16 
 
Sum                3       8       8       7       7       7       8      48 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         47      50      50      50      50      50      50     347 
 
 
                                                 
107 Cut off points above for PSOE transfers to AP/PP: 4.5, 12.5, 9.3, 7.0, 8.2, 8.9 and 16.7. 
108 Cut off points below for PSOE transfers to AP/PP: 0.5, 3.9, 2.3, 1.0, 1.0, 1.1 and 3.5. 
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Transfers from PSOE to UCD 
 
The means for the electoral districts shown in table 9.8 (below) are higher than the 
overall estimated percentages reported in chapter 6. This implies that also in relation 
to the UCD, there was no shift related to district size in the pattern of larger 
proportions of former voters defecting to the Right in the smaller districts than in the 
larger ones.  
There are 20 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 10 from the 
Centre, six from the First Periphery and four from the Second Periphery.109 This 
yields the following relative distribution: 23 percent of the Centre cases, 18 of the 
First Periphery cases and 21 percent of the second Periphery cases. This pattern runs 
contrary to the hypothesis. As to the cases more than one standard deviation below the 
means, we find that out of the total of 16, five belong to the Centre, seven to the First 
Periphery and four to the Second Periphery, i.e. 11, 21 and 21 percent of their 
respective totals.110 Thus, the combined pattern runs contrary to the expectations and 
the hypothesis is refuted. 
 
 
Table 9.8 PSOE transfers to UCD: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82    
Mean             6.3     1.0                                                                  
Std.dev.         4.0      .7 
------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                           Sum 
 
Centre             7       3      10  
1. Periphery       1       5       6 
2. Periphery       3       1       4 
 
Sum               11       9      20    
------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                           Sum 
 
Centre             3       2       5        
1. Periphery       5       2       7 
2. Periphery       3       1       4 
 
Sum               11       5      16   
------------------------------------ 




                                                 
109 Cut off points above for PSOE transfers to UCD: 10.3 and 1.7. 
110 Cut off points below for PSOE transfers to UCD: 2.3 and 0.3. 
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Transfers from PSOE to CDS 
 
Comparing the districts means in table 9.9 (below) to the overall percentages 
presented in chapter 6, we observe no shift in the consistent pattern of somewhat 
higher defection rates from the PSOE to the parties of the Right in the smaller districts 
than in the larger ones. 
There are altogether 25 cases more than one standard deviation above the means in 
the table, 19 from the Centre and three from each of the Peripheries.111 These amount 
to the following relative distribution: 22 percent of the Centre cases, 4 percent of the 
first Periphery cases and 7 percent of the second Periphery cases. Thus, the pattern 
also in relation to CDS is not in line with the expectations. This is definitely 
accentuated by the distribution of cases more than one standard deviation below the 
means. Out of 21 cases, 16 are from the First Periphery and only three from the 
Centre and two from the Second Periphery.112 This implies that 24 percent of the first 
Periphery cases and a mere 3 and 5 percent of the Centre and Second Periphery cases 
are found in this category. The conclusion, then, is that the hypothesis is refuted. 
 
 
Table 9.9 PSOE transfers to CDS: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93    
Mean             1.2     6.5     3.0      .4                                                  
Std.dev.          .7     3.1     1.7      .5 
   
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
ABOVE:                                           Sum 
 
Centre             6       7       4       2      19      
1. Periphery       2       0       1       0       3     
2. Periphery       1       1       1       0       3     
 
Sum                9       8       6       2      25     
------------------------------------------------------ 
BELOW:                                            Sum 
 
Centre             1       0       2       0       3   
1. Periphery       3       7      10       0      16   
2. Periphery       1       0       0       5       2   
 
Sum                4       7      12       5      21   
------------------------------------------------- 




                                                 
111 Cut off points above for PSOE transfers to CDS: 1.9, 9.6, 4.7 and 0.9. 
112 Cut off points below for PSOE transfers to CDS: 0.5, 3.4, 1.3 and –0.1. 
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The intersection of the cleavages: Transfers from PSOE 
 
The analysis of the behaviour of the first election PSOE voters has revealed that the 
H10 hypothesis does not hold for the transfers to any of the state-wide parties.  As 
summarised in table 9.10 (below), the relative distributions on the two indicators 
clearly show that the greatest differences in transfer rates are found between the 
Centre and the First Periphery.  
 
Table 9.10 Relative distributions of deviant cases 
PSOE    PCE/IU      AP/PP      UCD      CDS 
Centre             11             13             12             19 
1. Periphery               0              -9              -3            -20 
2. Periphery               5               -8               0               2 
 
 
As to the intersection of the two cleavages, we note that the relationship that exhibits 
a negative balance of deviant cases in the Second Periphery is the one regarding 
transfers to the AP/PP. The pattern of transfers from PSOE to the UCD and the CDS 
resemble the one found for the former PCE/IU voters, i.e. negative balance in the First 
Periphery and, albeit far less pronounced, a positive balance in the Second Periphery.  
Thus, based on the joint distributions of deviant cases from the PCE/IU and the 
PSOE, it is evident that after the collapse of the UCD and the demise of the CDS, the 
two cleavages have come to co-vary in a certain fashion, i.e. that relatively lower 
proportions of former voters of the state-wide Left would transfer to the state-wide 
Right in terms of AP/PP in the Second Periphery than both in the First Periphery and 






Transfers from AP/PP to PCE/IU 
 
Although the differences are quite small, the means for the electoral districts shown in 
table 9.11 (below) are consistently higher than the estimated overall percentages 
presented in chapter 6. This indicates that there was no change in the pattern of larger 
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proportions of former AP/PP voters defecting to the PCE/IU in the smaller districts 
than in the larger ones. 
There are 37 cases more than one standard deviation above the means.113 Six form the 
Centre, 26 from the First Periphery and five from the Second Periphery, i.e. 4, 22 and 
5 percent of their respective totals. Once again we note that in terms of transfers 
between the parties, the pattern runs contrary to the expectations. This is underscored 
by the distribution on the other indicator. Out of 19 cases more than one standard 
deviation below the means, 10 belong to the Centre, two to the First Periphery and 
seven to the Second Periphery.114 This amounts to 7, 2 and 10 percent of their 
respective totals. Thus, we conclude that the H10 hypothesis is refuted.  
 
 
Table 9.11 AP/PP transfers to PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean             2.1      .9     1.2     1.4      .8      .8      .5                         
Std.dev.         1.4      .4     1.0     1.6      .9      .6      .5 
N                 48      45      50      50      50      50      50      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             2       0       0       0       0       3       1       6  
1. Periphery       5       1       7       5       5       3       0      26 
2. Periphery       1       0       0       0       0       2       2       5 
 
Sum                8       1       7       5       5       8       3      37 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             3       2       1       0       0       5       0      10 
1. Periphery       0       1       0       0       0       1       0       2 
2. Periphery       2       2       0       0       0       3       0       7 
 
Sum                5       5       1       0       0       9       0      19 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 




                                                
This conclusion is supported by the box-plot analysis. Out of 16 positive outliers and 
extreme cases, 13 were from the First Periphery, two from the Second Periphery and 






113 Cut off points above for AP/PP-PCE/IU: 3.5, 1.3, 2.2, 3.0, 1.7, 1.4 and 1.0.  




Transfers from AP/PP to PSOE 
 
The district means shown in table 9.12 (below) are consistently somewhat higher than 
the overall percentages reported in chapter 6, and thus indicate no change in the 
pattern of higher defection rates to the PSOE in the smaller than in the larger districts. 
There are altogether 54 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 24 
from the Centre, 23 from the first Periphery and seven from the second Periphery.115 
This amounts to 16, 19 and 10 percent of their respective totals. Again we note that 
the pattern runs contrary to the hypothesis. 
 
Table 9.12 AP/PP transfers to PSOE: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Mean             7.6    20.5     9.7     5.1     3.7     2.5     3.2                          
Std.dev.         4.9     9.4     5.2     3.5     2.7     2.3     2.7 
N                 48      47      50      50      50      50      50      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             6       5       2       3       2       4       3      24  
1. Periphery       2       4       4       5       3       2       3      23 
2. Periphery       1       0       2       0       2       2       1       7 
 
Sum                9       1       8       8       7       8       3      54 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                                                   Sum 
 
Centre             2       3       2       1       1       1       1      11 
1. Periphery       2       2       3       4       7       3       2      23 
2. Periphery       2       5       2       2       1       1       0      13 
 
Sum                6      10       7       7       9       5       3      47 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 




Out of the 47 cases more than one standard deviation below the means, 11 belong to 
the Centre, 23 to the First Periphery and 13 to the Second Periphery, i.e. 7, 19 and 18 
percent of their respective totals.116 Thus, even though neither of the distributions on 
the indicators a such are in accord with the expectations, the combined relative pattern 
                                                 
115 Cut off points above for AP/PP-PSOE: 12.5, 29.9, 14.9, 8.6, 6.4, 4.8 and 5.9. 
116 Cut off points below for AP/PP-PSOE: 2.7, 11.1, 4.5, 1.6, 1.0, 0.2 and 0.5. 
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produced by the two indicators sustains the H10 hypothesis and shows an overall 
Centre-Periphery bias in the former AP/PP voter’s tendency to opt for the PSOE.117    
 
 
Transfers from AP/PP to UCD 
 
From table 9.13 (below), we note that the district means are consistently slightly 
lower than the overall percentages and thus indicate no shift in the pattern of larger 
proportions of defections to the UCD in the larger districts than the smaller ones. 
Of altogether 15 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 11 are from 
the Centre, three from the First Periphery and one from the Second Periphery.118 
These amount to 26, 9 and 6 percent of their respective totals. This distribution is in 
accord with the hypothesis. On the other end of the scale there are 12 cases more than 
one standard deviation below the means.119 None of these come from the Centre while 
there are 10 cases from the First Periphery and three cases form the Second Periphery, 
i.e. none, 29 and 17 percent of their respective totals. This means that the Relative 
distribution of cases runs contrary to the hypothesis.  
 
 
Table 9.13 AP/PP transfers to UCD: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82    
  
Mean            26.1     2.3                                                                 
Std.dev.        11.7     1.9 
N                 48      47      
------------------------------------- 
 
ABOVE:                           Sum 
 
Centre             7       4      11  
1. Periphery       1       2       3 
2. Periphery       0       1       1 
 
Sum                8       7      15    
------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                           Sum 
 
Centre             0       0       0        
1. Periphery       4       6      10 
2. Periphery       3       0       3 
 
Sum                7       6      13   
------------------------------------ 
N (Total)         48      47      95         
                                                 
117 See table 9.15 (below). 
118 Cut off points above for AP/PP-UCD: 37.8 and 4.2. 





Transfers from AP/PP to CDS 
 
We note from table 9.14 (below) that the district mean is lower than the overall 
percentage for the 1979-82 pair of elections and consistently higher than overall 
percentages from 1982-86 and onwards. Thus, after the demise of the UCD a 
territorial change related to district size took place in the former AP/PP voter’s 
propensity to opt for the CDS.  
Of 15 cases more than one standard deviation above the means in the table, 12 belong 
to the Centre and three to the first Periphery.120 That amounts to 17 percent of the 
total Centre cases and 4 percent of the First Periphery cases, and none of the Second 
Periphery cases, of course. This distribution is in accord with the expectations. Of the 
eight cases more than one standard deviation below the means, one belongs to the 
Centre, three to the First Periphery and four to the Second Periphery.121 In other 
words, 1 percent of the Centre cases, 4 percent of the First Periphery cases and 10 
percent of the Second Periphery cases. We may conclude, then, that the H10 
hypothesis is sustained for the AP/PP transfers to CDS.     
 
Table 9.14 AP/PP transfers to CDS: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93    
  
Mean             3.1     6.2     2.6      .5                                                  
Std.dev.         2.2     3.5     2.4      .4 
N                 47      50      50      50          
----------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                           Sum 
 
Centre             4       4       1       3      12      
1. Periphery       1       1       1       0       3     
2. Periphery       0       0       0       0       0     
 
Sum                5       5       2       2      15     
------------------------------------------------------ 
BELOW:                                            Sum 
 
Centre             0       1       0       0       1   
1. Periphery       1       1       0       1       3   
2. Periphery       2       2       0       0       4   
 
Sum                3       4       0       1       8   
------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         47      50      50      50     197       
                                                 
120 Cut off points above for AP/PP-CDS: 5.3, 9.7, 5.0 and 0.9. 





This pattern was corroborated by the box-plot analysis. Out of altogether eight 
positive outliers and extreme cases, seven came from the Centre and one from the 





The intersection of the cleavages: Transfers from AP/PP 
 
The analysis of the behaviour of the first election AP/PP voters has revealed that only 
two of the relationships met with the expectations stated in the H10 hypothesis, 
namely in terms of transfers to the CDS and PSOE.   
 
Table 9.15 Relative distributions of deviant cases 
AP/PP    PCE/IU      PSOE      UCD      CDS 
Centre              -3               9             26             16 
1. Periphery             20               0            -20               0 
2. Periphery              -3               -8            -11            -10 
 
 
As summarised in table 9.15, the relative balances of deviant cases were negative in 
the Second Periphery for all the other state-wide options. This is yet another token 
that the intersection in the Second Periphery is located between AP/PP on the one 
hand and all the other state-wide parties on the other in the Second Periphery. In the 
Centre, the point of intersection in relation to AP/PP is located between PCE/IU and 
the PSOE. The pattern in the First Periphery is very mixed indeed and no clear point 
of intersection can be identified.  
 
 
               
                 
Transfers from UCD to PCE/IU 
 
As observed in table 9.16 (below), the district means are close to identical to the 
overall percentages and no change related to district size has occurred.  
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Out of 19 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, three are from the 
Centre, nine from the First Periphery and seven from the Second Periphery.122 These 
numbers amount to 5, 18 and 24 percent of their respective totals, and this relative 




Table 9.16 UCD transfers to PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86  
 
 
Mean             1.0      .7      .6                                                          
Std.dev.          .6      .5      .6  
--------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                   Sum 
 
Centre             2       1       0       3         
1. Periphery       2       3       4       9       
2. Periphery       4       2       1       7       
 
Sum                8       6       5      19       
--------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                   Sum 
 
Centre             3       1       0       4     
1. Periphery       3       1       0       4     
2. Periphery       0       0       0       0     
 
Sum                6       2       0       8     
----------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         49      48      47     144       
 
Below, we observe that out of eight cases, four belong to the Centre, four to the First 
Periphery and none to the Second Periphery, i.e. 6, 8 and 0 percent of their respective 
totals.123 Thus the combined distributions on the two indicators yield a pattern that is 




Transfers from UCD to PSOE 
 
As shown in table 9.17 (below), the means for the electoral districts follow the overall 
percentages presented in chapter 6 closely, the deviation being too small in order to 
indicate any shift in relation to district size.  
                                                 
122 Cut off points above for UCD transfers to PCE/IU: 1.6, 1.2 and 1.2.  
123 Cut off points below for UCD transfers to PCE/IU: 0.4, 0.2 and 0.0. 
 199
Out of 24 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, nine are from the 
Centre, 15 from the First Periphery and none from the Second Periphery.124 These 
numbers amount to 14, 29 and 0 percent of their respective totals. This pattern is at 
odds with the H10 hypothesis.  
Below we find 16 cases, six from the Centre, six from the First Periphery and four 
from the Second Periphery, i.e. 9, 12 and 14 percent of their respective totals.125 The 
combined distribution on the two indicators, then, shows that the hypothesis is not 
supported by the data.  
 
Table 9.17 UCD transfers to PSOE: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86 
  
Mean             5.5    18.4    17.8                                                         
Std.dev.         3.0     8.8    16.8 
--------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                   Sum 
 
Centre             4       3       2       9         
1. Periphery       3       6       6      15       
2. Periphery       0       0       0       0       
 
Sum                7       9       8      24       
--------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                   Sum 
 
Centre             3       3       0       6     
1. Periphery       2       4       0       6     
2. Periphery       1       3       0       4     
 
Sum                6      10       0      16     
----------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         49      50      47     146       
 
 
This was corroborated by the box-plot analysis. Of four outliers and extreme cases, 
one came from the Centre and three from the First Periphery.  
 
 
Transfers from UCD to AP/PP  
 
As seen from table 9.18 (below), the district means are consistently lower than the 
overall percentages. This indicates that there has been no shift in the tendency of 
higher proportions of former UCD voters defecting to AP/PP in the larger districts 
than in the smaller ones.  
                                                 
124 Cut off points above for UCD transfers to PSOE: 8.5, 27.2 and 34.6. 
125 Cut off points below for UCD transfers to PSOE: 2.5, 9.6 and 1.0. 
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Out of 21 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 18 belong to the 
Centre, two to the First Periphery and one to the Second Periphery.126 These numbers 
amount to 27, 4 and 4 percent of their respective totals and yield a distribution that, 
although not far off the spot, is not in line with the hypothesis.  
 
 
Table 9.18 UCD transfers to AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   
  
Mean             3.1    32.7    29.8                                                          
Std.dev.         1.9    11.5    18.4 
--------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                   Sum 
 
Centre             7       7       4      18         
1. Periphery       0       0       2       2       
2. Periphery       1       0       0       1       
 
Sum                8       7       6      21       
--------------------------------------------- 
BELOW:                                   Sum 
 
Centre             0       0       0       0     
1. Periphery       4       5       6      15     
2. Periphery       0       2       3       5     
 
Sum                4       7       9      20     
----------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         47      50      47     144       
 
In terms of cases more than one standard deviation below the means, we note that out 
of the 20 cases, none belong to the Centre, while 15 and five belong to the First and 
Second Peripheries, respectively.127 These numbers amount to 0, 29 and 19 percent, 
respectively. Thus, the joint distribution on the two indicators clearly shows that the 
H10 hypothesis is not sustained by the data.   
 
 
Transfers from UCD to CDS  
 
As seen in table 9.19 (below), the district means are almost identical to the overall 
percentages presented in chapter 6. Thus, district size has had no bearings on the 
transfers from UCD to CDS. 
                                                 
126 Cut off points above for UCD transfers to AP/PP: 5.0, 44.2 and 48.2. 
127 Cut off points below for UCD transfers to AP/PP: 1.2, 21.2 and 11.4. 
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There are only five cases more than one standard deviation above the means, two 
from the Centre and three from the First Periphery, i.e. 5 and 9 percent of their 
respective totals.128 The distribution runs contrary to the H10 hypothesis. And, since 
the standard deviations are greater than the means, there are no cases more than one 
standard deviation below the mean and hence no relative distribution to consider on 
this indicator.129  
 
Table 9.19 UCD transfers to CDS: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               79-82   82-86    
 
Mean             3.1      8.0                                                                 
Std.dev.         4.0     11.3 
------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                           Sum 
 
Centre             1       1       2  
1. Periphery       0       3       3 
2. Periphery       0       0       0 
 
Sum                1       4       5    
------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      47      97         
 
The pattern was corroborated by the box-plot analysis. In the box-plot, however, 
altogether six outliers and extreme cases were detected,130 of which two belonged to 




The intersection of the cleavages: Transfers from UCD 
 
As shown in table 9.20 (below), the analysis of the behaviour of the first election 
UCD voters has revealed that the H10 hypothesis was only supported in regard of one 
of the relationships, the one related to the transfers to the PCE/IU. For all the other 
parties, the First Periphery stood out as the most deviant region. On the other hand, 




                                                 
128 Cut off points above for UCD transfers to CDS: 7.1 and 19.3. 
129 Cut off points below for UCD transfers to CDS: -0.9 and –3.3. 
130 The Baleares appeared as an outlier in 1982 even though its score (7.0 percent points) was within 
one standard deviation from the mean. 
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Table 9.20 Relative distributions of deviant cases 
UCD    PCE/IU      PSOE      AP/PP      CDS 
Centre              -1               5             27               5 
1. Periphery             10             17            -25               9 
2. Periphery             24             -14            -15               0 
 
We note that the former UCD voters have shown a far higher propensity to opt for the 
PCE/IU in the Second Periphery than both in the First Periphery and in the Centre, 
whereas the pattern in relation to AP/PP is quite the opposite. The patterns for the 
PSOE and the CDS fall somewhere in between.  
   
In sum, then, the behaviour of UCD’s first election voters underscores the notion 
hinted to in the previous chapters that the party’s electoral position in relation to the 
other state-wide parties on the Centre-Periphery axis and the Left Right axis was far 
less clear-cut than the electoral positions of the parties that survived the transition.  
 
As noted in the initial section of this chapter, the crucial question of where the former 
UCD voters transferred to in the peripheries would be dealt with. The inspection of all 
the tables involving transfers to the regional parties listed in appendix IV, revealed 
that there was only one substantial relationship, namely the one concerning the 
transfers to the Catalan CiU. 
 
 Table 9.21 UCD voters opting for CiU: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86    
 
Barcelona        6.1    30.1    41.3 
Girona           5.7    28.7    18.6 
Lleida           5.5    29.4    29.8 
Tarragona         .9    14.1    11.5 
                                      
As shown in table 9.21 (above), in Catalonia the CiU inflicted heavy tolls on the UCD 
both in 1982 and in 1986. Thus, in Catalonia, the collapse of the UCD benefited the 
conservative regional nationalists to a substantial extent.  
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Transfers from CDS to PCE/IU  
 
As shown in table 9.22 (below), the district means vary somewhat compared to the 
overall percentages presented in chapter 6. From almost identical at the first pair of 
elections, it fell below at the next pair before it gradually rose above again the last two 
pairs. Thus, there is an indication that a short-term territorial change in relation to 
district size took place with the creation of the IU.  
Out of altogether 26 cases more than one standard deviation above the means, 10 
belong to the Centre, six to the First Periphery and 10 to the Second Periphery.131 
These numbers amount to 11, 9 and 23 percent of their respective totals and shows 
that the distribution runs contrary to the H10 hypothesis. Nor is it sustained by the 
distribution of cases more than one standard deviation below the means. Of 16 cases, 
three belong to the Centre, 12 to the First Periphery and three to the Second 
Periphery, i.e. 3, 18 and 7 percent of their respective totals.132 
 
Table 9.22 CDS transfers to PCE/IU: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96    
 
Mean             2.0     6.8     5.1     8.5                                                  
Std.dev.         1.1     4.7     4.5     5.5 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                           Sum 
 
Centre             3       2       3       2      10      
1. Periphery       3       2       0       1       6     
2. Periphery       1       1       4       4      10     
 
Sum                7       5       7       7      26     
------------------------------------------------------ 
BELOW:                                            Sum 
 
Centre             2       0       0       1       3   
1. Periphery       2       4       3       3      12   
2. Periphery       3       0       0       0       3   
 
Sum                6       4       3       4      16   
------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      50      50      50     200       
 
 
Thus, once again the combined distribution on the two indicators underscores 
particular position of the PCE/IU in the First Periphery. However, the box-plot 
analysis yielded a somewhat different pattern. Out of nine positive outliers and 
                                                 
131 Cut off points above for CDS transfers to PCE/IU: 3.1, 11.5, 9.6 and 14.0. 
132 Cut off points below for CDS transfers to PCE/IU: 0.9, 2.1, 0.6 and 3.0. 
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extreme cases, five were from either the Basque Country or Catalonia and only three 




Transfers from CDS to PSOE 
 
As shown in table 9.23 (below), the means for the electoral districts are consistently 
higher than the overall percentages, indicating no shift in the pattern of higher 
defection rates to the PSOE in the smaller districts than in the larger ones. 
Out of 32 cases more than one standard deviation above the mean, 12 belong to the 
Centre, nine to the First Periphery and 11 to the Second Periphery.133 These numbers 
amount to 14, 13 and 25 percent of their respective totals. We note that the pattern 
runs contrary to the H10 hypothesis. 
 
Table 9.23 CDS transfers to PSOE: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   
Mean            14.0    11.2    13.5    10.4                                                  
Std.dev.         6.6     6.5     7.1     6.8 
       
----------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                           Sum 
 
Centre             5       3       1       3      12      
1. Periphery       2       2       3       2       9     
2. Periphery       1       4       2       4      11     
 
Sum                8       9       6       9      32     
------------------------------------------------------ 
BELOW:                                            Sum 
 
Centre             3       2       3       0       8   
1. Periphery       3       6       3       6      18   
2. Periphery       2       1       0       3       6   
 
Sum                8       4       6       9      32   
------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      50      50      50     200       
 
This tendency is even more accentuated in terms of cases more than one standard 
deviation below the means. Of the total number of 32, eight belong to the Centre, 18 
to the First Periphery and six to the Second Periphery, i.e. 9, 26 and 14 percent of 
their respective totals.134 Thus, the H10 hypothesis is refuted by the data. 
 
                                                 
133 Cut off points above for CDS transfers to PSOE: 20.6, 17.7, 20.6 and 17.2. 




Transfers from CDS to AP/PP 
 
As seen in table 9.24 (below), the means for the electoral districts are lower than the 
overall percentages reported in chapter 6 for all the pairs of elections except for the 
1989-1993 pair. Thus, a slight change in terms of districts size occurred at the 1993 
election when AP/PP made its leap from around 26 to around 35 percent of the valid 
votes cast. 
Out of 21 cases more than one standard deviation above then means, 13 are from the 
Centre, seven from the First Periphery and only one from the Second Periphery, i.e. 
15, 10 and 2 percent of their respective totals.135 This distribution is in accord with the 
expected pattern depicted by the H10 hypothesis.    
 
Table 9.24 CDS transfers to AP/PP: Trend and deviant cases 
 
               82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96    
 
Mean            12.9    10.8    25.8    25.5                                                  
Std.dev.         7.2     6.8     9.4    10.5  
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
ABOVE:                                           Sum 
 
Centre             1       5       3       4      13      
1. Periphery       2       0       2       3       7     
2. Periphery       0       1       0       0       1     
 
Sum                3       6       5       7      21     
------------------------------------------------------ 
BELOW:                                            Sum 
 
Centre             1       0       0       2       3   
1. Periphery       3       3       3       5      14   
2. Periphery       2       1       2       4       9   
 
Sum                6       4       5      11      26   
------------------------------------------------- 
N (Total)         50      50      50      50     200       
 
In terms of cases more than one standard deviation below the means, we find that out 
of 26 cases, three are from the Centre, 14 to from First Periphery and nine from the 
Second Periphery.136 This amounts to 3, 21 and 20 percent of their respective totals, 
and although the distribution on the lower indicator is not in accord the expected 
pattern, the combined distribution sustains the H10 hypothesis.  
                                                 
135 Cut off points above for CDS transfers to AP/PP: 20.1, 17.6, 35.2 and 36.0. 
136 Cut off points below for CDS transfers to AP/PP: 5.7, 4.0, 16.4 and 15.0.. 
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This was supported by the box-plot analysis. Of five positive outliers and extreme 
cases, three were from the Centre and two from the First Periphery. 
 
As stated in the initial sections of this chapter, the question of where the former CDS 
voters took to in relation to the peripheries should be dealt with. An inspection of all 
the transfers to the regional parties revealed that there was only one of significance, 
namely the one concerning the transfers to the Catalan CiU in 1986.137 This indicates 
that in Catalonia, after the realignment election 1982, the CiU benefited substantially 
from the unclear situation produced by the excision of the CDS from the UCD.  
 
 
The intersection of the cleavages: Transfers from CDS  
 
As summarised in table 9.25 (below), the patterns of deviant cases form the overall 
trends for the transfers from CDS has revealed that the H10 hypothesis is only 
supported in relation to the party’s fellow traveller on the Right, the AP/PP.  The CDS 
voters have far more readily transferred to the AP/PP in the Centre than both in the 
First and the Second Periphery. The patterns of transfers to the state-wide Left, 
however, exhibit a completely different logic. Not only do we find that larger 
proportion of former CDS voters have transferred to the Left in the Second Periphery 
than in the Centre, but also that the greatest discrepancy in this respect is found 
between the First and Second Periphery.  
 
Table 9.25 Relative distributions of deviant cases 
CDS    PCE/IU      PSOE      AP/PP 
Centre               8               5             12 
1. Periphery              -9            -13            -11 
2. Periphery             16              11            -18 
 
In sum, the distributions show that the CDS experienced quite different logics in term 
of competition from the Left and the Right along the Centre-Periphery axis. Thus, in 
terms of transfers form the CDS, the intersection of the cleavages in the Second 
Periphery is found between the CDS and the AP/PP in that the former CDS voters 
have rather opted for the Left than the Right in the Second Periphery.    
 
                                                 




Conclusions: Centre-Periphery and intersection of the cleavages.  
 
The analyses of competition among the state-wide parties along the Centre-Periphery 
axis have detected a very mixed set of patterns indeed. One conclusion, however, 
stands firm: The majority of the patterns of deviant cases for the individual parties did 
not meet the expectations stated in the H10 hypothesis. Out of altogether 19 
relationships only five were in accord with the hypothesis. Of these five, three were 
inter-bloc relationships and two were intra-bloc relationships. The inter-bloc 
relationships were found for the transfers from PCE/IU to AP/PP, from AP/PP to 
PSOE, and from UCD to PCE/IU. The intra-bloc relationships were found for the 
transfers from AP/PP to CDS and from CDS to AP/PP. Consequently, as observed in 
the mean distributions of deviant cases for the party blocs listed in table 9.26 (below), 
the intra-bloc transfers on the Left were more pronounced in the First Periphery than 
both in the Centre and, of course, the Second Periphery. The transfers from the Left to 
the Right exhibit a positive balance both in the Centre and in the Second Periphery, 
while the balance in the First Periphery is negative.  
 









Centre     5.5          16.0    12.0 
1. Periphery   16.0            -9.7    -0.5        
2. Periphery  -36.0            3.2    -5.5          
 
 
However, as shown when the AP/PP is singled out as the option of the transferred 
votes, the narrowing down of the electoral market produced by the collapse of the 
UCD and the demise of the CDS implied that the state-wide party system has become 
somewhat more clear-cut as to the relationship between the Left-Right and the Centre-
Periphery cleavages. Even though the differences are not overwhelming, the pattern 
of deviant cases regarding transfers from the Left to AP/PP in accord with the 




Table 9.27 From the Right: Mean relative distributions of deviant cases 
From the 
Right 
To the    
Right  
To the     
Left 
To AP/PP 
Centre      8.7           3.8     19.5 
1. Periphery      0.3            4.2    -18.0      
2. Periphery   -18.3            4.3    -16.5        
 
 
Likewise, as seen in table 9.27, the intra-bloc transfers on the Right exhibit a pattern 
that is in accord with the expectations derived from the straightforward Centre-
Periphery concept. Thus, we may conclude that, to the extent that the parties and the 
party system structure the behaviour of the voters, the logic of state-wide party 
competition along the two main axes of the Spanish system was rather confuse for as 
long as the UCD and the CDS existed. As noted in chapter 4, the attempt to straddle 
the two cleavages was seen as perhaps the most important factor in UCD’s collapse 
and the findings here might indicate that this, at least in part, also can explain why the 
CDS never managed to consolidate its electoral stance.      
 
In terms of the overall status of the hypotheses derived from the theory on Centre-
Periphery dynamics in the Spanish process of democratisation, then, we have found 
that: 
 
1) As shown in chapter 7, the pattern of electoral mobilisation and demobilisation 
along the Centre-Periphery axis for all the state-wide parties together was in 
accord with the expectation derived from the theory. This also held for the 
party-bloc on the Right. The parties on the Left, however, tended to mobilise 
relatively larger proportions of new voters and former abstainers in the First 
Periphery. This implies that the effect of the Centre-Periphery cleavage was 
not evenly distributed along the Left-Right axis. Thus, in relation to 
mobilisation and demobilisation, the two cleavages co-varied in a fashion that 
is in line with the notion that the parties and voters on the Left more readily 
came to accept that the territorial restructuring of the state was paramount to 
the consolidation of the new democracy. 
2) As shown in chapter 8, although less pronounced, the pattern of electoral 
stabilisation along the Centre-Periphery axis was in accord with the 
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expectations for all the state-wide parties seen together and for the party-bloc 
on the Right. Again, we noted that the effect of the Centre-Periphery cleavage 
was not evenly distributed along the Left-Right cleavage. In line with the 
notion that the parties and the voters on the Left more readily came to accept 
the territorial restructuring of the state was paramount to the consolidation of 
democracy, the highest levels of loyalty rates for these parties were found in 
the First Periphery. 
3) As shown in this chapter, the patterns of electoral competition along the 
Centre-Periphery axis were the ones that deviated most from the expectations. 
Again, the voters on the Left had more readily switched between the two 
parties in the First Periphery than both in the Centre and the Second Periphery. 
The only two patterns that were in accord with the hypothesis, were the ones 
found for the transfers within the party-bloc on the Right and for the transfers 
from the party-bloc on the Left to the sole party of the Right, the AP/PP. Thus, 
the narrowing down of the party system on the Right implies that, as we 
approach the millennium, the political space also in terms of state-wide party 
competition became structured in a more clear-cut Centre-Periphery pattern 





















The Electoral Nexus in Spain: Conclusions 
 
 
Synthesis and findings 
 
The main argument in this dissertation stemmed from the notion of a particular 
sequence in the translation of societal divisions into manifest cleavages of the Spanish 
party system(s) during the process of democratic transition and consolidation. Derived 
from a body of theories on transitions from authoritarianism, democratic 
consolidation and electoral behaviour in liberal democracies, particular emphasis was 
put on the idea of an electoral nexus between the elite driven transition and the 
behaviour of the electorate along the two main cleavages, the Left-Right axis and the 
Centre-Periphery axis. On the basis of this, the following question was put forward:  
 
How and to what extent may electoral participation and party choice in Spain 
between 1977 and 2000 be understood in relation to how the parties and voters 
handled the problems posed by the transition from authoritarianism and democratic 
consolidation, with particular reference to the functional axis and the territorial axis?  
     
In order to find an answer to this question, we started out in chapter 4 with an analysis 
of institutionalisation of parties, the electoral swings and party system formation 
between 1977 and 2000. In this, we concluded that the changes in electoral 
mobilisation and demobilisation had played a pivotal role in deciding the outcomes of 
the elections after the transitional phase proper (1977-1979). Then, in chapters 5-9, 
we embarked upon a series of extensive analyses of voter behaviour in terms of 
mobilisation, stabilisation and party competition for pairs of elections between 1977 
and 2000. The summarised empirical findings are the following:    
 
1) The aggregate analysis of the electoral profiles of the more than 8.000 
municipalities showed that, in terms of changes in electoral turnout between elections, 
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the pattern was generally in accord with the swings found in the overall official 
election results. However, the aggregate analysis also detected that the last executive 
takeover by the rejuvenated post-Francoist Right in 1996 coincided with substantial 
shifts in the territorial distribution of electoral mobilisation. This territorial 
“realignment” between 1993 and 1996 merits particular attention since it was not 
reflected in the overall official electoral results and has not been treated in previous 
research. 
Further, all the parties that survived the transition, with the predicted exception of the 
CDS, experienced an increase in the level of aggregate stability after the 1982 debacle 
and onwards. This trend was particularly pronounced in the case of the AP/PP. And, 
whereas the state-wide Left experienced a downturn in stability towards the end of the 
period, the stability of the AP/PP was unchanged. Thus, in general terms, the 
theoretical assumption on electoral stabilisation after the first founding elections of 
the transitional period was sustained at the aggregate municipal level, i.e. that the 
main parties consolidated their electoral clienteles in territorial terms. However, in 
relation to the party specific expectations derived from the H5 hypothesis, the 
predicted pattern in terms of the timing of the stabilisation of the PSOE, PCE/IU and 
the AP/PP vote was not reflected at the aggregate level. 
   
2) The state-wide parties surviving the transition, regardless of Left or Right 
orientation, related negatively to electoral abstention. We also noted that for the last 
pair of elections, the substantial drop in support for the PCE/IU from 1996 to 2000 
was reflected in a substantial drop in its negative correlations with second election 
abstention. 
The relationship between first election abstention and support for the regional parties 
showed very mixed patterns. The salience of the Centre-Periphery cleavage was 
clearly reflected in the Basque Country. First election abstention related positively to 
second election support for all the Basque parties at all of the pairs of elections 
studied. The Catalan parties showed mixed and erratic patterns, while the support for 
the Galician BNG related negatively to first election abstention. This implies that 
there were substantial differences in the logics of electoral abstention within the 
Second Periphery. Thus, the assumptions regarding the Centre-Periphery cleavage 
was only in part reflected at the aggregate level. 
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3) In terms of aggregate electoral competition, the patterns indicated that the Centre-
Periphery cleavage had become strengthened at the expense of the Left-Right 
cleavage as we approached the millennium. On the one hand, the negative relationship 
between support for the state-wide Left and Right of the 1970s in the first half of the 
1980s waned and even tended to turn into a positive relationship. On the other hand,  
we noted a steadily increasing negative relationship between first election support for 
the state-wide parties and second election support for the regional parties regardless of 
Left-Right orientation, the exceptions being very few. 
 
4) As to how the increase in aggregate stability related to the individual level loyalty, 
we noted in chapter 6 that the aggregate stabilisation of the electorate indeed reflected 
an overall increase in voter loyalty. However, the status of the H5 hypothesis related 
to the sequence of party stabilisation was somewhat less straightforward. The 
prediction was that, after the 1982 debacle, PSOE would the first of the state-wide 
parties to see an increase in loyalty rates between elections. This was supported by the 
ECOL data, whereas the survey data indicated that also AP/PP quickly stabilised its 
electorate. Both methods, however, showed clearly that PCE/IU lagged behind in this 
respect. As predicted, the results for CDS were more mixed. The recall method 
exhibited higher loyalty rates for the party than the ECOL estimates. They converged, 
however, in terms of the party’s demise in 1993. On the whole, then, the H5 
hypothesis was clearly supported with regard to PSOE and PCE/IU, but its status was 
less clear with regard to the two surviving parties of the Right. 
 
5) As to the role played by electoral abstention in the process of democratic transition 
and consolidation, we saw that the changes in electoral results and in the party system 
formats were to a substantial extent caused by differences between the parties in 
relation to transfers to and from abstention. At the 1977-79 pair of elections, which 
saw a substantial drop in turnout without any change in the state-wide party system, 
all the relevant parties lost former voters to abstention in a rather uniform fashion. At 
the mobilising election in 1982, the electoral gains for the winner PSOE and the “sub 
triumphant” AP/PP were to a large extent produced by the mobilisation of former 
abstainers, the CDS made a net gain whereas PCE/IU did not benefit from the 
increased turnout and UCD suffered a substantial net loss. Thus, the change in the 
party system was intimately linked to the dynamics of mobilisation and 
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demobilisation. Further, the reorientation of the PCE that culminated in the formation 
of the IU alliance was followed by period of net gains from abstention. This trend, 
however, came to an abrupt end in 2000. After its landslide victory, PSOE suffered 
net losses to abstention between 1982 and 1989. However, facing the challenge from 
the rejuvenated AP/PP in 1993, PSOE was once again able to obtain net gains from 
abstention. This trend ended in 2000 when the party suffered a net loss almost 
comparable to the one in 1986. On the Right, after obtaining net gains at the first two 
pairs of elections the CDS lost its grip on the voters suffered net losses both in 1989 
and 1993. The AP/PP, however, managed to obtain substantial net gains from 
abstention all the way from 1982 to 1996. Further, even though the turnout fell by 
more than seven percent from 1996 to 2000, AP/PP’s net loss was far smaller than the 
ones experienced by the state-wide Left. Thus, there is no doubt that the consolidation 
and growth of the AP/PP leading up to its eventual executive take-over was to a great 
extent caused by the structuring of electoral mobilisation and demobilisation. The 
conclusion, then, was that the assumption regarding the pivotal role played by 
electoral abstention in the transition and consolidation of the Spanish democracy was 
sustained by the individual level data. 
 
As to the mobilisation of new voters, the largest shares of the new voters opted for 
abstention at all the elections apart from the ones in 1982 and 1993. The main 
beneficiaries of this mobilisation were AP/PP and PSOE in 1982 and AP/PP in 1993. 
In addition, the share obtained by PSOE in 1993 nearly equalled the share that opted 
for abstention. Thus, the H1 hypothesis was sustained in that both realignment 
elections saw a substantial mobilisation of new voters. 
 
6) With regard to the hypotheses on electoral competition, we saw that patterns were 
in accord with the expectation in that the parties that lagged behind in party building 
after the transitional phase (PCE/IU, UCD and CDS) saw large shares of their former 
voters transfer to PSOE and AP/PP. After the formation of the IU alliance in 1986, the 
transfers from PCE/IU to the other parties decreased substantially and it was able to 
obtain net gains from both AP/PP and PSOE in the latter half of the 1980s. AP/PP 
was the main beneficiary of both UCD’s collapse and the demise of the CDS. On the 
whole, then, the H9 hypothesis was sustained by the individual level data. 
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For the question of how and to what extent the strengthening of the Centre-Periphery 
cleavage dimension observed in the aggregate analysis reflected an underlying 
tendency at the individual level, we observed that the transfers form the state-wide 
parties to the Catalan and Basque parties tended to decrease over the years. This 
tendency was particularly pronounced for the transfers form the state-wide Right to 
the Catalan and Basque Right. The transfers from the state-wide parties outside 
Catalonia and the Basque Country did not decrease in the same fashion.  
 
7) As to the patterns of mobilisation and demobilisation presented in chapter 7, a 
marked overall Centre-Periphery bias in the new voters propensity to opt for 
abstention was detected. While the Centre exhibited a negative balance of deviant 
cases, both the First Periphery and the Second Periphery exhibited positive balances. 
The H2 hypothesis was thus sustained. In terms of the new voter’s party choice, the 
Centre-Periphery bias was particularly marked for the state-wide Right. For the state-
wide Left, however, a slight modification of the initial hypothesis was called for. 
Although there was a marked difference in the relative distributions of deviant cases 
between the Centre and the Second Periphery both for PSOE and PCE/IU, they also 
showed positive balances in the First Periphery – and for PSOE the greatest difference 
was actually found between the First and the Second Periphery. Thus, we observed 
that the impact of the territorial cleavage was not evenly distributed along the 
functional axis of the state-wide party system(s) due to the strong showing of the Left 
in the First Periphery.  
 
Also the analysis of the first election abstainers showed an overall Centre-Periphery 
bias in their behaviour. The Second Periphery produced a substantially higher number 
of cases of large proportions of voters remaining demobilised at consecutive elections 
than cases of high levels of mobilisation. The First Periphery showed the same 
tendency, albeit to a lesser degree, while the tendency for the Centre, as expected, was 
quite the opposite. Thus, the H4 hypothesis was sustained by the data.  
 
In terms of the first election abstainers’ party choice, the state-wide parties were far 
more successful in mobilising the former abstainers in the Centre districts than in the 
First and Second Peripheries. The H10 hypothesis was therefore supported in general 
terms. This also held for the state-wide Right. For the Left, however, there was hardly 
 215
any difference between the Centre and the First Periphery. The patterns of 
demobilisation were more mixed. For both PSOE on the Left and AP/PP and CDS on 
the Right the patterns were in accord with the strict application of the Centre-
Periphery concept. For PCE/IU and UCD, however, the pattern of demobilisation ran 
contrary to the hypothesis. Nonetheless, the general conclusion was that we had 
detected an overall Centre-Periphery bias in the patterns of mobilisation and 
demobilisation for the state-wide parties between the seven pairs of elections from 
1977 to 2000. At the same time, we had detected that also in this respect the effect of 
the Centre-Periphery cleavage was unevenly distributed along the functional Left-
Right axis. After UCD’s collapse, the ability of the state-wide Right both to mobilise 
former abstainers and to retain former voters had definitely been skewed towards the 
Centre, while the state-wide Left had been far more successful in this respect also in 
the First-Periphery. Thus, we concluded that the Centre-Periphery axis and the Left-
Right axis co-varied in a certain fashion.  
 
8) As to the Centre-Periphery patterns of electoral stabilisation presented in chapter 8, 
it was only the distribution of deviant cases for the CDS that followed the strict 
pattern predicted by the H6 hypothesis. Although there was a general Centre-
Periphery bias in terms of differences between the Second Periphery versus either the 
Centre or the First Periphery also for the other parties, the initial expectations 
regarding the pattern of electoral stabilisation were not met for all the parties and the 
general assumption had to be modified.  
While all the parties seen together exhibited a strongly negative balance of deviant 
cases indicating a generalised lower ability to retain the voters in the Second 
Periphery, they differed substantially as to their ability to retain former voters in the 
First Periphery. Whereas both the parties of the state-wide Left, PCE/IU and PSOE, 
together with the UCD, showed the strongest ability to retain their voters in the First 
Periphery, both the CDS and the AP/PP showed their strongest ability in the Centre. 
Thus, after the collapse of the UCD, the loyalty patterns for the state-wide parties 
showed a clear differentiation along the functional Left-Right axis. The PCE/IU 
exhibited a positive balance both in the First Periphery and in the Centre in 
combination with a strong negative balance in the Second Periphery. This pattern also 
held for the PSOE, although the differences were less pronounced than for the 
PCE/IU. On the other hand, both the AP/PP and the CDS exhibited negative balances 
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both in the First and Second Peripheries, albeit AP/PP’s strong showing in Galicia 
palliated the effect of the centre-periphery cleavage for this party to a substantial 
degree.  
In terms of party blocs, however, the patterns were far more similar to the one 
detected for mobilisation. Although the difference between the Centre and the First 
Periphery for all the parties lumped together was not very substantial, the pattern was 
nonetheless in accord with the H6 hypothesis. This also held for the party bloc on the 
Right, whereas the party-bloc on the Left exhibited the by now familiar deviating 
pattern. Thus, the overall conclusion was that, although the bias was not as 
pronounced as the one found in relation to mobilisation, the Centre-Periphery axis and 
the Left-Right axis also had come to co-vary in relation to electoral stabilisation.  
 
9) The analyses of Centre-Periphery patterns of electoral competition presented in 
chapter 9 detected a very mixed set of patterns for the individual parties. The vast 
majority of the patterns of deviant cases did not meet the expectations stated in the 
H10 hypothesis. However, in the analyses of the mean transfers for the party blocs we 
found a set of patterns that were more similar to the ones already detected for 
mobilisation and stabilisation. The intra-bloc transfers on the Left were more 
pronounced in the First Periphery than both in the Centre and, of course, the Second 
Periphery. The transfers from the Left to the Right exhibited a positive balance both 
in the Centre and in the Second Periphery, while the balance in the First Periphery 
was negative. However, as shown when the AP/PP was singled out as the option of 
the transferred votes, the narrowing down of the electoral market produced by the 
collapse of the UCD and the demise of the CDS implied that the state-wide party 
system had become somewhat more clear-cut as to the relationship between the Left-
Right and the Centre-Periphery cleavages. Even though the differences were not 
overwhelming, the pattern of deviant cases regarding transfers from the Left to AP/PP 
was accord with the expectation stated in the hypothesis. Likewise, the intra-bloc 
transfers on the Right exhibited a pattern according to the expectations derived from 
the straightforward Centre-Periphery concept. Thus, we concluded that, after the 
disappearance of the UCD and the CDS, the logic of state-wide party competition 
along the two main axes of the party system had become akin to the pattern already 
detected for mobilisation and stabilisation.      
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Table 10.1 Status of the hypotheses 
 
No.                                           Hypotheses          
Status 
H1 In general, the largest proportions of the new voters have opted for abstention 
between 1977 and 2000. The realignment elections in 1982 and 1993, 
however, saw a sharp increase in turnout among the new voters. 
             
Sustained 
H2 Substantially lower proportions of new voters have turned out in the 
Peripheries than in the Centre between 1977 and 2000. The greatest 
differences in turnout will be found between the Second Periphery and the 
Centre.  
           
Sustained 
H3 In general, the largest proportion of those who abstained at the first election 
opted for abstention again at the second election between 1977 and 2000. The 
realignment elections in 1982 and 1993, however, saw a sharp increase in 
turnout among former abstainers. 
           
Sustained 
H4 Larger proportions of abstainers at the first election have opted for abstention 
again at the second election in the Peripheries than in the Centre between 
1977 and 2000. The greatest differences will be found between the Second 
Periphery and the Centre. 
           
Sustained 
H5 PSOE was the first state-wide party that managed to consolidate its electoral 
constituency in terms of increased loyalty rates between elections, followed by 





H6 The loyalty rates commanded by the state-wide parties were substantially 
lower in the Peripheries than in the Centre between 1977 and 2000. The 
greatest difference in loyalty rates will be found between the Centre and the 




H7 The Basque and Catalan Right saw a substantial increase in voter loyalty 
between the general elections after 1980. The Basque Left quickly followed 
suit, while the Catalan and Galician Left lagged behind. For the regional 
parties of the First Periphery no clear trend will be identified. 
 
Sustained 
H8 The new voters’ party choice will have followed the sequential translation of 
cleavages in that the UCD polled a large share between 1977 and 1979, the 
PSOE polled large shares from 1982 and onwards, the PCE/IU increased its 
share in the latter half of the 1980s and AP/PP became the preferred party for 




H9 The parties that lagged behind in party building after the transitional phase 
(PCE/IU, UCD and CDS) saw large proportions of their former voters 
transfer to PSOE and AP/PP between 1982 and 2000. With the formation of 
the IU alliance in 1986, the PCE/IU made net gains from the other parties. 
 
Sustained 
H10 The trends in voter mobilisation and transfers between the state-wide parties 
have differed markedly between the Centre and the Peripheries. The greatest 







Thus, as listed in table 10.1, in terms of the overall status of the hypotheses derived 
from the theory on the electoral nexus in relation to the process of democratisation in 
Spain, we note that six of the hypotheses have been sustained by the data and four 
have been only partially sustained.  
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Of the hypothesis only partially sustained, we have seen that the predicted timing of 
the stabilisation of the party vote for the AP/PP stated in hypothesis H5 was not 
observed in the recall data. Even though there are substantial indications that the 
loyalty rates for AP/PP were over-estimated in surveys during the first years of 
democratic rule, we will nonetheless have to conclude that the hypothesis is not 
sustained for this party. In relation to the H8 hypothesis, we saw that, although the 
AP/PP made huge inroads into the group of new voters, it was not the most preferred 
party at the takeover election in 1996. However, in the relation to the theory on the 
electoral nexus, the most interesting of the hypotheses only partially sustained are the 
H6 and H10. By submitting these two hypotheses to empirical tests, we have learned 
that in the process of democratic consolidation the two main cleavages of Spanish 
politics, the Centre-Periphery cleavage and the Left-Right cleavage, have co-varied in 
a particular fashion.   
 
Thus, briefly summarised, these two particular aspects of the Spanish experience 
merit particular attention: First, electoral mobilisation and demobilisation has played 
a pivotal role in the formation of the party systems(s) in Spain, both in temporal and 
in territorial terms. The patterns of electoral mobilisation and demobilisation have to 
a substantial extent been structured according to the timing of the translation of 
societal divisions into manifest cleavages along the Left-Right axis and at the same 
time been structured in accord with the general theory on Centre and Peripheries. 
Second, the Centre-Periphery axis and the Left-Right axis have co-varied in line with 
the notion that the Spanish Left came to accept that the territorial restructuring of the 
state was paramount to the consolidation of democracy. Consequently, to the extent 
that the electoral participation and party choice in Spain between 1977 and 2000 can 
be understood in relation to how the parties and voters handled the problems posed by 
the transition from authoritarianism and democratic consolidation, the differentiation 
of the effect of the Centre-Periphery cleavage along the Left-Right axis is paramount 
to the understanding of the electoral nexus between the sequence of cleavage 





Further research  
 
The investigation conducted and the findings presented in this dissertation have been 
limited to the general elections to the Spanish lower chamber. They have also been 
limited the state-wide parties and only the most important of the regional parties. Also 
in terms of the categorisation of Centre and Peripheries the analysis conducted has 
been rather crude. Thus, as there are no inherent limitations to the use of the ECOL 
method also to assess the behaviour of voters both at the regional and district level 
and expand the scope of parties to include all the relevant regional parties, the first 
implication to be stated is that the scope of the analysis should be expanded in order 
to cover all the relevant parties at different kinds of elections, i.e. including the parties 
that have obtained representation in the regional parliaments.  In particular, analyses 
of the dynamics of electoral behaviour between the general elections and the regional 
elections to the Autonomous parliaments would be extremely useful in order to assess 
the full impact of cleavage formation in the modern Spanish democracy. In this, both 
the impact of electoral mobilisation and demobilisation and the extent of transfers 
between the state-wide and the regional parties at the regional versus the general 
elections should be assessed. In addition, the extent and logics of ‘split ticket’ voting 
proper should be investigated. This last point is made with particular reference to 
Andalucía where the general and regional elections are held simultaneously.   
Thus, in order to make full advantage of the lessons from Spain for possible 
extrapolations to other processes of transition and democratic consolidation, more 
extensive studies of the Spanish elections are called for.  
 
Furthermore, as there are many countries around the world that have undergone 
processes of democratic transition and consolidation, the ECOL method for aggregate 
analysis and ecological inference could be employed to conduct analyses similar to 
the ones undertaken in this dissertation. The advantage of the ECOL method is that it 
is based on already existing electoral data tied to territorial sub units. Thus, the fact 
that reliable survey data tied to the level of electoral districts are often lacking in 
many of the pertaining countries should not refrain students from embarking upon 
analyses of territorial differentiation of dynamic behaviour between elections. 
Although there are some fundamental methodological caveats to this method in terms 
of estimating the true proportions of the transition matrixes, it yields results that are 
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fruitful in order to assess both the trends over time and the systematic differences 
along the territorial axis. Such analyses would be extremely valuable in refining our 
understanding of the electoral nexus between the behaviour of the political elites and 
the common citizenry as to the institutionalisation of parties and party systems in 
general and in the processes of democratic consolidation in particular.   
Hopefully, then, this dissertation may serve as a source of inspiration for students 
interested in this particular role played by elections in the process of translating sets of 
pertaining societal divisions into manifest cleavages in many other countries of the 






































































Acha Ugarte, B. and Pérez-Nievas, S. (1998): “Moderate nationalist parties in the 
Basque Country: Partido Nacionalista Vasco and Eusko Alkartasuna” in De Winter, 
L. and Türsan, H. (eds.): Regionalist Parties in Western Europe. London: Routledge. 
 
Achen, C.H. and Shively, W.P. (1995): Cross-Level Inference. Chicago/London: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Aja, E. (1993): "Balance Polémico" in Historia 16, año XVI, no.200, pp. 51-60. 
 
Alcántara, M. and Martínez, A. (eds.) (1997): Política y Gobierno en España. 
Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch. 
 
Alcántara, M. and Martínez, A. (eds.) (1998): Las elecciones autonómicas en España. 
Madrid: CIS. 
 
Alker. H.R. (1965): Mathematics and Politics, New York: Macmillan. 
 
Alker, H.R. (1969): "A Typology of Ecological Fallacies" in Dogan, M. and Rokkan, 
S. (eds.) (1969): Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge/London: MIT Press. 
 
Alt, J.E. and Boix, C. (2001): “Partisan Voting in the Spanish 1986 NATO 
Referendum: An Ecological Analysis” in Electoral Studies, 10, pp. 18-32. 
 
Alter, P. (1985): Nationalism, London: Edward Arnold. 
 
Álvarez Bolado, A. (1991): "Aprender de los Muertos: Panorama de la Iglesia 
Española desde 1931 a Nuestros Días" in Temas de Nuestra Epoca, El País 11. 4 
1991. 
 
Amodia, J. (1983): "Union of the Democratic Centre" in Bell, D.S.(ed.): Democratic 
Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics after Franco. London: Frances Pinter. 
 
Anduiza, E. and Bosch, A. (2004): Comportamiento politico y electoral. Barcelona: 
Ariel. 
 
Anduiza, E. and Méndez, M. (1997): “Elecciones y comportamiento electoral” in 
Alcántara, M. and Martínez, A. (eds.) (1997): Política y Gobierno en España. 
Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch. 
 




Bakka, P.H. (1998): Explaining Europe: a Weberian reconstruction of European 
political development based on Stein Rokkan's conceptual map of Europe. University 
of Bergen: Ph.D. dissertation. 
 
Bakka, P.H. (1997): "Deconstructing Europe". University of Bergen: UBBSV/ISP. 
Paper presented at the 5th National Political Science Conference at Geilo, January 
1997. 
 
Balcells, A. (1996): Catalan Nationalism. Houndmills: Macmillan. 
 
Balcells, A. (1992): "Cataluña: la marcha hacia el autogobierno" in Historia 16, 200. 
pp. 62-70. 
 
Baras, M. and Botella, J. (1996): El sistema electoral. Madrid: Tecnos. 
 
Barnes, S., McDonough, P. and López Pina, A. (1986): «Volatile Parties and Stable 
Voters in Spain» in Government and Opposition, 21(1) pp. 57-75. 
 
Barth, F. (ed.) (1969): Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of 
Cultural Difference. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (1990): Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability. 
The Stabilisation of European Electorates, 1885-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Barreiro, B. (2001): “Los determinantes de la participación en las elecciones 
españolas de marzo de 2000: El problema de la abstención en la izquierda.” 
Estudios/Working Paper 2001/171. Madrid: Instituto Juan March. 
 
Bell, D. S. (1983): "The Spanish Communist Party in the Transition" in Bell, 
D.S.(ed.): Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics after Franco. London: 
Frances Pinter. 
 
Berglund, S. and Dellenbrant, J.A. (eds.) (1994): The New Democracies in Eastern 
Europe: Party Systems and Political Cleavages. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
 
Berglund, S. and Aarebrot, F. (2001): Challenges to democracy: Eastern Europe ten 
years after the collapse of communism. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Berntzen, E., Buck, M. and Marsteintredet, L. (2006): ”La política comparada: a 
caballos entre historia y función” in de Cueto, C. (ed.): Sistemas políticos 
contemporáneos. Granada: Comares (forthcoming). 
 
Berntzen, E. and Selle, P. (1988): "Struktur og aktør i Stein Rokkans forskning" in 
Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, 4, 33, pp. 245-266. 
 
Berry, W. D.(1993): Understanding Regression Assumptions, Newbury Park: Sage. 
   
Blinkhorn, M. (ed.) (1986): Spain in Conflict 1931- 1939: Democracy and its 
Enemies. London: Sage. 
 224
Boetsch, L.: (1985) "The Church in Spanish Politics" in Lancaster, T. D. and Prevorst, 
G. (eds.): Politics and Change in Spain. New York: Praeger. 
 
Boix, C. and C. Riba (2000): “Las bases sociales y políticas de la abstención en las 
elecciones generales epsañolas: recursos individuales, movilización estatrégica e 
instituciones electorales” in Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 90, pp. 
95-128. 
 
Bohrnstedt, G. W. and Knoke, D. (1994): Statistics for Social Data Analysis. Ithaca 
(Illinois): F. E. Peacock Publishers. 
 
Bonime, A. R .(1985): "The Spanish State Structure: Constitution Making and the 
Creation of the New State" in Lancaster, T. D. and Prevorst, G. (eds.): Politics and 
Change in Spain. New York: Praeger. 
 
Botella, J. (1984): Elementos del sistema de partidos de la Cataluña actual, 
Barcelona: UAB.  
 
Boyd, C. P. and Boyden, J.M. (1985): "The Armed Forces and the Transition to 
Democracy in Spain" in  Lancaster, T. D. and Prevorst, G. (eds.): Politics and Change 
in Spain. New York: Praeger. 
 
Brand, J. A. (1985): "Nationalism and the Noncolonial Periphery: a Discussion of 
Scotland and Catalonia" in Tiryakian, E. and Rogowski, R. (eds.): New Nationalisms 
of the Developed West. Boston: Allen and Unwin. 
 
Brenan, G. (1978): El laberinto español: Antecedentes sociales y políticos de la 
guerra civil, Barcelona: Ruedo Iberio. 
 
Brown, P., Firth, D. and Payne, C. (1999): “Forecasting on British Election Night 
1997”. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (Series A), 162, pp. 211-226. 
 
Buck, M. (1998): “The Exemplary Transition from Authoritarianism: Some Notes on 
the Legacy of Undemocratic Decision-Making in Spain” in Larsen, S.U. (ed.) (1998): 
Modern Europe After Fascism 1943-1980s. New York: Colombia University Press. 
 
Buck, M. (1994): Territorium, Økonomi, Kultur. En økologisk analyse av valgene i 
Katalonia 1988/1989. Master thesis, University of Bergen, Department of 
Comparative Politics. 
 
Caciagli, M. (1986): Elecciones y partidos en la transición española. Madrid: CIS 
and Siglo XXI. 
 
Caciagli, M. (1984): "Spain: Parties and the Party System in the Transition" in West 
European Politics, 7, 2, pp. 84-98. 
 
Calvo, K. and Montero, J. R. (2002): “Cuando ser conservador ya no es un problema: 
Religiosidad, idelología y voto en las elecciones generales de 2000”. Estudio/Working 
paper 9/2002. Madrid: Instituto Juan March.  
 
 225
Canals, R. M., Molins, J. M., Pallarès, F., Valls, J. M. and Virós, R. (1990): Atlas 
electoral de Catalunya 1982-1988. Estudis Electorals / 9. Bellaterra: UAB.  
 
Candel, F. (1965): Los Otros Catalanes. Barcelona: Península. 
 
Candel, F. (1972): Inmigrantes y Trabajadores. Barcelona: Planeta. 
 
Caramani, D. (2004): The Nationalization of Politics – The Formation of National 
Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Carr, R. (1979): España, 1808-1939. Barcelona: Ariel. 
 
Carr, R. (1980): Modern Spain, 1875-1980. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Cazorla, J. and  Montabes, J. (1983): "The Social Structure of Spain" in Bell, D. S. 
(ed.): Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics after Franco. London: Frances 
Pinter. 
 
Clark, R. P. (1985): "Madrid and the Ethnic Homelands: is Consociational democracy 
Possible in Post-Franco Spain?" in Lancaster, T. D. and Prevorst, G. (eds.): Politics 
and Change in Spain. New York: Praeger. 
 
Clavero Arévalo, M. (1983): España, desde el Centralismo a las Autonomías. 
Barcelona: Editorial Planeta.  
 
Collier, D. y Adcock, R. (1999): “Democracy and Dichotomies. A Pragmatic 
Approach to Choices about concepts.” in Annual Review of Political Science, 2 , pp. 
537-565.  
 
Collier, D. y Levitsky S. (1997): “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation 
in Comparative Research.” in World Politics, 49, 3, pp. 430-451.  
 
Collier, D. y Mahon, J. (1993): “Conceptual ”Streching” Revisited: Adapting 
categories in Comparative Analysis.” in American Political Science Review, 4, pp. 
845-855. 
 
Colomer, J. M. (1986): Cataluña como Cuestión de Estado: La Idea de Nación en el 
Pensamiento Político Catalán (1939-1979). Madrid: Tecnos. 
 
Colomer, J. M. (1991): "Un radicalismo rural y agrario: Las relaciones capital-trabajo, 
marcadas por el maximalismo" in Temas de Nuestra Epoca, El País 11. 4 1991. 
 
Colomer, J. M. (1996): “Spain and Portugal – Rule by party leadership” in Colomer, 
J.M. (ed.): Political Institutions in Europe. London/New York: Routledge.   
 





Corkill, D. (1996): «Multiple national identities, immigration and nationalism in 
Spain and Portugal» in Jenkins, B. and Sofos, S.A. (eds): Nation and Identity in 
Contemporary Europe. 
London/New York: Routledge. 
 
Cox, G. (1997): Making votes count: Strategic coordination in the World’s electoral 
systems.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Crewe, I. and Denver, D. (eds.) (1985): Electoral Change in Western Democracies- 
Patterns and Sources of Electoral Volatility. London: Croom Helm. 
  
Crewe, I. and Payne, C. (1976): “Another Game with Nature: An Ecological 
Regression Model of the British Two-Party Vote Ratio in 1970”. British Journal of 
Political Science, 6, pp. 43-81. 
 
Cruells, M. (1965): Els no Catalans i Nosaltres. Barcelona: Aportació Catalana. 
 
Cyert, R.M. and March, J.G. (1992): A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Blackwell. 
 
Daalder, H. (2001): “The Rise of Parties in Western Democracies” in Diamond, L. 
and Gunther, R. (eds.): Political parties and democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
 
Dalton, R.J. (1996): Citizen Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies. Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers. 
 
de Burgos, J. (1983): España: Por un Estado Federal. Barcelona: Argos Vergara. 
 
de Carranza, M. T. (1982): "El Desequilibrio Regional". Estudios Territoriales  6, pp. 
111-128. 
 
De Winter, L. and Türsan, H. (eds.) (1998): Regionalist Parties in Western Europe. 
London: Routledge. 
 
del Castillo, P. (ed.) (1994): Comportamiento político y electoral. Madrid: CIS. 
 
del Castillo, P. and Sani, G. (1986): “Las elecciones de 1986: Continuidad sin 
consolidación” in Linz, J. J. and Montero J. R.(eds.): Crisis y cambio: Electores y 
partidos en la España de los años ochenta. Madrid: Centro de estudios 
constitucionales. 
 
Delgado, I. (1997): El comportamiento electoral municipal español, 1979-1995. 
Madrid: CIS. 
 






Diamandouros, P.N. and Gunther, R. (eds.) (2001): Parties, Politics, and Democracy 
in the New Southern Europe. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Diamond, L. (1997): “Civil Society and the Development of Democracy”. 
Estudio/working paper 101. Madrid: Instituto Juan March. 
 
Diamond, L. and Gunther, R. (eds.) (2001): Political parties and democracy. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Dogan, M. and Rokkan, S. (eds.) (1969): Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge/London: MIT Press. 
 
Downs, A. (1957): An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper Collins. 
 
Elliot, J. E. (1963): The Revolt of the Catalans: a Study in the Decline of Spain (1598-
1640). London: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ellwood, S.M. (1986): "Falange Española, 1933-9: from fascism to Francoism" in 
Blinkhorn, M. (ed.): Spain in Conflict 1931- 1939: Democracy and its Enemies. 
London: Sage. 
 
Enyedi, Z. (2005): “The role of agency in cleavage formation” in European Journal 
of Political Research, vol. 44, 5. pp. 697-720. 
 
Esman, M. J. (ed) (1977): Ethnic Conflict in the Western World. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Font, J. (1993): ”Non-voting in Catalonia”. Working Paper no. 75. Barcelona: Institut 
de Ciències Polítiques i Socials.  
 
Fraga, M. (1975): Legitimidad y Representación. Madrid: Grijalbo. 
 
Fraga, M. (1978): La Crisis del Estado Español. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta.  
 
Fraga, M. (1983): Poder Autonómico, Poder Municipal. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta. 
 
Franklin, M.N. (2004): Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in 
Established Democracies Since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Fuchs, D. and Klingeman, H.-D. (1990): “The left-Right Schema” in Kent Jennings, 
M. et. al.(eds.): Continuities in Political Action: Longitudinal Study of Political 
Orientations in Three Western Democracies. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
 
Fusi Aizpurúa, J. P. (1993): "De las aspiraciones históricas al Estado de las 
Autonomías" in Historia 16, 200, pp. 24-31. 
 
Gallagher, T. (1991): "Autonomy in Spain: Lessons for Britain?" in Crick, B. (ed): 




Gellner, E. (1983): Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Gellner, E. (1987): Culture, Identity, and Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Gispert, C. and Prats, J. M. (1978): España: Un Estado Plurinacional. Barcelona: 
Blume. 
 
González Casanova, J. A. (1979): La Lucha por la Democracia en Catalunya, 
Barcelona: Dopesa.    
 
González Encinar, J.J. (1982): Galicia: Sistema de Partidos y Comportamiento 
Electoral 1976-1981. Madrid: AKAL. 
 
Goodman, L. (1953): “Ecological Regressions and the Behavior of Individuals”. 
American Sociological Review, 18, pp. 663-666. 
 
Goodman, L. (1959): “Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlation”. American 
Journal of Sociology, 64, pp. 610-624. 
 
Grugel, J. and Rees, T. (1997): Franco’s Spain. London: Arnold. 
 
Gunther, R., Sani, G., and Shabad, G. (1988): Spain After Franco: The Making of a 
Competitive Party System. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
 
Gunther, R. (1989): "Electoral Laws, Party systems, and Elites: the Case of Spain" in 
American Political Science Review, 83, 3, pp. 835-858. 
 
Gunther, R. (1991): “The Dynamics of Electoral Competition in a Modern Society: 
Models of Spanish Voting Behavior, 1979 and 1982”. Working Paper 28. Barcelona: 
Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials.  
 
Gunther, R., Diamandouros, P.N. and Puhle, H.-J. (eds.)(1995): The Politics of 
Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.   
 
Gunther, R. (ed.) (1993): Politics, Society, and Democracy: The Case of Spain. 
Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press. 
 
Gunther, R. and Hopkin, J. (2002): “A Crisis of Institutionalization: The Collapse of 
the UCD in Spain” in Gunther, R., Montero, J.R. and Linz, J.J. (eds.): Political 
Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Gunther, R. and Montero, J. R. (1994): “Los anclajes del partidismo: una análisis 
comparado del comportamiento electoral en cuatro democracias del Sur de Europa” in 
del Castillo, P. (ed.): Comportamiento político y electoral. Madrid: CIS. 
 
Gunther, R. and Montero, J. R. (2001): “The Anchors of Partisanship: A Comparative 
Analysis of Voting Behavior in Four Southern European Democracies” in 
 229
Diamandouros, P.N. and Gunther, R. (eds.): Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the 
New Southern Europe. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Hagtvedt, B. (ed.) (1993): Politikk mellom økonomi og kultur. Oslo: Ad Notam. 
 
Hanmer, M.J. and Traugott, M.W. (2004): ”The Impact of Voting by Mail on Voter 
Behavior” in  American Politics Research, 32(4), pp. 375-405. 
 
Hänisch, D. (1998): Die österreichischen NSDAP-Wähler. Eine empirische Analyse 
ihrer Herkunft und ihres Sozialprofils. Vienna: Böhlau. 
 
Hechter, M. (1975): Internal Colonialism: the Celtic Fringe in British National 
Development 1536-1966. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
 
Hechter, M. (1985): "Internal Colonialism Revisited" in Tiryakian, E.A. and 
Rogowski, R. (eds): New Nationalism of the developed West. Boston: Allen 
and Unwin. 
 
Heiberg, M. (1982): "Urban Politics and Rural Culture: Basque Nationalism" in 
Rokkan, S. and Urwin, D. W. (eds.): The Politics of territorial Identity: Studies in 
European Regionalism. London: Sage. 
 
Heidar, K. and Berntzen, E. (1995): Vesteuropeisk politikk. Partier, regjeringsmakt, 
styreform. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Heras, R. (1997): Enciclopedia política y atlas electoral de la democrácia española. 
Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy. 
 
Herrero, C., Solér, A. and Villar, A. (2004): Capital Humano y Desarrollo Humano 
en España, sus Comunidades Autónomas y Provincias. 1980-2000. Valencia: 
Fundació Bancaixa. 
Heywood, P. (1995): Government and Politics of Spain. Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan.   
 
Hoffman, J. (1988): State, Power, and Democracy: Contentious Concepts in Practical 
Political Theory. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books. 
 
Hopkin, J. (1999a): Party Formation and Democratic Transition in Spain. The 
Creation and Collapse of the Union of the Democratic Centre. London: Macmillan. 
 
Hopkin, J. (1999b): “Spain: Political Parties in a Young Democracy” in Broughton, 
D. and Donovan, M. (eds.): Changing Party Systems in Western Europe. London: 
Pinter. 
 
Hopkin, J. (2001): “A ‘Southern Model’ of Electoral Mobilisation? Clientelism and 
Electoral Politics in Spain” in West European Politics, 24, 1, pp. 115-136. 
 
 230
Hopkin, J. and  Paolucci, C. (1999): «The business firm model of party organisation: 
Cases from Spain and Italy» in European Journal of Political Research 35, pp. 307-
339. 
 
Horowitz, D. L. (1981): "Patterns of ethnic separatism" in Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 23, pp. 165-195. 
 
Huneeus, C. (1985): La Unión de Centro Democrático y la transición a la 
democracia en España. Madrid: CIS/Siglo XXI. 
 
Huntington, S. P. (1991): The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth 
Century. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. 
 
Inglehart, R. (1979): “The Impact of Values, Cognitive Level and Social Background” 
in Barnes, S.H. et.al. (eds): Political Action. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 
Inglehart, R. and Klingemann, H.-D. (1976): ”Party Identification, Ideological 
Preference and the Left-Right Dimension Among Western Mass Publics” in Budge, I., 
Crewe, I. and Farlie, D. (eds.): Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of 
Voting and Party Competition. London: John Wiley and Sons.  
 
Johnston, R. J., Shelley, F. M. and Taylor, P. J. (1990): Developments in Electoral 
Geography. London: Routledge. 
 
Juaristi, J. (1997): El bucle melancólico. Historias de nacionalistas. Madrid: Espasa.  
 
Juliá, S. (1991): "II República: hace 60 años" in Temas de Nuestra Epoca, El País 11. 
4 1991. 
 
Juliá, S. (2005): Historias de las dos Españas. Madrid: Taurus. 
 
Justel, M (1992): “El líder como como factor de explicación del voto.” Working 
Paper 51. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials.  
 
Justel, M. (1994): “Composición y dinámica de la abstención electoral en España” in 
del Castillo, P. (ed.): Comportamiento político y electoral. Madrid: CIS. 
 
Justel, M. (1995): La abstención electoral en España, 1977-1993. Madrid: CIS. 
 
Karl, T.L. and Schmitter, P.C. (1991): "Modes of Transition in Latin America, 
Southern and Eastern Europe" in International Social Science Journal 128, May, pp. 
269-284. 
 
Keating, M. (2001): Plurinational Democracy. Stateless Nations in a Post-
Sovereignty Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Keating, M. (1993): “Regionalismo, Autonomía y Regímenes Internacionales”. 
Working Paper no. 66. Barcelona: Institut de Ciéncies Polítiques i Socials. 
  
Kellas, J.G. (1991): The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. London: Macmillan. 
 231
 
Khleif, B.B. (1985): "Issues of Theory and Methodology in the Study of 
Ethnolinguistic Movements" in Tiryakian, E.A. and Rogowski, R. (eds): New 
Nationalism of the developed West. Boston: Allen and Unwin. 
 
King. G. (1997): A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem. Reconstructing 
Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Kitchelt, H. (2000): “Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic 
Politics” in Comparative Political Studies 33, 6/7, pp. 845-879. 
 
Klingemann, H.-D. (1979): ”Measuring Ideological Conceptualizations” in Barnes, 
S.H. et.al. (eds): Political Action. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 
Knutsen, O. (1997): “The Partisan and Value Based Component of the Left-Right 
Self-placement: Comparative Study” in International Political Science Review 
18, 2, pp. 191-225. 
 
Lane, J.E. and Ersson, S.O. (1987): Politics and Society in Western Europe. London: 
Sage. 
 
Leithner, C. (1997): “A Gender Gap in Australia? Commonwealth Elections 1910-
96”. Australian Journal of Political Science', 32, 1, pp. 29-47. 
 
Levi, M. and Hechter, M.: (1985): "A Rational Choice Approach to the Rise and 
Decline and Ethnoregional Political Parties" in Tiryakian, E.A. and Rogowski, R. 
(eds): New Nationalism of the developed West. Boston: Allen and Unwin.  
 
Liebert, U. (1990): "From polarization to pluralism: regional-nationalist parties in the 
process of democratic consolidation in post-Franco Spain" in Pridham, G. (ed.): 
Securing Democracy: political parties and democratic consolidation in southern 
Europe. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Linz, J. J. (1967): "The Party System of Spain: Past and Future" in Lipset, S. M. and 
Rokkan, S. (eds.): Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New York: The Free Press.  
 
Linz, J. J. (1973a): "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms Against 
the State" in Eisenstadt, S. N. and Rokkan, S. (eds.): Building States and Nations: 
Models, Analyses and Data Across Three Worlds, Vol. II.  Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 
Linz, J. J. (1973b): "Opposition in and under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of 
Spain"  in Dahl, R. (ed.): Regimes and Oppositions. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
 
Linz, J. J. (1975a): "Totalitarian and Authoritarian regimes", in Greenstein, F. I., and 




Linz, J. J. (1975b): "Politics in a Multi-Lingual Society with a Dominant World 
Language: The case of Spain” in Savard, J.- G. and Vigneault, R. (eds.): Les états 
multilingues: problems et solutions. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval.  
 
Linz, J. J. (1981a): "Peripheries within the periphery" in Torsvik, P. (ed.): 
Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures and Nation-Building. Bergen: 
Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Linz, J. J. (ed.) (1981b): Informe sociológico sobre el cambio político en España 
1975-1981. Madrid: FOESSA. 
   
Linz, J. J. (1985a): "De la crisis de un Estado unitario al estado de las Autonomías" in 
Fernández Rodríguez, F. (ed.): La España de las Autonomías. Madrid: Instituto de 
Estudios de Administración Local. 
 
Linz, J.J. (1985b): "From Primordialism to Nationalism" in Tiryakian, E.A. and 
Rogowski, R. (eds.): New Nationalism of the developed West. Boston: Allen 
and Unwin. 
 
Linz, J. J. (1986): "Religión y Política" in Linz, J. J. and Montero J. R.(eds.): Crisis y 
cambio: Electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta. Madrid: Centro de 
estudios constitucionales. 
 
Linz, J. J. (1993): “State Building and Nation-building” in European Review 1, 4, pp.                  
355-369. 
 
Linz, J. J., Stepan, A. and Gunther, R. (1995): “Democratic Transitions and 
Consolidation in Southern Europe (With Reflections on Latin America and Eastern 
Europe)” in Gunther, R., Diamandouros, P.N. and Puhle, H.-J. (eds.): The Politics of 
Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.   
 
 
Linz, J. J. and Stepan, A. (1996): Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Linz, J. J. and Montero, J. R. (2001): “The party systems of Spain. Old cleavages and 
new challenges” in Karvonen, L. and Kuhnle, S. (eds.): Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments Revisited. London/New York: Routledge. 
 
Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (eds.) (1967): Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New 
York: The Free Press. 
 
Llera, F. J. R. (1994): ”La construcción del pluralismo polarizado vasco” in del 
Castillo, P. (ed.): Comportamiento político y electoral. Madrid: CIS. 
 
Llera, F. J. R. (1998): ”Puralismo y gobernabilidad en Euskadi (1980-1994)” in 




López Pina, A. (1985): “Shaping the Constitution” in Penniman, H. R. and Mujal-
León, E. M.: Spain at the Polls 1977, 1979, and 1982. A Study of the National 
Elections. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press. 
 
López Pintor, R. (1982): La opinión pública española: Del franquismo a la 
democracia. Madrid: CIS. 
 
Madariaga, S. de (1961): Spain, A Modern History. London: Jonathan Cape. 
 
Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. R. (eds.) (1995): Building Democratic Institutions: 
Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
 
Mainwaring, S. and Torcal, M. (2004): “Class voting: Latin America and Western 
Europe”. Estudio/Working paper 32. Madrid: UAM. 
 
Mainwaring, S. and Torcal, M. (2006): “Party System Institutionalization and Party 
System Theory After the Third Wave of Democratization” in Richard S. Katz and 
Willliam Crotty (eds.): Handbook of Political Parties. London: Sage (forthcoming). 
 
Mair, P. (1990) (ed.): The West European Party System. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Mair, P. (1997): Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Malefakis, E. (1982): "Spain and Its Francoist Heritage" in Herz, J. H. (ed): From 
Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and 
Totalitarianism. Westport / London: Greenwood Press. 
 
Malefakis, E. (1993): "A Comparative Analysis of Workers' Movements in Spain and 
Italy" in Gunther, R. (ed.): Politics, Society and Democracy: The Case of Spain. 
Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press. 
 
Maravall, J. M. (1985): ”The Socialist Alternative: The Policies and Electorate of the 
PSOE” in Penniman, H. R. and Mujal-León, E. M.: Spain at the Polls 1977, 1979, 
and 1982. A Study of the National Elections. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press. 
 
Marcet, J. (1987): Convergència Democràtica de Cataluña. Madrid: CIS. 
 
Marcet, J. and Arguelaget, J. (1998): “Nationalist Parties in Catalonia: Convergència 
Democràtica de Catalunya and Esquerra Republicana” in De Winter, L. and Türsan, 
H. (eds.): Regionalist Parties in Western Europe. London: Routledge. 
 
Martín-Moreno, J. and de Miguel, A. (1980): Memoria Histórica e Inteligencia 
Sociológica en las Elecciones Generales de 1977. Barcelona: C.I.D.C. 
 
Martínez-Herrera, E. (2002): ”From Nation-building to Building Identification with 
Political Communities: Consequences of political decentralisation in Spain, the 
Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, 1978-2001” en European Journal of 
Political Research 41: 421-453. 
 234
Mata, J.M. (1998): ”Nationalism and Political Parties in the Autonomous Community 
of the Basque Country. Strategies and Tensions.” Working Paper no. 137. Barcelona: 
Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials. 
   
Mayall, J. (1990): Nationalism and Internal Society. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Mercadé, F. Hernández, F. and Oltra, B. (1983): Once tesis sobre la cuestión nacional 
en España. Barcelona: Anthropos. 
 
McDonough, P. and López Pina, A. (1984): "Continuity and Change in Spanish 
Politics" in Dalton, R. J.; Flanagan, S. C. and Beck, P. A. (eds.): Electoral Change in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Molas, I. (1994): “Abstenir-se és una altra manera de participar”. Working Paper no. 
100. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials. 
  
Molas, I. and Bartomeus, O. (1998): “Estructura de la competència política a 
Catalunya”. Working Paper no. 138. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i 
Socials.  
 
Molas, I. and Bartomeus, O. (1999): “Els espais de frontera entre els electorates. 
Estructura de la competència política a Catalunya (II)”. Working Paper no. 165. 
Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials. 
 
Montero, J.R. (1989): “Los fracasos politicos y electorales de la derecha español: 
Alinza Popular, 1976-1987” in Tezanos, J. F., Cotarelo, R. and de Blas, A. (eds): La 
transición democrática española. Madrid: Sistema.  
 
Montero, J.R. (1990): “Non-voting in Spain – Quantitative and Attitudinal Aspects”. 
Working Paper no. 22. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials.  
 
Montero, J. R. (1998): “El debate sobre el sistema electoral: rendimientos, criterios y 
propuestas de reforma” in Montabes, J. (ed.): El sistema electoral a debate. Veinte 
años de rendimientos del sistema electoral español (1977-1997). Madrid: CIS. 
 
Montero, J.R. and Calvo, K. (2000): “Religiosity and party choice in Spain: an elusive 
cleavage?” in Broughton, D. and ten Napel, H-M. (eds.): Religion and Mass Electoral 
Behaviour in Europe. London/New York: Routledge. 
 
Morata, F. (1997): “El Estado de las Autonomías” in Alcántara, M. and Martínez, A. 
(eds.): Política y Gobierno en España. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch. 
  
Morlino, L. (1995), "Political parties and democratic consolidation in Southern 
Europe" in R. Gunther, P. N. Diamandouros y H. J. Puhle (eds.), The Politics of 
Democratic Consolidation. Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. London: 




Morlino, L. y J. R. Montero (1995), "Legitimacy and democracy in Southern Europe" 
in R. Gunther, P. N. Diamandouros y H. J. Puhle (eds.), The Politics of Democratic 
Consolidation. Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
 
Moxon-Browne, E. (1989): Political Change in Spain. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Mujal-León, E. M. (1985): ”The Spanish Communists and the Search for Electoral 
Space” in Penniman, H. R. and Mujal-León, E. M.: Spain at the Polls 1977, 1979, and 
1982. A Study of the National Elections. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press. 
 
Müller-Rommel F. and Pridham, G. (eds.) (1991): Small Parties in Western Europe. 
Comparative and National Perspectives. London: Sage. 
 
Nash, E. (1983): "The Spanish Socialist Party since Franco" in Bell, D. S. (ed.): 
Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics after Franco. London: Frances Pinter. 
 
Newton, M. (1983): "The Peoples and Regions of Spain" in Bell, D. S.(ed.): 
Democratic  Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics after Franco. London: Frances Pinter. 
 
Nielsson, G.P. (1985): "States and 'Nation-Groups' a Global Taxonomy" in Tiryakian, 
E.A. and Rogowski, R. (eds.): New Nationalism of the developed West, 
Boston: Allen and Unwin.  
 
Nieuwbeerta, P. and Ultee, W. (1999): “Class voting in Western industrialized 
countries, 1945-1990: Systematizing and testing explanations” in European Journal 
of Political Research 35, pp. 123-160. 
 
O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. and Whitehead, L. (1986): Transition from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore/London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
 
Olmeda Gómez, J. A. (1991): "La Causa Militar: El largo camino hacia la supremacia 
civil" in Temas de Nuestra Epoca, El País 11. april 1991. 
 
Oñate, P. and  Ocaña, F.A. (1999): Análisis de datos electorales. Madrid: CIS. 
 
Oppenhuis, E. (1995): Voting Behavior in Europe. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis. 
 
Park, W.-H. (2003): "Estimation of Voter Transition Rates and Ecological Inference". 
University of Florida: 2003 Harold Gosnell Prize Winner (best political methodology 
paper). 
 
Payne, S. G.: ”Representative Government in Spain: The Historical Background” in 
Penniman, H. R. and Mujal-León, E. M.: Spain at the Polls 1977, 1979, and 1982. A 
Study of the National Elections. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press. 
 
 236
Payne, S. G.: "The Defascistization of the Franco Regime, 1942-1975" in Larsen, 
S.U. (ed.) (1998): Modern Europe After Fascism 1943-1980s. New York: Colombia 
University Press. 
 
Pérez-Díaz, V. M. (1993): The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic 
Spain. Boston: Harvard University Press. 
 
Pi-Sunyer, O. (1985): "Catalan Nationalism", in Tiryakian, E.A. and Rogowski, R. 
(eds), New Nationalism of the developed West, Boston: Allen and Unwin. 
 
Pizzorno, A. (1990): “Parties in Pluralism” in Mair, P. (ed.): The West European 
Party System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Prevorst, G. (1985): "The Spanish Labor Movement" in Lancaster T. D. and Prevorst, 
G. (eds.): Politics and Change in Spain. New York: Praeger. 
 
Pridham, G. and Lewis, P.G. (eds.) (1996): Stabilising Fragile Democracies. 
Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Western Europe.  London: Routledge. 
 
Pujol, J. (1976): La Inmigració, Problema in Esperança de Catalunya. Barcelons: 
Nova Terra. 
 
Pujol, J. (1979): Construir Catalunya, Barcelona: Pórtic. 
 
Puhle, H.-J. (2005): “Democratic Consolidation and ‘Defective Democracies’”. 
Estudio/Working Paper 47/2005. Madrid: UAM.  
 
Puhle, H.-J. (1986): “El PSOE: un partido predominante y heterogéneo” in Linz, J. J. 
and Montero J. R.(eds.): Crisis y cambio: Electores y partidos en la España de los 
años ochenta. Madrid: Centro de estudios constitucionales. 
 
Renan, E. (1970): "What is a nation?" in Renan, E.: Poetry of the Celtic Races and 
Other Studies. London: Kennikat Press. 
 
Ribe, C. and Cuxart, A. (2003): “Asociacionismo y participación electoral. Un estudio 
mulitnivel de las elecciones generales españolas del año 2000”. Paper presented at the 
Vi Congress of the AECPA, Barcelona, September 18th-20th 2003. 
 
Robinson, W. S. (1950): "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals" in 
American Sociological Review, 15, pp. 351-357. 
 
Rogowski, R. (1985): “….” in Tiryakian, E.A. and Rogowski, R. (eds.): New 
Nationalism of the developed West. Boston: Allen and Unwin. 
 
Rokkan, S. (1970): Citizens, Elections, Parties. New York: Mc Kay. 
 
Rokkan, S. (1999): State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe. 
The Theory of Stein Rokkan. (Edited by Flora, P., Kuhnle, S. and Urwin, D.) Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
 237
Rokkan, S. and Urwin, D. W. (eds.) (1982): The Politics of Territorial Identity: 
Studies in European Regionalism. London: Sage. 
 
Rokkan, S. and Urwin, D. W. (1983): Economy, Territory, Identity. London: Sage.  
 
Rokkan, S. (1987): Stat, Nasjon, Klasse. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.  
 
Rokkan, S., Urwin, D., Aarebrot F.H., Malaba, P., and Sande, T. (1987): Centre-
Periphery Structures in Europe. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag. 
 
Rose, R. and Urwin, D.W. (1975): Regional Differentiation and Political Unity in 
Western Nations, London/Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 
Rovira Virgili, A. (1930): El nacionalismo catalán, Barcelona: Minerva. 
 
Sánchez-Sierra, A. (2005): ”El pacto PSOE-IU en las elecciones generales de 2000: 
estrategia electoral, proceso negociador y efectos.” Estudio/Working Paper 44/2005. 
Madrid: UAM. 
 
Sani, G. (1986): ” Los desplazamentos del electorado: anatomía del cambio” in Linz, 
J. J. and Montero J. R. (eds.): Crisis y cambio: Electores y partidos en la España de 
los años ochenta. Madrid: Centro de estudios constitucionales. 
 
Sartori, G. (1970): ”Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics.” in American 
Political Science Review, 4, pp. 1033-1053. 
 
Sartori, G. (1976): Parties and Party Systems: a Framework for Analysis, Volume I. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sartori, G. (1990): “The Sociology of Parties: A Critical Review” in Mair, P. (ed.): 
The West European Party System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sartori, G. (1994): Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into 
Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. London: MacMillan. 
 
Schmitter, P. (2001): “Parties Are Not What They Once Were” in Diamond, L. and 
Gunther, R. (eds.): Political parties and democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
 
Schedler, A. (2001): “Taking Uncertainty Seriously: The Blurred Boundaries of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation” in Democratization, 8, 4, pp. 1-22. 
 
Smith, G. (1989): Politics in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Aldershot: 
Dartmouth.  
 
Solé, C. (1993): "The Integration of Immigrants in an Industrialized Society" in 
Gunther, R. (ed): Politics, Society and Democracy: The Case of Spain. Boulder and 
Oxford: Westview Press. 
 
 238
Solé Tura, J. (1985): Nacionalidades y Nacionalismos en España - Autonomías, 
Federalismo, Autodeterminación. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. 
 
Solé Tura, J. (1988): "Cataluña, España y el nacionalismo como determinante" in 
Armet, L. (ed), Federalismo y Estado de las Autonomías, Barcelona: Planeta. 
 
Strøm, K. (1990): “A Behavioural Theory of Competitive Political Parties” in 
American Journal of Political Science 34, pp. 565-98. 
 
Tacq, J. (1997): Multivariate Analysis Techniques in Social Science Research. From 
Problem to Analysis. London: Sage. 
 
Taylor, P. J. and Johnston, R.J. (1979): Geography of Elections. New York: Holmes 
& Meier. 
 
Tezanos, J. F. (1989): “Continuidad y cambio en el socialismo español: el PSOE 
durante la transición española” in Tezanos, J.F., Cotarelo, R. and Blas, A. de (eds.): 
La transición democrática española. Madrid: Sistema. 
 
Thomsen, S.R. (1987): Danish Elections 1920-1979: A Logit Approach to Ecological 
Analysis and Inference. Århus: Politica. 
 
Thomsen, S. R. and Kim, H. (1993): “Electoral Dynamics in South Korea Since 
1981”, Korean Studies, 17, pp. 39-66. 
 
Tilly, C. (ed) (1975): The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Tiryakian, E. A. (1978): "The time perspectives of modernity", Loisir et Société n.s. 1 
april pp. 125-153. 
 
Tiryakian, E. A. (1985) "Introduction" in Tiryakian, E.A. and Rogowski, R. (eds.): 
New Nationalism of the developed West, Boston: Allen and Unwin. 
 
Tiryakian, E. A. and Nevitte, Neil (1985): "Nationalism and Modernity" in Tiryakian, 
E.A. and Rogowski, R. (eds.): New Nationalism of the developed West. Boston: Allen 
and Unwin. 
 
Tóka, G. (1996): “Parties and electoral choices in east-central Europe” in Pridham, G. 
and Lewis, P.G. (eds.) (1996): Stabilising Fragile Democracies. Comparing New 
Party Systems in Southern and Western Europe.  London: Routledge. 
 
Torcal, M. and Mainwaring, S. (2003): “The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of 
Party Competition: Chile, 1973-95.” in British Journal of Political Science, 33, pp. 
55-84.  
 
Torcal, M. and Chhibber, P. (1995): “Elites, cleavages, y sistema de partidos en una 
democracia consolidada: España (1986-1992)” in Revista de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas, 69, pp. 7-38. 
 
 239
Tussel, J. G. (1985): ”The Democratic Center and Christian Democracy in the 
Elections of 1977 and 1979” in Penniman, H. R. and Mujal-León, E. M. (eds.): Spain 
at the Polls 1977, 1979, and 1982. A Study of the National Elections. Durham, N. C.: 
Duke University Press. 
 
Urwin, D.W. (1982): "Conclusion: Perspectives on Condition of Regional protest and 
accommodation" in Rokkan S. and Urwin D.W. (eds.): The Politics of Territorial 
Identity: Studies in European Regionalism. London: Sage. 
 
Vallès, J. M. (1991): “Entre la irregularidad y la indeterminación: balance sobre el 
comportamiento electoral en España (1977-1989)” in Vidal Beneyto, J. (ed.): España 
a debate. La política. Madrid: Tecnos. 
 
Van Deth, J. W. and Geurts, P. (1989): “Value Orientation, Left-Right Placement and 
Voting” in European Journal of Political Research, 17, pp. 17-34.   
 
Varela, S. (1991): "Respuesta a Litigios Históricos: del Estado Integral al Estado de 
las Autonomías" in Temas de Nuestra Epoca, El País 11. april 1991. 
 
Vilar, P. (1978): Cataluña en la España moderna. Barcelona: Crítica. 
 
Vilar, S. (1986): La Década Sorprendente 1976 - 1986. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta.  
 
Vilas Nogueira, J. (1992): “Las elecciones en Galicia (1976-1991)”. Working Paper 
57. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials.   
 
Wiarda, H. J. (1993): Politics in Iberia: the Political Systems of Spain and Portugal. 
New York: Harper Collins. 
 
Wert Ortega, J. I. (1985):”The Transition from Below: Public Opinion Among the 
Spanish Population from 1977 to 1979” in Penniman, H. R. and Mujal-León, E. M. 
(eds.): Spain at the Polls 1977, 1979, and 1982. A Study of the National Elections. 
Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press. 
 
Young, B. (1993): "The 1982 Elections and the Democratic Transition in Spain" in 
Bell, D. S. (ed.): Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics after Franco. 
London: Frances Pinter. 
 
Østerud, Ø. (1978): Utviklingsteori and Historisk Endring. Oslo: Gyldendal. 
 












                        Aggregate logit correlations 1977-2000:  
             For all pairs of elections, and the first and the second elections  
 
                      (NB! Included and excluded voters are labelled ‘nonvoters’) 
 

































Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.  
         1979: 
1977    PCE  PSOE   UCD    CD    EE   PNV    UN   CiU  ERFN    HB   PSA  CUPC   PAR Other Nonvo Absta 
===================================================================================================== 
PCE    0.89  0.50 -0.46 -0.12 -0.65  0.08  0.10 -0.48 -0.29  0.08  0.35  0.37 -0.04  0.16 -0.33 -0.33 
PSOE   0.63  0.79 -0.22 -0.10 -0.26 -0.33  0.23 -0.37 -0.33 -0.19  0.19  0.53 -0.04  0.11 -0.14 -0.47 
PSPUS  0.29  0.26  0.13  0.40 -0.25 -0.26  0.43 -0.28  0.18 -0.18  0.78  0.16  0.15  0.25 -0.10 -0.18 
UCD   -0.43 -0.14  0.82  0.23 -0.12 -0.59  0.22 -0.05  0.12 -0.57 -0.24  0.07 -0.06 -0.21  0.36 -0.09 
AP    -0.22 -0.12  0.39  0.64  0.12  0.04  0.49  0.23  0.35 -0.14  0.14 -0.11  0.12 -0.07  0.13 -0.05 
IDCC  -0.53 -0.53  0.36  0.37 -0.06  0.00  0.03  0.60  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.19  0.05  0.17 
PDPC  -0.49 -0.37  0.35  0.19 -0.04  0.00  0.16  0.82  0.37  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.30  0.18 -0.08 
ECFED  0.01 -0.13 -0.07  0.04 -0.15  0.00 -0.37 -0.13  0.49  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.21 -0.28  0.29 
EE     0.06  0.22  0.10  0.00  0.73 -0.36 -0.15  0.00  0.00  0.16  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.25 -0.38 -0.17 
PNV   -0.14 -0.41 -0.58  0.00  0.25  0.47 -0.11  0.00  0.00  0.47  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.37  0.02  0.15 
CAIC  -0.31 -0.23  0.23 -0.12  0.00  0.00 -0.17  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.37 -0.22  0.10 -0.17 
Other -0.14 -0.05  0.02  0.23  0.68 -0.51  0.19  0.13 -0.17 -0.25  0.33  0.72 -0.03  0.42 -0.01 -0.12 
Nonvo -0.20  0.05  0.38 -0.04  0.69 -0.03  0.15  0.01  0.20  0.15 -0.26  0.43  0.17 -0.43  0.31 -0.05 




Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.  
         1977: 
1977    PCE  PSOE PSPUS   UCD    AP  IDCC  PDPC ECFED    EE   PNV  CAIC Other Nonvo Absta 
========================================================================================= 
PCE    1.00  0.63  0.31 -0.47 -0.21 -0.50 -0.49  0.00  0.04 -0.24 -0.31 -0.07 -0.32 -0.41 
PSOE   0.63  1.00  0.33 -0.21 -0.08 -0.51 -0.53  0.02  0.38 -0.27 -0.35  0.10 -0.08 -0.55 
PSPUS  0.31  0.33  1.00  0.13  0.34 -0.03 -0.34  0.52 -0.01 -0.16 -0.28  0.23 -0.07 -0.27 
UCD   -0.47 -0.21  0.13  1.00  0.40  0.11 -0.05 -0.03  0.06 -0.69 -0.16  0.05  0.37 -0.15 
AP    -0.21 -0.08  0.34  0.40  1.00  0.49  0.26  0.06  0.13  0.04  0.05  0.15  0.18 -0.13 
IDCC  -0.50 -0.51 -0.03  0.11  0.49  1.00  0.63  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.12  0.26  0.10 
PDPC  -0.49 -0.53 -0.34 -0.05  0.26  0.63  1.00 -0.18  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.02  0.20 -0.10 
ECFED  0.00  0.02  0.52 -0.03  0.06  0.09 -0.18  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.11  0.12  0.25 
EE     0.04  0.38 -0.01  0.06  0.13  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 -0.09  0.00  0.36  0.27 -0.34 
PNV   -0.24 -0.27 -0.16 -0.69  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.09  1.00  0.00 -0.61  0.73  0.39 
CAIC  -0.31 -0.35 -0.28 -0.16  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 -0.10 -0.16 -0.18 
Other -0.07  0.10  0.23  0.05  0.15 -0.12 -0.02 -0.11  0.36 -0.61 -0.10  1.00 -0.13 -0.17 
Nonvo -0.32 -0.08 -0.07  0.37  0.18  0.26  0.20  0.12  0.27  0.73 -0.16 -0.13  1.00 -0.00 




Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.  
         1979: 
1979    PCE  PSOE   UCD    CD    EE   PNV    UN   CiU  ERFN    HB   PSA  CUPC   PAR Other Nonvo Absta 
===================================================================================================== 
PCE    1.00  0.58 -0.34 -0.14 -0.73  0.07  0.19 -0.44 -0.27  0.05  0.20  0.18  0.00  0.10 -0.28 -0.42 
PSOE   0.58  1.00 -0.00 -0.18 -0.49 -0.48  0.30 -0.36 -0.33 -0.34 -0.42  0.24 -0.30 -0.08 -0.01 -0.58 
UCD   -0.34 -0.00  1.00  0.20 -0.25 -0.71  0.32  0.28  0.32 -0.64 -0.34 -0.13 -0.10 -0.28  0.43 -0.27 
CD    -0.14 -0.18  0.20  1.00  0.20  0.20  0.36  0.26  0.27  0.09  0.45  0.50  0.18  0.23 -0.02  0.01 
EE    -0.73 -0.49 -0.25  0.20  1.00 -0.18  0.02 -0.02 -0.17  0.22  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.17  0.09  0.03 
PNV    0.07 -0.48 -0.71  0.20 -0.18  1.00 -0.17  0.00  0.00  0.70  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.49 -0.67  0.45 
UN     0.19  0.30  0.32  0.36  0.02 -0.17  1.00  0.08 -0.14 -0.34  0.15  0.46  0.06 -0.01  0.01 -0.43 
CiU   -0.44 -0.36  0.28  0.26 -0.02  0.00  0.08  1.00  0.31  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.24  0.09 -0.11 
ERFN  -0.27 -0.33  0.32  0.27 -0.17  0.00 -0.14  0.31  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.17  0.10  0.14 
HB     0.05 -0.34 -0.64  0.09  0.22  0.70 -0.34  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.41 -0.46  0.39 
PSA    0.20 -0.42 -0.34  0.45  0.00  0.00  0.15  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.59 -0.11 -0.05 
CUPC   0.18  0.24 -0.13  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.46  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.69  0.41 -0.44 
PAR    0.00 -0.30 -0.10  0.18  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.13 -0.16 -0.05 
Other  0.10 -0.08 -0.28  0.23  0.17 -0.49 -0.01 -0.24 -0.17 -0.41  0.59  0.69  0.13  1.00 -0.19 -0.03 
Nonvo -0.28 -0.01  0.43 -0.02  0.09 -0.67  0.01  0.09  0.10 -0.46 -0.11  0.41 -0.16 -0.19  1.00 -0.05 
Absta -0.42 -0.58 -0.27  0.01  0.03  0.45 -0.43 -0.11  0.14  0.39 -0.05 -0.44 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05  1.00 


































Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.  
         1982: 
1979    PCE  PSOE   UCD   CDS    AP   CiU   ERC    EE   PNV    HB OTHER Nonvo Absta 
=================================================================================== 
PCE    0.90  0.67 -0.68  0.01 -0.08 -0.67 -0.48  0.27  0.12 -0.06  0.06 -0.27 -0.50 
PSOE   0.55  0.84 -0.38  0.07  0.08 -0.61 -0.45 -0.05 -0.46 -0.37 -0.04 -0.04 -0.53 
UCD   -0.26 -0.08  0.73  0.34  0.63  0.44  0.30 -0.41 -0.72 -0.63  0.16  0.30 -0.08 
CD    -0.17 -0.19  0.09  0.42  0.66  0.36  0.33  0.07  0.24  0.16  0.06 -0.00 -0.11 
UN     0.20  0.26  0.06  0.33  0.51 -0.02 -0.15 -0.04 -0.19 -0.50  0.10 -0.06 -0.42 
CiU   -0.42 -0.59  0.08 -0.15  0.14  0.82  0.58  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.14  0.16 -0.19 
ERFN  -0.20 -0.40  0.21  0.22  0.26  0.43  0.77  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.14  0.28 -0.01 
EE    -0.71 -0.58  0.34 -0.32 -0.44 -0.19 -0.22  0.69 -0.10  0.38 -0.57  0.12  0.37 
PNV   -0.05 -0.56 -0.26 -0.56 -0.54  0.00  0.00  0.62  0.93  0.55 -0.19 -0.29  0.25 
HB    -0.04 -0.39 -0.26 -0.48 -0.58  0.00  0.00  0.55  0.66  0.86 -0.24 -0.11  0.32 
PSA    0.05  0.21 -0.53  0.23  0.22  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.67 -0.22 -0.10 
CUPC   0.00  0.38 -0.70  0.14  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.75 -0.05 -0.22 
PAR    0.03 -0.08 -0.10  0.18  0.39  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.11 -0.04 -0.22 
OTHER  0.01  0.02 -0.30  0.18  0.04 -0.41 -0.27 -0.43 -0.58 -0.43  0.26 -0.19 -0.08 
Nonvo  0.00  0.17  0.26 -0.21  0.06 -0.12 -0.16  0.07  0.15  0.18  0.02 -0.13  0.04 




Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.  
         1979: 
1979    PCE  PSOE   UCD    CD    UN   CiU  ERFN    EE   PNV    HB   PSA  CUPC   PAR OTHER Nonvo Absta 
===================================================================================================== 
PCE    1.00  0.58 -0.35 -0.15  0.19 -0.46 -0.29 -0.74  0.04  0.02  0.18  0.16 -0.00  0.10 -0.07 -0.40 
PSOE   0.58  1.00 -0.02 -0.18  0.29 -0.37 -0.33 -0.51 -0.50 -0.34 -0.43  0.24 -0.29 -0.07  0.08 -0.56 
UCD   -0.35 -0.02  1.00  0.21  0.31  0.27  0.31 -0.27 -0.71 -0.64 -0.34 -0.19 -0.11 -0.27  0.25 -0.27 
CD    -0.15 -0.18  0.21  1.00  0.36  0.27  0.28  0.18  0.25  0.11  0.46  0.46  0.17  0.22 -0.11  0.04 
UN     0.19  0.29  0.31  0.36  1.00  0.08 -0.12 -0.02 -0.16 -0.32  0.15  0.42  0.06 -0.02  0.18 -0.42 
CiU   -0.46 -0.37  0.27  0.27  0.08  1.00  0.34 -0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.24 -0.10 -0.08 
ERFN  -0.29 -0.33  0.31  0.28 -0.12  0.34  1.00 -0.17  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.18 -0.13  0.16 
EE    -0.74 -0.51 -0.27  0.18 -0.02 -0.04 -0.17  1.00 -0.17  0.25  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.15  0.35  0.04 
PNV    0.04 -0.50 -0.71  0.25 -0.16  0.00  0.00 -0.17  1.00  0.68  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.50  0.13  0.43 
HB     0.02 -0.34 -0.64  0.11 -0.32  0.00  0.00  0.25  0.68  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.43  0.10  0.38 
PSA    0.18 -0.43 -0.34  0.46  0.15  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.60 -0.08 -0.01 
CUPC   0.16  0.24 -0.19  0.46  0.42  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.69  0.36 -0.40 
PAR   -0.00 -0.29 -0.11  0.17  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.13  0.05 -0.03 
OTHER  0.10 -0.07 -0.27  0.22 -0.02 -0.24 -0.18  0.15 -0.50 -0.43  0.60  0.69  0.13  1.00 -0.40  0.02 
Nonvo -0.07  0.08  0.25 -0.11  0.18 -0.10 -0.13  0.35  0.13  0.10 -0.08  0.36  0.05 -0.40  1.00 -0.27 




Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.  
         1982: 
1982    PCE  PSOE   UCD   CDS    AP   CiU   ERC    EE   PNV    HB OTHER Nonvo Absta 
=================================================================================== 
PCE    1.00  0.64 -0.59  0.06 -0.03 -0.57 -0.36  0.23  0.06 -0.14  0.08 -0.21 -0.49 
PSOE   0.64  1.00 -0.47  0.05  0.07 -0.81 -0.58 -0.12 -0.54 -0.43  0.05 -0.10 -0.55 
UCD   -0.59 -0.47  1.00  0.02  0.26  0.26  0.19 -0.07 -0.18 -0.29 -0.03  0.40  0.26 
CDS    0.06  0.05  0.02  1.00  0.46 -0.07  0.10 -0.22 -0.62 -0.49  0.20 -0.15 -0.29 
AP    -0.03  0.07  0.26  0.46  1.00  0.27  0.31 -0.38 -0.59 -0.61  0.15  0.15 -0.28 
CiU   -0.57 -0.81  0.26 -0.07  0.27  1.00  0.70  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.30  0.31 -0.10 
ERC   -0.36 -0.58  0.19  0.10  0.31  0.70  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.18  0.27 -0.09 
EE     0.23 -0.12 -0.07 -0.22 -0.38  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.66  0.44 -0.06 -0.39  0.06 
PNV    0.06 -0.54 -0.18 -0.62 -0.59  0.00  0.00  0.66  1.00  0.52 -0.23 -0.31  0.31 
HB    -0.14 -0.43 -0.29 -0.49 -0.61  0.00  0.00  0.44  0.52  1.00 -0.36 -0.14  0.31 
OTHER  0.08  0.05 -0.03  0.20  0.15 -0.30 -0.18 -0.06 -0.23 -0.36  1.00 -0.14 -0.08 
Nonvo -0.21 -0.10  0.40 -0.15  0.15  0.31  0.27 -0.39 -0.31 -0.14 -0.14  1.00  0.16 
































Nonvo  0.08  0.18 -0.12  0.08 -0.31 -0.17 -0.12  0.25  0.30  0.30 -0.04  1.00 -0.07 
========================================================================================= 
HB    -0.32 -0.50 -0.69 -0.60  0.00  0.54  0.52  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.70  0.15  0.56 
PAR   -0.05 -0.07 -0.14 -0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 -0.17 -0.08 -0.14 




Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.  
         1986: 
1982     IU  PSOE    CP   CDS   CiU    EE   PNV    HB   AIC    UV   PAR OTHER Nonvo Absta 
========================================================================================= 
PCE    0.87  0.50 -0.16  0.14 -0.61  0.29  0.17 -0.13  0.00  0.23 -0.02 -0.16 -0.15 -0.27 
PSOE   0.68  0.85 -0.02  0.24 -0.84 -0.21 -0.50 -0.51  0.45 -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 -0.09 -0.37 
AP    -0.01 -0.14  0.87  0.50  0.29 -0.51 -0.67 -0.71 -0.32  0.10  0.18  0.84 -0.24 -0.43 
UCD   -0.55 -0.31  0.54  0.18  0.34 -0.15 -0.14 -0.26 -0.04 -0.48 -0.00  0.52  0.15 -0.10 
CDS    0.03 -0.21  0.33  0.70 -0.03 -0.39 -0.67 -0.54  0.01 -0.05 -0.09  0.32 -0.25 -0.15 
CiU   -0.46 -0.75  0.25 -0.61  0.96  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.25  0.16 -0.41 
ERC   -0.24 -0.54  0.30 -0.35  0.70  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.37  0.11 -0.24 
EE    -0.11 -0.11 -0.45 -0.20  0.00  0.91  0.65  0.49  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.52 -0.11  0.56 
PNV   -0.32 -0.48 -0.66 -0.55  0.00  0.82  0.95  0.61  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.71  0.07  0.56 
HB    -0.28 -0.45 -0.59 -0.52  0.00  0.49  0.41  0.95  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.61  0.14  0.54 
OTHER  0.05  0.04  0.09  0.24 -0.31 -0.10 -0.23 -0.37 -0.53  0.58  0.07  0.23 -0.07 -0.01 
Nonvo  0.19  0.30 -0.00 -0.03 -0.18  0.32  0.32  0.31 -0.71 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.32 -0.07 




Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.  
         1982: 
1982    PCE  PSOE    AP   UCD   CDS   CiU   ERC    EE   PNV    HB OTHER Nonvo Absta 
=================================================================================== 
PCE    1.00  0.64 -0.06 -0.60  0.05 -0.56 -0.34  0.23  0.08 -0.14  0.07  0.08 -0.49 
PSOE   0.64  1.00  0.04 -0.49  0.05 -0.81 -0.57 -0.15 -0.55 -0.44  0.04  0.18 -0.55 
AP    -0.06  0.04  1.00  0.27  0.46  0.28  0.31 -0.41 -0.61 -0.61  0.15 -0.12 -0.26 
UCD   -0.60 -0.49  0.27  1.00  0.03  0.26  0.18 -0.09 -0.17 -0.30 -0.03  0.08  0.25 
CDS    0.05  0.05  0.46  0.03  1.00 -0.06  0.10 -0.23 -0.63 -0.46  0.21 -0.31 -0.27 
CiU   -0.56 -0.81  0.28  0.26 -0.06  1.00  0.70  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.29 -0.17 -0.08 
ERC   -0.34 -0.57  0.31  0.18  0.10  0.70  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.17 -0.12 -0.07 
EE     0.23 -0.15 -0.41 -0.09 -0.23  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.68  0.44 -0.07  0.25  0.06 
PNV    0.08 -0.55 -0.61 -0.17 -0.63  0.00  0.00  0.68  1.00  0.53 -0.25  0.30  0.31 
HB    -0.14 -0.44 -0.61 -0.30 -0.46  0.00  0.00  0.44  0.53  1.00 -0.36  0.30  0.33 
OTHER  0.07  0.04  0.15 -0.03  0.21 -0.29 -0.17 -0.07 -0.25 -0.36  1.00 -0.04 -0.06 




Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.  
         1986: 
1986     IU  PSOE    CP   CDS   CiU    EE   PNV    HB   AIC    UV   PAR OTHER Nonvo Absta 
IU     1.00  0.54 -0.08  0.18 -0.51 -0.10 -0.28 -0.32 -0.40  0.14 -0.05 -0.10 -0.13 -0.29 
PSOE   0.54  1.00 -0.13  0.05 -0.79 -0.17 -0.41 -0.50  0.23 -0.11 -0.07 -0.14  0.07 -0.31 
CP    -0.08 -0.13  1.00  0.46  0.26 -0.55 -0.73 -0.69 -0.57 -0.18 -0.14  0.93 -0.17 -0.48 
CDS    0.18  0.05  0.46  1.00 -0.65 -0.30 -0.59 -0.60 -0.68 -0.17 -0.07  0.42 -0.29 -0.31 
CiU   -0.51 -0.79  0.26 -0.65  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.25  0.19 -0.45 
EE    -0.10 -0.17 -0.55 -0.30  0.00  1.00  0.79  0.54  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.61 -0.00  0.62 
PNV   -0.28 -0.41 -0.73 -0.59  0.00  0.79  1.00  0.52  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.77  0.06  0.51 
AIC   -0.40  0.23 -0.57 -0.68  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00 -0.60  0.65  0.39 
UV     0.14 -0.11 -0.18 -0.17  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00 -0.05  0.09 -0.03 
OTHER -0.10 -0.14  0.93  0.42  0.25 -0.61 -0.77 -0.70 -0.60 -0.05 -0.17  1.00 -0.18 -0.43 




























Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.  
1986     IU  PSOE    PP   CDS   CiU    EE   PNV    EA    HB   AIC    UV    PA   PAR OTHER Nonvo Absta 









         1989: 
===================================================================================================== 
IU     0.89  0.37 -0.09  0.12 -0.51 -0.04 -0.20 -0.47 -0.36 -0.52  0.14 -0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.21 -0.24 
PSOE   0.50  0.89 -0.12  0.05 -0.82 -0.05 -0.36 -0.55 -0.55  0.29 -0.03  0.00 -0.24 -0.12  0.02 -0.31 
CP     0.10  0.11  0.95  0.51  0.33 -0.43 -0.63 -0.60 -0.69 -0.56 -0.15 -0.10  0.00  0.01  0.20 -0.30 
CDS    0.36  0.07  0.52  0.85 -0.64 -0.18 -0.50 -0.56 -0.62 -0.55 -0.17 -0.02  0.06  0.06 -0.18 -0.17 
CiU   -0.66 -0.77  0.10 -0.58  0.98  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.26  0.19 -0.43 
EE    -0.24 -0.26 -0.57 -0.32  0.00  0.94  0.76  0.68  0.55  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.01 -0.46  0.41 
HB    -0.47 -0.55 -0.68 -0.59  0.00  0.45  0.40  0.78  0.97  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.47 -0.05  0.17 
AIC   -0.40  0.09 -0.20 -0.81  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.91  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.42  0.13  0.29 
UV     0.19 -0.25 -0.33 -0.49  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.91  0.00  0.00  0.17  0.21  0.00 
PAR    0.00 -0.09 -0.11 -0.19  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.57 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 
OTHER  0.07  0.09  0.91  0.49  0.32 -0.49 -0.67 -0.66 -0.72 -0.54 -0.02  0.16 -0.03  0.22  0.20 -0.22 
Nonvo  0.27  0.17 -0.53 -0.23 -0.30  0.65  0.69  0.62  0.60 -0.13 -0.03  0.43 -0.00 -0.17 -0.58  0.12 




Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.  
         1986: 
1986     IU  PSOE    CP   CDS   CiU    EE   PNV    HB   AIC    UV   PAR OTHER Nonvo Absta 
========================================================================================= 
IU     1.00  0.53 -0.06  0.17 -0.51 -0.10 -0.29 -0.32 -0.39  0.13 -0.06 -0.08  0.36 -0.31 
PSOE   0.53  1.00 -0.10  0.06 -0.80 -0.17 -0.43 -0.51  0.24 -0.11 -0.08 -0.11  0.34 -0.32 
CP    -0.06 -0.10  1.00  0.48  0.26 -0.54 -0.73 -0.68 -0.54 -0.16 -0.13  0.93 -0.48 -0.47 
CDS    0.17  0.06  0.48  1.00 -0.65 -0.30 -0.60 -0.60 -0.67 -0.18 -0.08  0.44 -0.17 -0.31 
CiU   -0.51 -0.80  0.26 -0.65  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.25 -0.25 -0.44 
EE    -0.10 -0.17 -0.54 -0.30  0.00  1.00  0.78  0.52  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.60  0.71  0.60 
PNV   -0.29 -0.43 -0.73 -0.60  0.00  0.78  1.00  0.51  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.78  0.76  0.48 
HB    -0.32 -0.51 -0.68 -0.60  0.00  0.52  0.51  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.69  0.59  0.54 
AIC   -0.39  0.24 -0.54 -0.67  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00 -0.56 -0.22  0.40 
UV     0.13 -0.11 -0.16 -0.18  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 
PAR   -0.06 -0.08 -0.13 -0.08  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 -0.16  0.23 -0.16 
OTHER -0.08 -0.11  0.93  0.44  0.25 -0.60 -0.78 -0.69 -0.56 -0.04 -0.16  1.00 -0.49 -0.42 
Nonvo  0.36  0.34 -0.48 -0.17 -0.25  0.71  0.76  0.59 -0.22 -0.02  0.23 -0.49  1.00  0.06 




Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.  
         1989: 
1989     IU  PSOE    PP   CDS   CiU    EE   PNV    EA    HB   AIC    UV    PA   PAR OTHER Nonvo Absta 
===================================================================================================== 
IU     1.00  0.32  0.10  0.29 -0.65 -0.14 -0.46 -0.61 -0.52 -0.53  0.19  0.05 -0.04  0.01 -0.30 -0.27 
PSOE   0.32  1.00  0.08  0.12 -0.81 -0.14 -0.46 -0.59 -0.58  0.15 -0.20 -0.30 -0.28 -0.24  0.20 -0.43 
PP     0.10  0.08  1.00  0.52  0.15 -0.45 -0.68 -0.63 -0.69 -0.30 -0.36 -0.14 -0.17  0.02  0.17 -0.30 
CDS    0.29  0.12  0.52  1.00 -0.57 -0.19 -0.51 -0.60 -0.62 -0.74 -0.48 -0.32 -0.17  0.12 -0.10 -0.19 
CiU   -0.65 -0.81  0.15 -0.57  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.21  0.22 -0.45 
EE    -0.14 -0.14 -0.45 -0.19  0.00  1.00  0.67  0.62  0.46  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.06 -0.48  0.43 
PNV   -0.46 -0.46 -0.68 -0.51  0.00  0.67  1.00  0.56  0.46  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.04 -0.43  0.09 
EA    -0.61 -0.59 -0.63 -0.60  0.00  0.62  0.56  1.00  0.78  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.46 -0.26  0.16 
HB    -0.52 -0.58 -0.69 -0.62  0.00  0.46  0.46  0.78  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.48 -0.08  0.14 
AIC   -0.53  0.15 -0.30 -0.74  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.37  0.04  0.21 
UV     0.19 -0.20 -0.36 -0.48  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.20  0.21 -0.10 
PA     0.05 -0.30 -0.14 -0.32  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.43 -0.35  0.26 
PAR   -0.04 -0.28 -0.17 -0.17  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.02  0.00 -0.00 
OTHER  0.01 -0.24  0.02  0.12  0.21  0.06 -0.04 -0.46 -0.48 -0.37  0.20  0.43  0.02  1.00 -0.04  0.26 
Nonvo -0.30  0.20  0.17 -0.10  0.22 -0.48 -0.43 -0.26 -0.08  0.04  0.21 -0.35  0.00 -0.04  1.00 -0.09 




















SPAIN: Logit Correlations generales 1989-1993 
 
 
AIC   -0.28  0.25 -0.61  0.29  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.24  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.59 -0.06  0.33 
         1989: 
===================================================================================================== 
CDS    0.28  0.13  0.52  1.00 -0.57 -0.19 -0.52 -0.60 -0.62 -0.74 -0.49 -0.34 -0.18  0.12 -0.13 -0.19 
EE    -0.14 -0.14 -0.44 -0.19  0.00  1.00  0.66  0.61  0.45  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.52  0.41 
EA    -0.62 -0.59 -0.63 -0.60  0.00  0.61  0.55  1.00  0.78  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.46  0.38  0.13 
AIC   -0.51  0.15 -0.28 -0.74  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.38 -0.49  0.23 
PA     0.03 -0.32 -0.15 -0.34  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.41  0.58  0.23 
OTHER -0.03 -0.24  0.05  0.12  0.23  0.05 -0.06 -0.46 -0.49 -0.38  0.20  0.41 -0.00  1.00 -0.06  0.28 
===================================================================================================== 
         1993: 
PP     0.13  0.09  1.00  0.60  0.02 -0.54 -0.64 -0.65 -0.70 -0.25 -0.37 -0.40  0.01 -0.48  0.26  0.07 -0.44 
CC    -0.47 -0.03 -0.37 -0.23  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.50 -0.46 -0.25 
PAR    0.18 -0.51 -0.48 -0.30  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.95 -0.67 -0.31 









Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.  
         1993: 
1989     IU  PSOE    PP   CDS   CiU   ERC   PNV    EA    HB   BNG    CC    UV    PA   PAR OTHER Nonvo Absta 
=========================================================================================================== 
IU     0.92  0.36  0.19  0.34 -0.67 -0.18 -0.45 -0.61 -0.53  0.41 -0.39  0.15 -0.10  0.23 -0.21 -0.15 -0.20 
PSOE   0.28  0.94  0.15  0.08 -0.79 -0.43 -0.46 -0.57 -0.59  0.08  0.05 -0.20 -0.13 -0.24 -0.21  0.26 -0.43 
PP     0.03  0.01  0.93  0.56  0.12 -0.49 -0.69 -0.62 -0.65 -0.11 -0.43 -0.36 -0.04 -0.26  0.41  0.08 -0.43 
CDS    0.21  0.03  0.61  0.77 -0.57 -0.63 -0.52 -0.62 -0.61  0.40  0.12 -0.46 -0.15 -0.09  0.32 -0.11 -0.24 
CiU   -0.73 -0.83  0.08 -0.55  0.98  0.90  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.49  0.26 -0.40 
EE     0.05 -0.14 -0.41 -0.23  0.00  0.00  0.66  0.64  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.20 -0.41  0.61 
PNV   -0.34 -0.48 -0.63 -0.53  0.00  0.00  0.98  0.55  0.39  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.11 -0.27  0.33 
EA    -0.51 -0.61 -0.66 -0.61  0.00  0.00  0.56  0.97  0.77  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.18 -0.34  0.54 
HB    -0.46 -0.59 -0.73 -0.63  0.00  0.00  0.46  0.78  0.98  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.37 -0.15  0.52 
UV     0.22 -0.27 -0.38 -0.33  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.95  0.00  0.00  0.18  0.20 -0.02 
PA     0.14 -0.21 -0.09 -0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.69  0.00  0.48 -0.36  0.22 
PAR   -0.13 -0.30 -0.22 -0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.54  0.53 -0.27 -0.11 
OTHER -0.07 -0.30  0.04  0.04  0.25  0.14 -0.05 -0.49 -0.52  0.54  0.32  0.25  0.21  0.15  0.48 -0.17  0.05 
Nonvo  0.44  0.13 -0.20 -0.14 -0.27 -0.15  0.62  0.41  0.29  0.46  0.30  0.14  0.34  0.39 -0.37 -0.59  0.19 




Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.  
1989     IU  PSOE    PP   CDS   CiU    EE   PNV    EA    HB   AIC    UV    PA   PAR OTHER Nonvo Absta 
IU     1.00  0.31  0.09  0.28 -0.66 -0.14 -0.46 -0.62 -0.52 -0.51  0.19  0.03 -0.08 -0.03  0.38 -0.30 
PSOE   0.31  1.00  0.08  0.13 -0.80 -0.14 -0.47 -0.59 -0.59  0.15 -0.20 -0.32 -0.26 -0.24  0.06 -0.43 
PP     0.09  0.08  1.00  0.52  0.17 -0.44 -0.68 -0.63 -0.69 -0.28 -0.35 -0.15 -0.17  0.05 -0.35 -0.26 
CiU   -0.66 -0.80  0.17 -0.57  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.23 -0.32 -0.40 
PNV   -0.46 -0.47 -0.68 -0.52  0.00  0.66  1.00  0.55  0.45  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.06  0.62  0.04 
HB    -0.52 -0.59 -0.69 -0.62  0.00  0.45  0.45  0.78  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.49  0.32  0.11 
UV     0.19 -0.20 -0.35 -0.49  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.20  0.18 -0.11 
PAR   -0.08 -0.26 -0.17 -0.18  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 -0.00 -0.07 -0.02 
Nonvo  0.38  0.06 -0.35 -0.13 -0.32  0.52  0.62  0.38  0.32 -0.49  0.18  0.58 -0.07 -0.06  1.00 -0.04 
Absta -0.30 -0.43 -0.26 -0.19 -0.40  0.41  0.04  0.13  0.11  0.23 -0.11  0.23 -0.02  0.28 -0.04  1.00 
 
 
Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.  
1993     IU  PSOE    PP   CDS   CiU   ERC   PNV    EA    HB   BNG    CC    UV    PA   PAR OTHER Nonvo Absta 
=========================================================================================================== 
IU     1.00  0.35  0.13  0.34 -0.73 -0.34 -0.33 -0.51 -0.47  0.40 -0.47  0.19 -0.03  0.18 -0.22 -0.17 -0.15 
PSOE   0.35  1.00  0.09  0.06 -0.82 -0.45 -0.47 -0.59 -0.60 -0.08 -0.03 -0.26 -0.10 -0.51 -0.35  0.27 -0.37 
CDS    0.34  0.06  0.60  1.00 -0.56 -0.65 -0.53 -0.61 -0.61  0.37 -0.23 -0.32  0.02 -0.30  0.28 -0.07 -0.23 
CiU   -0.73 -0.82  0.02 -0.56  1.00  0.87  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.52  0.22 -0.42 
ERC   -0.34 -0.45 -0.54 -0.65  0.87  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.75 -0.00 -0.35 
PNV   -0.33 -0.47 -0.64 -0.53  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.55  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.13 -0.26  0.33 
EA    -0.51 -0.59 -0.65 -0.61  0.00  0.00  0.55  1.00  0.77  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.22 -0.33  0.57 
HB    -0.47 -0.60 -0.70 -0.61  0.00  0.00  0.40  0.77  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.37 -0.14  0.51 
BNG    0.40 -0.08 -0.25  0.37  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.13 -0.38 -0.17 
UV     0.19 -0.26 -0.40 -0.32  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.21  0.22 -0.01 
PA    -0.03 -0.10  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.13 -0.18  0.10 
OTHER -0.22 -0.35  0.26  0.28 -0.52 -0.75 -0.13 -0.22 -0.37  0.13 -0.50  0.21  0.13  0.95  1.00 -0.24 -0.04 






















         1996: 
PSOE   0.32  0.91  0.07 -0.84 -0.43 -0.50 -0.60 -0.60 -0.01  0.06 -0.24 -0.24  0.05  0.01 -0.52 
ERC   -0.36 -0.46 -0.55 -0.66  0.87  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.74  0.00 -0.35 
BNG    0.38 -0.09 -0.28  0.35  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.32 -0.20 
CC    -0.48 -0.04 -0.38 -0.24  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.52  0.06 -0.25 




Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.  
1993     IU  PSOE    PP   CiU   ERC   PNV    EA    HB   BNG    CC    UV    PA OTHER Nonvo Absta 
=============================================================================================== 
IU     0.95  0.28  0.18 -0.66 -0.44 -0.37 -0.51 -0.49  0.52 -0.39  0.12  0.01  0.36 -0.11 -0.23 
PP     0.12  0.03  0.94  0.18 -0.80 -0.66 -0.61 -0.71 -0.36 -0.25 -0.35 -0.10  0.28  0.18 -0.33 
CDS    0.35  0.01  0.61 -0.47 -0.62 -0.56 -0.59 -0.62  0.42 -0.06 -0.31 -0.02  0.25  0.07 -0.14 
CiU   -0.74 -0.72 -0.22  0.97  0.85  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.16  0.15 -0.41 
ERC   -0.46 -0.17 -0.59  0.87  0.94  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.69  0.10 -0.51 
PNV   -0.36 -0.41 -0.60  0.00  0.00  0.99  0.49  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.57 -0.13  0.21 
EA    -0.48 -0.56 -0.64  0.00  0.00  0.59  0.97  0.80  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.38 -0.15  0.48 
HB    -0.45 -0.58 -0.72  0.00  0.00  0.41  0.78  0.98  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.27 -0.01  0.47 
BNG    0.44 -0.11 -0.29  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.83  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.38 -0.27 -0.16 
CC    -0.48 -0.08 -0.32  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.83  0.00  0.00 -0.22 -0.07 -0.23 
UV     0.27 -0.08 -0.08  0.00  0.13  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.97  0.00  0.30  0.43 -0.08 
PA     0.01 -0.19  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.73  0.68 -0.06  0.13 
PAR    0.20 -0.27  0.35  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.47  0.09 -0.02 
OTHER -0.17 -0.28  0.40 -0.43 -0.58 -0.10 -0.19 -0.37  0.26 -0.33  0.22  0.52  0.25  0.17  0.22 
Nonvo  0.26  0.03 -0.32 -0.33 -0.27  0.59  0.18  0.19  0.33  0.06 -0.10  0.18  0.01 -0.79 -0.06 




Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.  
         1993: 
1993     IU  PSOE    PP   CDS   CiU   ERC   PNV    EA    HB   BNG    CC    UV    PA   PAR OTHER Nonvo Absta 
=========================================================================================================== 
IU     1.00  0.34  0.12  0.33 -0.74 -0.36 -0.36 -0.51 -0.47  0.38 -0.48  0.17 -0.04  0.18 -0.18  0.26 -0.18 
PSOE   0.34  1.00  0.10  0.06 -0.82 -0.46 -0.49 -0.60 -0.59 -0.09 -0.04 -0.23 -0.11 -0.51 -0.32  0.24 -0.39 
PP     0.12  0.10  1.00  0.61  0.02 -0.55 -0.64 -0.64 -0.69 -0.28 -0.38 -0.40  0.00 -0.49  0.29 -0.22 -0.43 
CDS    0.33  0.06  0.61  1.00 -0.57 -0.66 -0.54 -0.62 -0.60  0.35 -0.24 -0.33  0.03 -0.29  0.32 -0.21 -0.22 
CiU   -0.74 -0.82  0.02 -0.57  1.00  0.87  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.51 -0.13 -0.41 
PNV   -0.36 -0.49 -0.64 -0.54  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.55  0.39  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.14  0.61  0.30 
EA    -0.51 -0.60 -0.64 -0.62  0.00  0.00  0.55  1.00  0.76  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.22  0.24  0.55 
HB    -0.47 -0.59 -0.69 -0.60  0.00  0.00  0.39  0.76  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.38  0.17  0.49 
UV     0.17 -0.23 -0.40 -0.33  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.23 -0.06 -0.03 
PA    -0.04 -0.11  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.12  0.10  0.11 
PAR    0.18 -0.51 -0.49 -0.29  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.95 -0.18 -0.30 
OTHER -0.18 -0.32  0.29  0.32 -0.51 -0.74 -0.14 -0.22 -0.38  0.11 -0.52  0.23  0.12  0.95  1.00 -0.49 -0.02 
Nonvo  0.26  0.24 -0.22 -0.21 -0.13  0.00  0.61  0.24  0.17  0.32  0.06 -0.06  0.10 -0.18 -0.49  1.00  0.05 




Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.  
         1996: 
1996     IU  PSOE    PP   CiU   ERC   PNV    EA    HB   BNG    CC    UV    PA OTHER Nonvo Absta 
=============================================================================================== 
IU     1.00  0.24  0.21 -0.67 -0.46 -0.36 -0.47 -0.46  0.53 -0.44  0.22  0.08  0.42 -0.12 -0.22 
PSOE   0.24  1.00  0.04 -0.68 -0.11 -0.42 -0.57 -0.57 -0.06 -0.05 -0.10 -0.33 -0.07  0.21 -0.53 
PP     0.21  0.04  1.00 -0.05 -0.80 -0.61 -0.61 -0.73 -0.41 -0.37 -0.05  0.06  0.36  0.24 -0.31 
CiU   -0.67 -0.68 -0.05  1.00  0.89  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.05  0.34 -0.40 
ERC   -0.46 -0.11 -0.80  0.89  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.14  0.00 -0.65 -0.02  0.44 
PNV   -0.36 -0.42 -0.61  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.53  0.43  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.60 -0.17  0.25 
HB    -0.46 -0.57 -0.73  0.00  0.00  0.43  0.81  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.31 -0.06  0.46 
BNG    0.53 -0.06 -0.41  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.49 -0.37 -0.23 
CC    -0.44 -0.05 -0.37  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00 -0.21 -0.09 -0.39 
UV     0.22 -0.10 -0.05  0.00  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.29  0.47 -0.10 
PA     0.08 -0.33  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.95 -0.13  0.30 
OTHER  0.42 -0.07  0.36 -0.05 -0.65 -0.60 -0.35 -0.31  0.49 -0.21  0.29  0.95  1.00  0.07 -0.01 
Nonvo -0.12  0.21  0.24  0.34 -0.02 -0.17 -0.18 -0.06 -0.37 -0.09  0.47 -0.13  0.07  1.00 -0.18 






















SPAIN: Logit Correlations generales 1996-2000 
 
 
BNG    0.48 -0.11 -0.44  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.48  0.26 -0.28 
UV     0.27 -0.31 -0.22  0.00 -0.19  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.24  0.42  0.00 
=============================================================================================== 




Logit Correlations between elections Whole dataset.  
         2000: 
1996     IU  PSOE    PP   CiU   ERC    IC   PNV    EA   BNG    CC    UV    PA    CH OTHER Nonvo Absta 
===================================================================================================== 
IU     0.92  0.41  0.24 -0.86 -0.61  0.82 -0.39 -0.42  0.51 -0.54  0.14 -0.04  0.63  0.26 -0.25 -0.07 
PSOE   0.16  0.90  0.16 -0.79 -0.45  0.43 -0.45 -0.54 -0.12  0.19 -0.24 -0.15 -0.60 -0.18  0.23 -0.37 
PP     0.30  0.23  0.97 -0.45 -0.88  0.39 -0.62 -0.56 -0.42 -0.33 -0.30 -0.01  0.00 -0.47  0.25 -0.32 
CiU   -0.79 -0.85 -0.60  0.99  0.87 -0.59  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.97 -0.26 -0.77 
ERC   -0.79 -0.50 -0.89  0.85  0.97 -0.46  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.85 -0.61  0.21 
PNV   -0.37 -0.34 -0.59  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.98  0.44  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.49  0.30  0.22 
EA    -0.53 -0.57 -0.62  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.57  0.96  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.48  0.12  0.65 
HB    -0.52 -0.63 -0.76  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.48  0.81  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.53  0.14  0.85 
BNG    0.44  0.07 -0.44  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.84  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.47 -0.34  0.08 
CC    -0.36 -0.19 -0.34  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.80  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.11 -0.03 -0.41 
UV     0.28 -0.30 -0.18  0.00 -0.22  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.89  0.00  0.00  0.30 -0.12  0.11 
PA    -0.15 -0.28 -0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.69  0.00 -0.07  0.02  0.39 
OTHER  0.21 -0.03 -0.51  0.92  0.87 -0.46 -0.53 -0.43  0.51 -0.56  0.17 -0.02  0.58  0.92 -0.40 -0.02 
Nonvo  0.35  0.28  0.42 -0.33 -0.87  0.11  0.56  0.04  0.26  0.07 -0.15  0.23  0.69 -0.54 -0.15  0.02 




Logit Correlations - First Election Whole dataset.  
         1996: 
1996     IU  PSOE    PP   CiU   ERC   PNV    EA    HB   BNG    CC    UV    PA OTHER Nonvo Absta 
=============================================================================================== 
IU     1.00  0.15  0.21 -0.85 -0.60 -0.39 -0.49 -0.49  0.48 -0.46  0.27 -0.01  0.38  0.24 -0.21 
PSOE   0.15  1.00  0.13 -0.82 -0.45 -0.42 -0.57 -0.58 -0.11 -0.05 -0.31 -0.24 -0.15  0.26 -0.41 
PP     0.21  0.13  1.00 -0.43 -0.86 -0.61 -0.60 -0.73 -0.44 -0.35 -0.22  0.05 -0.49  0.40 -0.08 
CiU   -0.85 -0.82 -0.43  1.00  0.85  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.93 -0.35 -0.62 
ERC   -0.60 -0.45 -0.86  0.85  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.19  0.00  0.86 -0.87  0.12 
PNV   -0.39 -0.42 -0.61  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.54  0.45  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.53  0.53  0.31 
EA    -0.49 -0.57 -0.60  0.00  0.00  0.54  1.00  0.82  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.52  0.07  0.56 
HB    -0.49 -0.58 -0.73  0.00  0.00  0.45  0.82  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.49  0.10  0.54 
CC    -0.46 -0.05 -0.35  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00 -0.46  0.21 -0.36 
PA    -0.01 -0.24  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.02  0.31  0.34 
OTHER  0.38 -0.15 -0.49  0.93  0.86 -0.53 -0.52 -0.49  0.48 -0.46  0.24  0.02  1.00 -0.49 -0.31 
Nonvo  0.24  0.26  0.40 -0.35 -0.87  0.53  0.07  0.10  0.26  0.21  0.42  0.31 -0.49  1.00  0.02 
Absta -0.21 -0.41 -0.08 -0.62  0.12  0.31  0.56  0.54 -0.28 -0.36  0.00  0.34 -0.31  0.02  1.00 
 
 
Logit Correlations - Second Election Whole dataset.  
         2000: 
2000     IU  PSOE    PP   CiU   ERC    IC   PNV    EA   BNG    CC    UV    PA    CH OTHER Nonvo Absta 
===================================================================================================== 
IU     1.00  0.41  0.34 -0.80 -0.80  0.69 -0.37 -0.46  0.46 -0.44  0.17 -0.12  0.42  0.15 -0.19 -0.16 
PSOE   0.41  1.00  0.25 -0.85 -0.50  0.55 -0.37 -0.55  0.00  0.04 -0.24 -0.23 -0.46 -0.10  0.11 -0.46 
PP     0.34  0.25  1.00 -0.62 -0.90  0.51 -0.61 -0.58 -0.47 -0.27 -0.35 -0.05 -0.01 -0.50  0.25 -0.36 
CiU   -0.80 -0.85 -0.62  1.00  0.86 -0.62  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.99 -0.25 -0.81 
IC     0.69  0.55  0.51 -0.62 -0.41  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.62 -0.16  0.47 
PNV   -0.37 -0.37 -0.61  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.48  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.47  0.27  0.22 
EA    -0.46 -0.55 -0.58  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.48  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.39  0.07  0.62 
BNG    0.46  0.00 -0.47  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.45 -0.32  0.06 
CC    -0.44  0.04 -0.27  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.53  0.24 -0.55 
UV     0.17 -0.24 -0.35  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.29  0.76  0.03 
PA    -0.12 -0.23 -0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00 -0.15  0.04  0.31 
CH     0.42 -0.46 -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 -0.28 -0.69  0.23 
OTHER  0.15 -0.10 -0.50  0.99  0.86 -0.62 -0.47 -0.39  0.45 -0.53  0.29 -0.15 -0.28  1.00 -0.35 -0.09 
Nonvo -0.19  0.11  0.25 -0.25 -0.63 -0.16  0.27  0.07 -0.32  0.24  0.76  0.04 -0.69 -0.35  1.00 -0.10 


























                                  
 
 
                                  Appendix II 
 
 
             Complete ECOL transition Matrixes 1977-2000 
 
 
                  Four tables for each pair of elections: 
 
 







1. Total percentages 
3. Column percentages 




























Voter Mobility. .. Pct of Total. 
         1979: 
1977  PCE PSOE  UCD   CD   EE  PNV   UN  CiU ERFN   HB  PSA CUPC  PAR Othe Nonv Abst      
========================================================================================= 
PCE   3.3  1.5  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.1  1.0  6.6 
Othe  0.2  0.9  1.3  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.9  0.2  2.3  6.7 
Nonv  0.7  2.0  1.7  0.5  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.1  3.6  9.9 
         1979: 
1977  PCE PSOE  UCD   CD   EE  PNV   UN  CiU ERFN   HB  PSA CUPC  PAR Othe Nonv Abst      
========================================================================================= 
PNV   0.5  0.7  0.6  0.0  1.9 54.6  0.3  0.0  0.0 13.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.2  1.1 26.1 100 
Othe  3.3 12.9 19.1  4.9  0.8  2.6  2.0  0.6  0.1  2.1  1.1  0.9  0.2 13.6  2.2 33.6 100 
Abst  2.8  9.3 11.8  2.9  0.2  1.1  0.9  0.9  0.6  1.2  0.8  0.1  0.1  3.5  1.9 61.8 100 
         1979: 
PSPU  2.7  2.3  1.5  8.1  2.0  0.5  5.3  0.3  1.6  0.9 24.2  4.7  7.1  5.7  2.7  3.3  3.1 
ECFE  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.1  1.6 17.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.4  0.9  0.6 
Othe  3.2  4.3  5.6  8.2 17.4 16.1  9.9  2.1  2.1 21.6  5.9 27.8  8.7 17.8  8.4  7.0  6.7 
Nonv  9.2  9.9  7.5 12.6 11.0  5.2 11.5  4.6  5.7  6.7 18.5  7.5 14.1 14.0  3.7 11.4  9.9 
========================================================================================= 
 
         1979: 
PSOE  1.8 11.5  1.1  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  1.2  0.4  3.7 20.6 
PSPU  0.2  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  1.1  3.1 
UCD   0.2  1.4 14.0  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.5  5.7 23.9 
AP    0.1  0.3  1.5  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  1.7  5.6 
IDCC  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.7 
PDPC  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.5  2.0 
ECFE  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.6 
EE    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.1 
CAIC  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Abst  0.5  1.7  2.2  0.5  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.4 11.6 18.8 
========================================================================================= 
      7.1 19.9 22.9  4.0  0.3  1.1  1.4  1.7  0.4  0.6  1.2  0.2  0.1  5.2  1.8 32.0 100 
 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Row Pct. 
PCE  49.3 22.6  2.5  1.3  0.2  0.1  0.6  0.3  0.2  0.1  1.0  0.2  0.0  5.7  1.4 14.8 100 
PSOE  8.8 56.0  5.2  1.4  0.3  0.1  0.7  0.3  0.1  0.2  1.0  0.4  0.1  5.6  1.8 18.2 100 
PSPU  6.0 14.5 11.3 10.3  0.2  0.2  2.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  9.4  0.3  0.3  9.5  1.6 33.6 100 
UCD   1.0  5.7 58.5  3.4  0.1  0.1  1.2  0.5  0.2  0.0  0.6  0.1  0.1  2.8  2.1 23.8 100 
AP    1.8  5.6 27.6 18.5  0.1  0.5  6.2  0.8  0.4  0.2  1.3  0.1  0.2  4.2  2.5 30.1 100 
IDCC  1.1  2.4 18.4  3.9  0.0  0.0  0.4 33.8  3.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.6  1.0 32.5 100 
PDPC  1.4  4.7 15.1  1.9  0.0  0.0  0.3 46.1  3.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.1  1.7 22.0 100 
ECFE  3.4  6.5 13.5  2.2  0.1  0.0  0.2  5.0 13.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.4  1.2 49.4 100 
EE    3.4  8.7  4.2  0.0 28.2  4.7  0.6  0.0  0.0 10.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.1  1.6 34.9 100 
CAIC  0.7  4.6 41.1  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 17.7  2.0  5.3 25.9 100 
Nonv  6.6 19.9 17.3  5.0  0.4  0.6  1.6  0.8  0.2  0.4  2.3  0.2  0.2  7.3  0.7 36.6 100 
========================================================================================= 
      7.1 19.9 22.9  4.0  0.3  1.1  1.4  1.7  0.4  0.6  1.2  0.2  0.1  5.2  1.8 32.0 100 
 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Column Pct. 
1977  PCE PSOE  UCD   CD   EE  PNV   UN  CiU ERFN   HB  PSA CUPC  PAR Othe Nonv Abst      
========================================================================================= 
PCE  46.2  7.5  0.7  2.1  3.9  0.4  3.0  1.0  2.6  1.4  5.3  4.9  1.7  7.3  5.0  3.1  6.6 
PSOE 25.5 57.9  4.6  7.1 17.6  1.1  9.9  3.8  5.4  5.9 16.5 36.9 10.4 22.3 20.8 11.7 20.6 
UCD   3.5  6.8 61.0 20.4  4.9  1.2 20.9  6.3 10.9  1.0 11.6  5.6 15.4 12.9 27.4 17.8 23.9 
AP    1.4  1.6  6.7 25.9  1.7  2.5 25.7  2.5  5.0  1.4  5.8  3.7  7.7  4.6  7.7  5.3  5.6 
IDCC  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.7  0.1  0.0  0.2 13.4  6.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.4  0.7  0.7 
PDPC  0.4  0.5  1.4  1.0  0.3  0.0  0.5 54.1 16.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  1.9  1.4  2.0 
EE    0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0 21.2  1.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  4.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.2 
PNV   0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.3 53.8  0.2  0.0  0.0 21.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.7  0.9  1.1 
CAIC  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 18.1  0.1  0.4  0.1  0.1 
Abst  7.4  8.8  9.6 13.5 13.7 18.3 12.6 10.2 26.7 35.2 12.4  8.8 16.9 12.7 20.3 36.3 18.8 







Voter Mobility. .. Pct Net Flow. 
1977  PCE PSOE  UCD   CD   EE  PNV   UN  CiU ERFN   HB  PSA CUPC  PAR Othe Nonv Abst      
========================================================================================= 
PCE   0.0 -0.3 -0.1  0.1  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2 -0.6  0.5 -0.4 
PSOE  0.3  0.0 -0.3  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.3 -1.6  2.0  0.6 
PSPU  0.2  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  1.1  3.1 
UCD   0.1  0.3  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0 -0.6 -1.2  3.5  1.0 
AP    0.1  0.3  1.5  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  1.7  5.6 
IDCC  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.7 
PDPC  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.5  2.0 
ECFE  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.6 
EE   -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.1 
PNV   0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.2 -0.0  0.1 -0.0 
CAIC  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Othe -0.2 -0.3  0.6  0.3  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0 -0.6  1.6  1.6 
Nonv  0.6  1.6  1.2  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.0  3.3  8.1 
Abst -0.5 -2.0 -3.5  0.5 -0.0 -0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0 -1.6 -3.3  0.0-13.2 
========================================================================================= 





INFERRED ECOL PERCENTAGES 1979-1982: 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Pct of Total. 
         1982: 
1979  PCE PSOE  UCD  CDS   AP  CiU  ERC   EE  PNV   HB OTHE Nonv Abst      
========================================================================== 
PCE   1.5  3.7  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.5  6.8 
PSOE  0.5 14.0  0.2  0.2  1.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.5  1.7 19.0 
UCD   0.1  4.0  3.2  0.6  7.6  0.5  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.9  3.5 21.6 
CD    0.0  0.6  0.1  0.2  2.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.4  3.8 
UN    0.0  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  1.3 
CiU   0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.9  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  1.6 
ERFN  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4 
EE    0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  1.0 
HB    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.6 
PSA   0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  1.1 
CUPC  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2 
PAR   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 
OTHE  0.1  2.2  0.1  0.1  0.8  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.1  0.7  4.8 
Nonv  0.2  3.0  0.2  0.1  1.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.7  0.1  1.3  7.1 
Abst  0.5  7.8  1.2  0.8  5.0  0.9  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.2  1.3  1.5 10.1 30.1 
========================================================================== 
      3.0 36.3  5.1  2.2 20.0  2.7  0.5  0.4  1.4  0.7  4.9  3.6 19.2 100 
 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Row Pct. 
         1982: 
1979  PCE PSOE  UCD  CDS   AP  CiU  ERC   EE  PNV   HB OTHE Nonv Abst      
========================================================================== 
PCE  22.2 55.0  0.4  1.0  6.5  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  4.4  2.0  7.6 100 
PSOE  2.6 73.8  0.9  0.9  6.7  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.1  3.0  2.4  8.9 100 
UCD   0.7 18.4 14.9  3.0 35.2  2.4  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.0  4.2  4.3 16.4 100 
CD    0.7 15.7  2.4  4.9 56.1  1.7  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.1  3.7  3.4 10.8 100 
UN    1.5 20.8  3.7  3.8 44.1  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.1  6.6  4.1 14.0 100 
CiU   0.5  4.4  1.8  0.6 11.5 57.1  7.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.3  3.3 11.3 100 
ERFN  1.2  7.9  1.7  2.1 18.2 23.6 23.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.4  4.6 14.4 100 
EE    0.9 17.0  0.2  1.2  5.2  0.3  0.0 39.4  8.3  4.3  2.7  2.9 17.6 100 
PNV   0.1  1.0  0.1  0.4  1.1  0.0  0.0  1.9 72.0 10.1  0.8  1.2 11.3 100 
HB    0.2  3.9  0.1  0.3  0.8  0.0  0.0  2.6 17.6 59.5  0.9  1.9 12.1 100 
========================================================================== 
UN    0.6  0.8  0.9  2.3  2.9  0.3  0.2  0.8  0.3  0.1  1.8  1.5  1.0  1.3 
ERFN  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.4  3.5 19.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.3  0.4 
CUPC  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.2  0.1  0.2  0.2 
 
========================================================================== 
CD    0.0  0.6  0.1  0.2  2.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.4  3.8 
PSA   0.8 37.4  0.4  1.8 26.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 18.2  2.4 12.3 100 
CUPC  0.0 32.0  0.2  1.5 15.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 28.6  0.9 20.9 100 
PAR   1.0 23.9  1.4  3.8 49.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.8  4.5 11.7 100 
OTHE  2.5 45.3  1.4  2.3 17.6  1.1  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.3 11.1  2.9 14.3 100 
Nonv  2.3 41.7  2.3  1.8 19.9  1.0  0.2  0.4  1.4  0.6  9.2  1.0 18.3 100 
Abst  1.7 25.8  4.1  2.5 16.6  3.0  0.5  0.4  1.3  0.6  4.5  5.1 33.7 100 
      3.0 36.3  5.1  2.2 20.0  2.7  0.5  0.4  1.4  0.7  4.9  3.6 19.2 100 
 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Column Pct. 
         1982: 
1979  PCE PSOE  UCD  CDS   AP  CiU  ERC   EE  PNV   HB OTHE Nonv Abst      
========================================================================== 
PCE  49.7 10.3  0.5  3.1  2.2  0.9  1.3  2.2  0.4  1.1  6.2  3.9  2.7  6.8 
PSOE 16.6 38.7  3.2  8.0  6.4  2.1  3.4  7.8  0.4  1.5 11.7 12.9  8.9 19.0 
UCD   4.9 11.0 63.7 29.7 38.1 19.1 14.6  6.8  1.6  0.7 18.5 25.6 18.5 21.6 
CD    0.9  1.6  1.8  8.6 10.7  2.3  3.0  0.4  0.2  0.5  2.9  3.6  2.1  3.8 
CiU   0.3  0.2  0.6  0.5  0.9 33.6 23.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  1.5  1.0  1.6 
EE    0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0 31.2  1.7  1.7  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  5.2 51.6 13.7  0.2  0.3  0.6  1.0 
HB    0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.1  7.3 47.3  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.6 
PSA   0.3  1.2  0.1  0.9  1.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.2  0.8  0.7  1.1 
PAR   0.0  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1 
OTHE  3.9  6.0  1.3  5.1  4.2  2.0  2.0  4.6  1.8  1.9 10.9  3.9  3.6  4.8 
Nonv  5.3  8.2  3.2  5.8  7.1  2.7  2.5  6.7  6.8  6.0 13.5  1.9  6.8  7.1 
Abst 17.1 21.4 24.5 34.9 25.0 33.5 29.8 30.2 27.7 25.3 27.6 42.9 52.9 30.1 
========================================================================== 






Voter Mobility. .. Pct Net Flow. 
         1982: 
1979  PCE PSOE  UCD  CDS   AP  CiU  ERC   EE  PNV   HB OTHE Nonv Abst      
PCE   0.0  3.2 -0.1  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2 -0.0 -0.0  3.8 
PSOE -3.2  0.0 -3.8  0.2  1.3 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -1.6 -2.5 -6.1-17.3 
UCD   0.1  3.8  0.0  0.6  7.6  0.5  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.8  2.3 16.6 
UN    0.0  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  1.3 
CiU  -0.0  0.0 -0.5  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1 -0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.7 -1.1 
ERFN  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4 
EE   -0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
PNV  -0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 
HB   -0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 
PSA   0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  1.1 
CUPC  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2 
PAR   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 
OTHE -0.2  1.6 -0.8  0.1  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.5 -0.7 -0.1 
Nonv  0.0  2.5 -0.8  0.1  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.0 -0.2  3.5 
Abst  0.0  6.1 -2.3  0.8  5.0  0.7  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.7  0.2  0.0 10.9 
========================================================================== 
     -3.8 17.3-16.6  2.2 20.0  1.1  0.5  0.1  0.4  0.2  0.1 -3.5-10.9  0.0 
 251
INFERRED ECOL PERCENTAGES 1982-1986: 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Pct of Total. 
         1986: 
1982   IU PSOE   CP  CDS  CiU   EE  PNV   HB  AIC   UV  PAR OTHE Nonv Abst      
=============================================================================== 
PCE   1.0  0.7  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.7  2.9 
PSOE  1.1 20.1  1.4  2.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  1.6  1.1  6.5 34.3 
AP    0.2  1.4 10.6  1.1  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.9  0.7  3.4 18.9 
UCD   0.0  0.8  1.5  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.3  1.4  4.8 
CDS   0.0  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.6  2.1 
CiU   0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.3  2.6 
ERC   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5 
EE    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  1.3 
HB    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.7 
=============================================================================== 
         1986: 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  5.4 80.3 18.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  1.4  0.9  1.3 
EE    0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 







OTHE  0.1  1.0  0.6  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.2  1.5  4.6 
Nonv  0.3  2.7  1.1  0.7  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.1  3.0  9.0 
Abst  0.3  2.5  1.8  0.8  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.8 10.4 18.1 
      3.1 29.5 17.5  6.2  3.3  0.4  1.0  0.8  0.2  0.2  0.2  5.6  3.7 28.3  100 
 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Row Pct. 
1982   IU PSOE   CP  CDS  CiU   EE  PNV   HB  AIC   UV  PAR OTHE Nonv Abst      
=============================================================================== 
PCE  35.5 23.6  3.6  5.3  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  4.8  3.1 23.4  100 
PSOE  3.3 58.5  4.2  6.3  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.1  4.7  3.2 19.0  100 
AP    1.0  7.5 56.0  5.9  1.6  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.4  0.5  5.0  4.0 17.8  100 
UCD   0.5 17.0 30.7  8.3  1.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.9  5.6  5.4 29.8  100 
CDS   1.8 10.6 17.0 25.9  1.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.3  0.3  6.8  4.6 31.1  100 
CiU   0.3  0.5  2.8  0.2 78.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.6  4.2 10.1  100 
ERC   0.9  2.8  7.8  0.6 47.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 10.2  5.9 24.7  100 
EE    0.4  9.2  2.5  4.0  0.0 52.4  1.6  2.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.8  1.9 23.5  100 
PNV   0.0  0.3  0.9  0.3  0.0  1.5 62.3 10.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  4.0 19.4  100 
HB    0.1  0.9  0.3  0.4  0.0  1.2  8.4 67.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  2.6 18.0  100 
OTHE  2.4 21.3 12.2  6.9  0.8  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.6  0.3 18.2  4.5 32.0  100 
Nonv  3.0 30.2 11.8  8.2  2.8  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.1  7.5  1.3 33.4  100 
Abst  1.6 14.0  9.7  4.3  1.9  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.2  4.6  4.5 57.7  100 
=============================================================================== 
      3.1 29.5 17.5  6.2  3.3  0.4  1.0  0.8  0.2  0.2  0.2  5.6  3.7 28.3  100 
 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Column Pct. 
         1986: 
1982   IU PSOE   CP  CDS  CiU   EE  PNV   HB  AIC   UV  PAR OTHE Nonv Abst      
=============================================================================== 
PCE  32.9  2.3  0.6  2.4  0.3  0.5  0.1  0.2  0.0  2.5  0.8  2.4  2.5  2.4  2.9 
PSOE 36.7 68.1  8.2 34.6  1.2 11.8  0.2  1.2 38.7 21.6 15.1 29.1 30.3 23.0 34.3 
AP    6.3  4.8 60.7 18.0  9.2  5.3  0.7  0.3 14.9 34.6 39.3 16.7 20.5 11.9 18.9 
UCD   0.8  2.8  8.4  6.4  2.3  0.2  0.1  0.2  2.3  1.3 17.7  4.8  7.2  5.1  4.8 
CDS   1.2  0.7  2.0  8.6  0.6  1.1  0.1  0.2  3.9  2.7  2.2  2.5  2.6  2.3  2.1 
CiU   0.2  0.0  0.4  0.1 61.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.7  3.0  0.9  2.6 
ERC   0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  6.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.7  0.4  0.5 
EE    0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.0 52.1  0.6  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.3 
HB    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.3  5.7 61.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.4  0.7 
OTHE  3.5  3.3  3.2  5.1  1.2  2.3  0.3  0.5 12.3 12.4  4.8 14.9  5.6  5.2  4.6 
Nonv  8.8  9.2  6.1 11.9  7.5  9.2  4.0  5.1  8.0  8.8  5.5 12.0  3.1 10.6  9.0 
Abst  9.4  8.6 10.0 12.6 10.2  9.8  8.1 11.8 19.8 16.2 14.7 14.7 22.4 36.8 18.1 
=============================================================================== 






Voter Mobility. .. Pct Net Flow. 
         1986: 
1982   IU PSOE   CP  CDS  CiU   EE  PNV   HB  AIC   UV  PAR OTHE Nonv Abst      
=============================================================================== 
PCE   0.0  0.7  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.7  2.9 
PSOE  1.1  0.0  1.4  1.9  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.7 -1.6  4.0  4.8 
AP    0.2  1.4  0.0  1.1  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.9  0.7  3.4 18.9 
UCD   0.0  0.8  1.5  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.3  1.4  4.8 
CDS   0.0 -1.9  0.4  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.1 -4.1 
CiU   0.0 -0.0  0.1 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 
ERC   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3 
HB    0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.1 
OTHE  0.1 -0.7  0.6  0.2 -0.1  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.5  0.6 -1.0 
Abst  0.3 -4.0  1.8  0.1  0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.6 -2.2  0.0-10.3 
=============================================================================== 









INFERRED ECOL PERCENTAGES 1986-1989: 
 
 
         1989: 
CP    0.2  0.8 12.6  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.4  0.5  1.9 16.9 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0 
PAR   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2 
         1989: 
IU   65.4  7.3  2.4  2.4  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.1  2.8  2.2 16.8  100 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2 63.9 20.7  6.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  3.1  4.8  100 
CP    3.3  2.8 72.3  7.2  2.4  3.7  0.6  0.6  0.1  4.9 18.3  7.6  9.6  7.5 15.2  6.5 16.9 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7 76.2 45.2  9.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.2  1.0 
AIC   0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 41.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.2 
      100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Pct of Total. 
1986   IU PSOE   PP  CDS  CiU   EE  PNV   EA   HB  AIC   UV   PA  PAR OTHE Nonv Abst      
========================================================================================= 
IU    2.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.5  3.0 
PSOE  1.3 20.4  0.8  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.7  0.7  3.9 28.8 
CDS   0.5  0.6  0.6  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.2  1.6  6.0 
CiU   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.2  3.3 
EE    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3 
HB    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.7 
AIC   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2 
UV    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2 
OTHE  0.3  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  1.4  0.2  1.8  5.5 
Nonv  0.6  1.3  0.6  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.1  2.4  6.5 
Abst  1.3  2.8  2.1  1.2  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  1.2  1.4 16.2 27.3 
========================================================================================= 
      6.1 26.6 17.3  5.3  3.4  0.3  0.8  0.4  0.7  0.2  0.5  0.7  0.2  5.0  3.3 29.0  100 
 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Row Pct. 
1986   IU PSOE   PP  CDS  CiU   EE  PNV   EA   HB  AIC   UV   PA  PAR OTHE Nonv Abst      
========================================================================================= 
PSOE  4.3 70.7  2.7  2.8  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.1  2.3  2.6 13.6  100 
CP    1.2  4.4 74.1  2.3  0.5  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.3  0.1  2.2  3.0 11.2  100 
CDS   7.9  9.9  9.6 33.3  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.7  0.2  8.2  2.6 26.9  100 
CiU   0.2  0.2  1.1  0.1 81.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  8.0  2.8  5.7  100 
EE    1.5  3.0  2.8  1.9  0.0 49.5  1.4  3.2  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.3  1.2 30.8  100 
HB    0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.9  4.8  9.5 71.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  2.7 10.0  100 
AIC   3.2  2.6  3.2  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 40.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.3  1.9 44.5  100 
UV    4.5  4.7 11.5  1.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 45.5  0.0  0.0  6.8  1.9 23.5  100 
PAR   1.4 11.5 11.1  2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 44.1  1.8  7.4 20.6  100 
OTHE  5.6  8.9  9.0  6.8  1.6  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.9  4.4  0.1 25.2  3.3 33.3  100 
Nonv  8.9 20.1  9.9  6.7  3.0  0.5  1.1  0.8  0.4  0.4  0.7  1.1  0.2  7.1  1.4 37.8  100 
Abst  4.7 10.2  7.8  4.5  1.1  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.7  0.2  4.5  5.2 59.4  100 
========================================================================================= 





Voter Mobility. .. Column Pct. 
         1989: 
1986   IU PSOE   PP  CDS  CiU   EE  PNV   EA   HB  AIC   UV   PA  PAR OTHE Nonv Abst      
========================================================================================= 
IU   32.4  0.8  0.4  1.4  0.2  0.5  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.3  1.0  0.7  0.7  1.7  2.0  1.8  3.0 
PSOE 20.5 76.6  4.5 14.9  0.5  7.3  0.1  0.7  0.3  8.1 19.1 13.3  8.7 13.5 22.3 13.5 28.8 
CDS   7.9  2.2  3.3 37.9  0.1  4.1  0.2  0.6  0.2  2.9  3.1  5.9  6.1  9.9  4.7  5.6  6.0 
CiU   0.1  0.0  0.2  0.1 79.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.3  2.8  0.7  3.3 
EE    0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0 49.2  0.6  2.4  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.3 
HB    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.8  4.3 15.8 74.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.6  0.3  0.7 
UV    0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 20.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.2 
PAR   0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 43.6  0.1  0.5  0.2  0.2 
OTHE  5.0  1.8  2.9  7.0  2.6  2.6  0.4  1.2  0.6  9.3 10.3 34.7  3.0 27.7  5.4  6.3  5.5 
Nonv  9.4  4.9  3.7  8.2  5.7 10.3  8.6 11.0  3.8 10.6  9.5 10.4  4.9  9.1  2.8  8.4  6.5 









Voter Mobility. .. Pct Net Flow. 
         1989: 
1986   IU PSOE   PP  CDS  CiU   EE  PNV   EA   HB  AIC   UV   PA  PAR OTHE Nonv Abst      
========================================================================================= 
IU    0.0 -1.0  0.1 -0.4  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -3.1 
PSOE  1.0  0.0  0.8  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1 -0.0  0.2 -0.6  1.1  2.2 
CP    0.2  0.8  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.4  0.5  1.9 16.9 
CDS   0.4 -0.2  0.6  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 -0.3  0.4  0.7 
CiU  -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
EE    0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 
PNV  -0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.2 
HB    0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0 
AIC   0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.1  0.0 
UV    0.0 -0.1  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.3 
PAR   0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 
OTHE  0.2 -0.2  0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0 -0.3  0.6  0.5 
Nonv  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 -0.0  0.3  0.0  1.0  3.1 
Abst  0.8 -1.1  2.1 -0.4  0.1 -0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0 -0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0 -0.6 -1.0  0.0 -1.8 
========================================================================================= 





INFERRED ECOL PERCENTAGES 1989-1993: 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Pct of Total. 
         1993: 
1989   IU PSOE   PP  CDS  CiU  ERC  PNV   EA   HB  BNG   CC   UV   PA  PAR OTHE Nonv Abst      
============================================================================================== 
IU    4.0  0.4  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.6  5.8 
PSOE  0.4 20.3  1.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.1  0.8  1.4 25.1 
PP    0.1  0.5 14.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.5  0.8 16.6 
CDS   0.3  0.6  1.4  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.2  1.1  5.1 
CiU   0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  2.5  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  3.1 
EE    0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.3 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8 
EA    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4 
HB    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.6 
AIC   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2 
UV    0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4 
PA    0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.7 
PAR   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3 
OTHE  0.3  0.4  1.1  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.2  1.0  4.8 
Nonv  0.5  1.9  2.1  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.1  2.0  8.3 
Abst  1.1  3.3  4.6  0.4  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2  1.9  1.5 13.8 27.6 
============================================================================================== 




Voter Mobility. .. Row Pct. 
IU   70.0  7.6  4.8  0.9  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.2  4.6  1.9  9.6  100 
PSOE  1.7 80.8  3.8  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  4.5  3.0  5.4  100 
EE    8.3 13.2 17.4  1.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  2.5  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 16.0  3.3 35.5  100 
OTHE  6.8  8.4 21.8  2.1  6.2  2.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.5  1.2  0.4  0.2  0.5 20.6  4.0 21.5  100 
Abst  4.0 11.9 16.7  1.6  0.9  0.4  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.4  0.6  6.8  5.5 50.1  100 
OTHE  4.8  1.5  4.2  8.2  8.4 23.0  0.1  0.1  0.1 43.5  9.1  5.9  3.3  5.1 15.1  5.3  4.9  4.8 
      100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Pct Net Flow. 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 
============================================================================================== 
         1993: 
1989   IU PSOE   PP  CDS  CiU  ERC  PNV   EA   HB  BNG   CC   UV   PA  PAR OTHE Nonv Abst      
============================================================================================== 
PP    0.6  3.0 84.3  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2  2.7  3.2  5.1  100 
CDS   5.0 12.4 26.8  7.9  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  3.3  0.1  0.2  0.5 17.7  4.1 21.2  100 
CiU   0.0  0.2  3.1  0.0 81.1  9.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  3.6  2.7  100 
PNV   0.0  0.1  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0 86.7  2.1  1.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  3.7  4.8  100 
EA    0.2  0.3  0.5  0.1  0.0  0.0 10.5 68.1  5.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  3.4 11.2  100 
HB    0.2  0.3  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.1  2.6 80.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  2.7  8.6  100 
AIC   1.7  1.7 15.5  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 51.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.3  0.8 25.5  100 
UV    3.2  6.5 20.1  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 49.7  0.0  0.0  5.1  2.9 12.0  100 
PA    2.1  7.2 25.4  1.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 18.6  0.0 12.6  3.3 29.7  100 
PAR   0.5  1.9  3.7  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 41.1 44.3  1.4  6.9  100 
Nonv  6.3 22.5 25.5  1.2  5.3  0.5  1.2  0.5  0.4  0.7  1.9  0.3  0.4  0.5  8.3  0.9 23.6  100 
============================================================================================== 




Voter Mobility. .. Column Pct. 
         1993: 
1989   IU PSOE   PP  CDS  CiU  ERC  PNV   EA   HB  BNG   CC   UV   PA  PAR OTHE Nonv Abst      
============================================================================================== 
IU   59.0  1.6  1.1  4.2  0.1  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.9  0.4  1.2  0.8  3.2  4.0  3.0  2.6  5.8 
PSOE  6.1 73.7  3.9  5.3  0.2  0.6  0.1  0.1  0.1  3.8  5.9  5.3  4.4  9.8 17.2 21.0  6.4 25.1 
PP    1.5  1.8 56.4  5.3  0.5  1.4  0.2  0.1  0.1  6.7  1.5  3.7  2.6  6.9  6.7 14.7  4.0 16.6 
CDS   3.7  2.3  5.5 31.9  0.2  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.1  6.2 26.6  1.7  3.9  6.1 13.6  5.8  5.0  5.1 
CiU   0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0 71.1 48.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  3.1  0.4  3.1 
EE    0.4  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.5  2.0  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.3  0.5  0.3 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 74.0  4.1  2.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.2  0.8 
EA    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.8 70.8  3.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.4 
HB    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.8  4.3 82.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.3  0.6 
AIC   0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 17.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.2 
UV    0.2  0.1  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 64.4  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.4 
PA    0.2  0.2  0.7  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 41.4  0.0  1.3  0.6  0.9  0.7 
PAR   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 23.6  1.7  0.1  0.1  0.3 
Nonv  7.6  6.8  8.5  8.0 12.4  7.3 11.5 10.7  4.8 14.8 24.9  6.6 10.6  9.6 10.4  2.1  9.2  8.3 




         1993: 
1989   IU PSOE   PP  CDS  CiU  ERC  PNV   EA   HB  BNG   CC   UV   PA  PAR OTHE Nonv Abst      
============================================================================================== 
IU    0.0  0.0  0.2 -0.2  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -1.1 
PSOE -0.0  0.0  0.5 -0.6  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.7 -1.1 -1.9 -2.4 
PP   -0.2 -0.5  0.0 -1.3 -0.1  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.1 -0.2  0.0 -0.6 -1.6 -3.8 -8.2 
CDS   0.2  0.6  1.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.1  0.6  3.8 
CiU  -0.0 -0.0  0.1 -0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 
EE    0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.3 
EA    0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0 
HB    0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0 
AIC   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2 
UV    0.0  0.0  0.1 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.1 
PA    0.0  0.0  0.2 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 -0.0  0.1  0.4 
PAR  -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 
OTHE  0.1 -0.7  0.6 -0.8  0.3  0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.2  0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1  0.0 -0.5 -0.8 -1.8 
Nonv  0.4  1.1  1.6 -0.1  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.4  4.7 
Abst  0.6  1.9  3.8 -0.6  0.2  0.1  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.1  0.1 -0.0 -0.1  0.1  0.8 -0.4  0.0  6.3 
      1.1  2.4  8.2 -3.8  0.4  0.6  0.1 -0.0 -0.0  0.4  0.6 -0.1 -0.4  0.2  1.8 -4.7 -6.3  0.0 
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INFERRED ECOL PERCENTAGES 1993-1996: 
Voter Mobility. .. Pct of Total. 
         1996: 
1993   IU PSOE   PP  CiU  ERC  PNV   EA   HB  BNG   CC   UV   PA OTHE Nonv Abst      
==================================================================================== 
IU    5.2  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.6  6.8 
PSOE  0.8 22.6  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.7  1.7 27.2 
PP    0.1  0.4 22.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3  1.1 24.2 
CDS   0.1  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.5  1.2 
CiU   0.0  0.0  0.1  3.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  3.6 
ERC   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.9 
CC    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.6 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Row Pct. 
         1996: 
Voter Mobility. .. Pct Net Flow. 
IU    0.0 -0.4  0.1 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -1.2 
CiU   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 
UV    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 
EA    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4 
HB    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.6 
BNG   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3 
UV    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3 
PA    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.3 
PAR   0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4 
OTHE  0.4  1.1  1.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  1.0  0.2  1.5  6.1 
Nonv  0.5  1.5  1.2  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  1.7  5.6 
Abst  0.8  1.8  2.6  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.7  0.9 13.4 20.9 
==================================================================================== 
      8.0 28.2 29.2  3.5  0.5  1.0  0.4  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.3  0.4  2.8  2.7 21.3  100 
 
         1996: 
1993   IU PSOE   PP  CiU  ERC  PNV   EA   HB  BNG   CC   UV   PA OTHE Nonv Abst      
==================================================================================== 
IU   76.7  5.9  3.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.1  2.1  1.7  9.5  100 
PSOE  3.0 83.2  3.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.6  2.6  6.4  100 
PP    0.5  1.7 90.5  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.8  1.4  4.5  100 
CDS   7.2  8.8 29.6  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.2  0.1  0.3  7.8  5.6 39.7  100 
CiU   0.0  0.9  1.6 86.3  2.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  2.7  5.3  100 
ERC   0.1  1.7  0.8 25.4 61.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  3.0  7.3  100 
PNV   0.1  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0 89.4  0.7  0.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  2.1  5.9  100 
EA    0.2  0.2  0.3  0.0  0.0  6.8 74.4  3.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.8 12.3  100 
HB    0.3  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  5.1  2.0 78.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  2.5 10.5  100 
BNG   0.7  1.1  4.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 80.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  1.4 10.0  100 
CC    0.3  3.2  4.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 79.9  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.8 10.5  100 
UV    2.5  3.1 11.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 61.6  0.0  1.9  3.9 15.9  100 
PA    1.1  1.8 14.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 32.8 30.9  1.1 18.3  100 
PAR   2.9  9.0 49.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 11.0  3.9 24.2  100 
OTHE  6.5 18.4 25.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.3  0.1  0.2  1.0 16.7  3.9 24.6  100 
Nonv  8.4 27.7 20.9  1.6  0.1  1.3  0.3  0.2  0.7  1.2  0.2  0.9  4.5  1.8 30.3  100 
Abst  4.0  8.8 12.6  0.6  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.6  3.4  4.4 64.3  100 
==================================================================================== 
      8.0 28.2 29.2  3.5  0.5  1.0  0.4  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.3  0.4  2.8  2.7 21.3  100 
 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Column Pct. 
1993   IU PSOE   PP  CiU  ERC  PNV   EA   HB  BNG   CC   UV   PA OTHE Nonv Abst      
==================================================================================== 
IU   65.2  1.4  0.8  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  3.6  0.2  0.9  1.1  5.2  4.3  3.0  6.8 
PSOE 10.4 80.3  3.4  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1 10.0  3.5  2.7  9.8  6.2 26.2  8.1 27.2 
PP    1.6  1.5 75.1  1.2  1.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  1.5  2.3  2.8  4.4  7.3 13.0  5.2 24.2 
CDS   1.1  0.4  1.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.3  0.5  0.9  3.4  2.5  2.3  1.2 
CiU   0.0  0.1  0.2 88.3 19.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  3.5  0.9  3.6 
ERC   0.0  0.0  0.0  4.2 70.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.6  0.2  0.6 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 80.3  1.8  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.7  0.2  0.9 
EA    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.7 81.8  2.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.4 
HB    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.3  3.5 87.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.6  0.3  0.6 
BNG   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 37.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.3 
CC    0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 77.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.3  0.6 
UV    0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 77.1  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.3  0.3 
PA    0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 24.5  3.4  0.1  0.3  0.3 
PAR   0.1  0.1  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5  0.6  0.4  0.4 
OTHE  4.9  4.0  5.2  0.2  0.5  0.1  0.2  0.1 30.3  0.8  3.9 15.1 36.6  8.9  7.0  6.1 
Nonv  5.9  5.5  4.0  2.6  1.4  7.3  5.3  2.5  5.5  9.6  3.5 11.8  9.2  3.6  8.0  5.6 
Abst 10.5  6.5  9.0  3.4  6.2  6.0  7.0  5.8 10.4  6.2  8.5 32.3 25.6 34.0 63.1 20.9 
==================================================================================== 




         1996: 
1993   IU PSOE   PP  CiU  ERC  PNV   EA   HB  BNG   CC   UV   PA OTHE Nonv Abst      
==================================================================================== 
PSOE  0.4  0.0  0.6 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.1  0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.9 -0.8 -0.1 -1.0 
PP   -0.1 -0.6  0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -1.3 -0.8 -1.5 -5.0 
CDS   0.1  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.5  1.2 
ERC  -0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 
EA    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0 
HB    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 
BNG  -0.0 -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.2 -0.0 -0.0 -0.4 
CC    0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.1  0.0 -0.0 
PA   -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
PAR   0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4 
OTHE  0.2  0.9  1.3 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.8  3.3 
Nonv  0.4  0.8  0.8 -0.0 -0.0  0.1  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.1 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  2.9 
Abst  0.2  0.1  1.5 -0.1 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.1 -0.8 -0.8  0.0 -0.4 
==================================================================================== 
      1.2  1.0  5.0 -0.1 -0.1  0.1 -0.0 -0.1  0.4  0.0 -0.1  0.1 -3.3 -2.9  0.4  0.0 
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INFERRED ECOL PERCENTAGES 1996-2000: 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Pct of Total. 
         2000: 
1996   IU PSOE   PP  CiU  ERC   IC  PNV   EA  BNG   CC   UV   PA   CH OTHE Nonv Abst      
========================================================================================= 
IU    2.6  1.3  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.3  2.3  7.7 
PSOE  0.4 18.5  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.4  1.2  4.4 27.2 
PP    0.1  0.6 23.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.9  2.6 28.1 
CiU   0.0  0.0  0.0  2.5  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.4  3.4 
ERC   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.9 
EA    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3 
HB    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.5 
BNG   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.6 
CC    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.7 
UV    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3 
PA    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.4 
OTHE  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.8  2.3 
Nonv  0.2  1.2  1.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.4  0.1  3.0  6.6 
Abst  0.4  1.0  2.4  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.8  1.1 14.1 20.5 
========================================================================================= 
      3.7 22.8 29.8  2.8  0.6  0.3  1.0  0.3  0.9  0.7  0.2  0.6  0.2  3.4  3.9 28.8  100 
 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Row Pct. 
PNV   0.1  0.2  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0 69.7  3.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  1.1 24.5  100 
PA    0.4  2.1 10.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 46.4  0.0  3.9  3.5 33.0  100 
OTHE  3.5  4.9 17.2  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.9  0.1  0.2  0.4  5.0 26.6  4.5 35.6  100 
1996   IU PSOE   PP  CiU  ERC   IC  PNV   EA  BNG   CC   UV   PA   CH OTHE Nonv Abst      
EA    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.7 54.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.3 
BNG  -0.0 -0.1 -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 
OTHE -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.1  0.0 -0.3  0.0 -1.2 
 
         2000: 
1996   IU PSOE   PP  CiU  ERC   IC  PNV   EA  BNG   CC   UV   PA   CH OTHE Nonv Abst      
========================================================================================= 
IU   33.8 16.5  7.0  0.0  0.0  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.5  6.1  3.4 30.4  100 
PSOE  1.4 67.8  7.3  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.3  0.1  0.5  0.0  1.5  4.3 16.0  100 
PP    0.3  2.3 81.9  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.1  2.4  3.3  9.1  100 
CiU   0.0  0.2  1.1 74.5  6.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5  5.2 11.1  100 
ERC   0.1  0.4  1.0 20.3 59.7  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.2  3.5 13.4  100 
EA    0.2  0.3  0.9  0.0  0.0  0.0 17.3 47.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  1.2 31.8  100 
HB    0.4  0.4  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0 17.5  7.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.7 72.4  100 
BNG   0.6  3.3  4.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 70.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.5  1.5 16.6  100 
CC    0.1  1.2  2.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 74.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.3  1.9 17.1  100 
UV    1.2  2.7 12.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 42.2  0.0  0.0  6.7  6.2 28.7  100 
Nonv  2.3 18.8 18.8  1.5  0.2  0.3  1.8  0.4  1.3  1.0  0.1  1.0  0.1  5.7  1.0 45.8  100 
Abst  1.7  4.9 11.6  0.3  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.2  0.5  0.2  0.1  0.7  0.2  3.8  5.5 69.1  100 
========================================================================================= 
      3.7 22.8 29.8  2.8  0.6  0.3  1.0  0.3  0.9  0.7  0.2  0.6  0.2  3.4  3.9 28.8  100 
 
 
Voter Mobility. .. Column Pct. 
         2000: 
========================================================================================= 
IU   71.0  5.5  1.8  0.0  0.3 26.0  0.1  0.3  5.1  0.3  3.8  4.0 18.9 13.6  6.7  8.1  7.7 
PSOE 10.1 81.0  6.7  0.7  1.8 26.9  0.3  0.6 11.4 11.1  8.3 21.1  1.9 12.0 29.9 15.1 27.2 
PP    2.6  2.8 77.4  0.2  0.5  6.3  0.4  0.4  8.9  2.8  3.5  7.6  6.7 19.2 23.6  8.9 28.1 
CiU   0.0  0.0  0.1 90.0 35.9  3.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5  4.5  1.3  3.4 
ERC   0.0  0.0  0.0  3.6 52.3  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.5 
PNV   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 62.2  9.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.8  0.9 
HB    0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.0 12.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  1.3  0.5 
BNG   0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 50.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.2  0.4  0.6 
CC    0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 70.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.7 
UV    0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 65.2  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3 
PA    0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 30.8  0.0  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.4 
OTHE  2.2  0.5  1.3  0.1  0.4  2.7  0.6  1.2  2.4  0.3  2.7  1.6 52.2 17.7  2.6  2.8  2.3 
Nonv  4.1  5.4  4.2  3.5  2.9  5.8 11.5  8.2  9.5  9.4  5.2 10.8  2.7 10.9  1.6 10.5  6.6 
Abst  9.6  4.4  8.0  1.9  5.8 28.7 10.4 13.1 12.3  5.8 11.2 24.2 17.5 22.4 28.9 49.1 20.5 
========================================================================================= 




Voter Mobility. .. Pct Net Flow. 
         2000: 
1996   IU PSOE   PP  CiU  ERC   IC  PNV   EA  BNG   CC   UV   PA   CH OTHE Nonv Abst      
========================================================================================= 
IU    0.0  0.9  0.4 -0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.1  2.0  4.0 
PSOE -0.9  0.0  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3 -0.1  3.3  4.4 
PP   -0.4 -1.4  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.1  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3 -0.3  0.2 -1.6 
CiU   0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.6 
ERC  -0.0 -0.0  0.0 -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.1 
PNV  -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.1  0.1 -0.1 
EA   -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -0.0  0.1  0.0 
HB    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.5 
CC   -0.0 -0.1 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.1  0.1 -0.0 
UV   -0.0 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1 
PA   -0.0 -0.1 -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 
Nonv -0.1  0.1  0.3 -0.1 -0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1 -0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.0  1.9  2.7 
Abst -2.0 -3.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.0  0.1 -0.1 -0.1  0.0 -0.1 -0.1  0.0  0.0 -0.0 -1.9  0.0 -8.4 
========================================================================================= 













                                Appendix III 
 
         
 
                Loyalty Rates and Voter Transitions at District Level  
 
                                Inferred ECOL percentages 
 
               
(Bold types indicate cases more than one standard deviation above the means 



















Table A III.1 New voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages 
 
Granada         33.8     9.3    26.1    26.1    22.7    18.8    23.5 
Zamora          36.1    11.1    26.2    25.0    19.1    24.6    24.3 
Tarragona       43.0    16.3    31.7    47.0    29.6    38.7    10.7 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería         33.8    10.3    35.5    47.3    25.7    27.8    19.1 
Cádiz           27.9    22.5    35.8    40.4    29.4    38.6    36.3 
Córdoba         26.0     9.3    24.7    32.2    22.8    32.8    17.0 
Huelva          39.2    18.6    38.7    40.4    32.1    30.5    20.5 
Jaén            29.7    10.2    22.5    27.8    22.8    15.8    14.2 
Málaga          40.5    17.2    34.3    41.5    32.3    37.2    14.6 
Sevilla         31.0    14.0    26.6    33.8    19.8    24.9    55.2 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca          26.8    15.8    28.7    25.9    20.0    31.6    15.7 
Teruel          31.0    15.0    31.7    30.3    24.1    16.3    18.1 
Zaragoza        29.3     9.1    31.7    30.2    14.6    11.8    17.8 
ASTURIAS        46.9     7.1    29.6    30.8    16.6    25.6    16.7 
BALEARES        48.8    27.9    50.5    49.5    24.3    45.0     7.5 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas      41.6    18.5    38.6    44.8    27.2    36.8     2.9 
Tenerife        52.1    51.2    41.6    54.9    26.3    37.6    19.2 
CANTABRIA       23.5    11.5    22.7    25.2    17.0    18.2    23.1 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete        19.0     5.3    26.8    23.7    13.6    26.4     5.8 
Ciudad Real     41.2     9.0    28.7    31.4    22.2    27.3    23.3 
Cuenca          20.5    15.4    23.3    25.9    13.8    19.1    29.2 
Guadalajara     25.0     9.2    21.2    26.9    15.4    21.3    23.5 
Toledo          31.6    12.4    21.8    30.5    19.1    24.5    23.8 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila           28.5    10.0    21.4    19.7    14.5    12.3    24.7 
Burgos          32.8    24.7    30.8    27.2    15.1    18.8    13.3 
León            44.9    16.3    36.8    28.6    15.9    19.8    12.1 
Palencia        31.0     9.4    25.3    26.3    20.3    20.3    28.5 
Salamanca       39.8    12.9    20.2    25.5    16.6    20.5    18.5 
Segovia         29.6    14.6    20.5    29.2    15.3    20.1    24.6 
Soria           31.4    11.4    26.9    34.9    23.8    25.9    21.5 
Valladolid      48.1    18.8    33.0    31.9    22.5    16.9    29.5 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona       49.7    24.6    37.9    54.9    33.3    42.4     6.6 
Girona          19.9    12.5    36.4    49.0    30.9    26.8     6.6 
Lleida          26.3    10.1    29.0    37.8    24.9    30.4    10.5 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante        32.3    20.2    32.8    35.8    18.2    29.8    18.0 
Castellón       15.8    10.7    17.8    28.0    17.2     2.4    20.5 
Valencia        20.6    13.0    28.3    22.2    13.7    17.6    42.9 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz         28.5    12.9    22.2    31.5    16.7    20.5    16.3 
Cáceres         30.9    15.3    23.3    29.5    17.0    21.5    22.7 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña        46.8    26.2    40.9    37.9     9.2    33.7    11.1 
Lugo            51.4    19.0    28.4    31.2    13.7    33.8    10.7 
Ourense         53.4    38.2    52.1    44.7    34.8    38.5    11.3 
Pontevedra      25.2     9.4    39.2    28.1     7.5    34.3    10.6 
MADRID          46.5    29.1    36.7    45.2    25.6    34.2    17.1 
MURCIA          23.0     9.0    20.2    26.2    11.9    20.3    16.4 
NAVARRA         29.3    14.6    39.7    35.9    27.8    38.4    18.3 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava           36.1    30.6    39.4    38.6    25.2    32.4     5.4 
Guipúzcoa       45.6    20.7    52.6    35.8    44.4    34.4     3.3 
Vizcaya         48.2    23.6    59.4    30.5    41.3    41.4      .7 





Table A III.2 New voters opting for PCE/IU: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería          7.2     3.3     2.5    10.5     5.3    11.1     1.5 
Cádiz           10.7     3.4     4.7     7.9     7.5    11.7     2.8 
Córdoba         15.8     4.9     8.6    31.1     9.0    16.7     4.5 
Granada          7.5     3.2     5.9    26.6     9.6    21.2     3.6 
Jaén             7.9     5.1    10.5    16.8     7.3    17.6     3.4 
Sevilla          9.0     5.5     4.4    12.5     8.3    12.6     2.8 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Soria            2.6     1.0     3.0    11.7    10.1    13.3     5.9 
Lleida           8.4     2.5     2.3     4.1     4.9     3.6      .6 
Cáceres          4.7     1.1     1.8    10.6    14.2    11.4     4.0 
Ourense          1.2      .3      .7     1.5     6.5      .7     1.4 
Vizcaya          2.2      .5     1.5     1.9     1.3     4.0      .5 
Huelva           4.0     1.4     2.7     7.3     7.0     7.7     2.1 
Málaga           6.6     4.0     4.2     7.0    11.9     2.5     1.2 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca           6.4     1.4     2.3     8.4     9.1     8.1     2.1 
Teruel           2.2     1.1     1.1     5.3     6.1    12.4     3.0 
Zaragoza         6.5     1.3     3.7    24.3    13.0      .6      .8 
ASTURIAS         8.4     3.6     2.4    18.3    11.0    14.9     7.5 
BALEARES         2.7     1.3     1.7     3.4     2.7     3.8     1.6 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas       1.4             1.2      .8      .5      .6      .3 
Tenerife         2.7             1.9     1.8     2.2     2.0      .4 
CANTABRIA        6.4     1.8     2.5    13.7     8.7    11.0     2.9 
Albacete         9.8     1.9     3.7    20.3    11.2     9.9     3.2 
Ciudad Real      6.0     1.8     2.2     5.5     3.5    10.3     1.2 
Cuenca           7.8     2.4     1.2     8.7     9.8     9.4     2.5 
Guadalajara      7.0     3.0     5.9    14.9    14.6    16.7     7.3 
Toledo           7.0     1.9     2.4     9.8     6.0     8.5     2.8 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila            2.6     1.7     2.3    14.6    11.2    25.0     4.9 
Burgos           1.8     1.5     1.7    17.2    18.0    19.3     3.6 
León             3.4     1.8     2.0    13.7    13.3    18.5     3.1 
Palencia         3.1     1.7     3.2     8.1     9.3    13.1     3.6 
Salamanca        2.8     1.1     1.6    12.6    14.9    15.0     3.7 
Segovia          1.9     1.2     2.8    11.3     9.2    11.8     5.7 
Valladolid       3.1     2.0     3.1     3.3         6.3     12.1 1.8 
Zamora           2.3      .9     1.5     9.2    13.0    15.1     5.0 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona        8.4     3.9     2.2     2.2     1.4     3.0      .7 
Girona          11.8     2.9     1.0     3.5     2.3     4.6     1.2 
Tarragona        8.1     2.3     2.1     2.9     2.8     3.5     1.0 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante         7.8     2.3     2.5     6.3     3.1     4.3     1.2 
Castellón        8.1     2.8     1.2     9.1     6.9     7.3     2.8 
Valencia        13.5     2.0     3.8     8.1     5.0     4.8     1.4 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz          7.0     2.5     3.5    12.0    11.1    10.7     2.7 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña         2.5      .8     1.4     7.0     9.8     3.8      .9 
Lugo             1.1      .2      .8     3.0     8.4     1.4      .9 
Pontevedra       4.3     1.5      .8     5.1     9.6     3.1     1.1 
MADRID           6.4      .9     3.8     9.7     5.0    13.2     4.1 
MURCIA           7.7     3.1     2.6     7.6     5.6     8.7     1.7 
NAVARRA          1.9      .9     1.2    14.4     5.4    15.1     5.4 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava            2.3      .6      .5     2.9    14.1     9.6     1.1 
Guipúzcoa        3.1     1.0      .6     1.3     1.3     3.8      .7 







Table A III.3 New voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
Huesca          32.8    43.9    32.9    19.3     7.5    24.7    15.7 
BALEARES        20.3    29.4    22.5    15.4    21.0    23.6     7.5 
CANTABRIA       22.7    30.0    41.1    24.9    33.2    32.2    23.1 
Cuenca          32.8    44.2    32.2    24.3    29.4    26.9    29.2 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila           11.9    37.3    13.2    18.9    17.7    21.8    24.7 
Burgos           6.7    35.2    24.4    14.2    24.0    12.2    13.3 
3.5    25.3 2.1 
Palencia        21.2    55.8    39.1    26.0    28.2    29.0    28.5 
Valladolid      11.4    46.1    31.1    36.0    24.2    40.0    29.5 
Valencia        26.7    56.8    31.5    31.3    36.7    58.3    42.9 
GALICIA                                                              
Pontevedra      11.7    39.2    15.5    26.9    17.5     1.2    10.6 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería         33.4    56.5    32.6    13.4    25.0    23.9    19.1 
Cádiz           11.1    45.5    47.2    36.6    41.3    20.8    36.3 
Córdoba         16.3    46.9    37.2    14.8    47.9    12.9    17.0 
Granada         25.0    54.1    35.9    14.7    33.2    15.3    23.5 
Huelva          16.7    41.9    31.3    20.3    21.5    28.8    20.5 
Jaén            24.3    39.5    31.9    18.3    29.4    18.1    14.2 
Málaga          28.2    46.0    39.8    21.0     8.8    26.3    14.6 
Sevilla         26.2    46.6    48.2    34.7    54.9    48.9    55.2 
ARAGON                                                               
Teruel          16.6    45.0    24.7    19.5    27.3    29.1    18.1 
Zaragoza        20.6    49.1    26.0    11.1     4.9    49.6    17.8 
ASTURIAS        24.4    56.5    18.4    11.3     9.1    14.3    16.7 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas      10.8    26.7    11.2    14.0     6.1    14.5     2.9 
Tenerife        11.6    12.9    24.5    15.5     5.4    24.9    19.2 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete        29.0    40.9    32.2    19.9     6.4     8.1     5.8 
Ciudad Real     24.9    40.3    29.3    27.1    17.9    14.0    23.3 
Guadalajara     21.9    47.0    29.1    21.1    27.0    27.7    23.5 
Toledo          21.4    46.5    35.9    27.8    29.3    24.4    23.8 
León            12.7    4     18.8    15.3    14.4    1
Salamanca       14.4    42.5    28.6    15.5    13.3    15.4    18.5 
Segovia         10.4    34.2    29.0    22.5    22.9    27.7    24.6 
Soria           17.2    31.8    32.8    23.6    24.9    27.3    21.5 
Zamora          16.4    43.7    22.2    26.5    29.9    22.6    24.3 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona       15.5    52.7    27.1     9.2    16.5    43.7     6.6 
Girona          28.4    41.0    12.5    15.2    17.9    34.9     6.6 
Lleida          27.9    46.6    25.7    21.1    21.1    29.3    10.5 
Tarragona       22.2    36.0    28.0    12.2    14.2    25.9    10.7 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante        32.3    46.3    36.3    31.7    36.7    33.1    18.0 
Castellón       32.7    48.4    20.9    18.8    20.7    17.4    20.5 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz         27.0    52.9    35.6    15.5    25.1    21.3    16.3 
Cáceres         22.2    38.8    31.8    20.8    11.4    21.6    22.7 
A Coruña         7.3    31.1    16.3    15.9    25.0     2.1    11.1 
Lugo            12.9    25.4    19.5    13.4    18.6     1.5    10.7 
Ourense         11.4    25.0     8.4    12.2    16.0     3.2    11.3 
MADRID          18.1    32.8    39.1    23.2    24.0    31.2    17.1 
MURCIA          36.7    43.5    43.6    32.0    11.1    19.8    16.4 
NAVARRA         17.5    49.1    22.8    21.4    29.4    20.1    18.3 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava           20.8    23.6    20.0    27.1    19.6    10.2     5.4 
Guipúzcoa        6.5    33.7    10.7     7.9     9.3    12.2     3.3 
Vizcaya         10.0    18.5     9.6     2.9     3.5     4.4      .7 
LA RIOJA        17.7    33.7    33.9    16.9    21.0    24.3    23.6 
 260
Table A III.4 New voters opting for AP/PP: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería          5.2    20.1    18.4    11.1    36.6    30.1    29.8 
Cádiz            2.8    18.5     3.1     1.0    10.7    15.8     7.6 
Córdoba          7.3    31.1    18.4     6.8    13.2    20.9    23.4 
Granada          2.7    27.1    14.5    10.6    26.4    26.2    14.2 
Huelva           3.6    28.3    16.2    18.0    32.8    24.6    20.9 
Jaén             4.1    36.5    20.2    15.0    29.1    35.4    34.8 
Málaga           2.4    24.4    11.2     9.8    37.4    13.3    14.1 
Sevilla          2.5    27.9     9.1     2.4    12.7     6.4     5.0 
BALEARES         2.7    21.5     7.3    14.6    40.9    23.0    26.9 
Palencia        12.9    24.3    13.1    21.5    24.9    30.4    16.0 
Salamanca        7.5    32.1    23.0    28.4    41.4    40.4    31.9 
Soria            9.2    37.6    12.9    13.8    24.4    28.7    21.4 
Barcelona        1.1     2.6     1.2     1.2     6.2     1.1     3.1 
Lleida           3.0    18.9    16.7    11.3    27.2     9.3     8.9 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca           3.6    21.9    16.1    21.9    23.7    26.5    34.4 
Teruel           6.8    24.4    21.6    21.4    24.4    35.4    23.8 
Zaragoza         5.9    29.1    11.4    13.3    19.9    31.6    25.6 
ASTURIAS         6.7    25.0     9.7    11.3    42.6    22.0    22.1 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas       1.8    22.2     5.1      .7    15.1    15.5     2.3 
Tenerife         4.4    13.7     9.9     3.4    22.6    12.2     9.4 
CANTABRIA        9.2    25.7    14.9    17.8    28.2    33.8    33.1 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete         3.4    41.2    19.7    14.3    52.5    48.3    47.5 
Ciudad Real      6.4    31.1    18.8    17.7    46.0    40.9    31.6 
Cuenca           6.6    22.4    31.3    22.4    36.7    39.9    35.1 
Guadalajara      9.0    28.7    17.2    17.2    30.0    29.4    22.1 
Toledo           4.5    24.1    22.9    18.2    37.6    39.1    30.0 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila            5.1    34.9    21.1    21.4    44.5    35.1    42.2 
Burgos           7.7    25.3    21.9    21.0    26.2    39.7    35.3 
León             8.2    23.0    14.5    18.9    30.2    33.8    21.0 
Segovia          4.1    31.7    19.4    15.7    19.6    31.7    20.0 
Valladolid       7.3    21.0     6.0    18.1    27.9    33.9    29.1 
Zamora          18.1    32.9    28.6    22.0    23.7    31.5    16.3 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Girona           1.9    11.1     5.6     6.2    10.2     8.6     7.7 
Tarragona        1.6    12.7     2.3     3.8    19.2    12.1     9.0 
Alicante         4.6    20.4    12.1    10.1    37.0    30.6    33.3 
Castellón        5.2    23.9    49.6    15.1    42.9    14.6    23.7 
Valencia         2.8    19.4    17.7    16.2    35.0    12.0    17.8 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz          3.3    21.5    24.3    15.9    33.7    42.3    44.0 
Cáceres          3.7    28.7    17.8    18.2    40.3    38.3    35.9 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña        10.6    30.4    12.4    14.1    11.1    40.0    27.9 
Lugo             8.2    43.3    23.8    21.1    17.5    54.8    31.1 
Ourense         12.5    29.4    22.1    24.8    11.1    46.4    19.0 
Pontevedra      30.3    28.7    20.4    18.1    13.8    36.6    17.6 
MADRID           3.6    3.4     2.9     8.2     36.9    18.0    14.5 
MURCIA           2.9    37.6    24.5    15.2    67.1    47.2    57.6 
NAVARRA          7.3    16.6    13.6    10.6    26.6    13.8    19.6 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava                    4.2     4.8     6.9    16.2    19.7    31.5 
Guipúzcoa                3.6     5.2     3.4     6.7    18.5     7.7 
Vizcaya                  2.9     2.3     2.5     7.0    13.5     1.5 
LA RIOJA        11.1    30.5    23.0    10.9    31.3    32.5    22.3 
 




Table A III.5 New voters opting for UCD: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82    
ANDALUCIA                    
Almería          9.8      .3 
Cádiz           13.3      .6 
Córdoba         13.3      .5 
Granada         22.1     1.3 
CATALUNYA                    
Girona          11.7     2.0 
Tarragona        5.8     1.7 
Castellón       22.3     2.1 
Valencia        18.9     1.9 
GALICIA                  
Huelva          15.5     1.4 
Jaén            24.0     2.9 
Málaga           7.8      .4 
Sevilla          9.9      .8 
ARAGON                       
Huesca          24.9     5.8 
Teruel          37.3     3.6 
Zaragoza        11.9     1.1 
ASTURIAS         6.7      .9 
BALEARES        15.8     7.6 
CANARIAS                     
Las Palmas      35.4      .7 
Tenerife        20.0     3.7 
CANTABRIA        9.9     2.3 
CAST.-MANCHA                 
Albacete        32.9     1.0 
Ciudad Real     13.3    10.0 
Cuenca          29.9     8.4 
Guadalajara     23.3     3.4 
Toledo          24.9     3.6 
CAST.-LEON                   
Avila           46.5     4.8 
Burgos          44.1     4.8 
León            26.9     7.5 
Palencia        19.6     1.6 
Salamanca       28.2     3.6 
Segovia         50.2     6.2 
Soria           32.4     6.8 
Valladolid      20.5     2.1 
Zamora          18.6     1.4 
Barcelona        7.3      .7 
Lleida          11.4     1.9 
C.VALENCIANA                 
Alicante        16.9     2.0 
EXTREMADURA                  
Badajoz         27.0     2.2 
Cáceres         29.8     3.7 
    
A Coruña        16.7     6.0 
Lugo            17.0     8.1 
Ourense         12.1     3.6 
Pontevedra      10.2      .4 
MADRID          18.2     2.4 
MURCIA          21.9     1.3 
NAVARRA         15.5     3.4 
BASQUE COUNTRY                      
Alava           17.0         
Guipúzcoa        9.9         
Vizcaya          8.2         





Table A III.6 New voters opting for CDS: Ecol percentages 
 
               79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93    
ANDALUCIA                                    
Almería          2.2     4.6     7.4      .8 
Cádiz            1.4     2.1     1.0      .2 
Huesca           3.3     8.0     6.7     3.1 
Las Palmas       1.3    35.0    33.2      .3 
Cuenca           1.7     7.3    10.0     2.4 
Toledo           1.9    12.5     6.8     1.6 
Soria            5.1    19.9
NAVARRA          3.6     7.1     8.4     1.6 
Córdoba          1.7     4.8     4.4     1.0 
Granada          1.5     6.1     4.8      .6 
Huelva           1.4     4.4     2.4      .7 
Jaén              .6     7.0     6.5      .9 
Málaga           1.1     4.5     6.4      .9 
Sevilla           .3     2.6     2.0      .4 
ARAGON                                       
Teruel           4.1     9.3     8.4     1.6 
Zaragoza         3.7    12.6     6.2     1.0 
ASTURIAS         4.8    25.1    15.6     2.2 
BALEARES         3.4     7.8    10.0     1.3 
CANARIAS                                     
Tenerife         4.3     5.6     5.0      .7 
CANTABRIA        2.8     8.1     4.9     2.0 
CAST.-MANCHA                                 
Albacete         1.9    10.5     8.4     2.8 
Ciudad Real      1.4    11.6    10.1     2.3 
Guadalajara      4.0    18.7    10.4     2.5 
CAST.-LEON                                   
Avila            7.0    33.5     7.8     3.8 
Burgos           3.6    15.2     8.2     2.5 
León             2.2    12.2     9.6     1.3 
Palencia         4.2    11.4     7.6     2.8 
Salamanca        4.1    19.1     7.3     2.8 
Segovia          4.9    19.1    13.1    12.3 
     9.6     4.0 
Valladolid       3.7    18.1     5.6     3.6 
Zamora           3.8    15.6     6.7     2.8 
CATALUNYA                                    
Barcelona         .8     2.5     1.2      .2 
Girona           1.3     1.4     4.2      .3 
Lleida           1.8     3.8     6.2      .7 
Tarragona        1.8     2.9     2.8      .5 
C.VALENCIANA                                 
Alicante         1.8     8.5     8.5     1.1 
Castellón        2.2     3.8     9.6     1.8 
Valencia          .9     7.3     3.5      .4 
EXTREMADURA                                  
Badajoz           .9     8.7    13.3     2.8 
Cáceres          1.7     8.8     7.4     2.8 
GALICIA                                      
A Coruña         1.5     8.0     9.4     1.8 
Lugo              .7     9.4     9.7     2.7 
Ourense           .9     2.9     5.6     2.4 
Pontevedra       2.2     6.9     4.2     1.2 
MADRID            .5     9.7     8.7     2.0 
MURCIA           1.8     4.8    13.1      .7 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                      
Alava           17.8     5.2     3.5      .6 
Guipúzcoa        1.6     3.1     1.5      .1 
Vizcaya           .5     3.8     1.4      .2 






               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
Sevilla         67.4    22.9    36.3    66.6    51.1    61.0    73.1 
Huesca          64.9    32.6    45.1    43.8    41.0    58.6    49.9 
CANARIAS                                                             
Guadalajara     62.9    26.7    51.7    49.0    43.3    51.9    55.8 
Salamanca       56.5    31.0    60.5    50.9    46.9    53.4    60.7 
Segovia         43.2    26.7    42.6    44.2    38.3    45.3    51.4 
Soria           58.8    32.5    49.2    49.3    48.0    57.0    57.1 
Barcelona       61.2    27.7    63.9    63.4    55.0    63.4    72.2 
Lleida          62.0    43.1    57.9    62.7    49.5    59.9    70.2 
       
Alicante        60.2    29.5    56.5    56.0    49.9    71.7    80.1 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
A Coruña        81.6    55.7    68.3    68.1    45.5    69.7    61.4 
NAVARRA         54.0    37.6    64.2    62.2    55.7    64.8    66.4 
 
Table A III.7 Electoral abstainers opting for abstention: Ecol percentages 
 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería         62.8    42.2    50.0    51.8    50.2    60.6    67.2 
Cádiz           63.9    37.6    67.6    68.6    57.8    61.5    69.6 
Córdoba         55.5    32.0    45.3    56.9    50.0    60.2    69.4 
Granada         65.8    50.0    71.3    59.2    52.5    63.9    69.5 
Huelva          71.8    40.7    68.5    66.4    55.7    67.6    76.5 
Jaén            54.5    36.9    57.5    52.8    49.4    58.3    69.4 
Málaga          65.0    31.6    42.3    50.6    52.5    66.0    71.4 
ARAGON                                                               
Teruel          53.6    39.6    54.8    51.9    41.0    47.6    54.7 
Zaragoza        59.8    27.9    45.1    56.9    38.2    57.3    66.8 
ASTURIAS        82.2    47.7    86.1    68.4    58.2    71.3    73.4 
BALEARES        57.4    28.2    66.2    68.4    59.6    76.1    80.5 
Las Palmas      63.1    44.3    69.2    72.5    55.2    73.6    80.0 
Tenerife        77.4    27.3    38.2    68.3    60.9    74.8    77.2 
CANTABRIA       66.5    27.0    63.2    59.4    51.0    59.4    76.7 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete        62.9    40.1    49.9    51.0    49.6    61.6    72.0 
Ciudad Real     64.8    36.8    41.4    55.8    51.5    63.1    75.2 
Cuenca          55.3    25.8    45.9    53.5    42.5    54.3    61.1 
Toledo          51.2    28.0    46.6    55.3    46.7    60.1    69.6 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila           69.9    34.4    57.2    49.7    43.4    50.4    28.6 
Burgos          43.2    38.3    60.6    50.4    50.4    62.2    59.0 
León            67.1    42.3    69.0    67.6    52.8    68.0    70.2 
Palencia        65.0    32.2    45.7    43.5    46.6    56.5    56.8 
Valladolid      50.1    18.1    33.5    47.5    45.4    56.8    61.6 
Zamora          65.2    42.4    64.2    59.8    56.0    66.0    67.3 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Girona          56.6    32.3    52.0    59.9    49.1    58.2    71.9 
Tarragona       62.2    34.5    59.7    59.7    48.1    56.9    71.5 
C.VALENCIANA                                                  
Castellón       55.6    33.7    52.3    60.6    48.1    58.1    72.3 
Valencia        53.1    24.6    44.5    46.0    35.9    66.5    73.8 
Badajoz         54.8    36.9    64.4    51.5    50.3    49.9    53.8 
Cáceres         68.6    38.7    59.8    52.5    49.1    56.2    55.9 
GALICIA                                                              
Lugo            77.5    51.5    68.9    59.8    41.9    61.6    56.0 
Ourense         83.9    63.5    71.1    62.5    29.9    56.5    50.5 
Pontevedra      82.5    47.8    66.2    64.2    45.2    70.7    67.2 
MADRID          30.8    17.0    37.9    49.5    44.8    61.0    65.4 
MURCIA          53.8    32.1    59.4    58.1    51.0    69.3    83.1 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava           54.5    19.6    48.4    60.7    58.9    65.3    58.1 
Guipúzcoa       51.4    41.3    68.6    68.1    68.4    72.6    67.6 
Vizcaya         52.6    36.1    68.8    71.1    62.1    73.2    61.1 
LA RIOJA        56.5    24.1    47.0    54.3    43.2    53.8    56.1 
 264
Table A III.8 Electoral abstainers opting for PCE/IU: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
Jaén             3.3     2.1     1.1     2.0     1.1     3.8      .6 
Málaga           2.8     1.7     3.4     5.8     3.6     4.2     1.1 
Sevilla          3.5     1.5     3.4     5.1     5.8     3.4     1.2 
Huesca           2.4     1.7     1.2     4.1     2.8     5.1     2.7 
Zaragoza         2.9     2.0      .9     5.4     2.4     6.2     1.9 
ASTURIAS         1.5     1.9      .7     1.3     1.0      .7      .7 
Tenerife         1.8             1.5     3.5     2.7     3.8      .9 
Albacete         3.4     1.1     1.0     3.2     3.5     2.3     1.5 
Toledo           3.7     1.1     2.6     6.3     4.2     5.0     1.8 
Salamanca        1.8     1.1     1.4     2.9     3.2     4.1     2.0 
Barcelona        3.1     2.6     1.8     6.2     5.2     3.5     1.0 
Castellón        1.9     1.2      .7     2.7     3.8     5.0     2.1 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería           .9     1.4     1.3     2.2     3.9     2.9     1.1 
Cádiz            2.5     1.2     3.0     4.0     4.9     5.6     1.4 
Córdoba          1.7     1.0      .8     4.1     4.2     4.3     1.7 
Granada          3.4     1.6     1.4     1.5     1.8     1.3      .8 
Huelva           1.6     1.3     1.0     2.6     4.3     3.8     1.4 
ARAGON                                                               
Teruel           2.3     1.0     1.4     3.5     2.6     5.6     2.1 
BALEARES         3.0     1.6     1.1     2.8     3.5     4.2     2.2 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas       2.7             4.8     6.8     4.9     2.2      .8 
CANTABRIA        1.7     1.5     1.2     1.3     1.9     4.0     1.2 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Ciudad Real      2.6     1.3     1.4     3.3     3.5     2.8      .9 
Cuenca           3.1     1.5     1.7     2.6     3.5     3.8     2.8 
Guadalajara      2.2     1.9     1.1     2.6     3.9     4.3     2.5 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila            2.0     1.4      .9     2.0     2.1     5.1     4.4 
Burgos           3.2     1.2     1.1     3.0     3.6     2.9     2.1 
León             2.0     1.5     1.3     2.2     2.4     2.9     1.2 
Palencia         2.0     2.1     1.7     2.8     5.0     5.6     2.4 
Segovia          2.3     1.3     1.2     4.5     4.5     5.2     2.7 
Soria                      1.1         3.4 1.4  .9  2.7 4.0     5.5     
Valladolid       6.8     2.7     1.2    11.8     8.2     9.1     3.0 
Zamora           1.0      .8     1.3     1.7     2.2     2.9     1.4 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Girona           2.8     1.4     1.6     3.0     2.7     2.9     1.1 
Lleida           2.0     1.7     1.1     2.1     1.8     2.9      .9 
Tarragona        4.3     2.5     2.1     3.5     3.1     3.9     1.0 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante         2.8     1.5     1.5     6.0     7.4     4.7     1.6 
Valencia         5.0     2.3     2.1     6.7     7.1     7.0     2.4 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz          3.3     1.6     2.4     3.7     3.3     3.6     2.0 
Cáceres          3.1     1.2     1.2     2.6     2.5     3.1     1.9 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña          .5      .9      .3      .6     1.2      .6      .3 
Lugo              .3      .5      .3      .4     1.0      .9      .6 
Ourense           .7      .4      .3      .5      .3     1.7      .4 
Pontevedra       .7     .7      .3     1.0     1.1      .5      .4   
MADRID           7.7     3.2     3.2    12.0     6.4     5.9     4.2 
MURCIA           2.4     2.7     1.3     4.1     4.9     5.3     1.2 
NAVARRA          1.0      .6      .8     2.6     5.6     5.8     3.1 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava             .8      .6      .1     1.1     2.5     5.0     2.2 
Guipúzcoa        1.9     1.2      .6     1.1     3.0     2.7     1.8 
Vizcaya           .9      .8      .5     1.6     4.0     4.2     2.0 




Table A III.9 Abstainers opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
Zaragoza        10.1    34.9    25.2     9.0     4.3     9.3     2.7 
BALEARES         7.9    24.0     9.5     8.3    11.4    11.2     4.3 
Tarragona        8.9    22.1     6.8     9.4     9.2    18.7     5.7 
GALICIA                                                              
Pontevedra       1.0     9.7     2.9     9.0    15.8     1.1     2.6 
MURCIA          10.8    26.0    13.2    12.3     5.3     7.6     1.7 
 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería          7.1    22.8    22.4    21.6     5.6    11.3     1.7 
Cádiz            7.6    37.1     8.5     2.9     5.6     2.3     1.8 
Córdoba         12.2    38.4    31.7    13.7     6.2     4.6     1.5 
Granada          9.6    18.7    13.9    20.9    14.1    12.6     5.5 
Huelva           8.7    34.0    17.0    10.6    10.6     5.7     1.8 
Jaén            24.9    35.1    21.8    27.3    18.3    14.6     6.7 
Málaga           9.0    40.2    30.4    22.7    13.5      .9     1.7 
Sevilla          9.9    46.9    36.4     5.3    14.4     4.9     3.1 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca           6.5    21.0    20.1    20.6    12.0    14.0    13.0 
Teruel          15.5    23.4    13.5    13.9    11.0    15.2     5.2 
ASTURIAS         1.6    18.4     4.6    16.8    13.5    11.7     6.7 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas       6.8    15.4     7.4     3.7     2.5     4.1     2.0 
Tenerife         4.5    32.4    23.4     6.1     2.9     1.3     2.2 
CANTABRIA        4.9    22.4    10.1     4.0     7.6     7.3     1.2 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete        12.2    24.2    19.9    23.2    15.8    14.2     5.6 
Ciudad Real     14.1    30.7    25.4    13.7    12.4     8.8     4.9 
Cuenca           9.9    23.1    17.9    16.2    13.1    13.6     8.7 
Guadalajara      6.6    21.5    11.9    15.0    15.1    11.2     9.1 
Toledo          13.6    28.0    17.9    11.2     9.0     8.7     5.7 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila            6.0    13.3     6.0    11.0    10.9    10.5    16.6 
Burgos          14.6    16.5    10.1    15.5    12.8    10.6     8.7 
León             6.8    20.6    12.3    10.7    22.8     9.2     5.2 
Palencia         5.0    24.5    13.2    18.2    13.7     9.3     7.0 
Salamanca        9.6    29.3    12.9    15.0    15.3    12.8     7.1 
Segovia          8.9    21.2     9.4     7.3    10.7    11.9     5.9 
Soria            7.6    21.1     8.5     7.9    13.5     8.2     5.1 
Valladolid      11.9    43.0    23.8     3.8    11.6     7.7     8.7 
Zamora           4.0    12.0     4.9     6.6     7.4     5.3     3.7 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona        4.2    21.8     7.8     4.3    11.6    18.0     6.4 
Girona           6.7     9.9     4.8     5.4     8.5    17.8     4.3 
Lleida           3.8     8.9     2.0     2.9     5.6    13.1     5.1 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante        13.7    38.4    15.2    11.2    12.4     7.5     3.0 
Castellón        6.4    22.3    13.7    10.4    12.1    12.2     3.1 
Valencia        14.6    28.4    21.8    12.9    15.4     5.3     2.3 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz         21.5    32.8    18.8    24.9    11.8    21.5    13.7 
Cáceres         13.7    27.0    14.6    19.9    18.7    14.0    10.2 
A Coruña         1.4     4.8     4.6     8.6    13.3     1.4     3.1 
Lugo             2.1     9.7     2.9    12.6    11.7     2.6     6.8 
Ourense          1.9     5.9     4.1    10.4    18.1     3.3     2.4 
MADRID          34.0    46.3    27.7    12.9    17.0     8.7     8.7 
NAVARRA          3.0    10.4     3.4     2.3     7.5     2.0     3.0 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava            2.3    26.6     2.1     4.5     3.5     4.8     6.2 
Guipúzcoa        1.4     7.6     3.3     1.9     5.8     4.2     3.2 
Vizcaya          2.7    14.1     2.9     2.2    10.8     5.1     4.8 




Table A III.10 Abstainers opting for AP/PP: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería          2.7    19.4     8.7     7.7    27.6    15.5    19.4 
Cádiz            1.3    12.7     9.3     5.1    17.7    15.6    15.2 
Córdoba          3.2    14.0     8.4     7.4    25.7    18.2    19.4 
Granada          2.2    10.4     5.1     5.8    18.2    11.5    13.3 
Huelva           2.0    10.3     2.7     3.6    17.5     8.8     8.7 
Jaén             1.3     9.8    11.6     5.5    19.6    11.1    11.1 
Málaga           2.0    13.8    10.0     7.1    17.6    16.3    15.4 
Sevilla          2.0    16.0    11.2     3.5    16.5    15.8     8.3 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca           4.1    20.2    10.8     9.6    14.3    14.1    18.0 
Teruel           3.8    15.3     7.3     9.0    11.5    22.7    15.4 
Zaragoza         3.8    19.5    10.8     9.3    10.9    15.3    12.2 
ASTURIAS         1.4    11.8     2.3     3.2    15.0     8.9     9.8 
BALEARES        11.3    28.0    12.2    10.7    11.3     3.4     4.3 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas       2.5    14.6     8.0     5.0    21.6    11.6     3.8 
Tenerife         1.4    16.6    10.0     4.6    14.3    10.8     7.8 
CANTABRIA        4.1    24.7    13.9    22.6    20.1    19.9    11.9 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete         1.7    13.4    22.3     8.7    19.0    14.2    13.3 
Salamanca        2.9    15.8    11.3    14.6    18.4    22.0    19.9 
Soria            5.0    21.1    18.5 24.3    18.3    21.2    23.5 
Zamora           4.1    16.9    12.9    15.2    18.6    17.0    18.5 
Barcelona        3.8    15.5     2.8     4.0    11.9     6.7     7.1 
Lleida           2.1     9.2     3.3     2.5     9.0     4.9     5.6 
 
Ciudad Real      2.7    13.9    18.7    11.4    19.1    16.7     9.9 
Cuenca           2.7    27.3    19.9    12.6    27.0    20.4    16.1 
Guadalajara      5.7    24.7    21.8    19.9    24.3    23.9    22.0 
Toledo           6.0    25.1    17.6    11.8    27.0    17.1    11.9 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila            3.5    16.5    10.5    13.6    24.8    25.9    42.8 
Burgos           5.1    18.3    12.8    14.7    18.8    17.1    21.6 
León             3.4    12.8     5.0     5.8    10.5    11.0    11.3 
Palencia         3.4    20.8    19.3    19.4    17.9    18.7    22.3 
Segovia          3.6    25.1    21.6    24.2    26.0    29.3    28.1 
    
Valladolid       8.4    20.1    24.8    15.6    16.8    17.3    12.3 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Girona           2.5     9.9     4.3     3.6    11.4     4.9     6.9 
Tarragona        2.7    12.0     8.1     4.4    14.0     7.0     7.4 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante         3.6    17.0     9.9    11.1    15.1     7.6     6.4 
Castellón        2.5    24.7    19.0     9.4    20.2    16.2     9.9 
Valencia         2.8    24.9    10.2    11.3    28.2    13.2     9.7 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz          1.9    12.5     4.7     6.5    21.9    19.2    22.9 
Cáceres          2.3    11.0     9.9     8.2    17.8    18.1    19.8 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña         2.7    19.2    14.3     8.2    16.4    18.5    19.9 
Lugo             3.0    19.0    13.3    14.4    20.6    23.4    17.4 
Ourense          3.4     7.5     9.7    13.1    25.3    17.9    30.8 
Pontevedra       1.7    20.3    21.6    13.7    17.0    21.6    20.6 
MADRID           1.4    22.7    12.5     9.2    17.4    16.9     9.7 
MURCIA           5.6    26.1    11.6     6.8    23.2     8.0     6.6 
NAVARRA          9.2    12.6     7.3     7.7     9.7     5.4    11.8 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava                    9.1     4.4     2.1     8.1     5.8    18.0 
Guipúzcoa                2.8     1.5     2.0     5.7     3.3     4.8 
Vizcaya                  4.6     1.8     1.6     8.5     4.9    13.1 





Table A III.11 Abstainers opting for UCD: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82    
ANDALUCIA                    
Almería         21.2     3.4 
Cádiz           16.4     2.2 
Córdoba         15.8     4.3 
Granada         11.8     7.9 
Huelva           5.2     3.1 
Jaén            10.9     6.9 
Málaga           8.1     1.2 
Sevilla          3.5     1.0 
ARAGON                       
Huesca          17.1     7.8 
Teruel          16.4     6.4 
Zaragoza         9.4     1.7 
ASTURIAS         8.7     4.4 
BALEARES        14.5     3.4 
CANARIAS                     
Las Palmas      15.9     1.0 
Tenerife         9.3     8.0 
CANTABRIA       12.5     4.1 
CAST.-MANCHA                 
Albacete        14.1    11.2 
Ciudad Real      9.9     6.0 
Cuenca          24.8     9.5 
Guadalajara     15.0    11.2 
Toledo          15.8     4.0 
CAST.-LEON                   
Avila               13.5  9.0 
Burgos          20.3    10.3 
León            16.2    10.8 
Palencia        16.7     5.6 
Salamanca       22.6     8.4 
Segovia         35.2     7.4 
Soria           21.6    10.8 
Valladolid          13.4  2.5 
Zamora          20.7    11.9 
CATALUNYA                    
Barcelona       13.1     1.5 
Girona          13.6     2.1 
Lleida          13.6     3.5 
Tarragona        8.2     1.4 
C.VALENCIANA                 
Alicante         9.8     1.8 
Castellón       24.2     4.4 
Valencia        14.1     2.8 
EXTREMADURA                  
Badajoz         13.6     3.6 
Cáceres          6.7     9.5 
GALICIA                      
A Coruña         9.6     9.3 
Lugo            11.3     8.6 
Ourense          5.9    13.5 
Pontevedra      10.3    11.6 
MADRID          13.6     1.1 
MURCIA          22.3     2.5 
NAVARRA         11.9     7.9 
BASQUE COUNTRY                      
Alava            4.8       
Guipúzcoa        1.5       
Vizcaya          1.9       







Table A III.12 Abstainers opting for CDS: Ecol percentages 
 
               79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93    
ANDALUCIA                                    
Almería          1.7     6.2     8.0     1.9 
Cádiz            1.2     7.0     3.3      .8 
Córdoba          1.2     2.3     4.4     1.4 
Granada          1.3     2.5     4.2     1.3 
Huelva           1.5     2.9     3.8      .9 
Jaén              .8     1.6     3.1     1.0 
Málaga           1.0     3.7     3.3     1.0 
Sevilla           .7     3.1     2.3      .9 
ARAGON                                       
Huesca           4.3     6.1     5.2     1.8 
Teruel           3.5     7.1     4.8     1.6 
Zaragoza         3.8     3.1     5.1     1.0 
ASTURIAS         3.1     1.4     4.2     2.4 
BALEARES         2.8     3.2     2.5     2.5 
CANARIAS                                     
Las Palmas       7.2     3.3     4.8     1.3 
Tenerife         2.2     9.1     4.6     1.5 
CANTABRIA        3.7     6.0     5.4     1.4 
CAST.-MANCHA                                 
Albacete         1.8     1.5     5.6     1.9 
Ciudad Real      2.1     4.2     5.9     2.5 
Cuenca           1.9     4.5     5.6     2.7 
Guadalajara      2.6     3.1     4.2     2.7 
Toledo           2.4     6.0     5.1     2.5 
CAST.-LEON                                   
Avila           15.1    18.4    13.6     5.4 
Burgos           4.5     4.7     6.5     2.9 
León             1.8     5.6     5.1     2.1 
Palencia         4.4     9.5     8.0     3.5 
Salamanca        7.6     3.9 2.8     6.7     
Segovia          6.1    12.9     9.9     6.8 
Soria            3.9     9.2     5.9     3.7 
Valladolid       4.7     7.1     8.9     4.5 
Zamora           3.4     8.2     7.6     3.3 
CATALUNYA                                    
Barcelona        2.5     3.5     4.0      .9 
Girona           2.1     1.5     2.2      .6 
Lleida           3.1      .9     2.7      .6 
Tarragona        2.0     1.9     3.1      .7 
C.VALENCIANA                                 
Alicante         3.2     4.5     6.4     3.2 
Castellón        4.1     3.9     6.7     2.2 
Valencia         3.0     6.9     4.6     1.9 
EXTREMADURA                                  
Badajoz          1.4     3.0     4.9     2.2 
Cáceres          1.5     3.3     7.1     1.9 
GALICIA                                      
A Coruña         1.5     2.5     6.6     1.1 
Lugo             1.1     1.4     2.7      .5 
Ourense          1.1     1.5     2.0      .3 
Pontevedra       1.6     2.1     3.9      .9 
MADRID           3.9     9.9     5.4     2.6 
MURCIA           2.6     5.1     7.1     2.9 
NAVARRA          4.3     5.8     4.4     1.8 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                      
Alava            3.3     1.0     1.9      .8 
Guipúzcoa        1.2     1.2     1.0      .6 
Vizcaya           .9     2.2     1.7      .7 
LA RIOJA         3.4     4.4     3.5     1.8 
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Table A III.13 Loyal to PCE/IU: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00           
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería         48.9    12.1    37.5    56.3    75.8    76.0    30.4 
Cádiz           52.3    30.1    48.5    75.0    84.5    82.5    35.3 
Córdoba         83.6    45.8    77.8    91.1    87.5    91.3    54.9 
Granada         75.2    46.9    41.3    62.6    79.8    89.0    47.8 
Huelva          63.5    35.4    46.6    70.5    75.7    82.4    44.0 
Jaén            71.4    39.1    61.2    76.7    84.1    87.4    52.4 
Málaga          59.0    24.5    46.4    69.4    83.4    91.6    41.1 
Sevilla         69.8    38.0    55.0    80.3    78.3    86.0    45.7 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca          41.2    17.7    13.0    37.5    49.3    54.3    12.8 
Teruel          30.3    12.5    10.3    18.8    35.7    50.2    18.1 
Zaragoza        39.2    22.7    14.1    60.0    64.8    68.6    25.0 
ASTURIAS        55.5    47.6    54.6    85.7    90.8    92.0    52.0 
BALEARES         5.8     4.1     9.6    48.7    80.2    86.1    25.5 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas      16.9                    60.9    21.5    42.0    26.7 
Tenerife        31.3                    65.0    38.6    61.0    27.4 
CANTABRIA       28.5    17.1    17.2    45.1    67.3    81.0    30.9 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete        67.0    30.8    26.5    66.6    75.7    85.9    38.8 
Ciudad Real     62.5    20.1    27.8    66.8    79.4    87.5    36.5 
Cuenca          57.0    24.7    11.5    41.2    51.5    61.9    26.1 
Guadalajara     48.9    20.8    23.6    57.4    60.3    69.7    32.4 
Toledo          72.8    36.8    50.4    67.9    74.3    84.9    41.5 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila           39.8    17.4    18.8    25.4    51.1    56.9    15.0 
Burgos          19.9     7.1    10.3    36.0    59.6    73.7    24.7 
León            29.7     7.8    18.6    43.8    50.0    72.6    30.9 
Palencia        26.6    18.8    14.5    33.2    46.2    62.0    27.6 
Salamanca       26.5     4.3     7.8    36.9    48.4    63.9    22.9 
Segovia         31.0     9.1    11.4    33.4    41.6    46.4    28.2 
Soria           16.6     6.1     8.6    19.3    34.5    52.1    15.7 
Valladolid      35.6    19.2    12.0    61.2    71.9    80.9    36.4 
Zamora          15.6     8.0     8.1    23.8    39.9    63.6    19.9 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona       45.6    10.8    32.7    53.1    67.3    63.4    13.2 
Girona          41.2    13.2    13.3    29.2    31.3    30.5     9.1 
Lleida          38.0     9.0     9.7    23.1    20.3    30.5     3.5 
Tarragona       48.1    20.4    28.2    39.4    51.2    43.9     6.6 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante        49.3    22.4    45.9    64.6    78.5    86.3    37.8 
Castellón       51.6    21.4    16.7    50.7    54.1    63.6    30.0 
Valencia        71.6    26.0    30.2    66.5    73.3    82.2    40.1 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz         60.7    33.1    50.1    62.4    81.0    83.7    36.4 
Cáceres         34.2    12.0    11.7    29.8    49.1    71.5    26.0 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña        36.0    12.8    13.3    41.3    49.3    74.2    21.6 
Lugo             3.2     1.8     2.1     6.9    16.2    36.0     9.0 
Ourense         10.6     4.9     1.2     7.1    12.9    27.7     6.6 
Pontevedra      28.0    18.6    12.6    23.9    43.4    51.0    21.7 
MADRID          41.2    18.0    22.5            75.2    69.0 69.2 33.2 
MURCIA          41.4    25.6    41.1    86.7    84.7    84.2    46.2 
NAVARRA         26.4     8.5     7.1    30.0    60.4    70.6    32.1 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava           12.7     4.2     1.2     5.4    37.9    63.2    27.0 
Guipúzcoa        8.2     5.4     5.2    11.9    43.4    55.5    15.7 
Vizcaya         26.1    24.4    23.5    29.4    52.8    74.8    30.9 





Table A III.14 PCE/IU voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería         17.0     8.0    18.4    21.7     5.5    10.5    39.7 
Cádiz           21.4     7.9    30.0    17.3     7.3    10.4    41.1 
Córdoba          3.9     2.2     3.8     3.6     3.3     3.5    22.9 
Granada          6.5     4.3    11.3    16.3     4.5     3.7    23.7 
Huelva          12.4     4.9    17.2    14.7     7.0     8.0    26.4 
Jaén             6.5     5.2     9.3     6.3     4.3     3.7    22.0 
Málaga          17.8    16.4    24.6    10.2     5.4     3.3    21.7 
Sevilla         14.8    12.3    17.3    10.5     6.0     7.6    33.8 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca          17.7     7.4    23.0    20.3    14.7    18.6    39.7 
Teruel          26.2    18.8    39.7    39.4    25.4    18.8    41.2 
Zaragoza        22.6     5.3    33.6    22.5    12.6    11.7    40.1 
ASTURIAS        10.5     2.3    15.9     5.6     2.7     3.4    25.8 
BALEARES        30.5    35.2    45.6    36.9    11.5    10.6    59.3 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas      22.9    26.7            16.7    10.8    20.4    34.4 
Tenerife        42.4    17.7            21.5    30.4    22.9    45.4 
CANTABRIA       19.6     5.5    18.3    23.7     9.7     6.2    26.2 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete         7.2     5.1    12.6    11.6     8.1     6.3    37.3 
Ciudad Real     13.9    11.0    23.4    15.6     7.1     7.7    44.3 
Cuenca          15.0     7.3    19.8    24.5    16.3    18.0    40.1 
Guadalajara     15.1     5.2    20.9    18.2    11.1    11.3    39.4 
Toledo           7.6     8.6    16.0    17.2    11.9     8.3    39.5 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila           21.7     9.0    28.1    28.1    12.7    11.6    21.8 
Burgos          11.1    11.9    31.2    28.8    10.3    11.0    30.0 
León            22.9     9.9    31.3    31.6    17.1    13.3    39.7 
Palencia        30.0     6.7    25.6    31.2    18.2    17.8    39.3 
Salamanca       24.6     9.4    39.7    28.3    16.3    15.0    46.9 
Segovia         20.6     8.7    28.7    26.8    14.3    16.7    34.4 
Soria           30.1    11.0    33.5    37.8    23.4    17.7    46.5 
Valladolid      26.9     5.6    40.7    24.3    17.0    13.6    38.0 
Zamora          35.9    15.0    39.8    34.6    22.0    16.6    49.5 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona        9.1     7.7    28.7            28.3  9.5 11.2    24.5 
Girona          11.4     5.8    29.0    36.6    22.3    19.1    47.9 
Lleida          13.6     7.6    37.5    42.8    28.9    25.6    49.2 
Tarragona       23.9    11.3    31.6    31.0    19.7    26.0    49.7 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante        10.5     6.7     9.9    14.5     7.2    6.4     36.9 
Castellón        6.7     3.0    10.5    20.2    18.3    21.4    47.3 
Valencia        12.1     6.5    22.5    14.4     8.2    11.0    42.5 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz         14.4     9.6    20.0    15.2     7.3     6.2    32.2 
Cáceres         29.7    12.5    31.7    29.0    13.8     9.8    30.3 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña        19.0     6.9    41.0    32.9    10.3    11.2    42.7 
Lugo            66.0    24.1    48.0    45.9    13.8    25.5    31.5 
Ourense         48.5    21.4    40.7    37.6    30.8    14.7    44.2 
Pontevedra      23.3     4.8    35.1    33.7     8.2    12.8    27.1 
MADRID          20.1     5.8    30.2    14.7    11.6     9.7    26.2 
MURCIA          26.3     7.6    21.5     6.7     4.8     8.5    26.0 
NAVARRA         22.5    11.9    35.7    35.4     9.5    13.2    20.4 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava           16.2     2.1    34.8    40.0    17.6    14.3     8.7 
Guipúzcoa       27.1    25.4    43.1    53.4    16.8    10.5    10.7 
Vizcaya         24.7     4.3    18.3    32.6     9.3     6.7     6.0 




Table A III.15 PCE/IU voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería         19.2    49.0    16.3     3.7      .9     1.3     5.3 
Cádiz            2.2    54.6    13.2     3.4     3.1      .9     2.1 
Córdoba          4.7    38.6     8.8     1.6      .5      .2      .5 
Granada          6.7    38.4    25.8     9.0     3.2     1.3     4.2 
Huelva          13.4    49.0    23.2     7.0     7.2     1.5     2.6 
Jaén            12.0    40.0    17.8     8.8     4.2     1.7     5.0 
Málaga           7.7    34.1    13.0     9.4     3.7      .1     4.4 
Sevilla          3.8    36.5    16.0     4.1    11.1     2.1    11.3 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca          28.4    48.7    38.5    16.0     6.2     4.7    13.6 
Teruel          29.3    52.6    26.1    16.9    21.1    15.8    12.5 
Zaragoza        19.2    56.9    19.7     1.4      .8      .5     1.1 
ASTURIAS        28.4    45.3    13.1     2.9     2.5     1.9    10.8 
BALEARES        43.0    35.2    34.4     8.6     5.2     2.5     7.8 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas      19.2    41.1             1.3     1.0     1.7     2.3 
Tenerife         7.6    32.9             1.4     1.0      .2     2.1 
CANTABRIA       24.5    52.9    43.4    13.0    14.7     5.3     9.7 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete        10.0    36.0    32.4     8.1     2.3     2.1     3.2 
Ciudad Real     16.7    55.8    24.0     6.0     3.4     1.0     5.8 
Cuenca          13.1    44.2    29.0    19.3    12.6     7.9    15.8 
Guadalajara     20.6    55.1    35.6     7.7     8.6     7.3     9.1 
Toledo           7.1    32.7    15.9     4.8     3.1     1.7     5.1 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila           21.3    43.1    19.8    17.0     7.1     7.5    23.5 
Burgos          31.9    56.9    38.3    20.1    13.8     6.9    22.4 
León            30.6    61.4    31.6    10.3    16.1     6.6    10.9 
Palencia        30.7    64.2    46.0    19.4    21.3    14.7    21.8 
Salamanca       23.8    51.7    14.7     5.5     4.9     2.1     7.7 
Segovia         25.5    60.2    25.1    12.3    13.6    16.1    17.9 
Soria           22.0    49.5    20.0    18.0    22.6    15.4    20.9 
Valladolid      25.7    62.9    19.8     1.1     1.9     1.9     8.6 
Zamora          22.3    44.4    18.0    16.6    16.2     6.3    11.1 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona       33.5    69.6    23.8     6.1    10.0    14.5    39.5 
Girona          28.0    62.4    26.2     9.6    18.7    42.7    19.7 
Lleida          30.2    60.6    26.3    10.8    22.3    30.4    20.4 
Tarragona       10.6    41.6    12.6     7.4    10.6    17.2    11.1 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante        32.2    56.9    34.1    12.6     5.5     3.7     7.4 
Castellón       26.0    54.7    30.4     7.1     8.5     7.1     6.1 
Valencia         7.1    45.5    22.5     7.7     6.5     1.4     3.5 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz         17.9    43.4    20.1    14.1     3.2     3.7    11.8 
Cáceres         24.2    52.6    32.1    16.5     6.1     3.3     4.9 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña        22.4    54.9    10.2     5.2    11.4     1.1     7.0 
Lugo             8.9    27.4    12.2    19.0    17.1     3.0    13.6 
Ourense         16.9    42.7    20.2    16.6    17.1     6.1    12.4 
Pontevedra       8.4    32.6    13.4    10.8     5.8      .5     3.0 
MADRID          27.7    69.4    35.9    10.2    11.1    10.0    31.3 
MURCIA          11.4    40.6    11.4     2.0      .7     1.3     1.1 
NAVARRA         24.7    51.0    24.6     8.8    13.8     5.5    17.0 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava           49.9    50.1    36.2    19.1    15.6    13.4    32.6 
Guipúzcoa       24.7    16.2    23.8    12.9    24.0    22.5    43.9 
Vizcaya         32.2    62.8    41.4    16.7    27.9    13.4    39.0 




Table A III.16 PCE/IU voters opting for AP/PP: Ecol percentages 
 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería          3.7    22.0    15.0     6.6    13.8    10.0    13.5 
Cádiz            2.9     3.8     3.0     1.1     2.7     2.9    13.2 
Córdoba          1.2    10.0     3.5     1.0     5.0     3.5    13.8 
Granada          1.0     5.8     4.9     4.0     7.9     3.9    13.5 
Huelva            .7     4.5     2.1     2.3     3.9     2.2     9.8 
Jaén              .9     8.5     3.9      .8     3.0     3.9     7.7 
Málaga           2.4    19.1     8.3     4.1     5.0     3.6    24.1 
Sevilla          1.2     7.1     4.2      .4     1.4     1.9     2.1 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca           2.7    15.7     8.6     7.4     6.7     7.4    17.1 
Teruel           2.3     6.5     3.4     6.6     6.5     6.8     8.6 
Zaragoza         3.1     6.5     4.8     2.8     5.3     1.6     6.6 
ASTURIAS         1.1     1.4      .4      .2      .8      .6     1.8 
BALEARES         2.9     9.8     2.1     1.7      .6      .1     1.3 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas       3.6    12.2            12.8    33.8    23.7    16.7 
Tenerife         6.4    27.3             6.8    22.5    12.1    11.1 
CANTABRIA        4.7    13.4     5.0     3.9     4.4     1.8     2.9 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete          .8    19.6    15.1     2.9     7.5     3.2     9.2 
Ciudad Real      1.6     5.1     6.9     1.1     2.5     2.1     3.2 
Cuenca           1.7    12.3    17.3     6.0    11.0     7.4     6.8 
Guadalajara      2.6    10.7     5.2     2.3     5.3     5.4     4.3 
Toledo           1.1    10.3     7.3     3.1     5.3     2.7     4.2 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila            3.5    19.3    11.1    11.2    22.1    19.4    30.7 
Burgos           4.8    11.8     4.9     3.0     4.7     4.3     6.9 
León             3.5     9.9     2.9     2.5     5.1     3.3     3.8 
Palencia         4.1     4.6     3.0     3.1     1.5     1.1     2.0 
Salamanca        5.9    25.6    12.2    12.8    19.5    12.3     5.5 
Segovia          2.0     8.5    13.8     9.3     4.3     7.8     5.0 
Soria           11.4    15.3    13.6    12.0     6.5     8.7     7.1 
Valladolid       5.1     5.4     3.5     2.0     1.0      .8      .9 
Zamora           9.9    17.3     9.8     8.3     8.4     7.4     5.5 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona         .2      .8      .6     1.5     3.5     6.0     6.7 
Girona            .6     4.5     4.4     2.4     5.4     3.4    11.9 
Lleida           1.1     9.0     3.6     3.1    11.2     8.5    12.5 
Tarragona        1.4     6.0     5.0     2.6     8.2     7.1    10.6 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante         2.2     6.8     3.3     3.1     4.0      .9     6.5 
Castellón        1.2    10.3     8.4     2.9     7.3     3.9     3.4 
Valencia          .8    10.9     3.9     2.7     6.5     3.0     3.2 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz           .9     8.4     2.6     2.1     5.3     4.9    11.8 
Cáceres          1.9    11.8     8.4     7.1    19.7    12.0    27.7 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña         4.5    12.3     8.5     5.0     4.4     4.3     2.7 
Lugo             2.7    27.1    10.4     9.2     3.5     6.7     7.2 
Ourense          7.1    16.7    15.4    17.5     8.8    12.6     5.3 
Pontevedra      13.6    16.3    10.6     7.3     5.1     2.6     1.6 
MADRID            .6     3.5     1.9     1.0     1.2      .9      .4 
MURCIA           3.5    19.8     5.8     1.0     8.2     2.9    17.5 
NAVARRA          3.0     6.7     7.2     6.4     5.3     4.4    13.0 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava                    5.7     3.3     4.3     7.7     5.7    18.0 
Guipúzcoa                3.9     1.5     1.7     5.5     5.9    19.9 
Vizcaya                  1.0      .5      .6     3.1     2.4    12.4 





Table A III.17 PCE/IU voters opting for UCD: Ecol percentages 
               77-79   79-82    
ANDALUCIA                    
Almería          2.0      .1 
Cádiz            2.7      .1 
Córdoba          1.6      .2 
Granada          3.2      .5 
Huelva            .9      .4 
Jaén             4.7      .8 
Málaga           3.3      .4 
Sevilla           .8      .3 
ARAGON                       
Huesca           6.1     1.2 
Teruel           4.5     1.3 
Zaragoza         1.0      .1 
ASTURIAS          .3      .0 
BALEARES         3.2     3.9 
CANARIAS                     
Las Palmas       1.6      .1 
Tenerife         1.4     1.6 
CANTABRIA        3.0     1.4 
CAST.-MANCHA                 
Albacete        10.5      .7 
Ciudad Real      2.5      .5 
Cuenca          10.2     3.4 
Guadalajara      3.6     1.2 
Toledo           4.9     1.4 
CAST.-LEON                   
Avila            7.3     1.3 
Burgos          14.2     3.1 
León             9.9      .9 
Palencia          .9      .3 
Salamanca       13.7     1.0 
Segovia         17.2     1.2 
Soria           10.8     3.2 
Valladolid       2.0      .3 
Zamora           8.6     1.6 
CATALUNYA                    
Barcelona        1.1      .1 
Girona          10.0      .5 
Lleida           5.5      .9 
Tarragona        3.3      .6 
C.VALENCIANA                 
Alicante          .9      .2 
Castellón        7.3      .2 
Valencia         2.1      .8 
EXTREMADURA                  
Badajoz          3.2      .4 
Cáceres          3.9     1.6 
GALICIA                      
A Coruña         2.8      .4 
Lugo             6.8     5.4 
Ourense          8.6     4.2 
Pontevedra       1.4      .3 
MADRID           1.7      .1 
MURCIA           5.4      .3 
NAVARRA          6.7     2.5 
BASQUE COUNTRY                      
Alava            1.8         
Guipúzcoa       12.9         
Vizcaya          4.5         








Table A III.18 PCE/IU voters opting for CDS: Ecol percentages 
               79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93    
 
ANDALUCIA                                    
Almería          2.8     5.0     2.3      .2 
Cádiz             .2     1.3      .5      .0 
Córdoba           .6     3.0     1.1      .3 
Granada           .3     1.2     1.4      .4 
Huelva            .4     1.7      .9      .1 
Jaén              .7     2.7     2.0      .2 
Málaga            .8     1.9     1.1      .1 
Sevilla           .2      .5      .7      .1 
ARAGON                                       
Huesca            .9     4.5     5.7     2.1 
Teruel           2.4     5.4     3.9     1.2 
Zaragoza         3.2    10.9     4.7      .9 
ASTURIAS          .3     4.6     3.2      .4 
BALEARES         2.4     3.8      .9     1.2 
CANARIAS                                     
Las Palmas       1.6              .2      .2 
Tenerife         2.8             1.3      .6 
CANTABRIA        1.8     5.3     2.4     1.6 
CAST.-MANCHA                                 
Albacete         2.0     2.5     2.5      .9 
Ciudad Real      1.5     9.4     6.3     1.1 
Cuenca           1.0     6.3     3.4     1.6 
Guadalajara      2.4     7.2     7.3     2.8 
Toledo           1.3     3.8     1.9      .9 
CAST.-LEON                                   
Avila            4.4    12.7     5.3     1.7 
Burgos           3.3     8.1     5.6     2.2 
León             1.9     8.9     4.6     1.2 
Palencia         2.2     4.9     5.7     2.3 
Salamanca        4.5    13.4     6.0     2.0 
Segovia          3.8 7.0 10.0     9.0          
Soria            8.4    17.3     6.5     3.2 
Valladolid       3.0    15.1     4.8     2.2 
Zamora           4.2    10.7     4.8     2.4 
CATALUNYA                                    
Barcelona         .5     9.0     5.0     1.1 
Girona            .7     2.3     2.5      .5 
Lleida           2.2     3.9     4.4      .9 
Tarragona        1.5     1.6     2.2      .4 
C.VALENCIANA                                 
Alicante          .8     1.2     1.1      .3 
Castellón        2.0     7.9     5.8     1.9 
Valencia         1.3     6.5     2.8      .7 
EXTREMADURA                                  
Badajoz           .6     2.9     1.7      .6 
Cáceres          1.3     4.6     6.8     2.7 
GALICIA                                      
A Coruña         3.8    10.6     3.4     3.3 
Lugo             1.4     8.1     3.6     2.7 
Ourense          2.0     9.8     5.3     2.4 
Pontevedra       2.8     6.6     4.2     1.6 
MADRID            .8     5.7     1.4     1.2 
MURCIA           1.6     6.9     1.4      .2 
NAVARRA          4.9    10.2     8.1     1.8 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                      
Alava             .8     7.0     6.5     1.6 
Guipúzcoa        1.8     4.4     4.5     1.3 
Vizcaya           .3     3.7     4.8      .8 
LA RIOJA         2.8     5.9     4.2     2.5 
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Table A III.19 Loyal to PSOE: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería         74.4    81.0    51.6    72.9    91.0    89.5    74.4 
Cádiz           62.2    90.5    72.8    74.9    91.5    84.8    68.4 
Córdoba         62.1    79.8    57.2    79.8    92.1    89.0    81.5 
Granada         72.0    80.9    62.6    73.3    90.4    88.9    78.7 
Huelva          67.9    79.9    65.2    80.4    91.4    89.1    76.2 
Jaén            65.4    74.4    66.2    76.8    85.6    86.9    85.7 
Málaga          54.1    60.4    48.2    63.0    89.4    85.9    77.2 
Sevilla         51.9    71.9    57.1    82.0    90.9    81.1    73.0 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca          62.3    74.9    43.7    49.9    69.6    86.2    57.8 
Teruel          69.5    82.1    64.1    70.2    72.5    84.1    65.1 
Zaragoza        49.0    75.5    45.3    72.0    76.6    84.7    73.3 
ASTURIAS        69.5    82.1    62.1    64.3    84.9    91.5    68.0 
BALEARES        58.9    72.1    64.4    65.8    86.1    86.8    62.5 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas      30.0    81.8    71.5    69.7    73.4    89.3    57.9 
Tenerife        60.3    61.7    32.6    78.4    88.1    91.9    59.0 
CANTABRIA       59.2    73.2    59.7    74.2    72.3    72.3    76.6 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete        65.2    74.2    54.4    76.0    87.6    89.4    79.5 
Ciudad Real     72.7    78.0    58.0    81.9    88.0    89.2    76.9 
Cuenca          70.8    68.9    57.0    75.1    78.0    80.8    72.0 
Guadalajara     53.1    67.1    57.2    64.7    75.4    76.3    70.3 
Toledo          64.3    79.6    64.2    80.2    84.2    83.9    76.1 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila           74.5    77.0    52.6    76.3    80.2    83.7    38.4 
Burgos          54.6    73.5    59.5    61.4    81.5    78.4    69.6 
León            58.5    70.3    66.2    68.0    71.5    87.3    69.0 
Palencia        65.7    88.2    58.9    63.2    81.1    84.6    72.1 
Salamanca       65.2    71.2    50.9    70.9    79.2    78.9    68.1 
Segovia         58.4    76.0    56.8    64.9    72.7    76.0    70.8 
Soria           67.1    75.8    62.5    67.7    81.5    78.3    70.1 
Valladolid      62.8    76.9    44.0    72.8    82.4    84.4    71.3 
Zamora          56.1    72.7    67.4    72.5    82.1    82.5    64.0 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona       46.1    77.1    65.0    78.3    90.1    85.7    59.7 
Girona          51.9    60.2    62.4    72.0    81.1    89.3    58.5 
Lleida          50.0    71.4    59.4    73.6    78.6    88.4    60.6 
Tarragona       64.8    74.3    61.7    69.4    82.9    82.0    62.8 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante        57.6    75.6    60.8    66.7    77.0    85.2    64.2 
Castellón       74.6    75.9    54.6    65.3    74.5    66.8    66.0 
Valencia        59.0    65.3    58.1    62.3    68.0    84.7    65.7 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz         53.1    62.7    68.3    77.4    87.3    83.0    70.2 
Cáceres         81.0    79.6    69.6    78.7    84.7    87.8    77.5 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña        51.7    82.4    70.9    67.4    47.7    57.0    56.6 
Lugo            34.0    64.9    65.3    54.0    44.0    63.6    53.0 
Ourense         42.9    71.9    72.4    61.3    38.3    56.8    53.2 
Pontevedra      54.9    65.0    57.4    54.2    46.4    78.1    58.1 
MADRID          52.1    69.9    47.1    61.2    79.7    77.7    70.2 
MURCIA          55.2    72.6    65.6    75.7    83.8    91.8    72.4 
NAVARRA         63.4    83.6    61.3    73.5    83.6    76.3    57.9 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava           41.6    49.8    49.4    54.4    82.4    82.1    54.2 
Guipúzcoa       45.3    82.5    60.2    76.5    85.7    81.8    56.9 
Vizcaya         40.0    86.6    69.0    70.6    84.4    86.2    65.2 






GALICIA                                                              
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Table A III.20 PSOE voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería         10.9     4.5    19.2    10.4     2.8     1.5     5.6 
Cádiz           17.0     4.8    14.8    13.7     3.2     6.2    15.6 
Córdoba         14.9     6.3    15.4     8.4     2.4     2.6     5.3 
Granada          9.3     6.9    13.3    15.1     6.1     5.8    14.9 
Huelva          16.7     8.2    14.4     8.5     2.6     3.5    12.0 
Jaén            14.4     8.9    13.3    10.8     6.2     4.5     5.6 
Málaga          23.4    18.6    29.8    21.0     3.5     5.5     9.0 
Sevilla         20.0    16.3    25.6     8.7     2.8     7.5    15.5 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca          13.4     5.9    21.4    20.5     3.9     5.9    13.8 
Teruel          15.2     7.9    17.9    14.1     8.0     5.2    13.3 
Zaragoza        18.6     7.8    24.0    12.9     4.9     3.1     8.0 
ASTURIAS         8.0     1.3     6.2     9.9     5.0     4.0    18.3 
BALEARES        24.5     7.3    17.3    20.7     6.9     9.3    26.5 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas      13.2    10.2    15.3    15.1     5.6     4.0    20.5 
Tenerife        21.6     9.1    29.5    10.2     1.5     2.5    13.7 
CANTABRIA       10.6     4.1    10.9     6.8     4.9     6.9     6.6 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete         9.7     5.1    19.6    11.1     2.7     2.3     4.1 
Ciudad Real     16.7     8.9    20.3     7.5     2.8     3.0     8.1 
Cuenca          12.7     7.8    16.4     9.1     6.0     4.6     6.3 
Guadalajara     17.0     5.9    13.5    13.6     7.4     8.4    12.0 
Toledo          13.8     5.9    15.2     7.2     2.6     3.1     5.1 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila            9.4     3.9    10.4     8.9     5.3     5.6    23.6 
Burgos          12.7     7.3    20.0    16.8     9.3    10.7    17.3 
León            12.9     7.0     9.8    12.3     8.8     7.9    19.9 
Palencia        13.6     2.3    18.8    16.0     6.2     6.5    13.8 
Salamanca       12.5     5.5    11.7    11.4     6.0     7.3     6.6 
Segovia         13.6     3.5    11.1    12.7     7.5     7.2    12.3 
Soria           12.2     5.4    17.8    17.2     7.2     8.8    14.6 
Valladolid      19.4     7.9    29.0    12.0     2.2     3.0    10.6 
Zamora          16.2     4.5     5.2     7.0     3.3     3.8     9.2 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona       23.8     9.2    22.8    14.8     5.5     6.5    30.1 
Girona          11.6     8.3    16.7    16.1     8.9     5.8    26.8 
Lleida          15.5     5.1    17.1    13.3     7.9     5.1    24.7 
Tarragona       17.5     7.3    20.7    15.7     7.4     9.7    22.4 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante        19.9     7.1    18.8    13.5     2.6     3.0     8.9 
Castellón        5.4    2.4    13.5    10.9     2.6    19.1     9.2  
Valencia        17.5    17.0    14.2    14.7     9.4     4.1    13.6 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz         21.3    15.7    11.1     7.7     4.3     5.7     5.4 
Cáceres          9.8     6.4     9.9     7.9     4.7     4.6     9.9 
A Coruña         4.7     3.8     4.9    14.1     1.7    19.2    18.7 
Lugo            39.6     6.6    11.1    16.2     2.6    16.5    21.0 
Ourense         22.1     9.3     7.7    13.0    10.1    15.3    21.1 
Pontevedra      7.1                1.4     8.2      3.9 16.4 13.4  17.0 
MADRID          22.6    11.7    28.0    21.2    11.7    10.0    21.5 
MURCIA          20.2     6.1    12.6     8.3     2.7     2.0    10.3 
NAVARRA          8.6     1.9    11.0     7.3     2.0     4.3     7.7 
Alava           20.6     1.6    24.3    18.9     5.2     5.1    11.3 
Guipúzcoa       15.7     4.3    17.3    10.9     4.5     3.8    10.8 
Vizcaya         23.7     2.6    13.9    13.0     4.5     2.7     9.3 
LA RIOJA        13.9     8.0    18.9    14.0     5.7     5.5     7.5 
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Table A III.21 PSOE voters opting for PCE/IU: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Córdoba          5.5     1.4     5.3     1.7      .1      .4      .3 
Jaén             7.8     3.6     3.7     2.7      .3      .8      .2 
Las Palmas       4.2             3.4     2.5      .7      .2      .3 
Avila            3.8     1.0     1.9     2.4      .7     1.7     2.1 
Soria            2.8      .8     2.7     5.2     1.7     3.2     2.0 
Zamora           4.6      .5     1.6     3.6      .9     1.2      .9 
Barcelona       15.7     5.2     2.4     4.0     2.3     5.1     1.4 
Lleida          10.9     1.9     2.3     3.1     2.8     1.9      .8 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
A Coruña         6.0     1.0      .8     2.1      .2     1.1      .2 
Almería          5.0     1.5     3.4     3.0      .1      .4      .2 
Cádiz            3.3      .3     1.7     2.7      .8     1.7     1.0 
Granada          5.5     1.5     3.3     3.8      .3      .6      .4 
Huelva           3.3     1.8     3.6     2.1      .4     1.3     1.1 
Málaga           4.4     2.0     4.4     3.6      .5     1.6     1.0 
Sevilla          9.1     1.9     3.0     2.3     1.0     2.9     1.6 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca           5.8     1.5     2.6     4.4      .5      .6      .5 
Teruel           3.1      .7     1.0     3.0     1.4     3.1     1.2 
Zaragoza         8.4     1.4     3.7     2.7      .2      .3      .1 
ASTURIAS        13.1     4.4     6.5     8.1      .4      .3      .5 
BALEARES         1.3     1.9     2.4     4.5     1.1     1.7     1.3 
CANARIAS                                                             
Tenerife         2.1             1.8      .3      .0      .2      .1 
CANTABRIA        6.0     3.0     2.9     5.0     2.4     7.8      .9 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete         5.1      .9     3.2     1.7      .2      .1      .3 
Ciudad Real      3.3     1.0     3.4     1.6      .2      .3      .1 
Cuenca           4.6      .9     2.0     2.3     1.0     1.2      .7 
Guadalajara     10.0     3.4     5.2     5.2     1.5     2.4     1.1 
Toledo           4.6      .6     2.1     1.9      .3      .4      .2 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Burgos           4.8     1.9     3.9     8.3     1.6     2.6     2.0 
León             7.9     1.6     2.4     4.4     2.4     1.4      .9 
Palencia         7.8     1.9     3.3     6.6     2.5     2.8     2.0 
Salamanca        4.2      .8     1.5     1.9      .5      .9      .2 
Segovia          7.4      .9     3.1     6.9     2.3     3.8     2.4 
Valladolid       7.1     2.9     2.9     1.8      .3      .5      .4 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Girona           4.1     2.6     2.0     2.6     2.2     2.3     1.3 
Tarragona        3.0      .8     1.7     2.8     1.3     2.3      .8 
Alicante         9.2     2.8     3.4     5.6     1.4     1.5      .9 
Castellón        5.6     1.1     1.9     2.6      .7      .6      .6 
Valencia         6.8     1.8     3.4     3.5     2.3     1.5      .6 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz          6.1     1.6     2.6     3.2      .5     1.2      .8 
Cáceres          3.7      .8     1.4     2.1      .6      .5      .7 
GALICIA                                                              
Lugo             1.6      .4      .5     3.0      .3     1.1      .6 
Ourense          4.1      .4      .5     2.2     1.1      .7      .5 
Pontevedra                .6 9.0 1.1       3.2      .3      .2      .2 
MADRID          15.0     4.6     5.9    10.9     5.4     9.7     4.3 
MURCIA           3.8     1.0     2.9     2.4      .5      .5      .2 
NAVARRA          1.7      .6     1.9     4.9     2.3     4.7     2.4 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava            5.3     2.4     1.0     4.7     3.1     7.4     3.8 
Guipúzcoa        2.3     1.3     1.1     2.8     5.0     9.5     5.5 
Vizcaya          9.4     3.7     1.7     5.6     7.1     8.4     5.8 





Table A III.22 PSOE voters opting for AP/PP: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería          1.9     9.9    13.4     5.2     2.0     3.3    13.8 
Cádiz             .4      .5     1.5      .3      .6     1.2     2.6 
Córdoba          1.9     5.6     8.8      .8      .6      .9     1.8 
Granada          1.1     6.3     6.9     1.2      .6      .8     1.3 
Huelva            .8     2.7     4.9     3.8     1.2     1.4     2.1 
Jaén             1.4     5.7     7.1     2.8     3.7     4.0     3.5 
Málaga           2.4    12.2     7.2     2.3     1.1     1.4     3.9 
Sevilla          1.0     2.8     4.1      .2      .5     2.2     1.8 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca           1.7     7.9    10.7     8.3     3.8     3.7    14.9 
Teruel           1.3     3.1     3.1     3.3     3.5     3.0     7.2 
Zaragoza         3.0     6.6     5.8     4.2     3.5     8.1     8.4 
ASTURIAS         2.2     6.8     2.9     5.2     4.0     1.2     5.0 
BALEARES          .6     6.0     1.3     1.5     2.7      .8     4.8 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas       2.7     3.3     1.7     1.8     9.1     2.5     7.0 
Tenerife         2.8    11.0     5.6      .6     2.5     1.0    12.7 
CANTABRIA        2.8     9.8     5.6     3.6     7.8     9.3    10.6 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete         2.2    12.5     8.2     4.0     4.5     4.3    10.8 
Ciudad Real      1.3     5.3     4.1     1.8     3.5     3.2     7.7 
Cuenca           2.0    14.4    10.7     5.9     8.9     9.3    15.0 
Guadalajara      3.2    13.8     5.5     6.1     9.6     9.5    12.2 
Toledo           1.3     7.7     5.9     3.1     7.3     8.5    12.1 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila            3.3    12.4    17.6     7.8     8.1     5.0    28.6 
Burgos           2.8     8.9     3.2     3.8     2.8     4.2     5.4 
León             4.5    11.9     5.4     4.7     9.6     1.5     5.0 
Palencia         4.2     4.3     3.8     3.8     4.1     3.1     5.8 
Salamanca        4.8    16.4    12.6     7.3     7.6     9.1    19.9 
Segovia          2.8    10.3     8.6     4.6     5.0     8.4     7.9 
Soria            4.8    10.1     4.1     2.6     2.9     5.9     8.3 
Valladolid       3.9     5.4     3.3     8.6    10.0    10.3    14.5 
Zamora           9.8    13.0    10.5    10.0     7.8     8.5    18.6 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona         .4      .8      .2      .1      .3      .9     2.2 
Girona            .8     6.5     4.0     1.8     2.6     1.4     4.3 
Tarragona        1.1     5.5     2.2     1.4     2.1     2.6     3.0 
Valencia          .7     7.0     6.4     6.5    12.7     5.7    12.3 
Cáceres           .9     6.2     6.2     3.4     3.4     2.5     4.6 
A Coruña         2.4     6.2     3.6     4.4     1.0    10.5    11.2 
Vizcaya                  1.1      .8      .3     1.2      .7    10.4 
Lleida           1.8     9.0     6.9     2.9     5.3     2.4     4.3 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante         2.7    14.8     19.2  6.3     3.0     3.6         8.2
Castellón        1.1    13.3     9.7     8.8    11.9    12.1    15.3 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz          1.2    10.3     6.4     1.7     2.1     4.4    15.1 
GALICIA                                                              
Lugo             2.7    17.6     5.5    11.7     1.5     8.5    10.2 
Ourense          9.9    12.9     9.2    12.4     3.2    18.3    14.8 
Pontevedra       5.1    17.1     5.2     3.3      .5     9.2    17.0 
MADRID            .3     7.4     1.3      .4      .8      .9      .5 
MURCIA           1.2    13.8     7.0     1.7     7.2     3.1    12.3 
NAVARRA          2.1     5.6     6.7     7.4     7.7    11.4    26.5 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava                    9.0     4.2     3.2     3.9     2.6    19.9 
Guipúzcoa                2.0     2.0     1.2     1.6     1.9    16.5 






Teruel           4.3      .7 
Cuenca           7.6     1.8 
Toledo           8.6      .9 
León            11.3     1.1 
Salamanca        9.2      .7 
Soria            7.5     1.3 
Zamora           5.9      .7 
Barcelona        2.5      .1 
Lleida           7.0      .5 
Alicante         1.7      .7 
      
Badajoz         11.7     2.2 
Ourense         10.7     1.5 
Vizcaya          9.7         
 
Table A III.24 PSOE voters opting for UCD: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82    
ANDALUCIA                    
Almería          2.4      .2 
Cádiz            8.4      .3 
Córdoba          6.3     2.0 
Granada          4.8     1.1 
Huelva           1.3     2.0 
Jaén             5.5     2.0 
Málaga           3.0      .8 
Sevilla          3.6     1.2 
ARAGON                       
Huesca          10.8     2.4 
Zaragoza         1.9      .4 
ASTURIAS         1.3      .0 
BALEARES         8.4     1.0 
CANARIAS                     
Las Palmas       2.2      .3 
Tenerife          .7      .9 
CANTABRIA        4.1     1.4 
CAST.-MANCHA                 
Albacete        13.1     1.3 
Ciudad Real      2.4      .5 
Guadalajara      8.0     1.3 
CAST.-LEON                   
Avila            4.1     1.1 
Burgos          12.7     1.2 
Palencia          .8      .1 
Segovia         13.6      .8 
Valladolid       2.7      .4 
CATALUNYA                    
Girona           7.5      .8 
Tarragona        2.7      .3 
C.VALENCIANA                 
Castellón        6.8     .2  
Valencia         7.8     2.2 
EXTREMADURA            
Cáceres          1.4     1.4 
GALICIA                      
A Coruña         2.8      .5 
Lugo            11.0     3.5 
Pontevedra       1.2      .3 
MADRID           3.4      .4 
MURCIA          12.5     2.1 
NAVARRA         11.9     1.5 
BASQUE COUNTRY                      
Alava            7.2         
Guipúzcoa       14.3         
LA RIOJA         5.1      .8 
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Table A III.25 PSOE voters opting CDS: Ecol percentages 
               79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93    
ARAGON                                       
ASTURIAS         1.6    12.1     5.4      .2 
Tenerife         1.3     2.1     3.4      .1 
Ciudad Real       .6     6.5     1.7      .1 
Cuenca           1.1     6.8     2.8     1.0 
CAST.-LEON                                   
Palencia         1.2     7.8     4.3      .6 




ANDALUCIA                                    
Almería           .6     4.9     2.5      .1 
Cádiz             .0      .9      .6      .0 
Córdoba           .4     4.2     1.8      .1 
Granada           .4     3.9     1.2      .1 
Huelva            .2     3.1      .3      .0 
Jaén              .5     3.2     1.7      .1 
Málaga           1.1     3.2     3.0      .0 
Sevilla           .1     1.6     1.0      .0 
Huesca           1.2     8.6     3.9      .2 
Teruel           1.5     4.9     1.8      .2 
Zaragoza         2.3     9.5     1.7      .1 
BALEARES         2.2     5.2     2.1      .5 
CANARIAS                                     
Las Palmas        .6     3.2     8.1      .3 
CANTABRIA        1.4    10.1     2.5      .9 
CAST.-MANCHA                                 
Albacete          .7     6.8     3.0      .1 
Guadalajara      2.2    10.9     4.4      .6 
Toledo            .5     5.8     2.0      .2 
Avila            1.4     9.5      .7      .6 
Burgos           2.0     7.6     4.2      .8 
León             1.5     8.8     5.3      .8 
Salamanca        2.3    13.9     4.0      .9 
Segovia          3.4    11.5     5.5     3.7 
Soria            2.2     8.7     4.1      .9 
Valladolid       2.3    12.6     1.5      .3 
Zamora           1.9     7.1     2.0      .6 
CATALUNYA                                    
Barcelona         .5     3.5     1.3      .1 
Girona            .7     2.5     1.8      .2 
Lleida           1.4     3.5     2.3      .2 
Tarragona         .9     3.4     2.2      .3 
C.VALENCIANA                                 
Alicante          .6     5.2     2.9      .3 
Castellón        1.0     7.0     3.1      .4 
Valencia          .7     5.1     2.1      .4 
EXTREMADURA                                  
Badajoz           .9     4.4     4.2      .2 
Cáceres           .4     4.3     2.3      .3 
GALICIA                                      
A Coruña         1.5     9.8     2.9      .1 
Lugo             1.0     8.6     3.3      .1 
Ourense          1.2     3.5     3.4      .4 
Pontevedra       2.4     7.0     3.7      .1 
MADRID           1.0    11.1     3.8      .3 
MURCIA            .3     6.7     8.2      .6 
NAVARRA          1.3     7.0     2.4      .3 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                      
Alava             .8     9.6     5.1      .3 
Vizcaya           .3     4.6     2.4      .3 





Table A III.26 Loyal to AP/PP: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería          9.0    58.3    39.1    57.4    76.7    82.3    70.2 
Cádiz            7.3    57.0    62.3    64.8    90.1    91.1    76.2 
Córdoba         12.2    47.5    49.3    65.0    87.6    93.3    86.4 
Granada         16.7    39.6    67.2    74.3    89.8    93.1    82.8 
Huelva           7.1    46.3    59.4    61.4    76.8    95.0    86.3 
Jaén            12.4    43.7    58.7    74.1    87.8    92.0    81.6 
Málaga           6.9    48.9    43.5    56.2    78.1    94.8    69.8 
Sevilla         32.5    61.2    55.5    80.1    92.2    94.7    88.0 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca           3.6    37.8    32.5    48.7    71.8    79.8    54.6 
Teruel          16.7    66.0    55.4    73.9    79.0    85.1    69.2 
Zaragoza         9.8    37.4    43.2    75.2    79.0    73.0 77.8    
ASTURIAS        22.0    56.6    73.4    78.6    91.7    95.0    83.1 
BALEARES        34.4    51.0    55.7    85.8    89.0    89.4    87.9 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Palencia        14.3    47.3    59.8    80.4    85.7    90.1    85.1 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas       9.3    22.8    62.8    58.9    81.1    88.2    90.5 
Tenerife         5.7    29.9    30.7    71.9    73.2    83.4    67.3 
CANTABRIA       26.1    56.1    54.1    76.6    62.3    78.0    84.8 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete         6.9    52.5    47.9    80.9    87.6    89.8    78.9 
Ciudad Real      3.2    44.6    53.0    74.4    91.9    93.8    86.9 
Cuenca          17.3    44.1    47.4    74.2    79.9    83.1    76.1 
Guadalajara     16.3    52.7    59.9    75.1    82.8    82.6    76.2 
Toledo           9.7    53.9    58.1    77.8    85.1    86.5    81.5 
Avila           28.1    42.9    42.0    75.5    78.2    84.3    61.4 
Burgos          11.5    63.3    60.0    79.0    87.4    89.4    81.6 
León            16.8    56.1    68.0    82.4    87.2    93.8    77.5 
Salamanca       13.3    45.2    53.4    76.8    81.9    83.7    72.3 
Segovia         19.5    33.4    54.5    53.8    74.4    82.7    78.6 
Soria           30.9    55.3    56.3    73.7    79.8    83.8    75.4 
Valladolid      10.7    43.9    54.3    82.7    85.3    86.8    81.3 
Zamora          20.1    54.0    52.2    72.4    83.6    87.8    75.0 
CALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona       15.7    53.8    50.0    75.6    88.5    84.1    85.2 
Girona          12.6    28.7    37.8    43.8    65.3    71.3    72.8 
Lleida           8.3    45.3    52.1    51.6    75.8    75.8    75.5 
Tarragona       12.7    49.5    46.9    60.9    77.2    80.6    79.6 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante        15.6    41.1    59.6    73.4    91.0    91.7    81.2 
Castellón        7.6    52.3    26.9    73.7    84.6    76.5    82.2 
Valencia        18.3    55.9    53.3    51.9    72.6    94.0    86.2 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz         12.6    51.1    59.5    71.2    84.9    81.7    66.0 
Cáceres         12.1    44.8    55.7    73.8    82.5    89.1    78.8 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña        36.1    71.9    54.9    73.1    77.9    94.3    72.5 
Lugo            45.9    71.8    61.8    67.3    67.7    94.1    79.2 
Ourense         22.4    50.9    48.1    60.4    53.7    83.5    76.1 
Pontevedra      17.1    57.4    41.7    70.3    76.4    91.1    76.7 
MADRID          23.9    68.5    64.9    89.2    94.1    98.2    92.5 
MURCIA          21.2    60.0    60.0    75.1    92.7    94.5    80.6 
NAVARRA                 51.5    64.8    84.3    84.3    83.8    80.5 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava                           51.4    67.9    83.9    89.9    76.2 
Guipúzcoa                       61.2    60.6    78.4    85.2    75.9 
Vizcaya                         69.5    78.1    88.4    92.9    81.7 
LA RIOJA        38.6    61.5    53.1    73.7    82.8    83.4    74.8 
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Table A III.27 AP/PP voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería         47.5     9.7    24.9    19.0     8.2     9.9    20.0 
Cádiz           41.9    14.2    23.6    17.3     4.6     4.4    16.8 
Córdoba         34.7    14.7    24.1    18.1     5.7     4.1    10.6 
Granada         29.8    17.7    13.5    14.3     4.8     4.1     9.7 
Huelva          39.7    13.1    19.1    21.8     7.1     3.0    10.1 
Jaén            18.5    10.8    12.9    11.2         3.6     3.0 10.6 
Málaga          48.9    19.3    22.2    22.9    11.7     3.6    23.5 
Sevilla         31.2    11.1    21.5    11.1     3.7     2.8     7.5 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca          36.5    16.5    24.3    22.5     7.6     8.6    20.6 
Teruel          24.5    11.9    20.5    11.8     7.2     7.5    12.6 
Zaragoza        36.3    10.1    20.5    10.8     4.6     9.8    10.6 
ASTURIAS        32.5     5.9     9.4     9.9     4.2     2.8     7.0 
BALEARES        27.3    32.6    26.5     6.3     2.8     3.9     4.4 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas      55.2    32.3    12.1    18.1     2.1     5.0     5.2 
Tenerife        52.7    17.1    35.2    14.1    15.5     9.6    20.9 
CANTABRIA       22.1     8.2    22.0    14.4     7.9    11.1     9.8 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Ciudad Real     24.0    18.6    22.1     7.6     2.6     2.5     6.7 
Avila           19.9     9.3    16.2     8.9     7.5     6.5    19.8 
Girona          36.7    22.6    28.8    33.6    18.3    16.7    20.2 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Albacete        38.9     7.0    16.2     5.1     3.0     4.1    12.1 
Cuenca          31.0    12.1    23.1     9.8     5.6     6.1     9.4 
Guadalajara     32.0    13.2    15.7    10.6     6.8     8.1     9.0 
Toledo          21.2    17.9    17.3     7.6     3.7     4.4     7.4 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Burgos          26.7    10.2    13.8     9.1     4.6     5.7     8.7 
León            40.8     7.5     8.7     5.8     3.6     2.6     5.2 
Palencia        20.9     7.4    16.3     6.9     4.2     4.8     6.2 
Salamanca       28.4     8.2    11.7     9.8     6.7     6.8    14.1 
Segovia         21.7    16.6    15.1    14.4     9.4    11.3    10.0 
Soria           26.9    10.5    21.6    13.0    10.4    11.0    13.0 
Valladolid      20.4     8.9    14.4     3.3     3.6     4.6     7.6 
Zamora          33.1    10.2    14.7    10.4     4.7     5.4    11.2 
CALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona       45.0     8.4    20.3     7.4     2.0     7.9     6.9 
Lleida          44.8    16.5    22.0    24.5     13.8      9.5     9.3
Tarragona       28.3    17.1    24.5    26.0    12.2    11.1    13.5 
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Alicante        28.9     9.6    14.3     3.0     1.6    1.8     6.7  
Castellón       36.2     8.5    25.6     5.8     1.9    10.7     5.6 
Valencia        30.5    12.1    15.1    17.4     7.9     3.1     6.4 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz         31.6    13.0    16.3    11.7     7.1     9.9    22.5 
Cáceres         37.0    15.9    16.1    11.1     7.4     5.8    12.5 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña        36.7     8.5    19.6    16.6     6.1     3.1    15.4 
Lugo            32.1    14.2    19.1    19.4    10.4     3.7     9.7 
Ourense         43.4    17.4    17.0    23.1    18.7    12.7    13.4 
Pontevedra      50.0     6.3    22.8    18.9    12.0     6.6    12.5 
MADRID          10.5     4.0    13.8     3.9     1.3      .9     3.4 
MURCIA          40.6    18.6    20.4     8.7     2.9     1.6     9.9 
NAVARRA                 17.0    14.1     6.6     3.8     6.2     4.4 
Alava           36.2            11.9    16.5     4.6     4.0     3.3 
Guipúzcoa                       20.5    22.4     8.7     5.5     3.7 
Vizcaya         35.2            14.0    12.9     4.4     2.7     2.2 




Table A III.28 AP/PP voters opting for PCE/IU: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería           .8     1.2     4.2     4.8     2.3     2.1      .9 
Cádiz            1.1      .6     1.1     1.6      .9      .7      .2 
Córdoba          2.1     1.0     2.8     4.3     1.4     1.1      .4 
Granada          2.7      .9     2.3     2.4      .7      .5      .4 
Huelva           3.5      .5      .9     1.7     1.6      .4      .3 
Jaén             6.0     1.1     1.5     1.2      .2      .4      .2 
Málaga           5.2     1.1     4.9     7.2     3.9      .8      .6 
Ciudad Real       .8      .9      .6      .2      .1      .1      .1 
Guadalajara      1.5     1.1      .9      .4      .2      .5      .3 
Burgos            .8      .6      .5      .7      .2      .5      .3 
Salamanca        1.6      .6     1.2     1.4      .9     1.6      .8 
CALUNYA                                                            
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Ourense          1.1      .3      .5      .7      .8      .2      .1 
Pontevedra       1.5     1.3      .5      .3      .3      .1      .1 
 
Sevilla          1.9      .5     1.4      .8      .4      .1      .1 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca           1.5     1.3     2.3     2.6      .9     1.4      .8 
Teruel           1.2     .4      .7      .6      .4      .9      .3  
Zaragoza         1.4     1.5      .7      .9      .3     1.6      .2 
ASTURIAS         1.5      .9      .1      .3      .1      .0      .1 
BALEARES         2.6      .8      .4      .1      .1      .2      .1 
CANARIAS                                                             
Las Palmas       3.2             3.5     7.0     3.8     1.5      .4 
Tenerife         4.4             2.7     3.8     2.7      .9      .6 
CANTABRIA         .7     1.2      .7      .5      .1     1.8      .2 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete         4.9      .6     1.5      .5      .3      .5      .4 
Cuenca           2.6      .7     1.0      .6      .5      .7      .3 
Toledo           1.6      .6      .9      .6      .3      .4      .2 
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Avila            3.8     1.1     1.0     1.5     1.4     2.6     2.0 
León             1.9      .5      .4      .6      .3      .2      .1 
Palencia          .4     1.0      .5      .2      .1      .1      .1 
Segovia          2.4     1.0      .7     1.2      .7      .6      .2 
Soria            1.6      .8     1.4      .7      .4      .6      .7 
Valladolid       1.0     1.7      .4      .1      .1      .1      .1 
Zamora            .6      .5      .9      .5      .3      .3      .4 
Barcelona         .7      .7      .6      .6      .3      .3      .2 
Girona           3.9     1.0     1.2     1.6     1.1     1.3      .6 
Lleida           2.0     1.2     1.4     1.9     1.4     1.2      .4 
Tarragona        2.8     1.5     1.3     1.4     1.6      .9      .4 
Alicante         3.7      .8      .8      .5      .2      .2      .2 
Castellón        2.4     1.1     1.2      .3      .2      .4      .3 
Valencia         4.3     1.1     1.1     2.0     1.8      .3      .3 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Badajoz          3.4      .9     1.2     1.5      .8     1.4      .8 
Cáceres          2.8      .6      .9     1.9     1.1     1.2      .9 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña         1.0      .7      .5      .4      .5      .0      .1 
Lugo              .3      .2      .3      .2      .3      .1      .1 
MADRID            .5      .3      .6      .2      .0      .0      .2 
MURCIA           3.5     1.6     1.6     2.4      .4      .9      .9 
NAVARRA                   .2      .4      .6      .9     1.1      .9 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Alava            1.3              .3      .5      .7     1.7     1.4 
Guipúzcoa                         .2     1.0     1.7     2.3     2.3 
Vizcaya           .4              .2      .6      .6      .5     1.0 






Table A III.29 AP/PP voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
ANDALUCIA                                                            
Almería          9.3    24.2    15.1    10.2     5.1     2.4     4.1 
Cádiz             .9    13.8     1.2      .3      .2      .1      .6 
Córdoba         10.9    26.7     7.0     2.4      .6      .2      .3 
Granada          7.9    24.6     4.9     1.9      .7      .3      .6 
Huelva          13.5    26.8     9.2     7.1     9.2      .6      .5 
Jaén            16.8    32.1    13.2     8.0     4.6     2.2     2.5 
ASTURIAS        11.0    24.7    11.9     6.8     2.2      .9     3.1 
BALEARES         3.4     6.3     2.2     1.0      .7     1.2      .3 
CANARIAS                                                             
CAST.-LEON                                                           
Burgos           3.8    11.9     8.4     2.0     1.5      .7     1.1 
Palencia         3.4    30.9
CALUNYA                                                            
C.VALENCIANA                                                         
Badajoz         18.7    21.1     8.4     7.3     2.4     4.5     5.7 
Lugo             4.2     4.9     7.5     5.1     7.4      .1      .7 
Ourense          4.4    18.7    15.9     8.0     9.9     1.1     1.7 
MADRID           1.5     3.7     1.3      .3      .1      .0      .2 
Alava            8.6            17.0     3.6     1.5     2.2    11.4 
Málaga          10.3    25.1    15.7     3.0     1.8      .1      .9 
Sevilla          1.4    16.2     8.1      .7      .9      .1      .6 
ARAGON                                                               
Huesca          11.3    26.8    18.0    10.5     3.8     6.2     7.2 
Teruel           7.8     9.7     5.1     3.5     2.9     3.4     1.6 
Zaragoza         8.3    39.2    10.4     3.6     2.3     4.3     3.3 
Las Palmas       7.8    15.7     3.4     3.2      .3     1.4      .5 
Tenerife         2.8    31.8     8.0     1.4      .7      .9     1.8 
CANTABRIA        2.6    22.3     8.6     2.4     3.5     5.6      .6 
CAST.-MANCHA                                                         
Albacete        14.2    32.2    21.5     9.5     5.7     3.5     4.6 
Ciudad Real      7.3    26.2    12.8    13.4     3.0     2.1     2.8 
Cuenca          13.7    26.5    15.3     7.9     7.0     6.6     8.0 
Guadalajara      4.9    15.7     9.7     6.7     4.5     4.6     7.2 
Toledo           3.7    13.3     9.8     8.5     6.1     5.8     5.8 
Avila           22.2    31.7     9.4     8.6     5.6     2.8     8.9 
León             9.1    21.4     7.9     3.0     1.1      .4      .5 
     7.8     2.7     1.5     1.1     1.0 
Salamanca        9.0    35.2    12.5     4.5     4.0     3.6     4.8 
Segovia         13.8    26.7     6.2     5.8     2.6     1.9     2.1 
Soria            9.7    20.8     6.9     1.6     1.5      .8     1.3 
Valladolid       4.0    34.5    14.0     7.4     5.2     5.0     4.4 
Zamora           3.1    21.9    14.6     9.1     5.7     3.1     4.8 
Barcelona        1.0     3.2      .4      .1      .2      .4      .9 
Girona           7.7     7.8    10.2     3.8     4.9     6.7     2.8 
Lleida           5.9    14.8     9.0     4.5     5.7     5.6     4.0 
Tarragona        4.7     9.1     7.3     2.3     2.9     2.6     2.2 
Alicante        10.6    34.7     8.2    11.1     3.3     4.6     7.2 
Castellón       10.4    25.9    26.6    12.6    10.0    10.4     6.5 
Valencia         6.1    12.9    10.1    10.7     8.4     1.0     2.0 
EXTREMADURA                                                          
Cáceres         13.7    23.7    12.4     6.5     5.1     1.7     2.4 
GALICIA                                                              
A Coruña         3.1    10.9     6.1     3.0     4.5      .2     2.9 
Pontevedra       2.9    23.6    14.7     3.3     3.5      .3     1.6 
MURCIA           6.3     9.5     3.8     5.9     1.8     1.0     1.7 
NAVARRA                  9.8     9.8     3.4     7.6     4.6     7.2 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                                              
Guipúzcoa                        5.8     2.0     3.0     2.7     6.2 
Vizcaya          2.0             1.9      .7     1.0      .4     1.9 




Table A III.30 AP/PP voters opting for UCD: Ecol percentages 
Vizcaya          9.0         
 
               77-79   79-82    
ANDALUCIA                    
Almería         26.0      .3 
Cádiz           29.3      .2 
Córdoba         26.2      .6 
Granada         22.0     2.6 
Huelva           6.7      .8 
Jaén            28.2      .6 
Málaga           7.8      .1 
Sevilla          9.1      .3 
ARAGON                       
Huesca          35.6     4.7 
Teruel          40.9     2.5 
Zaragoza        25.9      .5 
ASTURIAS        23.4      .8 
BALEARES        23.2     4.9 
CANARIAS                     
Las Palmas       4.2      .2 
Tenerife        26.8     1.3 
CANTABRIA       22.7     2.8 
CAST.-MANCHA                 
Albacete        28.2      .5 
Ciudad Real     46.9     2.2 
Cuenca          32.0     4.4 
Guadalajara     32.4     6.6 
Toledo          48.9     3.1 
CAST.-LEON                   
Avila           15.6     3.8 
Burgos          49.4     4.0 
León            24.5     6.2 
Palencia        44.4     2.4 
Salamanca       41.6     3.1 
Segovia         34.4     7.7 
Soria           21.7     2.9 
Valladolid      46.6     1.3 
Zamora          36.3     2.1 
CALUNYA                    
Barcelona       17.8     1.7 
Girona          19.0     1.9 
Lleida          19.7      .9 
Tarragona       34.3     1.3 
C.VALENCIANA                 
Alicante        28.3      .6 
Castellón       30.6      .3 
Valencia        17.6     1.2 
EXTREMADURA                  
Badajoz         24.6     1.8 
Cáceres         21.3     4.2 
GALICIA                      
A Coruña        11.9     1.0 
Lugo             9.5     2.1 
Ourense         17.7     6.2 
Pontevedra      19.1      .4 
MADRID          44.1     3.6 
MURCIA          15.7     1.5 
NAVARRA                  3.8 
BASQUE COUNTRY                      
Alava           26.5         
Guipúzcoa                    




Table A III.31 AP/PP voters opting for CDS: Ecol percentages 
 
               79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93    
ANDALUCIA                                    
Zaragoza         3.7     3.3     1.1      .2 
BALEARES          .5     4.8     2.0      .1 
CAST.-MANCHA                                 
Burgos           2.6     9.2     3.0      .5 
CALUNYA                                    
Tarragona        1.4     3.6     1.6      .3 
Almería          1.8     7.6     1.7      .4 
Cádiz            2.8     2.7     1.0      .2 
Córdoba          1.9    10.0     4.4      .3 
Granada          5.4     6.0     3.3      .4 
Huelva           2.3     4.4     1.7      .2 
Jaén             1.3     5.4     1.7      .2 
Málaga           1.0     5.7     1.6      .4 
Sevilla          2.7     4.5      .7      .3 
ARAGON                                       
Huesca           4.3     7.3     3.2      .7 
Teruel           3.8     5.9     2.9      .5 
ASTURIAS         4.7     2.6     2.2      .4 
CANARIAS                                     
Las Palmas       3.2     1.6     1.4      .0 
Tenerife         3.1     4.7     1.0      .5 
CANTABRIA        2.2     7.1     2.3      .2 
Albacete         2.5     6.7      .8      .2 
Ciudad Real      2.2     5.3     1.5      .2 
Cuenca           1.9     5.2     2.2      .8 
Guadalajara      2.9     5.3     1.4      .5 
Toledo           3.5     8.2     1.9      .4 
CAST.-LEON                                   
Avila            4.9    22.6     1.6     1.0 
León             2.3     5.6     1.6      .6 
Palencia         3.2     7.3     3.2      .7 
Salamanca        3.5    12.3     3.2      .8 
Segovia          8.4    14.6    17.7     3.1 
Soria            5.7     4.7     3.5     1.1 
Valladolid       3.6     8.9     1.6      .9 
Zamora           2.3     8.3     3.3      .4 
Barcelona        2.5     1.6      .9      .1 
Girona           2.5     2.9     3.7      .6 
Lleida           2.3     2.9     2.9      .3 
C.VALENCIANA                                 
Alicante         5.4     8.4     6.0      .3 
Castellón        4.3     8.5     2.9      .2 
Valencia         3.1     4.5     2.5      .7 
EXTREMADURA                                  
Badajoz          1.4     7.3     4.7      .7 
Cáceres          2.2     4.6     2.5      .4 
GALICIA                                      
A Coruña         1.6     4.6     2.0      .4 
Lugo              .6     2.1     2.6      .2 
Ourense           .7     5.2     2.9      .6 
Pontevedra       3.4     6.2     2.6      .4 
MADRID          14.1     8.2     1.3      .4 
MURCIA           1.6     5.1     3.5      .1 
NAVARRA          2.3     3.5     1.2      .3 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                      
Alava                    7.0     1.4      .3 
Guipúzcoa                3.6     1.4      .3 
Vizcaya                  7.6     1.4      .3 




Table A III.32 Loyal to UCD: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82    
ANDALUCIA                    
Almería         63.6    26.4 
Cádiz           49.7    14.8 
Córdoba         59.6    18.8 
Granada         55.8    10.1 
Sevilla         67.0    12.8 
ASTURIAS        66.4     9.6 
Badajoz         64.0    15.8 
Huelva          62.0    18.2 
Jaén            55.3    19.4 
Málaga          74.7    12.3 
ARAGON                       
Huesca          63.0    24.1 
Teruel          61.1    28.0 
Zaragoza        68.3    19.3 
BALEARES        55.9    17.6 
CANARIAS                     
Las Palmas      73.2    25.5 
Tenerife        72.2    31.6 
CANTABRIA       67.6     7.6 
CAST.-MANCHA                 
Albacete        49.7    13.2 
Ciudad Real     67.4    20.8 
Cuenca          63.6    23.0 
Guadalajara     59.0    21.4 
Toledo          58.1    21.1 
CAST.-LEON                   
Avila           68.3    11.0 
Burgos          55.5     9.6 
León            55.2    21.0 
Palencia        69.0    19.9 
Salamanca       60.8    20.9 
Segovia         57.8    12.7 
Soria           57.7    26.7 
Valladolid      54.0    15.6 
Zamora          59.1    28.6 
CATALUNYA                    
Barcelona       24.7     2.6 
Girona          47.6     3.7 
Lleida          53.9    12.8 
Tarragona       65.2    14.3 
C.VALENCIANA                 
Alicante        78.2    19.1 
Castellón       64.9    26.2 
Valencia        59.0     8.2 
EXTREMADURA                  
Cáceres         65.0    19.8 
GALICIA                      
A Coruña        63.0    15.5 
Lugo            53.7    21.5 
Ourense         52.7    32.1 
Pontevedra      59.4    28.1 
MADRID          52.5     8.3 
MURCIA          54.4    14.5 
NAVARRA         64.1    19.7 
BASQUE COUNTRY                      
Alava           48.8         
Guipúzcoa                    
Vizcaya         49.0         




Table A III.33 UCD voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86    
 
ANDALUCIA                            
Almería         25.9    27.0    26.0 
Cádiz           32.2    39.2    47.2 
Jaén            26.8    14.3    31.5 
    
Huesca          21.3    16.4    25.8 
Teruel          24.5    11.0    19.8 
ASTURIAS        24.3    14.4    77.1 
BALEARES        23.4    15.2    10.9 
CANARIAS                             
Tenerife        20.8    34.9    18.4 
Guadalajara     22.0    17.1    25.4 
Toledo          17.4     8.7    12.6 
    
Avila           22.1    11.8    38.5 
León            26.7    14.6    44.0 
Valladolid      23.0    16.3    
Girona          28.1    18.8    41.3 
Alicante        11.6    12.3     7.8 
Ourense         32.6 50.3 
MURCIA          22.0    15.2    19.2 
LA RIOJA        17.4    13.7    14.5 
Córdoba         23.9    19.0    13.8 
Granada         28.0    17.7    51.2 
Huelva          22.1    17.1    24.5 
Málaga          12.8    27.1    35.0 
Sevilla         13.8    16.1    15.1 
ARAGON                           
Zaragoza        19.1    18.6    23.5 
Las Palmas      15.2     9.7     6.5 
CANTABRIA       20.8    15.2    37.4 
CAST.-MANCHA                         
Albacete        30.2    17.2    35.9 
Ciudad Real     19.0    18.1    28.9 
Cuenca          23.5    14.9    23.8 
CAST.-LEON                       
Burgos          28.7    13.8    26.1 
Palencia        20.4    13.1    14.6 
Salamanca       23.0    16.4    34.8 
Segovia         25.5    14.0    18.1 
Soria           23.2    17.9    20.6 
 4.8 
Zamora          21.7    16.2    39.5 
CATALUNYA                            
Barcelona       48.0    19.7    37.4 
Lleida          26.0    20.6    45.3 
Tarragona       18.8    23.5    28.9 
C.VALENCIANA                         
Castellón       14.8    13.2    11.8 
Valencia        19.4    11.8    19.6 
EXTREMADURA                          
Badajoz         18.2     9.2    20.9 
Cáceres         19.9    15.6    42.1 
GALICIA                              
A Coruña        26.7    25.2    56.1 
Lugo            27.1    31.7    50.3 
    18.2    
Pontevedra      29.7    29.3    57.2 
MADRID          24.8     9.9    10.1 
NAVARRA         18.5     9.6    33.8 
BASQUE COUNTRY                              
Alava           24.8     9.1         
Guipúzcoa               10.3         




Table A III.34 UCD voters opting for PCE/IU: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86  
ANDALUCIA                            
Almería           .5      .5      .2 
Cádiz             .9     1.1     1.5 
Córdoba           .5      .7      .3 
Granada          1.3      .9      .8 
Huelva            .5      .6      .3 
Jaén             1.4     1.9      .8 
Málaga            .9     2.6     2.5 
Sevilla          1.0     1.3     2.6 
ARAGON                               
Huesca           1.0      .6      .5 
Teruel            .6      .1      .3 
Zaragoza          .3      .3      .1 
ASTURIAS          .3      .1      .1 
BALEARES         1.4      .3      .1 
CANTABRIA         .5      .5      .8 
Albacete         2.8     1.5      .7 
Burgos            .9      .6      .8 
CANARIAS                             
Las Palmas        .2              .1 
Tenerife          .3              .4 
CAST.-MANCHA                         
Ciudad Real       .6      .5      .2 
Cuenca           1.6     1.0     1.0 
Guadalajara       .9      .8      .4 
Toledo           2.4      .4      .4 
CAST.-LEON                           
Avila             .7      .5      .5 
León             1.1      .5      .3 
Palencia          .2      .2      .2 
Salamanca         .8      .7      .4 
Segovia           .7      .7      .4 
Soria            1.0      .6      .4 
Valladolid       1.1      .4      .1 
Zamora            .8      .3      .3 
CATALUNYA                            
Barcelona        2.8     1.3      .6 
Girona           2.1     1.6     1.3 
Lleida           1.9      .8     1.0 
Tarragona        1.7     1.6     1.2 
C.VALENCIANA                         
Alicante          .4      .5      .1 
Castellón        1.7     1.4      .2 
Valencia         1.9      .8     1.4 
EXTREMADURA                          
Badajoz           .8      .3      .3 
Cáceres           .8      .4      .8 
GALICIA                              
A Coruña          .4      .5      .1 
Lugo              .6      .3      .3 
Ourense           .7      .2      .3 
Pontevedra        .6      .3      .1 
MADRID           1.1      .6      .3 
MURCIA            .8      .9      .2 
NAVARRA           .3      .3      .8 
BASQUE COUNTRY                              
Alava             .6      .3         
Guipúzcoa                 .7         
Vizcaya          1.1      .6         




Table A III.35 UCD voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86 
ANDALUCIA                            
Almería          5.6    25.6    44.5 
Cádiz            2.4    25.8    15.2 
Córdoba          5.5    33.6    69.5 
Granada          6.4    30.8    26.2 
Huelva           5.4    32.9    54.5 
Jaén             9.3    25.7    33.4 
Málaga           7.4    35.4    44.0 
Sevilla          5.4    33.9    56.2 
ARAGON                               
Huesca           6.9    19.1    19.8 
Teruel           4.0     8.6     7.3 
Zaragoza         2.9     8.3    23.7 
ASTURIAS         1.8    17.4     5.4 
BALEARES         9.2    11.9     3.3 
CANARIAS                             
Las Palmas       5.6    15.5    18.4 
Tenerife         1.7     7.5    45.5 
CANTABRIA        1.9    13.9    16.1 
CAST.-MANCHA                         
Albacete         8.9    28.3    23.6 
Toledo           9.8    15.9    17.2 
CAST.-LEON                           
Palencia         1.2     2.9     2.6 
Girona           6.6    18.3    10.8 
Tarragona        3.3    10.0     3.6 
Ciudad Real      4.3    14.0    18.0 
Cuenca           5.3    20.7    15.1 
Guadalajara      5.0    12.9     7.9 
Avila            2.5     9.2     4.2 
Burgos           2.8    12.5     7.7 
León             5.7    19.5     6.0 
Salamanca        3.7    20.4    11.4 
Segovia          3.7    13.7     5.7 
Soria            6.8     6.2     4.0 
Valladolid       4.3    13.3    19.2 
Zamora           6.2    11.3     3.2 
CATALUNYA                            
Barcelona        6.1     9.1     1.7 
Lleida           5.0     8.8     3.9 
C.VALENCIANA                         
Alicante         4.8     5.4     8.2 
Castellón        9.6    20.3     6.2 
Valencia         8.1    32.6    24.5 
EXTREMADURA                          
Badajoz         11.3    35.0    39.7 
Cáceres          7.2    19.1    16.9 
GALICIA                              
A Coruña         2.5    24.4     4.5 
Lugo             6.9    14.0     5.1 
Ourense          4.0    13.0     2.6 
Pontevedra       1.5     8.4     2.2 
MADRID           5.3    12.5     2.8 
MURCIA          17.3    28.7    41.5 
NAVARRA          3.8    21.1    10.8 
BASQUE COUNTRY                              
Alava            4.0    24.0         
Guipúzcoa               26.5         
Vizcaya          7.6    25.2         




Table A III.36 UCD voters opting for AP/PP: Ecol percentages 
Almería           .7    11.0    15.6 
Granada          2.4    33.4    10.5 
Huelva           1.7    24.8    13.0 
CANARIAS                             
CAST.-LEON                           
Tarragona        3.7    26.3    30.7 
Valencia         2.6    34.7    36.3 
.6 5.6 3.4 
MADRID           8.8    56.2    70.2 
NAVARRA          5.3    39.0    33.5 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   
ANDALUCIA                            
Cádiz            1.7    11.1     6.4 
Córdoba          2.5    18.3     7.5 
Jaén             1.4    31.4    26.2 
Málaga            .5    12.1     4.9 
Sevilla          2.2    27.4    13.9 
ARAGON                               
Huesca           2.8    24.4    21.6 
Teruel           4.4    38.9    29.9 
Zaragoza         1.2    42.9    21.6 
ASTURIAS         3.0    48.9    12.2 
BALEARES         2.6    40.5    39.5 
Las Palmas        .4    28.4     2.7 
Tenerife          .8    16.7     5.2 
CANTABRIA        2.4    49.5    30.3 
CAST.-MANCHA                         
Albacete         2.1    28.7    33.0 
Ciudad Real      2.9    37.5    46.3 
Cuenca           2.5    29.0    40.2 
Guadalajara      6.6    38.1    53.9 
Toledo           4.1    43.4    44.6 
Avila            2.1    33.1    32.8 
Burgos           5.8    52.0    28.7 
León             6.9    32.7    28.6 
Palencia         3.9    54.0    60.0 
Salamanca        3.3    26.9    37.4 
Segovia          4.0    41.4    30.6 
Soria            4.3    32.8    47.7 
Valladolid       3.6    43.5    62.8 
Zamora           6.1    28.4    39.5 
CATALUNYA                            
Barcelona        3.8    24.1     8.5 
Girona           3.8    17.1    13.5 
Lleida           2.0    16.1     7.6 
C.VALENCIANA                         
Alicante         1.7    51.5    64.3 
Castellón        1.5    24.4    75.5 
EXTREMADURA                          
Badajoz          1.6    25.4    24.5 
Cáceres          1.4    28.2    25.9 
GALICIA                              
A Coruña         2.4    22.8    30.8 
Lugo             3.0    23.8     9.2 
Ourense          5.4    31.9    14.9 
Pontevedra       1     2     3
MURCIA           2.0    33.9    26.4 
BASQUE COUNTRY                              
Alava                   43.9         
Guipúzcoa               40.8         
Vizcaya                 42.7         




Table A III.37 UCD voters opting for CDS: Ecol percentages 
 
               79-82   82-86    
ANDALUCIA                    
Almería           .5     2.1 
Cádiz            2.1    23.1 
Córdoba          1.0     1.2 
Granada          1.4     4.2 
Huelva            .4      .7 
Jaén              .9     1.1 
Málaga           1.3     2.0 
Sevilla           .3     3.7 
ARAGON                       
Huesca           5.3     9.8 
Teruel           4.3     7.1 
Zaragoza         2.0     1.8 
ASTURIAS         5.3     2.0 
BALEARES         7.0     4.7 
CANARIAS                
C.VALENCIANA                 
EXTREMADURA                  
A Coruña         1.4     1.9 
Ourense           .7      .6 
BASQUE COUNTRY                      
     
Las Palmas       3.8    68.7 
Tenerife         3.4    24.7 
CANTABRIA        6.6     7.9 
CAST.-MANCHA                 
Albacete         1.5     1.1 
Ciudad Real      1.4     3.2 
Cuenca           1.1     7.3 
Guadalajara      2.2     2.8 
Toledo           1.2    14.4 
CAST.-LEON                   
Avila           28.3    17.2 
Burgos           3.8    13.4 
León             2.2     8.4 
Palencia         2.5     9.9 
Salamanca        3.1     8.5 
Segovia          6.6    32.7 
Soria            2.9    10.9 
Valladolid       2.6     2.1 
Zamora           3.3    10.2 
CATALUNYA                    
Barcelona        2.0     1.4 
Girona           2.3     5.3 
Lleida           2.3     1.4 
Tarragona        3.4     1.1 
Alicante         2.1     6.3 
Castellón        1.4     1.5 
Valencia         2.1     9.3 
Badajoz          1.2     6.6 
Cáceres          1.9     4.4 
GALICIA                      
Lugo             1.6     1.7 
Pontevedra       1.1     2.2 
MADRID           4.9     5.0 
MURCIA            .4     2.0 
NAVARRA          3.6     9.4 
Alava            4.5         
Guipúzcoa        3.6         
Vizcaya          5.1         






Table A III.38 Loyal to CDS: Ecol Percentages 
 
               82-86   86-89   89-93    
ANDALUCIA                            
Almería         28.3    17.6     4.0 
Cádiz           10.4    33.4     6.8 
Córdoba         18.5    18.6     6.1 
Granada         29.5    29.3     5.3 
Huelva          28.3    22.5     3.3 
Jaén             9.3    23.6     6.0 
Málaga          14.1    13.2     2.7 
Sevilla         10.2     9.1     2.1 
ARAGON                               
Huesca          25.7    16.7     5.3 
Teruel          27.3    37.0     6.3 
Zaragoza        26.1    23.6     2.8 
ASTURIAS        28.0    42.3    18.7 
BALEARES        52.5    23.0     2.3 
CANARIAS                             
Las Palmas      32.8    63.3      .6 
Tenerife        15.4    40.7     3.9 
CANTABRIA       30.9    40.3     3.0 
CAST.-MANCHA                         
Albacete        17.8    30.9    11.6 
Ciudad Real     22.2    30.0    10.9 
Salamanca       33.9    33.7    13.3 
Barcelona       15.1    38.2     7.3 
Girona           5.4    14.3     1.9 
Cáceres         15.3    36.8    10.5 
NAVARRA         26.7    25.4     5.2 
Cuenca          11.7    22.2     8.7 
Guadalajara     14.8    22.8     8.3 
Toledo          25.8    38.8     7.4 
CAST.-LEON                           
Avila           81.4    64.0    28.2 
Burgos          27.6    30.1     9.8 
León            20.7    30.0     8.3 
Palencia        24.5    16.3    13.3 
Segovia         44.7    15.8    12.7 
Soria           20.8    20.1     7.7 
Valladolid      45.2    37.7     9.7 
Zamora          35.0    34.6    12.7 
CATALUNYA                            
Lleida           7.4    14.8     2.9 
Tarragona       12.5    20.5     3.2 
C.VALENCIANA                         
Alicante        42.6    30.4     4.7 
Castellón       14.8    24.6     8.5 
Valencia        19.7    30.6     5.5 
EXTREMADURA                          
Badajoz         16.6    40.0     6.1 
GALICIA                              
A Coruña        16.9    15.1     2.0 
Lugo            12.5    18.2     3.2 
Ourense         11.6    14.9     2.4 
Pontevedra      20.0    10.0     2.5 
MADRID          19.8    41.9    11.0 
MURCIA          17.5    15.4    10.0 
BASQUE COUNTRY                              
Alava           13.5    35.6     5.9 
Guipúzcoa       22.4    17.6     2.6 
Vizcaya         36.3    29.0     6.4 
LA RIOJA        27.9    34.7    10.3 
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Table A III.39 CDS voters opting for abstention: Ecol Percentages 
 
               82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96    
ANDALUCIA                                    
Almería         34.5    47.1    33.0    56.5 
Cádiz           40.3    46.4    34.9    39.1 
Córdoba         38.9    33.3    24.1    46.7 
Granada         37.9    32.2    27.3    47.4 
Huelva          43.2    40.2    38.1    58.4 
Jaén            38.1    30.4    22.7    39.0 
Málaga          36.1    40.8    30.0    47.8 
Sevilla         36.4    48.9    28.2    35.2 
ARAGON                                       
Huesca          35.7    17.5    20.2    45.1 
Teruel          31.0    28.2    27.6    41.0 
Zaragoza        31.9    30.6    26.1    45.8 
ASTURIAS        27.1    22.1    14.9    53.6 
BALEARES        11.3    32.3    13.0    63.1 
CANARIAS                                     
Las Palmas      47.6    14.5    18.5    73.3 
Tenerife        35.5    29.2    19.3    65.8 
Ciudad Real     31.1    35.6    22.2    44.6 
Palencia        25.4    29.1    21.2    34.7 
Valladolid      27.3    27.9    26.2    39.1 
GALICIA                                      
NAVARRA         38.2    40.8    27.9    41.5 
Vizcaya         33.6    30.9    19.5    31.1 
CANTABRIA       28.1    13.4    17.2    25.0 
CAST.-MANCHA                                 
Albacete        30.2    27.4    27.7    45.2 
Cuenca          37.4    26.3    21.2    36.0 
Guadalajara     29.4    25.4    20.5    33.7 
Toledo          39.5    21.3    15.2    31.2 
CAST.-LEON                                   
Avila           13.3    17.1    11.2    25.6 
Burgos          29.0    26.6    21.3    34.7 
León            26.9    24.0    21.3    43.7 
Salamanca       26.4    20.0    18.5    35.7 
Segovia         22.1    23.3    21.2    21.7 
Soria           26.2    33.4    29.5    34.6 
Zamora          24.7    23.1    21.5    39.2 
CATALUNYA                                    
Barcelona       48.9    26.2    20.2    35.7 
Girona          44.0    49.8    30.8    44.5 
Lleida          53.7    45.7    35.7    49.8 
Tarragona       39.2    36.7    35.8    46.5 
C.VALENCIANA                                 
Alicante        32.3    28.3    14.1    40.2 
Castellón       36.6    31.3    19.0    23.3 
Valencia        33.6    25.9    18.4    58.1 
EXTREMADURA                                  
Badajoz         43.6    24.3    16.3    30.0 
Cáceres         36.3    23.9    24.3    35.2 
A Coruña        35.6    38.6    33.2    44.0 
Lugo            44.8    34.2    27.3    35.3 
Ourense         44.7    29.6    24.6    25.2 
Pontevedra      32.2    28.3    16.9    46.7 
MADRID          19.4    20.2    23.1    30.8 
MURCIA          48.6    41.0     9.3    50.3 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                      
Alava           40.8    25.0    21.1    31.4 
Guipúzcoa       40.8    36.9    20.9    32.9 






Table A III.40 CDS voters opting for PCE/IU: Ecol Percentages 
 
               82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96    
Jaén             4.0    10.9     3.2     5.8 
Barcelona        2.8    23.7    19.5    12.3 
Alicante          .8     3.0     1.3     3.7 
ANDALUCIA                                    
Almería          5.6     6.2     2.3     2.4 
Cádiz            1.2     2.2     3.1     2.8 
Córdoba          4.2    18.3     3.5     9.2 
Granada          2.8     5.6     2.3     3.0 
Huelva           1.2     3.5     5.7     3.8 
Málaga           2.8     6.1     3.3     4.5 
Sevilla          1.0     1.4     3.4     1.1 
ARAGON                                       
Huesca           1.3     8.0     4.6    12.8 
Teruel            .9     2.0     2.3     4.8 
Zaragoza         2.8    18.0     6.2    15.0 
ASTURIAS          .3    10.2     5.5     2.5 
BALEARES          .2     1.8      .5     9.1 
CANARIAS                                     
Las Palmas       1.6      .2      .3     4.4 
Tenerife         1.7     1.0      .5     3.3 
CANTABRIA        1.1     2.9     1.2    21.0 
CAST.-MANCHA                                 
Albacete         3.5    10.9     5.7     6.0 
Ciudad Real      1.7    10.8     9.9     6.4 
Cuenca           2.7     4.5     4.3     3.8 
Guadalajara      3.2    13.3    10.9    10.2 
Toledo           3.1     3.3     2.2     5.0 
CAST.-LEON                                   
Avila             .3     2.3      .7     3.2 
Burgos           1.2     7.0     5.3    11.1 
León             1.4     5.6     4.1     3.7 
Palencia         2.4     3.7     3.2     8.1 
Salamanca        2.2     6.7     2.1     5.4 
Segovia          1.5     4.0     3.4    11.6 
Soria            2.8     3.7     6.2    10.3 
Valladolid       2.2    13.5     6.6     8.7 
Zamora           1.9     2.5     1.2     3.8 
CATALUNYA                                    
Girona           1.8     3.4     4.4     4.8 
Lleida           2.0     6.0     5.2     9.4 
Tarragona        2.2     5.9     6.7     7.3 
C.VALENCIANA                                 
Castellón        2.4     7.8     4.5     9.1 
Valencia         3.0    11.4     8.8    11.9 
EXTREMADURA                                  
Badajoz          1.7     4.5     2.3     4.4 
Cáceres          2.1     8.7     5.0    13.5 
GALICIA                                      
A Coruña         3.7     8.9     1.1     6.3 
Lugo              .7     6.4     3.4    14.4 
Ourense          1.0     5.2     3.5    12.3 
Pontevedra        .8     4.3     2.4     3.4 
MADRID           1.4     7.9     4.2     5.4 
MURCIA           3.5    10.5     1.7     6.2 
NAVARRA          1.1     5.0    14.0    16.9 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                      
Alava            1.4     4.7    10.0    26.3 
Guipúzcoa        1.5     6.9    19.5    19.3 
Vizcaya           .6     5.4    17.4    15.3 
LA RIOJA         1.9     8.7     7.8    17.6 
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Table A III.41 CDS voters opting for PSOE: Ecol Percentages 
 
               82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   
ANDALUCIA                                    
Almería          8.5     8.0    12.9     7.9 
Cádiz            1.8     2.4     8.0      .9 
Córdoba         12.7     3.0    15.7     6.8 
Granada          7.9     3.0     3.8     3.3 
Huelva           5.2     3.3    4.4     2.0  
Jaén            20.5     9.6    23.0     6.9 
Málaga          29.0     5.5    15.1      .4 
Sevilla         12.6     3.6    35.9     1.5 
ARAGON                                       
Teruel          13.7     9.7     9.7     9.4 
ASTURIAS        24.4     6.5     6.2    10.8 
Toledo          10.6    17.8    15.2     7.0 
4.4 
Girona           9.2    12.2    17.3    25.3 
Valencia         8.1     6.4    15.8     4.0 
Pontevedra      17.4    35.1    18.6     1.7 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                      
Huesca          12.1    16.5    12.3     9.1 
Zaragoza        16.9     4.0     2.6     5.9 
BALEARES         8.2     5.2     3.1    14.0 
CANARIAS                                     
Las Palmas       8.7    18.8    14.1    11.0 
Tenerife        12.5    19.1    23.3     3.3 
CANTABRIA       15.2    20.4    12.0    19.4 
CAST.-MANCHA                                 
Albacete        21.6    12.1    10.8     8.3 
Ciudad Real     18.5     5.9     8.0     7.2 
Cuenca          20.2    20.2    16.1    15.9 
Guadalajara     27.9    14.8    15.0    12.2 
CAST.-LEON                                   
Avila           .8     3.0     1.4    10.6   
Burgos          21.3     9.7    10.5    10.5 
León            19.5    12.5    25.3     9.5 
Palencia        19.8    11.6     9.2    12.8 
Salamanca       13.3    11.7    12.5    15.9 
Segovia         15.1     9.0    10.6    17.6 
Soria           24.8    15.2    13.1     9.3 
Valladolid       9.3     1.7     5.5     5.7 
Zamora          14.2    16.3     9.2    10.4 
CATALUNYA                                    
Barcelona        3.9     4.5    11.5    1
Lleida          10.6    16.7    15.2    18.2 
Tarragona       11.0    19.6    16.0    25.4 
C.VALENCIANA                                 
Alicante        7.2     9.8    10.3     17.3 
Castellón       22.0    13.1    15.5    27.4 
EXTREMADURA                                  
Badajoz         17.8    13.3    16.1    16.4 
Cáceres         15.7    10.5    11.9    10.1 
GALICIA                                      
A Coruña        20.8    13.0    15.5     2.2 
Lugo            12.8    19.1    10.2     3.9 
Ourense         16.2    19.7    19.5     6.2 
MADRID           3.2     8.3     9.8    2.5  
MURCIA           7.0    14.2    18.4    21.3 
NAVARRA         11.8     6.2    15.5     6.0 
Alava           15.7    15.0    10.6     9.8 
Guipúzcoa       18.5    11.5    34.6    23.8 
Vizcaya          5.7     6.6    22.5    10.2 






Huelva           2.9     3.9    25.5    14.5 
Las Palmas       1.6      .3     6.8     4.5 
Albacete        16.8     7.3    27.4    28.8 
Toledo          13.0     9.1    40.4    39.2 
León            15.9    15.2    23.2    29.4 
Segovia          7.9    38.5    33.1    37.5 
Soria           15.5    19.5    23.1    32.5 
Valladolid       6.8    10.7    32.5    30.8 
CATALUNYA                                    
Tarragona       13.6     6.3    17.9    10.1 
Lugo            15.2     8.2    20.6    15.1 
MURCIA           8.4     3.8    36.1    10.7 
Guipúzcoa        4.2     7.6    10.0    13.2 
Table A III.42 CDS voters opting for AP/PP: Ecol Percentages 
 
               82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96    
ANDALUCIA                                    
Almería         13.4     8.5    34.4    24.7 
Cádiz           37.8     5.4    30.5    44.6 
Córdoba         17.0    14.5    30.4    27.6 
Granada         13.2    16.2    46.4    32.5 
Jaén            17.8     5.5    27.8    33.7 
Málaga              15.5    32.2     9.3 37.6 
Sevilla         25.8    11.3    18.9    46.0 
ARAGON                                       
Huesca          11.4    16.7    17.4    16.6 
Teruel          14.1    12.9    22.9    33.2 
Zaragoza         6.8     5.9    15.1    17.9 
ASTURIAS         8.6     5.2    18.1    22.8 
BALEARES         3.5     8.2    33.1     3.9 
CANARIAS                                     
Tenerife        12.4     3.7    16.3    12.8 
CANTABRIA       14.3    13.2    22.7    18.2 
CAST.-MANCHA                                 
Ciudad Real     16.4     6.0    20.5    28.7 
Cuenca          17.8    18.7    29.5    27.9 
Guadalajara     17.4    10.4    21.3    29.6 
CAST.-LEON                                   
Avila            1.3     6.6    22.9    47.4 
Burgos          11.5    16.2    30.8    29.9 
Palencia        16.6    28.2    25.3    29.2 
Salamanca       13.7    18.1    25.6    34.6 
Zamora          12.2    14.6    27.6    26.9 
Barcelona       14.5     3.3    18.2    28.6 
Girona           8.1     8.6    24.5    17.4 
Lleida           5.1     7.2    21.1    13.4 
C.VALENCIANA                                 
Alicante        10.2    16.9    56.4    14.4 
Castellón        8.8     4.5    34.1    28.4 
Valencia        19.9    12.2    34.9    19.8 
EXTREMADURA                                  
Badajoz         11.1     9.2    43.4    34.8 
Cáceres         14.7     8.3    27.7    31.9 
GALICIA                                      
A Coruña        10.2     7.8    16.4    18.4 
Ourense         14.1    21.0    19.0    14.2 
Pontevedra           7.0    18.9    13.1 24.3 
MADRID          39.7     9.5    30.0    43.3 
NAVARRA          9.1     9.1    15.9    14.6 
BASQUE COUNTRY                                      
Alava            8.4     4.6    13.7    24.5 
Vizcaya         12.3     5.6    17.2    28.2 










                                    Appendix IV 
 
 
Ecol Loyalty Rates and Selected Transition Matrixes for CiU, PNV 





Table A IV.1 Loyal to CiU: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
Barcelona       49.5    56.0    77.9    83.7    82.6    87.0    75.3 
Lleida          22.9    66.2    78.9    76.2    75.3    83.4    72.1 
Tarragona       50.5    60.0    83.9    77.7    76.3    84.4    72.5 
 
 
Table A IV.2 Loyal to PNV: Ecol percentages 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
                                                              
Alava            3.3    52.3    48.1    75.6    90.0    94.2    79.6 
Guipúzcoa       61.3    83.7    65.5    47.0    87.0    90.7    69.7 




Table A IV.4  New voters opting for CiU: Ecol percentages 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
Lleida          10.4    10.9    11.2     8.2    10.3    21.9    17.3 
 
 
Table A IV.3 Loyal to HB: Ecol percentages 
 
               79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96    
Alava           25.0    38.3    61.9    73.8    71.7 
Guipúzcoa       68.3    69.3    77.4    84.8    84.8 
Vizcaya         56.5    70.1    71.5    79.4    77.7 
 
 
CATALUNYA                                                            
Barcelona        5.8     6.1    19.1    21.2    36.3     7.8     8.0 
Girona          17.6    17.7    33.8    11.3    28.4    20.9    21.8 





Table A IV.5 New voters opting for PNV: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
  
Alava            5.1     8.5     5.9      .5     1.3    17.8    13.6 
Guipúzcoa        9.7    23.2     9.3     9.4    12.1    14.8    23.1 
Vizcaya         10.8    28.6     7.5    28.7    30.8    24.4    45.9 
 
 
Table A IV.6 New voters opting for HB: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   
  
Alava            5.3     6.6    13.2      .9     2.1     1.0 
Guipúzcoa        6.9     5.9     6.6     6.8     7.7     3.8 
Vizcaya          7.3    14.2     5.6     8.3     5.6     4.2 
 
 
Table A IV.7 Abstainers opting for CiU: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Barcelona        5.4    17.4     9.0     4.8     3.0     1.7      .7 
Girona          10.2    29.3    27.0    14.8    12.5     9.0     4.6 
Lleida           7.6    17.7    26.0    14.7    18.7    11.3     5.9 
Tarragona        3.5    11.5    13.1     9.7    10.8     5.1     2.9 
 
 
Table A IV.8 CiU voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
Barcelona       20.8    10.9     9.6     3.1     1.3     5.0    10.7  
Girona          24.6    12.7    13.3    11.9     5.4     6.0    10.6  
Lleida          30.0    16.4    13.3    14.6     8.2     7.8    13.2  
Tarragona       21.0     9.6     6.9    11.4     5.5     4.9    12.5  
 
 
Table A IV.9 Abstainers opting for PNV: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
  
Alava           18.1    16.7    24.6     3.2     4.5     6.8     3.0 
Guipúzcoa        9.2    19.3     6.2     3.4     2.6     5.6     7.8 
Vizcaya         19.5    22.4     5.7     4.8     1.9     1.3     7.6 
 
 
Table A IV.10 PNV Voters opting for abstention: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
Alava           34.8    23.4    25.6     8.8     3.5     2.2    14.7 
Guipúzcoa       23.6     6.7    19.9     6.1     4.7     3.9    23.1 






Table A IV.11 Abstainers opting for HB: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   
  
Guipúzcoa       26.6    13.9    10.7     4.6     2.6     3.2 
 
 
               79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
Vizcaya         13.2    12.3     5.9     6.0     9.4    60.4 
 
 
Guipúzcoa         .4      .4      .4      .1      .1      .1      .3 
Alava            9.9     8.3     9.4     5.6     1.8     2.0 
Vizcaya         14.0     6.0     5.3     2.3      .5      .3 
 
Table A IV.12 HB Voters opting for Abstention: Ecol percentages 
  
Alava            8.2    40.3    11.8    11.1    11.3    67.6 





Table A IV.13 PCE/IU voters opting for HB: Ecol percentages 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96    
  
Alava            8.2     9.3     3.9     1.1      .2      .2 
Guipúzcoa        9.2    16.8     3.9     2.0      .3      .1 
Vizcaya          1.8      .5      .5      .3      .0      .0 
 
 
Table A IV. 14 PSOE voters opting for CiU: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
Barcelona         .6      .8      .2      .1      .0      .0      .1   
Girona          15.8     9.6     1.5      .8      .8      .2     1.2   
Lleida           3.2     2.1     2.6      .9      .8      .3     1.2  
Tarragona        4.0     4.9     4.4     3.1     1.3      .7     2.4  
 
Table A IV.15  CiU voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
Barcelona        1.7     2.7      .2      .0      .0      .3      .1 
Girona          11.3     8.8     1.5      .4      .2     1.9      .2 
Lleida          14.3     5.1      .5      .3      .3     1.2      .3 
Tarragona       11.2    13.7     1.6     1.4     1.5     4.3     1.1 
 
Table A IV.16 PNV Voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
Alava           22.5     4.7     1.0      .1      .0      .1      .1 






Table A IV.17 HB Voters opting for PSOE: Ecol percentages 
               79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
Alava           29.8     6.0      .5      .4      .6     1.0 
Guipúzcoa        2.6      .7      .2      .2      .1      .4 
Vizcaya          1.4      .4      .1      .2      .1      .2 
 
 
Table A IV.18 AP/PP voters opting for CiU: Ecol percentages 
 
         
Barcelona       11.7    20.1    21.2     7.8     1.8     2.1      .2  
Girona           7.4    22.7    10.0     5.8     2.5     1.6      .5  
Lleida          10.3     8.7     5.6     5.9     2.3     3.4      .9 
Tarragona        3.6     9.7     7.8     4.2     1.7     2.2      .7 
 
 
Table A IV.19 CiU voters opting for AP/PP: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
Barcelona        2.2    13.8     3.5     1.2     3.6     2.0     1.4 
Girona           1.9     6.1     1.2      .6      .8      .2      .2 
Lleida            .9     3.2     1.3      .4     2.5      .4      .7 
Tarragona        1.0     4.1     1.1      .8     2.8      .7      .7 
 
 
Alava            4.6             4.6     2.4     1.2      .7      .4 
 
Table A IV.20 AP/PP voters opting for PNV: Ecol percentages 
               77-79   79-82   82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96   96-00 
 
  
Guipúzcoa                         .9     1.0      .4      .3      .7  




Table A IV.21 UCD voters opting for CiU: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82   82-86    
Barcelona        6.1    30.1    41.3 
Tarragona         .9    14.1    11.5 
Lleida          13.3     1.2 
 
Girona           5.7    28.7    18.6 
Lleida           5.5    29.4    29.8 
 
 
Table A IV.22 CiU voters opting for UCD: Ecol percentages 
 
               77-79   79-82    
 
Barcelona       17.4     2.2 
Girona           9.8      .6 





















       
 
   
Table A IV.23  CDS voters opting for CiU: Ecol Percentages 
               82-86   86-89   89-93   93-96    
Barcelona        7.6      .5      .5      .3 
Girona          20.4     3.8     4.6     2.7 
Lleida          11.7     2.3     5.9     2.9 
Tarragona       10.6     2.6     4.8     2.4 
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